Slavery and Four Years of War Part 44

General Early, in his report, says twenty guns under Colonel Jones opened fire on this position. General Hays reports his loss, 14 killed, 78 wounded, 13 missing.

Part of the guns left in the earthworks we had abandoned, and the artillery of Colonel Jones now opened on our fortifications. An artillery duel ensued which was maintained until after dark. No other hard fighting occurred on this day, only some slight skirmis.h.i.+ng took place with Gordon's brigade south and with portions of Johnson's division east of Winchester.

The most notable event of the day was the opening fire of a score of artillery pieces in broad daylight from a quarter where no enemy was known to be. Captain Morgan (13th Pennsylvania Cavalry), who was charged with the duty of patrolling the Romney and Pughtown roads, was censured for failing to discover and report the presence of the enemy. In a large sense this censure was unjust. His report, made about 2 P.M., that no enemy was found on these roads or near them, was doubtless then true, yet an hour later Early with three of his brigades reached them about one mile in front of the earthwork occupied by me. At that time Captain Morgan had finished his reconnoissance and returned to camp. There was, however, a lack of vigilance on the part of somebody; possibly General Milroy was not altogether blameless.

As has already been stated, I was not charged with the duty of ascertaining the movements of the enemy; on the contrary, I had been informed that pickets and scouts covered my front. It is the only instance, perhaps, in the war of such a surprise.

The situation of Milroy's command was now critical. He had about 7000 men able for duty, more troops than could be used in the forts or protected by them. Colonel A. T. McReynolds, of the 1st New York Cavalry, who commanded Milroy's Third Brigade at Berryville, some ten miles eastward of us, was attacked on the 13th, and, pursuant to orders, retired, reaching Winchester at 9 P.M. It was certainly known on the 14th that Ewell had at least 20,000 men of all arms, and it was clear that while we might stand an a.s.sault, our artillery ammunition would soon be exhausted, and the surrender of the entire command, if it remained, become inevitable. About 11 A.M. I was present in the princ.i.p.al fort at what was called a council of war, but my opinion was not asked or expressed as to the propriety of undertaking to escape. I ventured, however, to suggest that if a surrender were contemplated, I could take my infantry command out that night, with perhaps others, by the Back Creek or Apple-Pie Ridge road without encountering the enemy, and could safely reach Pennsylvania by keeping well to the west of Martinsburg. It was decided about midnight, however, to spike the guns, abandon all wagons, and all sick and wounded and stores of all kinds, and evacuate Winchester. The teamsters, artillerists, and camp followers were to ride and lead the horses and mules, following closely the armed troops, who were to move at 1 A.M. on the Martinsburg road. If the enemy were encountered, we were to attack him, and, if possible, cut through. The movement did not commence until 2 A.M., and the night was dark. The great body of horses and mules, being ridden by undisciplined men and unused to riders, fell into great confusion as they crowded on the pike close on the heels of the infantry. The mules brayed a chorus seldom heard, and as if prompted by a malicious desire to notify the enemy of our departure. My regiment was in the advance on the turnpike.

Milroy did not accompany the head of the column. Elliott was, however, with it a portion of the time. When we had proceeded about three miles the familiar _chuck_ of the hubs of artillery wheels was heard to the eastward, and it soon became apparent the enemy was moving towards the pike, intending to strike it on our front. Some of our troops were then moving on a line parallel with the pike, eastward of it. When the head of the column had proceeded about four miles, and as it approached Stephenson's Depot (located a short distance east of the Martinsburg pike), firing in a desultory way commenced on my right and soon extended along a line obliquely towards one front. The column was moved by the flank to the left, at right angles with the road, my regiment being followed by the 122d Ohio Regiment. A line of battle was formed with these regiments in the darkness, and skirmishers thrown forward. The line advanced northward, feeling for the enemy, but it was soon halted, and the troops were again moved by the flank. My regiment, being on the left, again took the advance, keeping about one hundred yards westward of the pike. I had been informed that the whole army was to follow and share our fate. When about five miles from Winchester, and when the head of the column was about west of the Depot named, some straggling shots notified us that the enemy were on the pike near us. I halted and faced the men in line of battle towards the pike, and, though still dark, a personal investigation revealed the fact that the Confederates were in confusion, and the commands they were giving indicated also that they were greatly excited.

I found Elliott some distance in the rear, and obtained his consent to charge them. Colonel Wm. H. Ball, with the 122d Ohio, was requested to support me on the right. My command charged rapidly across the road without firing. It fortunately struck the enemy's flank. We took a few prisoners and drove the enemy's right through the woods for about two hundred yards and upon his approaching artillery. Our line then halted and opened fire into the enemy's ranks, causing great confusion and killing and wounding large numbers. A battery now opened upon us, but this we soon silenced by killing or driving away its gunners. The enemy retreated for protection to a railroad cut,(13) and the woods were cleared in my front, but my right was unprotected, and at this juncture a considerable force of infantry and two pieces of artillery threatened that flank. I withdrew a short distance, changed direction to the right, and again advanced. Colonel Ball came up gallantly with his regiment on my right, and in twenty minutes our front was cleared, the enemy's guns silenced, the gunners shot down or driven away, and the artillery horses killed. We were only prevented from taking possession of the guns by the appearance of another and larger body of the enemy on our right. Daylight was now approaching.

Without waiting the enemy's fire, I ordered both my regiments withdrawn, which was effected in good order, to the west of the pike. The enemy at once reoccupied the woods in our front in superior force, but obviously without a good battle-line. Again I ordered the two regiments to a charge, which was splendidly responded to, although a promised attack in our support was not made. Elliott I did not see or receive any order from after the battle began. Milroy was trying to maintain the fight nearer Winchester, to the east of the pike, and he gave no order that reached me.

After a conflict in which the two lines were engaged in places not twenty feet apart, the enemy gave way, and our line advanced to his artillery, shooting and driving the gunners from their pieces and completely silencing them, the Confederates again taking refuge in the railroad cut. I could learn nothing of the progress of the fight at other points, and could hear no firing, save occasional shots in the direction of Winchester. I concluded the object of the attack was accomplished so far as possible, and that the non- combatants had had time to escape. It was now day-dawn, and we could not hope to further surprise the enemy or long operate on his flank. About 5 A.M., therefore, I ordered the whole line withdrawn from the woods, and resumed the march northward along the Martinsburg road. I was soon joined by Generals Milroy and Elliott and by members of their staffs, but with few men. Milroy had personally led a charge with the 87th Pennsylvania and had a horse shot under him, but there was no concert of action in the conduct of the battle. Colonel Wm. G. Ely and a part of the brigade he commanded were captured between Stephenson's Depot and Winchester, having done little fighting, and a portion of McReynolds' brigade shared the same fate.

The cavalry became panic-stricken and, commingling with the mules and horses on which teamsters and others were mounted, all in great disorder took wildly to the hills and mountains to the northwest, followed by infantry in somewhat better order; the mules brayed, the horses neighed, the teamsters and riders indulged in much vigorous profanity, but the most of the retreating ma.s.s reached b.l.o.o.d.y Run, Pennsylvania, marching _via_ Sir John's Run, Hanc.o.c.k, and Bath. Citizens on Apple-Pie Ridge who witnessed the wild scene describe it as a veritable bedlam.(14)

Captain Z. Baird, of Milroy's staff, who joined me while engaged in the night fight in the woods, but who was under the erroneous impression Elliott had ordered the attack, in his testimony before the Milroy Court of Inquiry, gives this account of the engagement:

"General Elliott ordered Colonel Keifer with the 110th Ohio to proceed into the woods. The order was promptly obeyed. As soon as the regiment reached the woods, a severe firing of musketry occurred. General Elliott remarked to me that the enemy must be there in force, and that the 110th should be immediately supported by the 122d Ohio. I volunteered to deliver the order to Colonel Ball of the 122d Ohio, and to guide him to the woods, so as to place him on the right flank of the 110th Ohio, and to avoid shooting our own men by mistake. The 122d Ohio arrived on the right flank of the 110th in tolerably good order, and immediately commenced firing. Both regiments then advanced, and drove the enemy out of the woods. There were indications of a surprise to the enemy by the suddenness of their attack. They took one of their caissons or pa.s.sed it. We could look into their camp and see that their artillery horses were ungovernable. We were so close that we could hear the orders given by their officers in endeavoring to restore order. The fire of the enemy, though rapid, went over us, both of small arms and artillery. As we progressed, we saw evidences from the wounded and slain of the enemy that our fire had been efficient.

After this contest had lasted perhaps an hour Colonel Keifer requested me to return to the rear and learn what dispositions were going on on the right to sustain Colonel Ball and himself. I complied with his order. When I arrived at the rear, I noticed the 87th Pennsylvania, the 18th Connecticut, and the 123d Ohio advancing on the right in line of battle, under the immediate command of Colonel Ely of the 18th Connecticut. General Milroy was also present, but dismounted, his horse being, as I supposed, disabled. He was engaged in changing horses. Without reporting to General Milroy, as I now recollect, I returned with all possible expedition to Colonel Keifer, to notify him of the support which he was about to have on the right. I supposed at the time that from the effect of the fire of the 110th and 122d Ohio, that when Colonel Ely with his force attacked on the right we would rout them. I met, however, the 110th and 122d Ohio falling back. The officers were so busy in preserving order that I could not communicate with them. After we had fallen back to the Martinsburg road, I saw Generals Milroy and Elliott. I was informed by the former that the retreat was again in progress."(15)

Colonel Wm. H. Ball (122d Ohio), in his official report speaks of the fight thus:

"I was ordered to follow the 110th Ohio Volunteer Infantry, which had been moved off the field some time before, and was out of sight.

The regiments being so separated, I did not engage the enemy as soon as the 110th. I formed on the right of the 110th Ohio Volunteer Infantry, and the two regiments advanced within the skirt of the woods and engaged the enemy, who occupied the woods with infantry and artillery. After a sharp action, the line was advanced at least 100 yards and to within twenty paces of the enemy's artillery, where a terrible fire was maintained for fifteen or twenty minutes by both parties. The artillery was driven back over 100 yards, and for a time silenced by the fire of our rifles. By order of Colonel Keifer the two regiments then retreated beyond the range of the enemy's infantry, reformed, and again advanced within the woods, and, after a sharp engagement, retreated, by order of Colonel Keifer, the enemy then moving on our flank."

The contemplated attack by Colonel Ely and others was not made.

We marched _via_ Smithfield (Wizzard's Clip), Charlestown, and Halltown, and reached Harper's Ferry about 3 P.M., having marched thirty-five miles and fought two hours on the way.

Berryville, held by McReynolds' brigade of Milroy's command, was taken by Rodes' division of five brigades on the 13th of June; Bunker Hill, on the direct road to Martinsburg from Winchester, was occupied by the enemy early the morning of the 14th; and Martinsburg was taken (all by the same division) the evening of that day. General Daniel Tyler and Colonel B. F. Smith (126th Ohio), with a small command of infantry and cavalry and one battery, made a gallant stand for a few hours, to enable their baggage and supply trains, escorted by a small number of cavalry, to escape _via_ Williamsport. A portion of the battery was captured, but Tyler and Smith's troops retreated on Shepherdstown, thence to Harper's Ferry.

We pursued, in the retreat from Stephenson's Depot, the only possible route then open to us to Harper's Ferry. About 2000 men of all arms reached Harper's Ferry with us, and others straggled in later.

But much the larger part of Milroy's command escaped with the animals to Pennsylvania; 2700 soldiers a.s.sembled at b.l.o.o.d.y Run alone. The losses in captured, including the sick and wounded left in hospital, and the wounded left on the field, were about 3000.

The losses in my command, considering the desperate nature of the fighting, were small, and but few of my officers and soldiers, fit for duty and not wounded in battle, were captured. Lieutenants T.

J. Weakley and C. M. Gross, through neglect of the officer of the day, were left on picket near Winchester, with 60 men of the 110th Ohio, and, consequently captured. The surgeons, with their a.s.sistants, were left at the hospital and on the field in charge of the sick and wounded. Chaplain McCabe remained to a.s.sist in the care of the wounded left on the battle-field. The enemy's loss in killed and wounded much exceeded the Union loss on each of the three days' fighting. I was bruised by a spent ball on the 13th, and slightly wounded by a musket fired by a soldier not ten feet from me near the close of the fight at the earthwork on the 14th, and my horse was shot under me in the night engagement at Stephenson's Depot. We fought the best of the troops of Lee's army. General Edward Johnson's division of Ewell's corps, in the night engagement, consisted of Stewart, Nicholl, and Walker's (Stonewall) brigades.

Johnson was censured for not having reached and covered the Martinsburg road earlier in the night of the 14th of June. He reported his command in a critical situation for a time after our attack upon it; that "two sets of cannoniers (13 out of 16) were killed or disabled."(16)

The war furnishes no parallel to the fighting at Winchester, and there is no instance of the war where a comparatively small force, after being practically surrounded by a greatly superior one, cut its way out.

Johnson's division was so roughly handled on the morning of the 15th that it did not pursue us, nor was it ordered to march again until some time the next day. The plan of Lee was for Ewell's corps to push forward rapidly into Pennsylvania. His delay at Winchester postponed Lee's giving the order to Ewell "to take Harrisburg" until June 21st.(17) The loss of three or more days at Winchester most likely saved Pennsylvania's capital from capture.

The disaster to the Union arms at Winchester was, by General Halleck, charged upon General Milroy, and General Schneck was ordered by Halleck to place Milroy in arrest. In August, 1863, a Court of Inquiry convened at Was.h.i.+ngton to investigate and report upon Milroy's conduct and the evacuation of Winchester. Schenck's action in relation to the matter was also drawn in question. The court was in session twenty-seven days, heard many witnesses, including Generals Schenck and Milroy, and had before it a ma.s.s of orders and dispatches. I was a known friend of Milroy, hence was not called against him, and he did not have me summoned because I had differed so radically with him as to the necessity of evacuating Winchester. The testimony, while doing me ample justice, did not disclose much of the information communicated by me to Milroy, nor my views with respect to the judgment displayed by him in a great emergency. Milroy and his friends maintained, with much force, that his holding Winchester for about three days delayed, for that time or longer, Lee's advance into Pennsylvania, and thus saved Harrisburg from capture, and gave the Army of the Potomac time to reach Gettysburg, and there force Lee to concentrate his army and fight an unsuccessful battle. The Court of Inquiry made no formal report, but Judge-Advocate-General Holt reviewed the testimony, and reached conclusions generally exonerating Milroy from the charge of disobedience of orders and misconduct during the evacuation, but reflecting somewhat on Schenck for not positively ordering the place evacuated. President Lincoln made a characteristic indors.e.m.e.nt on this record, not unfavorable to either Schenck or Milroy, concluding with this paragraph:

"Serious blame is not necessarily due to any serious disaster, and I cannot say that in this case any of the officers are deserving of serious blame. No court-martial is deemed necessary or proper in this case."(18)

Halleck did not, however, cease in his hostility to Milroy, and not until in the last months of the war did the "Gray Eagle" have another command in the field. He was a rashly-brave and patriotic man, and his whole heart was in the Union cause. In battle he risked his own person unnecessarily and without exercising a proper supervision over his entire command. He died at Olympia, Was.h.i.+ngton, March 29, 1890, when seventy-five years of age. The colored people of America should erect a monument to his memory. He was their friend when to be so drew upon him much adverse criticism.

( 1) _Mana.s.sas to Appomattox_ (Longstreet), pp. 242, 257, 401.

( 2) _Ibid_., 263.

( 3) _Abraham Lincoln_ (Nicolay and Hay), vol. vi., p. 159.

( 4) In letters, dated in May, 1863, to Col. Wm. S. Furay (then a correspondent (Y. S.) of the Cincinnati _Gazette_ with Rosecrans'

army in Tennessee, I detailed the general plan of Lee's advance northward, and gave the date when the movement would commence.

( 5) _War Records_, vol. xxvii., Part III., p. 36.

( 6) _War Records_, vol. xxvii., Part II., p. 125. Piatt, June 11th, wired Schenck from Winchester, after inspecting the place, that Milroy "can whip anything the rebels can fetch here."--_Ibid_., p. 161.

( 7) _War Records_, vol. xxvii., Part II., pp. 130-7, 159-81.

( 8) A few days before this event I peremptorily ordered all officers' wives and citizens visiting in my command to go North, but the ladies held an indignation meeting and waited on General Milroy, with the request that he countermand my order, which he did, at the same time saying something about my being too apprehensive of danger. I had the pleasure of meeting and greeting these same ladies in Was.h.i.+ngton, July 5th, on their arrival from Winchester _via_ Staunton, Richmond, _Castle-Thunder_, the James and Potomac Rivers.

( 9) _War Records_, Early's Rep., vol. xxvii., Part II., p. 460.

(10) His son, Major Hugh H. Gordon, served efficiently on my staff in Florida, Georgia, and Cuba (Spanish War), as did Captain J. E.

B. Stuart, son of the great Confederate cavalry General; also Major John Gary Evans (ex-Governor South Carolina), and others closely related to distinguished Confederate officers. See Appendix F.

(11) _War Records_, vol. xxvii., Part II., p. 491.

(12) _War Records_, vol. xxvii., Part II., p. 46.

(13) General Johnson's Report (Confederate), _War Records_, vol.

xxvii., Part II., p. 501.

(14) An orderly who attempted to carry on horseback a valise containing papers, etc., of mine, threw it way in a field as he rode into the mountains. A Quakeress, Miss Mary Lupton, witnessed the act from her home, and found the valise and returned it to me with all its contents, after the battle of Opequon, Sept. 19, 1864.

(15) _War Records_, vol. xxvii., Part II., p. 136.

(16) _War Records_, vol. xxvii., Part II., pp. 501-2.

(17) _Ibid_., p. 443.

(18) _War Records_, vol. xxvii., Part II., pp. 88-197.

CHAPTER II Invasion of Pennsylvania--Campaign and Battle of Gettysburg--Lee's Retreat Across the Potomac, and Losses in Both Armies

At Harper's Ferry, June 16th, I was a.s.signed to command a brigade under General W. H. French, a regular officer. General Joseph Hooker, in command of the Army of the Potomac, June 25th, ordered French to be ready to march at a moment's notice. French took position on Maryland Heights, where, June 27th, Hooker visited him and gave him orders to prepare to evacuate both the Heights and Harper's Ferry. French had under him there about 10,000 effective men. Halleck, on being notified of Hooker's purpose to evacuate these places and to unite French's command with the Army of the Potomac for the impending battle, countermanded Hooker's order; thereupon the latter, by telegram from Sandy Hook, requested to be relieved from the command of that army. His request being persisted in, he was, on June 28th, relieved, and Major-General George G.

Meade was, by the President, a.s.signed to succeed him. Meade, also feeling in need of reinforcements, on the same day asked permission to order French, with his forces, to join him. Halleck, though placing French under Meade's command, did not consent to this.

French, however, with all his troops (save my brigade), under orders from Was.h.i.+ngton, abandoned Harper's Ferry and Maryland Heights, and became a corps of observation to operate in the vicinity of Frederick, Maryland, in the rear of the Army of the Potomac. And though no enemy was threatening, nor likely to do so soon, I was ordered to dismantle the fortified heights, load the guns and stores on Chesapeake and Ohio Ca.n.a.l boats, and escort them to Was.h.i.+ngton, repairing the ca.n.a.l and locks on the way. This work was done thoroughly, and we arrived with a fleet of twenty-six boats in Was.h.i.+ngton shortly after midnight, July 4, 1863. It was my first visit to that city.

Under orders from Halleck, I started on the 6th, by rail, to reoccupy Harper's Ferry, but was stopped by Meade at Frederick, and there again reported to French. French had been a.s.signed to command the Third Army Corps (to succeed General Daniel E. Sickles, wounded at Gettysburg), and his late command became the Third Division of that corps, under Elliott; my brigade, consisting of the 110th and 122d Ohio, 6th Maryland, and 138th Pennsylvania Infantry regiments, became the Second Brigade of this division. This brigade (with, later, three regiments added) was not broken up during the war, and was generally known as "_Keifer's Brigade_."

It is not my purpose to attempt to write the full story of the battle of Gettysburg, the greatest, measured by the results, of the many great battles of the war. Gettysburg marks the high tide of the Rebellion. From it dates the certain downfall of the Confederacy, though nearly two years of war followed, and more blood was spilled after Lee sullenly commenced his retreat from the heights of Gettysburg than before.

About this stage of the war, President Lincoln took an active interest in the movements of the armies, although he generally refrained from absolutely directing them in the field. It was not unusual for army commanders to appeal to him for opinions as to military movements, and he was free in making suggestions, volunteering to take the responsibility if they were adopted and his plans miscarried. Hooker, in an elaborate dispatch (June 15th) relating to the antic.i.p.ated movements of Lee's army from the Rappahannock to the northward, said: