The New Physics and Its Evolution Part 1

The New Physics and Its Evolution.

by Lucien Poincare.

Prefatory Note

M. Lucien Poincare is one of the distinguished family of mathematicians which has during the last few years given a Minister of Finance to the Republic and a President to the Academie des Sciences. He is also one of the nineteen Inspectors-General of Public Instruction who are charged with the duty of visiting the different universities and _lycees_ in France and of reporting upon the state of the studies there pursued. Hence he is in an excellent position to appreciate at its proper value the extraordinary change which has lately revolutionized physical science, while his official position has kept him aloof from the controversies aroused by the discovery of radium and by recent speculations on the const.i.tution of matter.

M. Poincare's object and method in writing the book are sufficiently explained in the preface which follows; but it may be remarked that the best of methods has its defects, and the excessive condensation which has alone made it possible to include the last decade's discoveries in physical science within a compa.s.s of some 300 pages has, perhaps, made the facts here noted a.s.similable with difficulty by the untrained reader. To remedy this as far as possible, I have prefixed to the present translation a table of contents so extended as to form a fairly complete digest of the book, while full indexes of authors and subjects have also been added. The few notes necessary either for better elucidation of the terms employed, or for giving account of discoveries made while these pages were pa.s.sing through the press, may be distinguished from the author's own by the signature "ED."

THE EDITOR.

Author's Preface

During the last ten years so many works have acc.u.mulated in the domain of Physics, and so many new theories have been propounded, that those who follow with interest the progress of science, and even some professed scholars, absorbed as they are in their own special studies, find themselves at sea in a confusion more apparent than real.

It has therefore occurred to me that it might be useful to write a book which, while avoiding too great insistence on purely technical details, should try to make known the general results at which physicists have lately arrived, and to indicate the direction and import which should be ascribed to those speculations on the const.i.tution of matter, and the discussions on the nature of first principles, to which it has become, so to speak, the fas.h.i.+on of the present day to devote oneself.

I have endeavoured throughout to rely only on the experiments in which we can place the most confidence, and, above all, to show how the ideas prevailing at the present day have been formed, by tracing their evolution, and rapidly examining the successive transformations which have brought them to their present condition.

In order to understand the text, the reader will have no need to consult any treatise on physics, for I have throughout given the necessary definitions and set forth the fundamental facts.

Moreover, while strictly employing exact expressions, I have avoided the use of mathematical language. Algebra is an admirable tongue, but there are many occasions where it can only be used with much discretion.

Nothing would be easier than to point out many great omissions from this little volume; but some, at all events, are not involuntary.

Certain questions which are still too confused have been put on one side, as have a few others which form an important collection for a special study to be possibly made later. Thus, as regards electrical phenomena, the relations between electricity and optics, as also the theories of ionization, the electronic hypothesis, etc., have been treated at some length; but it has not been thought necessary to dilate upon the modes of production and utilization of the current, upon the phenomena of magnetism, or upon all the applications which belong to the domain of Electrotechnics.

L. POINCARe.

CHAPTER I

THE EVOLUTION OF PHYSICS

The now numerous public which tries with some success to keep abreast of the movement in science, from seeing its mental habits every day upset, and from occasionally witnessing unexpected discoveries that produce a more lively sensation from their reaction on social life, is led to suppose that we live in a really exceptional epoch, scored by profound crises and ill.u.s.trated by extraordinary discoveries, whose singularity surpa.s.ses everything known in the past. Thus we often hear it said that physics, in particular, has of late years undergone a veritable revolution; that all its principles have been made new, that all the edifices constructed by our fathers have been overthrown, and that on the field thus cleared has sprung up the most abundant harvest that has ever enriched the domain of science.

It is in fact true that the crop becomes richer and more fruitful, thanks to the development of our laboratories, and that the quant.i.ty of seekers has considerably increased in all countries, while their quality has not diminished. We should be sustaining an absolute paradox, and at the same time committing a crying injustice, were we to contest the high importance of recent progress, and to seek to diminish the glory of contemporary physicists. Yet it may be as well not to give way to exaggerations, however pardonable, and to guard against facile illusions. On closer examination it will be seen that our predecessors might at several periods in history have conceived, as legitimately as ourselves, similar sentiments of scientific pride, and have felt that the world was about to appear to them transformed and under an aspect until then absolutely unknown.

Let us take an example which is salient enough; for, however arbitrary the conventional division of time may appear to a physicist's eyes, it is natural, when inst.i.tuting a comparison between two epochs, to choose those which extend over a s.p.a.ce of half a score of years, and are separated from each other by the gap of a century. Let us, then, go back a hundred years and examine what would have been the state of mind of an erudite amateur who had read and understood the chief publications on physical research between 1800 and 1810.

Let us suppose that this intelligent and attentive spectator witnessed in 1800 the discovery of the galvanic battery by Volta. He might from that moment have felt a presentiment that a prodigious transformation was about to occur in our mode of regarding electrical phenomena.

Brought up in the ideas of Coulomb and Franklin, he might till then have imagined that electricity had unveiled nearly all its mysteries, when an entirely original apparatus suddenly gave birth to applications of the highest interest, and excited the blossoming of theories of immense philosophical extent.

In the treatises on physics published a little later, we find traces of the astonishment produced by this sudden revelation of a new world.

"Electricity," wrote the Abbe Hauy, "enriched by the labour of so many distinguished physicists, seemed to have reached the term when a science has no further important steps before it, and only leaves to those who cultivate it the hope of confirming the discoveries of their predecessors, and of casting a brighter light on the truths revealed.

One would have thought that all researches for diversifying the results of experiment were exhausted, and that theory itself could only be augmented by the addition of a greater degree of precision to the applications of principles already known. While science thus appeared to be making for repose, the phenomena of the convulsive movements observed by Galvani in the muscles of a frog when connected by metal were brought to the attention and astonishment of physicists.... Volta, in that Italy which had been the cradle of the new knowledge, discovered the principle of its true theory in a fact which reduces the explanation of all the phenomena in question to the simple contact of two substances of different nature. This fact became in his hands the germ of the admirable apparatus to which its manner of being and its fecundity a.s.sign one of the chief places among those with which the genius of mankind has enriched physics."

Shortly afterwards, our amateur would learn that Carlisle and Nicholson had decomposed water by the aid of a battery; then, that Davy, in 1803, had produced, by the help of the same battery, a quite unexpected phenomenon, and had succeeded in preparing metals endowed with marvellous properties, beginning with substances of an earthy appearance which had been known for a long time, but whose real nature had not been discovered.

In another order of ideas, surprises as prodigious would wait for our amateur. Commencing with 1802, he might have read the admirable series of memoirs which Young then published, and might thereby have learned how the study of the phenomena of diffraction led to the belief that the undulation theory, which, since the works of Newton seemed irretrievably condemned, was, on the contrary, beginning quite a new life. A little later--in 1808--he might have witnessed the discovery made by Malus of polarization by reflexion, and would have been able to note, no doubt with stupefaction, that under certain conditions a ray of light loses the property of being reflected.

He might also have heard of one Rumford, who was then promulgating very singular ideas on the nature of heat, who thought that the then cla.s.sical notions might be false, that caloric does not exist as a fluid, and who, in 1804, even demonstrated that heat is created by friction. A few years later he would learn that Charles had enunciated a capital law on the dilatation of gases; that Pierre Prevost, in 1809, was making a study, full of original ideas, on radiant heat. In the meantime he would not have failed to read volumes iii. and iv. of the _Mecanique celeste_ of Laplace, published in 1804 and 1805, and he might, no doubt, have thought that before long mathematics would enable physical science to develop with unforeseen safety.

All these results may doubtless be compared in importance with the present discoveries. When strange metals like pota.s.sium and sodium were isolated by an entirely new method, the astonishment must have been on a par with that caused in our time by the magnificent discovery of radium. The polarization of light is a phenomenon as undoubtedly singular as the existence of the X rays; and the upheaval produced in natural philosophy by the theories of the disintegration of matter and the ideas concerning electrons is probably not more considerable than that produced in the theories of light and heat by the works of Young and Rumford.

If we now disentangle ourselves from contingencies, it will be understood that in reality physical science progresses by evolution rather than by revolution. Its march is continuous. The facts which our theories enable us to discover, subsist and are linked together long after these theories have disappeared. Out of the materials of former edifices overthrown, new dwellings are constantly being reconstructed.

The labour of our forerunners never wholly perishes. The ideas of yesterday prepare for those of to-morrow; they contain them, so to speak, _in potentia_. Science is in some sort a living organism, which gives birth to an indefinite series of new beings taking the places of the old, and which evolves according to the nature of its environment, adapting itself to external conditions, and healing at every step the wounds which contact with reality may have occasioned.

Sometimes this evolution is rapid, sometimes it is slow enough; but it obeys the ordinary laws. The wants imposed by its surroundings create certain organs in science. The problems set to physicists by the engineer who wishes to facilitate transport or to produce better illumination, or by the doctor who seeks to know how such and such a remedy acts, or, again, by the physiologist desirous of understanding the mechanism of the gaseous and liquid exchanges between the cell and the outer medium, cause new chapters in physics to appear, and suggest researches adapted to the necessities of actual life.

The evolution of the different parts of physics does not, however, take place with equal speed, because the circ.u.mstances in which they are placed are not equally favourable. Sometimes a whole series of questions will appear forgotten, and will live only with a languis.h.i.+ng existence; and then some accidental circ.u.mstance suddenly brings them new life, and they become the object of manifold labours, engross public attention, and invade nearly the whole domain of science.

We have in our own day witnessed such a spectacle. The discovery of the X rays--a discovery which physicists no doubt consider as the logical outcome of researches long pursued by a few scholars working in silence and obscurity on an otherwise much neglected subject-- seemed to the public eye to have inaugurated a new era in the history of physics. If, as is the case, however, the extraordinary scientific movement provoked by Rontgen's sensational experiments has a very remote origin, it has, at least, been singularly quickened by the favourable conditions created by the interest aroused in its astonis.h.i.+ng applications to radiography.

A lucky chance has thus hastened an evolution already taking place, and theories previously outlined have received a singular development.

Without wis.h.i.+ng to yield too much to what may be considered a whim of fas.h.i.+on, we cannot, if we are to note in this book the stage actually reached in the continuous march of physics, refrain from giving a clearly preponderant place to the questions suggested by the study of the new radiations. At the present time it is these questions which move us the most; they have shown us unknown horizons, and towards the fields recently opened to scientific activity the daily increasing crowd of searchers rushes in rather disorderly fas.h.i.+on.

One of the most interesting consequences of the recent discoveries has been to rehabilitate in the eyes of scholars, speculations relating to the const.i.tution of matter, and, in a more general way, metaphysical problems. Philosophy has, of course, never been completely separated from science; but in times past many physicists dissociated themselves from studies which they looked upon as unreal word-squabbles, and sometimes not unreasonably abstained from joining in discussions which seemed to them idle and of rather puerile subtlety. They had seen the ruin of most of the systems built up _a priori_ by daring philosophers, and deemed it more prudent to listen to the advice given by Kirchhoff and "to subst.i.tute the description of facts for a sham explanation of nature."

It should however be remarked that these physicists somewhat deceived themselves as to the value of their caution, and that the mistrust they manifested towards philosophical speculations did not preclude their admitting, unknown to themselves, certain axioms which they did not discuss, but which are, properly speaking, metaphysical conceptions. They were unconsciously speaking a language taught them by their predecessors, of which they made no attempt to discover the origin. It is thus that it was readily considered evident that physics must necessarily some day re-enter the domain of mechanics, and thence it was postulated that everything in nature is due to movement. We, further, accepted the principles of the cla.s.sical mechanics without discussing their legitimacy.

This state of mind was, even of late years, that of the most ill.u.s.trious physicists. It is manifested, quite sincerely and without the slightest reserve, in all the cla.s.sical works devoted to physics.

Thus Verdet, an ill.u.s.trious professor who has had the greatest and most happy influence on the intellectual formation of a whole generation of scholars, and whose works are even at the present day very often consulted, wrote: "The true problem of the physicist is always to reduce all phenomena to that which seems to us the simplest and clearest, that is to say, to movement." In his celebrated course of lectures at l'ecole Polytechnique, Jamin likewise said: "Physics will one day form a chapter of general mechanics;" and in the preface to his excellent course of lectures on physics, M. Violle, in 1884, thus expresses himself: "The science of nature tends towards mechanics by a necessary evolution, the physicist being able to establish solid theories only on the laws of movement." The same idea is again met with in the words of Cornu in 1896: "The general tendency should be to show how the facts observed and the phenomena measured, though first brought together by empirical laws, end, by the impulse of successive progressions, in coming under the general laws of rational mechanics;"

and the same physicist showed clearly that in his mind this connexion of phenomena with mechanics had a deep and philosophical reason, when, in the fine discourse p.r.o.nounced by him at the opening ceremony of the Congres de Physique in 1900, he exclaimed: "The mind of Descartes soars over modern physics, or rather, I should say, he is their luminary. The further we penetrate into the knowledge of natural phenomena, the clearer and the more developed becomes the bold Cartesian conception regarding the mechanism of the universe. There is nothing in the physical world but matter and movement."

If we adopt this conception, we are led to construct mechanical representations of the material world, and to imagine movements in the different parts of bodies capable of reproducing all the manifestations of nature. The kinematic knowledge of these movements, that is to say, the determination of the position, speed, and acceleration at a given moment of all the parts of the system, or, on the other hand, their dynamical study, enabling us to know what is the action of these parts on each other, would then be sufficient to enable us to foretell all that can occur in the domain of nature.

This was the great thought clearly expressed by the Encyclopaedists of the eighteenth century; and if the necessity of interpreting the phenomena of electricity or light led the physicists of last century to imagine particular fluids which seemed to obey with some difficulty the ordinary rules of mechanics, these physicists still continued to retain their hope in the future, and to treat the idea of Descartes as an ideal to be reached sooner or later.

Certain scholars--particularly those of the English School--outrunning experiment, and pus.h.i.+ng things to extremes, took pleasure in proposing very curious mechanical models which were often strange images of reality. The most ill.u.s.trious of them, Lord Kelvin, may be considered as their representative type, and he has himself said: "It seems to me that the true sense of the question, Do we or do we not understand a particular subject in physics? is--Can we make a mechanical model which corresponds to it? I am never satisfied so long as I have been unable to make a mechanical model of the object. If I am able to do so, I understand it. If I cannot make such a model, I do not understand it." But it must be acknowledged that some of the models thus devised have become excessively complicated, and this complication has for a long time discouraged all but very bold minds.

In addition, when it became a question of penetrating into the mechanism of molecules, and we were no longer satisfied to look at matter as a ma.s.s, the mechanical solutions seemed undetermined and the stability of the edifices thus constructed was insufficiently demonstrated.

Returning then to our starting-point, many contemporary physicists wish to subject Descartes' idea to strict criticism. From the philosophical point of view, they first enquire whether it is really demonstrated that there exists nothing else in the knowable than matter and movement. They ask themselves whether it is not habit and tradition in particular which lead us to ascribe to mechanics the origin of phenomena. Perhaps also a question of sense here comes in.

Our senses, which are, after all, the only windows open towards external reality, give us a view of one side of the world only; evidently we only know the universe by the relations which exist between it and our organisms, and these organisms are peculiarly sensitive to movement.

Nothing, however, proves that those acquisitions which are the most ancient in historical order ought, in the development of science, to remain the basis of our knowledge. Nor does any theory prove that our perceptions are an exact indication of reality. Many reasons, on the contrary, might be invoked which tend to compel us to see in nature phenomena which cannot be reduced to movement.

Mechanics as ordinarily understood is the study of reversible phenomena. If there be given to the parameter which represents time,[1] and which has a.s.sumed increasing values during the duration of the phenomena, decreasing values which make it go the opposite way, the whole system will again pa.s.s through exactly the same stages as before, and all the phenomena will unfold themselves in reversed order. In physics, the contrary rule appears very general, and reversibility generally does not exist. It is an ideal and limited case, which may be sometimes approached, but can never, strictly speaking, be met with in its entirety. No physical phenomenon ever recommences in an identical manner if its direction be altered. It is true that certain mathematicians warn us that a mechanics can be devised in which reversibility would no longer be the rule, but the bold attempts made in this direction are not wholly satisfactory.

[Footnote 1: I.e., the time-curve.--ED.]

On the other hand, it is established that if a mechanical explanation of a phenomenon can be given, we can find an infinity of others which likewise account for all the peculiarities revealed by experiment.

But, as a matter of fact, no one has ever succeeded in giving an indisputable mechanical representation of the whole physical world.