A Historical Geography of the British Colonies Part 32

By a Canadian Act of 1858, the harbour of Quebec, for the purposes of the Act, is defined as extending from the Cap Rouge river, about eight miles above Quebec, to the Montmorency, about the same distance below the city. At Quebec, and for many miles above, the St. Lawrence is a tidal river. Below Quebec the river flows due north-east, and is divided into two channels by the island of Orleans, which also lies due north-east and south-west, being twenty miles long with a maximum breadth of six miles. The inland--the south-western--end of the island points directly at the rock of Quebec, which runs out from the northern sh.o.r.e of the St. Lawrence, facing straight down the river, at four miles distance from the island. The two channels, looking up stream, unite at the end of the island, and form a semicircular basin just below Quebec, where the northern sh.o.r.e recedes. Immediately above this basin the rock of Quebec on the north of the river, and Point Levis on the southern mainland, jut out towards each other, narrowing the St. Lawrence to a breadth of considerably less than a mile. Above Quebec the upward course of the river is still south-west by west. The northern bank is continuously steep, and at five to six miles' distance from Quebec on this side is Sillery Cove. {298} Between two and three miles further on, nearly due west, is Cap Rouge. Over against Sillery the Chaudiere river flows in from the south, forming in old days a possible route to the St. Lawrence for those who followed up the course of the Kennebec from the coast of Maine.[9]

[Footnote 9: See above, p. 123.]

Miles of river-side cliff culminate in the promontory on which Quebec stands, and the south-western end of which is known as Cape Diamond.

From the river above the town, Quebec, if man combined with nature, was almost inaccessible. Below, the eastern side of the city is girt by the winding River St. Charles, beyond which are the meadows of Beauport, with shoals in front and high ground behind; and, past the little Beauport river, which is very roughly equidistant from the St.

Charles and the Montmorency, the northern bank of the St. Lawrence is again more or less fringed with steep ground as far as, and beyond, the falls, over which the Montmorency takes its way into the great river.

[Sidenote: _The strength of the French position._]

Nature had given Quebec a position of unique strength; man had added fortifications; and, when Wolfe came before it, 16,000 soldiers, including French, Canadians, and Indians, were mustered for its defence, under one of the most skilful generals of his day. There was a garrison in Quebec itself; but the main army was encamped below the city, and lined entrenchments from the St. Charles to the Montmorency, Montcalm's head quarters being on the further side of the Beauport river. To defeat an army nearly double the strength of his own, and to take the citadel which, since the days of Kirke and Champlain, had proved impregnable, was the hopeless task a.s.signed to Wolfe. It was a task which he accomplished.

[Sidenote: _Wolfe's troops superior in quality to Montcalm's._]

[Sidenote: _Importance of commanding the river._]

[Sidenote: _Co-operation of English army and navy._]

Over and above his own leaders.h.i.+p, he had two points in his favour.

His troops were better than those commanded by Montcalm. The majority of Montcalm's men were Canadian militia, disinclined for long continuous service, {299} which kept them away from their farms, and, while excellent for raiding purposes or for fighting under cover, not to be relied on if ever they should be brought face to face with English regiments in the open field. Wolfe, moreover, gained complete command of the river. Such s.h.i.+ps as the French possessed had been sent high up the St. Lawrence out of harm's way; and, though the guns of Quebec commanded the river strait immediately below the rock, as the siege went on some of the English vessels, and many boats, were taken past the promontory, so that the St. Lawrence was securely held both below and above the city. In war and in peace English sailors and soldiers have known how to support each other. At the sieges of Louisbourg the admirals co-operated in every possible way with the leaders of the land forces, and equally hearty was the co-operation of the two arms of the service before Quebec. Admiral Saunders, with Durell and Holmes, did all that men could do to second Wolfe in his difficult enterprise.

[Sidenote: _The island of Orleans occupied._]

[Sidenote: _Vaudreuil's fires.h.i.+ps._]

[Sidenote: _Point Levis occupied._]

Piloted by Canadian prisoners or by their own determined seamen, the British s.h.i.+ps had threaded their way up the St. Lawrence, and on June 26 anch.o.r.ed on the southern side of the Isle of Orleans. That night a party of Rangers landed on the island, meeting with some slight opposition, and the next day the whole force disembarked and marched across the island towards its westernmost point, the Point of Orleans. There the city of Quebec came in full view, 'at once a tempting and a discouraging sight.'[10] Hardly had the troops landed when, on the same day, a heavy storm broke upon the English s.h.i.+ps, and drove some of the transports ash.o.r.e; while, little more than twenty-four hours later, a new danger threatened the fleet in the form of fires.h.i.+ps sent down from Quebec. This was a pet scheme of Vaudreuil, but, like the author of the scheme, the s.h.i.+ps did nothing more than splutter and make a noise, scaring the {300} English outpost at the Point of Orleans. Some stranded, others were towed ash.o.r.e by the English sailors--none of them reached the fleet which they were intended to destroy. On the evening of the next day, the twenty-ninth, part of Monckton's brigade was carried across the mile and a half of water which separates the island of Orleans at its westernmost point from the mainland on the southern sh.o.r.e; on the thirtieth the rest of the brigade was landed, and occupied Point Levis. Here batteries were erected under fire from Quebec; and, after a futile, half-hearted attempt had been made to dislodge the English by a party of Canadians, who crossed the river higher up on the night of July 12, the guns opened fire on the city opposite, and began the work--which went on for weeks--of knocking its buildings to pieces.

[Footnote 10: _Annual Register_ for 1759, p. 35.]

[Sidenote: _Landing effected on the northern sh.o.r.e below the Montmorency._]

[Sidenote: _Division of Wolfe's force._]

[Sidenote: _The English s.h.i.+ps gain the upper river._]

[Sidenote: _Montcalm on the defensive._]

Before the batteries at Point Levis were complete, Wolfe had sent troops across to the northern sh.o.r.e of the St. Lawrence, lower down the river, and occupied the heights on the eastern side of the Montmorency river, which more or less commanded the extreme left of the French line, where Levis was stationed. The movement was not effected without some loss to the Rangers, who were ambushed by a party of Indians. The latter had crossed the Montmorency by a ford above the falls, but the ford was too securely guarded on the French side to justify any attempt on the part of Wolfe's small force to attack in this direction. It was the English general's plan to reconnoitre and threaten every point in turn of the French position, to divide the enemy's forces if possible, and if possible to induce Montcalm to take the offensive. With this object, Wolfe ran great risks. One part of his army was at Point Levis, another below the Montmorency, a third small detachment held the Point of Orleans. On July 18 his s.h.i.+ps began to run the gauntlet of the Quebec batteries and reach the upper river, while boats were dragged overland by Point Levis to co-operate above the city. A still further division of the attacking force {301} was then made, and Carleton was sent some eighteen miles up stream to land and raid on the northern sh.o.r.e. But though the movement drew off a certain number of French troops from the Beauport lines to watch the enemy above Quebec, Montcalm persisted in playing a waiting game, in making no attack, and running no risk. His policy was no doubt a sound one. It is true that Quebec was being riddled with shot and sh.e.l.l, that the farmers and villagers in the country round were suffering, that the Canadians and Indians were losing heart at the apparent inaction of their leaders, but time and place were on the side of the French, and as the weeks went on the wisdom of patient defence became more and more apparent.

[Sidenote: _Frontal attack on the French lines by the Montmorency._]

At the end of July, Wolfe determined to try to force the French entrenchments where they ab.u.t.ted on the Montmorency river. The plan involved a frontal attack on a very strong position, and it was only possible to make the attempt when the tide was out. At low tide the Montmorency could be forded below the falls, and the General proposed to land Monckton's brigade on the sh.o.r.e of the St. Lawrence, above the Montmorency, in face of the French lines, and to support it by marching Townshend's and Murray's troops, who held the heights below the Montmorency, across the ford at the mouth of the latter river.

The two forces converging were to carry an advanced French redoubt which stood on the flat a little beyond high-water mark, and, if the French still refused battle, to a.s.sault the heights beyond.

[Sidenote: _The English repulsed with heavy loss._]

Monckton's men, embarked mainly at Point Levis, were moved up and down the river through the day, keeping the French in doubt as to where the attack would be made. A s.h.i.+p of war was anch.o.r.ed in a position to cover the ford of the Montmorency, while two large flat-bottomed boats carrying guns, or, as Knox called them, 'two armed transport cats (catamarans) drawing little water,'[11] were taken in {302} close to sh.o.r.e, and left to be stranded as the tide went out. Towards evening the water was low, the guns opened fire, and, after some delay in finding a landing-place, the men began to disembark on the muddy edge of the river. The Grenadiers, with some of the Royal Americans, who were first landed, rushed forward and seized the redoubt, which the French abandoned. They then hurried on, without waiting for the main body of troops, to attack the higher ground behind. This premature movement ruined the enterprise.

Advancing without order or formation up slippery slopes, in a storm of rain, under heavy fire, the Grenadiers were hurled back to the redoubt with a loss of over 400 men, and were brought off by Wolfe, who saw the uselessness of repeating the attack in the deepening shades of evening. Some of the troops were re-embarked, the others retreated in good order across the ford, and the day ended in failure, though the bulk of the English army had taken no part in the fight. In his General Order on the following day Wolfe commented severely, and with reason, upon the 'impetuous, irregular, and unsoldierlike proceedings' of the Grenadiers, reminding them that 'the Grenadiers could not suppose that they alone could beat the French army.'[12] The blame for the disaster rested solely with the soldiers of the advanced party, who, in eagerness to attack, lost all order and discipline; but the effect was much the same as though the leaders had blundered. The small English army had lost a number of men, who could ill be spared; the defenders of Quebec gained heart, their enemies were correspondingly dispirited.

[Footnote 11: Knox, vol. i, p. 354.]

[Footnote 12: Knox, vol. ii, p. 1.]

[Sidenote: _Operations on the upper river._]

[Sidenote: _Levis sent to Montreal to oppose Amherst._]

Wolfe still held his ground below the Montmorency, but moved more of his men than before above Quebec. Here Murray was placed in command, with Admiral Holmes in charge of the s.h.i.+ps and boats. Bougainville, with 1,500 men, was detached by Montcalm to watch the enemy's {303} movements and to guard the northern sh.o.r.e; but, on both sides of the river, both above and below the town, the English spread havoc and destroyed supplies. The waterway being blocked by Holmes' vessels and the country round Quebec being desolated, Montcalm's army could only be fed by a toilsome overland transport of many miles, until the means of transport failed, when provisions were again sent down the river, running the blockade usually under cover of night. Meanwhile, early in August, the French had learnt of the fall of Niagara and the abandonment of Ticonderoga and Crown Point, and to meet Amherst's expected advance Levis was sent up to Montreal with 800 men. In this respect, and in no other, Amherst's operations helped Wolfe. As events turned out, it was of incalculable importance to the English that, when the battle of Quebec took place, Montcalm's able lieutenant was not on the field.

[Sidenote: _Critical position of Wolfe._]

[Sidenote: _His illness._]

[Sidenote: _His brigadiers recommend an attempt above the city._]

The position of the French was critical, but that of the English was more critical still. The summer was waning. The English troops were dwindling in numbers from casualties and disease. Worst of all, when the middle of August was past, worn in mind and body, Wolfe was laid low with fever in the camp at Montmorency. On his life, as the soldiers who loved him knew, hung all the hopes of the expedition.

While recovering, but still unable to move, he submitted to his brigadiers three alternative plans for attacking Montcalm's lines.

They met on August 29, and, rejecting all three proposals, counselled an attempt above the city. 'We are of opinion,' they wrote, 'that the most probable method of striking an effectual blow is to bring the troops to the south sh.o.r.e, and to carry the operations above the town. If we can establish ourselves on the north sh.o.r.e, the Marquis de Montcalm must fight us on our own terms. We are between him and his provisions, and between him and the army opposing General Amherst.'[13] Their {304} advice, which was unanimous, was taken without demur, and Wolfe proceeded with the desperate task of putting it into execution.

[Footnote 13: Wright, p. 545.]

[Sidenote: _Wolfe's despondency._]

That he had little hope of success is shown by the tone of his correspondence. In his last dispatch to Pitt, dated September 2, he wrote, 'there is such a choice of difficulties, that I own myself at a loss how to determine.'[14] To Admiral Saunders, two or three days before, he had written of himself as 'a man that must necessarily be ruined';[14] and in his last letter to his mother, written on August 31, he spoke of being determined to leave the service at the earliest opportunity.[14] Townshend, meanwhile, in private, criticized him much as Wolfe himself had criticized his superior officers the year before. 'General Wolfe's health,' he wrote to his wife, 'is but very bad: his generals.h.i.+p, in my poor opinion, is not a bit better.'[15]

Yet, sick and despondent as he was, Wolfe did not lie down in the furrow. For past failures he blamed no one but himself; manfully he faced the future in all its gloom; and, if Townshend felt little confidence in his leading, the soldiers knew better; and he led them to victory.

[Footnote 14: Wright, pp. 548, 549, 553.]

[Footnote 15: From the _Townshend Papers_. The letter is quoted in full by Kingsford in his _History of Canada_, vol. iv, p. 226, note.]

[Sidenote: _Disposition of Wolfe's army at the end of August._]

At the end of August, the following was the disposition of the English forces. Murray, with Admiral Holmes, was operating above the city; Monckton was at Point Levis, and near him Admiral Saunders, with the main English fleet, was anch.o.r.ed in the basin of Quebec.

Wolfe himself, with Townshend, was still encamped on the northern sh.o.r.e below the Montmorency; and Admiral Durell, with the rearguard of the fleet, was watching the river below. Amherst's successes were known to Wolfe and his colleagues, but they soon learnt also that no help could be expected from him. September was on them, and at the end of September, or at {305} latest by the middle of October, the campaign would close. Whatever had to be done must be done quickly.

[Sidenote: _The camp at the Montmorency broken up, and the troops moved up the river._]

[Sidenote: _Montcalm deceived._]

On September 3 the English camp by the Montmorency was broken up, and the troops were moved to the Point of Orleans and Point Levis. On the fifth, Murray's troops, which had returned to Point Levis, were marched up the southern sh.o.r.e and embarked on Holmes' vessels; they were followed by battalions of Monckton's and Townshend's brigades; and by September 7 nearly 4,000 troops, with the necessary supplies, were moving up and down the river above Quebec, menacing a landing at this point or at that, wearying Bougainville's force, now raised to 3,000 men, which, with its head quarters at Cap Rouge, was required to keep pace with the enemy's fleet, and to guard the heights on the northern bank of the St. Lawrence. Montcalm knew that the English force above Quebec had been strengthened; but he seems not to have known the full extent of Wolfe's preparations. English forces at Point Levis and on the island of Orleans still faced the Beauport lines, while Saunders' fleet lay directly off Quebec. The French general regarded Wolfe's movements on the upper river as feints; the main attack, if attack there should be, he expected below the town.

[Sidenote: _Preparation for the final attack._]

There was bad weather on September 7 and 8, and Wolfe landed a large proportion of his men from the crowded transports high up on the southern sh.o.r.e. Early on the twelfth they were put on board again, and orders were issued for the coming night. Two days' provisions each soldier took with him; and in the General Order, the last which Wolfe issued, officers and men alike were bid to 'remember what their country expects from them.' It was a signal such as Nelson gave at the battle of Trafalgar.

[Sidenote: _The landing-place selected._]