Theodicy Part 25

I observe first, indeed, with regard to the second corollary of the first proposition, that it is very true, but that it is not very well proven. The writer affirms that if G.o.d only ceased to will the existence of a being, that being would no longer exist; and here is the proof given word for word:

'Demonstration. That which exists only by the will of G.o.d no longer exists once that will has ceased.' (But that is what must be proved. The writer endeavours to prove it by adding:) 'Remove the cause, you remove the effect.' (This maxim ought to have been placed among the axioms which are stated at the beginning. But unhappily this axiom may be reckoned among those rules of philosophy which are subject to many exceptions.) 'Now by the preceding proposition and by its first corollary no being exists save by the will of G.o.d. Therefore, etc.' There is ambiguity in this expression, that nothing exists save by the will of G.o.d. If one means that things [392]

begin to exist only through this will, one is justified in referring to the preceding propositions; but if one means that the existence of things is at all times a consequence of the will of G.o.d, one a.s.sumes more or less what is in question. Therefore it was necessary to prove first that the existence of things depends upon the will of G.o.d, and that it is not only a mere effect of that will, but a dependence, in proportion to the perfection which things contain; and once that is a.s.sumed, they will depend upon G.o.d's will no less afterwards than at the beginning. That is the way I have taken the matter in my Essays.

Nevertheless I recognize that the letter upon which I have just made observations is admirable and well deserving of perusal, and that it contains n.o.ble and true sentiments, provided it be taken in the sense I have just indicated. And arguments in this form may serve as an introduction to meditations somewhat more advanced.

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REFLEXIONS ON THE WORK THAT MR. HOBBES PUBLISHED IN ENGLISH ON 'FREEDOM, NECESSITY AND CHANCE'

1. As the question of Necessity and Freedom, with other questions depending thereon, was at one time debated between the famous Mr. Hobbes and Dr. John Bramhall, Bishop of Derry, in books published by each of them, I have deemed it appropriate to give a clear account of them (although I have already mentioned them more than once); and this all the more since these writings of Mr. Hobbes have hitherto only appeared in English, and since the works of this author usually contain something good and ingenious. The Bishop of Derry and Mr. Hobbes, having met in Paris at the house of the Marquis, afterwards Duke, of Newcastle in the year 1646, entered into a discussion on this subject. The dispute was conducted with extreme restraint; but the bishop shortly afterwards sent a note to My Lord Newcastle, desiring him to induce Mr. Hobbes to answer it. He answered; but at the same time he expressed a wish that his answer should not be published, because he believed it possible for ill-instructed persons to abuse dogmas such as his, however true they might be. It so happened, however, that Mr. Hobbes himself pa.s.sed it to a French friend, and allowed a young Englishman to translate it into French for the benefit of this friend. This young man kept a copy of the English original, and published it later in England without the author's knowledge. Thus the bishop was obliged to reply to it, and Mr. Hobbes to make a rejoinder, and to [394]

publish all the pieces together in a book of 348 pages printed in London in the year 1656, in 4to., ent.i.tled, _Questions concerning Freedom, Necessity and Chance, elucidated and discussed between Doctor Bramhall, Bishop of Derry, and Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury_. There is a later edition, of the year 1684, in a work ent.i.tled _Hobbes's Tripos_, where are to be found his book on human nature, his treatise on the body politic and his treatise on freedom and necessity; but the latter does not contain the bishop's reply, nor the author's rejoinder. Mr. Hobbes argues on this subject with his usual wit and subtlety; but it is a pity that in both the one and the other we stumble upon petty tricks, such as arise in excitement over the game.

The bishop speaks with much vehemence and behaves somewhat arrogantly. Mr.

Hobbes for his part is not disposed to spare the other, and manifests rather too much scorn for theology, and for the terminology of the Schoolmen, which is apparently favoured by the bishop.

2. One must confess that there is something strange and indefensible in the opinions of Mr. Hobbes. He maintains that doctrines touching the divinity depend entirely upon the determination of the sovereign, and that G.o.d is no more the cause of the good than of the bad actions of creatures. He maintains that all that which G.o.d does is just, because there is none above him with power to punish and constrain him. Yet he speaks sometimes as if what is said about G.o.d were only compliments, that is to say expressions proper for paying him honour, but not for knowing him. He testifies also that it seems to him that the pains of the wicked must end in their destruction: this opinion closely approaches that of the Socinians, but it seems that Mr. Hobbes goes much further. His philosophy, which a.s.serts that bodies alone are substances, hardly appears favourable to the providence of G.o.d and the immortality of the soul. On other subjects nevertheless he says very reasonable things. He shows clearly that nothing comes about by chance, or rather that chance only signifies the ignorance of causes that produce the effect, and that for each effect there must be a concurrence of all the sufficient conditions anterior to the event, not one of which, manifestly, can be lacking when the event is to follow, because they are conditions: the event, moreover, does not fail to follow when these conditions exist all together, because they are sufficient conditions. All which amounts to the same as I have said so many times, that everything comes to pa.s.s as a result of determining reasons, the knowledge [395]

whereof, if we had it, would make us know at the same time why the thing has happened and why it did not go otherwise.

3. But this author's humour, which prompts him to paradoxes and makes him seek to contradict others, has made him draw out exaggerated and odious conclusions and expressions, as if everything happened through an absolute necessity. The Bishop of Derry, on the other hand, has aptly observed in the answer to article 35, page 327, that there results only a hypothetical necessity, such as we all grant to events in relation to the foreknowledge of G.o.d, while Mr. Hobbes maintains that even divine foreknowledge alone would be sufficient to establish an absolute necessity of events. This was also the opinion of Wyclif, and even of Luther, when he wrote _De Servo Arbitrio_; or at least they spoke so. But it is sufficiently acknowledged to-day that this kind of necessity which is termed hypothetical, and springs from foreknowledge or from other anterior reasons, has nothing in it to arouse one's alarm: whereas it would be quite otherwise if the thing were necessary of itself, in such a way that the contrary implied contradiction. Mr. Hobbes refuses to listen to anything about a moral necessity either, on the ground that everything really happens through physical causes. But one is nevertheless justified in making a great difference between the necessity which constrains the wise to do good, and which is termed moral, existing even in relation to G.o.d, and that blind necessity whereby according to Epicurus, Strato, Spinoza, and perhaps Mr.

Hobbes, things exist without intelligence and without choice, and consequently without G.o.d. Indeed, there would according to them be no need of G.o.d, since in consequence of this necessity all would have existence through its own essence, just as necessarily as two and three make five.

And this necessity is absolute, because everything it carries with it must happen, whatever one may do; whereas what happens by a hypothetical necessity happens as a result of the supposition that this or that has been foreseen or resolved, or done beforehand; and moral necessity contains an obligation imposed by reason, which is always followed by its effect in the wise. This kind of necessity is happy and desirable, when one is prompted by good reasons to act as one does; but necessity blind and absolute would subvert piety and morality.

4. There is more reason in Mr. Hobbes's discourse when he admits that [396]

our actions are in our power, so that we do that which we will when we have the power to do it, and when there is no hindrance. He a.s.serts notwithstanding that our volitions themselves are not so within our power that we can give ourselves, without difficulty and according to our good pleasure, inclinations and wills which we might desire. The bishop does not appear to have taken notice of this reflexion, which Mr. Hobbes also does not develop enough. The truth is that we have some power also over our volitions, but obliquely, and not absolutely and indifferently. This has been explained in some pa.s.sages of this work. Finally Mr. Hobbes shows, like others before him, that the certainty of events, and necessity itself, if there were any in the way our actions depend upon causes, would not prevent us from employing deliberations, exhortations, blame and praise, punishments and rewards: for these are of service and prompt men to produce actions or to refrain from them. Thus, if human actions were necessary, they would be so through these means. But the truth is, that since these actions are not necessary absolutely whatever one may do, these means contribute only to render the actions determinate and certain, as they are indeed; for their nature shows that they are not subject to an absolute necessity. He gives also a good enough notion of _freedom_, in so far as it is taken in a general sense, common to intelligent and non-intelligent substances: he states that a thing is deemed free when the power which it has is not impeded by an external thing. Thus the water that is dammed by a d.y.k.e has the power to spread, but not the freedom. On the other hand, it has not the power to rise above the d.y.k.e, although nothing would prevent it then from spreading, and although nothing from outside prevents it from rising so high. To that end it would be necessary that the water itself should come from a higher point or that the water-level should be raised by an increased flow. Thus a prisoner lacks the freedom, while a sick man lacks the power, to go his way.

5. There is in Mr. Hobbes's preface an abstract of the disputed points, which I will give here, adding some expression of opinion. _On one side_ (he says) the a.s.sertion is made, (1) 'that it is not in the present power of man to choose for himself the will that he should have'. That is _well_ said, especially in relation to present will: men choose the objects through will, but they do not choose their present wills, which spring from reasons and dispositions. It is true, however, that one can seek new [397]

reasons for oneself, and with time give oneself new dispositions; and by this means one can also obtain for oneself a will which one had not and could not have given oneself forthwith. It is (to use the comparison Mr.

Hobbes himself uses) as with hunger or with thirst. At the present it does not rest with my will to be hungry or not; but it rests with my will to eat or not to eat; yet, for the time to come, it rests with me to be hungry, or to prevent myself from being so at such and such an hour of day, by eating beforehand. In this way it is possible often to avoid an evil will. Even though Mr. Hobbes states in his reply (No. 14, p. 138) that it is the manner of laws to say, you must do or you must not do this, but that there is no law saying, you must will, or you must not will it, yet it is clear that he is mistaken in regard to the Law of G.o.d, which says _non concupisces_, thou shalt not covet; it is true that this prohibition does not concern the first motions, which are involuntary. It is a.s.serted (2) 'That hazard' (_chance_ in English, _casus_ in Latin) 'produces nothing', that is, that nothing is produced without cause or reason. Very _right_, I admit it, if one thereby intends a real hazard. For fortune and hazard are only appearances, which spring from ignorance of causes or from disregard of them. (3) 'That all events have their necessary causes.' _Wrong_: they have their determining causes, whereby one can account for them; but these are not necessary causes. The contrary might have happened, without implying contradiction. (4) 'That the will of G.o.d makes the necessity of all things.' _Wrong_: the will of G.o.d produces only contingent things, which could have gone differently, since time, s.p.a.ce and matter are indifferent with regard to all kinds of shape and movement.

6. _On the other side_ (according to Mr. Hobbes) it is a.s.serted, (1) 'That man is free' (absolutely) not only 'to choose what he wills to do, but also to choose what he wills to will.' That is _ill_ said: one is not absolute master of one's will, to change it forthwith, without making use of some means or skill for that purpose. (2) 'When man wills a good action, the will of G.o.d co-operates with his, otherwise not.' That is _well_ said, provided one means that G.o.d does not will evil actions, although he wills to permit them, to prevent the occurrence of something which would be worse than these sins. (3) 'That the will can choose whether it wills to will or not.' _Wrong_, with regard to present volition. (4) 'That things happen without necessity by chance.' _Wrong_: what happens without necessity [398]

does not because of that happen by chance, that is to say, without causes and reasons. (5) 'Notwithstanding that G.o.d may foresee that an event will happen, it is not necessary that it happen, since G.o.d foresees things, not as futurities and as in their causes, but as present.' That begins _well_, and finishes _ill_. One is justified in admitting the necessity of the consequence, but one has no reason to resort to the question how the future is present to G.o.d: for the necessity of the consequence does not prevent the event or consequent from being contingent in itself.

7. Our author thinks that since the doctrine revived by Arminius had been favoured in England by Archbishop Laud and by the Court, and important ecclesiastical promotions had been only for those of that party, this contributed to the revolt which caused the bishop and him to meet in their exile in Paris at the house of Lord Newcastle, and to enter into a discussion. I would not approve all the measures of Archbishop Laud, who had merit and perhaps also good will, but who appears to have goaded the Presbyterians excessively. Nevertheless one may say that the revolutions, as much in the Low Countries as in Great Britain, in part arose from the extreme intolerance of the strict party. One may say also that the defenders of the absolute decree were at least as strict as the others, having oppressed their opponents in Holland with the authority of Prince Maurice and having fomented the revolts in England against King Charles I.

But these are the faults of men, and not of dogmas. Their opponents do not spare them either, witness the severity used in Saxony against Nicolas Krell and the proceedings of the Jesuits against the Bishop of Ypres's party.

8. Mr. Hobbes observes, after Aristotle, that there are two sources for proofs: reason and authority. As for reason, he says that he admits the reasons derived from the attributes of G.o.d, which he calls argumentative, and the notions whereof are conceivable; but he maintains that there are others wherein one conceives nothing, and which are only expressions by which we aspire to honour G.o.d. But I do not see how one can honour G.o.d by expressions that have no meaning. It may be that with Mr. Hobbes, as with Spinoza, wisdom, goodness, justice are only fictions in relation to G.o.d and the universe, since the prime cause, according to them, acts through the necessity of its power, and not by the choice of its wisdom. That is [399]

an opinion whose falsity I have sufficiently proved. It appears that Mr.

Hobbes did not wish to declare himself enough, for fear of causing offence to people; on which point he is to be commended. It was also on that account, as he says himself, that he had desired that what had pa.s.sed between the bishop and him in Paris should not be published. He adds that it is not good to say that an action which G.o.d does not will happens, since that is to say in effect that G.o.d is lacking in power. But he adds also at the same time that it is not good either to say the opposite, and to attribute to G.o.d that he wills the evil; because that is not seemly, and would appear to accuse G.o.d of lack of goodness. He believes, therefore, that in these matters telling the truth is not advisable. He would be right if the truth were in the paradoxical opinions that he maintains. For indeed it appears that according to the opinion of this writer G.o.d has no goodness, or rather that that which he calls G.o.d is nothing but the blind nature of the ma.s.s of material things, which acts according to mathematical laws, following an absolute necessity, as the atoms do in the system of Epicurus. If G.o.d were as the great are sometimes here on earth, it would not be fitting to utter all the truths concerning him. But G.o.d is not as a man, whose designs and actions often must be concealed; rather it is always permissible and reasonable to publish the counsels and the actions of G.o.d, because they are always glorious and worthy of praise. Thus it is always right to utter truths concerning the divinity; one need not anyhow refrain from fear of giving offence. And I have explained, so it seems to me, in a way which satisfies reason, and does not wound piety, how it is to be understood that G.o.d's will takes effect, and concurs with sin, without compromising his wisdom and his goodness.

9. As to the authorities derived from Holy Scripture, Mr. Hobbes divides them into three kinds; some, he says, are for me, the second kind are neutral, and the third seem to be for my opponent. The pa.s.sages which he thinks favourable to his opinion are those which ascribe to G.o.d the cause of our will. Thus Gen. xlv. 5, where Joseph says to his brethren, 'Be not grieved, nor angry with yourselves, that you sold me hither: for G.o.d did send me before you to preserve life'; and verse 8, 'it was not you that sent me hither, but G.o.d.' And G.o.d said (Exod. vii. 3), 'I will harden Pharaoh's heart.' And Moses said (Deut. ii. 30), 'But Sihon King of [400]

Heshbon would not let us pa.s.s by him: for the Lord thy G.o.d hardened his spirit, and made his heart obstinate, that he might deliver him into thy hand.' And David said of s.h.i.+mei (2 Sam. xvi. 10), 'Let him curse, because the Lord hath said unto him: Curse David. Who shall then say, wherefore hast thou done so?' And (1 Kings xii. 15), 'The King [Rehoboam] hearkened not unto the people; for the cause was from the Lord.' Job xii. 16: 'The deceived and the deceiver are his.' v. 17: 'He maketh the judges fools'; v.

24: 'He taketh away the heart of the chief of the people of the earth, and causeth them to wander in a wilderness'; v. 25: 'He maketh them to stagger like a drunken man.' G.o.d said of the King of a.s.syria (Isa. x. 6), 'Against the people will I give him a charge, to take the spoil, and to take the prey, and to tread them down like the mire of the streets.' And Jeremiah said (Jer. x. 23), 'O Lord, I know that the way of man is not in himself: it is not in man that walketh to direct his steps.' And G.o.d said (Ezek.

iii. 20), 'When a righteous man doth turn from his righteousness, and commit iniquity, and I lay a stumbling-block before him, he shall die.' And the Saviour said (John vi. 44), 'No man can come to me, except the Father which hath sent me draw him.' And St. Peter (Acts ii. 23), 'Jesus having been delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of G.o.d, ye have taken.' And Acts iv. 27, 28, 'Both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and the people of Israel, were gathered together, for to do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel determined before to be done.' And St.

Paul (Rom. ix. 16), 'It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of G.o.d that showeth mercy.' And v. 18: 'Therefore hath he mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth'; v. 19: 'Thou wilt say then unto me, why doth he yet find fault? For who hath resisted his will?'; v. 20: 'Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against G.o.d? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, why hast thou made me thus?' And 1 Cor. iv. 7: 'For who maketh thee to differ from another? and what hast thou that thou didst not receive?' And 1 Cor. xii.

6: 'There are diversities of operations, but it is the same G.o.d which worketh all in all.' And Eph. ii. 10: 'We are his workmans.h.i.+p, created in Christ Jesus unto good works, which G.o.d hath before ordained that we should walk in them.' And Phil. ii. 13: 'It is G.o.d which worketh in you both to will and to do of his good pleasure.' One may add to these pa.s.sages all those which make G.o.d the author of all grace and of all good [401]

inclinations, and all those which say that we are as dead in sin.

10. Here now are the neutral pa.s.sages, according to Mr. Hobbes. These are those where Holy Scripture says that man has the choice to act if he wills, or not to act if he wills not. For example Deut. x.x.x. 19: 'I call heaven and earth to record this day against you, that I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing: therefore choose life, that both thou and thy seed may live.' And Joshua xxiv. 15: 'Choose you this day whom ye will serve.' And G.o.d said to Gad the prophet (2 Sam. xxiv. 12), 'Go and say unto David: Thus saith the Lord, I offer thee three things; choose thee one of them, that I may do it unto thee.' And Isa. vii. 16: 'Until the child shall know to refuse the evil and choose the good.' Finally the pa.s.sages which Mr. Hobbes acknowledges to be apparently contrary to his opinion are all those where it is indicated that the will of man is not in conformity with that of G.o.d. Thus Isa. v. 4: 'What could have been done more to my vineyard, that I have not done in it? Wherefore, when I looked that it should bring forth grapes, brought it forth wild grapes?' And Jer. xix. 5: 'They have built also the high places of Baal, to burn their sons with fire for burnt offerings unto Baal; which I commanded not, nor spake it, neither came it into my mind.' And Hos. xiii. 9: 'O Israel, thou hast destroyed thyself; but in me is thine help.' And I Tim. ii. 4: 'G.o.d will have all men to be saved, and to come unto the knowledge of the truth.' He avows that he could quote very many other pa.s.sages, such as those which indicate that G.o.d willeth not iniquity, that he willeth the salvation of the sinner, and generally all those which declare that G.o.d commands good and forbids evil.

11. Mr. Hobbes makes answer to these pa.s.sages that G.o.d does not always will that which he commands, as for example when he commanded Abraham to sacrifice his son, and that G.o.d's revealed will is not always his full will or his decree, as when he revealed to Jonah that Nineveh would perish in forty days. He adds also, that when it is said that G.o.d wills the salvation of all, that means simply that G.o.d commands that all do that which is necessary for salvation; when, moreover, the Scripture says that G.o.d wills not sin, that means that he wills to punish it. And as for the rest, Mr.

Hobbes ascribes it to the forms of expression used among men. But one will answer him that it would be to G.o.d's discredit that his revealed will [402]

should be opposed to his real will: that what he bade Jonah say to the Ninevites was rather a threat than a prediction, and that thus the condition of impenitence was implied therein; moreover the Ninevites took it in this sense. One will say also, that it is quite true that G.o.d in commanding Abraham to sacrifice his son willed obedience, but did not will action, which he prevented after having obtained obedience; for that was not an action deserving in itself to be willed. And it is not the same in the case of actions where he exerts his will positively, and which are in fact worthy to be the object of his will. Of such are piety, charity and every virtuous action that G.o.d commands; of such is omission of sin, a thing more alien to divine perfection than any other. It is therefore incomparably better to explain the will of G.o.d as I have explained it in this work. Thus I shall say that G.o.d, by virtue of his supreme goodness, has in the beginning a serious inclination to produce, or to see and cause to be produced, all good and every laudable action, and to prevent, or to see and cause to fail, all evil and every bad action. But he is determined by this same goodness, united to an infinite wisdom, and by the very concourse of all the previous and particular inclinations towards each good, and towards the preventing of each evil, to produce the best possible design of things. This is his final and decretory will. And this design of the best being of such a nature that the good must be enhanced therein, as light is enhanced by shade, by some evil which is incomparably less than this good, G.o.d could not have excluded this evil, nor introduced certain goods that were excluded from this plan, without wronging his supreme perfection. So for that reason one must say that he permitted the sins of others, because otherwise he would have himself performed an action worse than all the sin of creatures.

12. I find that the Bishop of Derry is at least justified in saying, article XV, in his Reply, p. 153, that the opinion of his opponents is contrary to piety, when they ascribe all to G.o.d's power only, and that Mr.

Hobbes ought not to have said that honour or wors.h.i.+p is only a sign of the power of him whom one honours: for one may also, and one must, acknowledge and honour wisdom, goodness, justice and other perfections. _Magnos facile laudamus, bonos libenter._ This opinion, which despoils G.o.d of all goodness and of all true justice, which represents him as a Tyrant, wielding an absolute power, independent of all right and of all equity, and [403]

creating millions of creatures to be eternally unhappy, and this without any other aim than that of displaying his power, this opinion, I say, is capable of rendering men very evil; and if it were accepted no other Devil would be needed in the world to set men at variance among themselves and with G.o.d; as the Serpent did in making Eve believe that G.o.d, when he forbade her the fruit of the tree, did not will her good. Mr. Hobbes endeavours to parry this thrust in his Rejoinder (p. 160) by saying that goodness is a part of the power of G.o.d, that is to say, the power of making himself worthy of love. But that is an abuse of terms by an evasion, and confounds things that must be kept distinct. After all, if G.o.d does not intend the good of intelligent creatures, if he has no other principles of justice than his power alone, which makes him produce either arbitrarily that which chance presents to him, or by necessity all that which is possible, without the intervention of choice founded on good, how can he make himself worthy of love? It is therefore the doctrine either of blind power or of arbitrary power, which destroys piety: for the one destroys the intelligent principle or the providence of G.o.d, the other attributes to him actions which are appropriate to the evil principle. Justice in G.o.d, says Mr. Hobbes (p. 161), is nothing but the power he has, which he exercises in distributing blessings and afflictions. This definition surprises me: it is not the power to distribute them, but the will to distribute them reasonably, that is, goodness guided by wisdom, which makes the justice of G.o.d. But, says he, justice is not in G.o.d as in a man, who is only just through the observance of laws made by his superior. Mr. Hobbes is mistaken also in that, as well as Herr Pufendorf, who followed him. Justice does not depend upon arbitrary laws of superiors, but on the eternal rules of wisdom and of goodness, in men as well as in G.o.d. Mr. Hobbes a.s.serts in the same pa.s.sage that the wisdom which is attributed to G.o.d does not lie in a logical consideration of the relation of means to ends, but in an incomprehensible attribute, attributed to an incomprehensible nature to honour it. It seems as if he means that it is an indescribable something attributed to an indescribable something, and even a chimerical quality given to a chimerical substance, to intimidate and to deceive the nations through the wors.h.i.+p which they render to it. After all, it is difficult for Mr. Hobbes to have a different opinion of G.o.d and of wisdom, since he admits only material substances. If Mr. Hobbes were still alive, I would beware of ascribing to him opinions which might do him injury; but it [404]

is difficult to exempt him from this. He may have changed his mind subsequently, for he attained to a great age; thus I hope that his errors may not have been deleterious to him. But as they might be so to others, it is expedient to give warnings to those who shall read the writings of one who otherwise is of great merit, and from whom one may profit in many ways.

It is true that G.o.d does not reason, properly speaking, using time as we do, to pa.s.s from one truth to the other: but as he understands at one and the same time all the truths and all their connexions, he knows all the conclusions, and he contains in the highest degree within himself all the reasonings that we can develop. And just because of that his wisdom is perfect.

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OBSERVATIONS ON THE BOOK CONCERNING 'THE ORIGIN OF EVIL' PUBLISHED RECENTLY IN LONDON

1. It is a pity that M. Bayle should have seen only the reviews of this admirable work, which are to be found in the journals. If he had read it himself and examined it properly, he would have provided us with a good opportunity of throwing light on many difficulties, which spring again and again like the head of the hydra, in a matter where it is easy to become confused when one has not seen the whole system or does not take the trouble to reason according to a strict plan. For strictness of reasoning performs in subjects that transcend imagination the same function as figures do in geometry: there must always be something capable of fixing our attention and forming a connexion between our thoughts. That is why when this Latin book, so learned and so elegant of style, printed originally in London and then reprinted in Bremen, fell into my hands, I judged that the seriousness of the matter and the author's merit required an attention which readers might fairly expect of me, since we are agreed only in regard to half of the subject. Indeed, as the work contains five chapters, and the fifth with the appendix equals the rest in size, I have observed that the first four, where it is a question of evil in general and of physical evil in particular, are in harmony with my principles (save for a few individual pa.s.sages), and that they sometimes even develop with force and eloquence some points I had treated but slightly because M. Bayle [406]

had not placed emphasis upon them. But the fifth chapter, with its sections (of which some are equal to entire chapters) speaking of freedom and of the moral evil dependent upon it, is constructed upon principles opposed to mine, and often, indeed, to those of M. Bayle; that is, if it were possible to credit him with any fixed principles. For this fifth chapter tends to show (if that were possible) that true freedom depends upon an indifference of equipoise, vague, complete and absolute; so that, until the will has determined itself, there would be no reason for its determination, either in him who chooses or in the object; and one would not choose what pleases, but in choosing without reason one would cause what one chooses to be pleasing.

2. This principle of choice without cause or reason, of a choice, I say, divested of the aim of wisdom and goodness, is regarded by many as the great privilege of G.o.d and of intelligent substances, and as the source of their freedom, their satisfaction, their morality and their good or evil.

The fantasy of a power to declare one's independence, not only of inclination, but of reason itself within and of good and evil without, is sometimes painted in such fine colours that one might take it to be the most excellent thing in the world. Nevertheless it is only a hollow fantasy, a suppression of the reasons for the caprice of which one boasts.

What is a.s.serted is impossible, but if it came to pa.s.s it would be harmful.

This fantastic character might be attributed to some Don Juan in a St.

Peter's Feast, and a man of romantic disposition might even affect the outward appearances of it and persuade himself that he has it in reality.

But in Nature there will never be any choice to which one is not prompted by the previous representation of good or evil, by inclinations or by reasons: and I have always challenged the supporters of this absolute indifference to show an example thereof. Nevertheless if I call fantastic this choice whereto one is determined by nothing, I am far from calling visionaries the supporters of that hypothesis, especially our gifted author. The Peripatetics teach some beliefs of this nature; but it would be the greatest injustice in the world to be ready to despise on that account an Occam, a Suisset, a Cesalpino, a Conringius, men who still advocated certain scholastic opinions which have been improved upon to-day.

3. One of these opinions, revived, however, and introduced by [407]

degenerate scholasticism, and in the Age of Chimeras, is vague indifference of choice, or real chance, a.s.sumed in our souls; as if nothing gave us any inclination unless we perceived it distinctly, and as if an effect could be without causes, when these causes are imperceptible. It is much as some have denied the existence of insensible corpuscles because they do not see them. Modern philosophers have improved upon the opinions of the Schoolmen by showing that, according to the laws of corporeal nature, a body can only be set in motion by the movement of another body propelling it. Even so we must believe that our souls (by virtue of the laws of spiritual nature) can only be moved by some reason of good or evil: and this even when no distinct knowledge can be extracted from our mental state, on account of a concourse of innumerable little perceptions which make us now joyful and now sad, or again of some other humour, and cause us to like one thing more than another without its being possible to say why. Plato, Aristotle and even Thomas Aquinas, Durand and other Schoolmen of the sounder sort reason on that question like the generality of men, and as unprejudiced people always have reasoned. They a.s.sume that freedom lies in the use of reason and the inclinations, which cause the choice or rejection of objects. But finally some rather too subtle philosophers have extracted from their alembic an inexplicable notion of choice independent of anything whatsoever, which is said to do wonders in solving all difficulties. But the notion is caught up at the outset in one of the greatest difficulties, by offending against the grand principle of reasoning which makes us always a.s.sume that nothing is done without some sufficient cause or reason. As the Schoolmen often forgot to apply this great principle, admitting certain prime occult qualities, one need not wonder if this fiction of vague indifference met with applause amongst them, and if even most worthy men have been imbued therewith. Our author, who is otherwise rid of many of the errors of the ordinary Schoolmen, is still deluded by this fiction: but he is without doubt one of the most skilful of those who have supported it.

_Si Pergama dextra_ _Defendi possent, etiam hac defensa fuissent._

He gives it the best possible turn, and only shows it on its good side. He knows how to strip spontaneity and reason of their advantages, [408]

transferring all these to vague indifference: only through this indifference is one active, resisting the pa.s.sions, taking pleasure in one's choice, or being happy; it appears indeed that one would be miserable if some happy necessity should oblige us to choose aright. Our author had said admirable things on the origin and reasons of natural evils: he only had to apply the same principles to moral evil; indeed, he believes himself that moral evil becomes an evil through the physical evils that it causes or tends to cause. But somehow or other he thinks that it would be a degradation of G.o.d and men if they were to be made subject to reason; that thus they would all be rendered pa.s.sive to it and would no longer be satisfied with themselves; in short that men would have nothing wherewith to oppose the misfortunes that come to them from without, if they had not within them this admirable privilege of rendering things good or tolerable by choosing them, and of changing all into gold by the touch of this wondrous faculty.

4. We will examine it in closer detail presently; but it will be well to profit beforehand by the excellent ideas of our author on the nature of things and on natural evils, particularly since there are some points in which we shall be able to go a little further: by this means also we shall gain a better understanding of the whole arrangement of his system. The first chapter contains the principles. The writer calls substance a being the idea of which does not involve the existence of another. I do not know if there are any such among created beings, by reason of the connexion existing between all things; and the example of a wax torch is not the example of a substance, any more than that of a swarm of bees would be. But one may take the terms in an extended sense. He observes aptly that after all the changes of matter and after all the qualities of which it may be divested, there remain extension, mobility, divisibility and resistance. He explains also the nature of notions, and leaves it to be understood that _universals_ indicate only the resemblances which exist between _individuals_; that we understand by _ideas_ only that which is known through an immediate sensation, and that the rest is known to us only through relations with these ideas. But when he admits that we have no idea of G.o.d, of spirit, of substance, he does not appear to have observed sufficiently that we have immediate apperception of substance and of spirit in our apperception of ourselves, and that the idea of G.o.d is found in[409]

the idea of ourselves through a suppression of the limits of our perfections, as extension taken in an absolute sense is comprised in the idea of a globe. He is right also in a.s.serting that our simple ideas at least are innate, and in rejecting the _Tabula rasa_ of Aristotle and of Mr. Locke. But I cannot agree with him that our ideas have scarce any more relation to things than words uttered into the air or writings traced upon paper have to our ideas, and that the bearing of our sensations is arbitrary and _ex inst.i.tuto_, like the signification of words. I have already indicated elsewhere why I am not in agreement with our Cartesians on that point.

5. For the purpose of advancing to the first Cause, the author seeks a criterion, a distinguis.h.i.+ng mark of truth; and he finds it in the force whereby our inward a.s.sertions, when they are evident, compel the understanding to give them its consent. It is by such a process, he says, that we credit the senses. He points out that the distinguis.h.i.+ng mark in the Cartesian scheme, to wit, a clear and distinct perception, has need of a new mark to indicate what is clear and distinct, and that the congruity or non-congruity of ideas (or rather of terms, as one spoke formerly) may still be deceptive, because there are congruities real and apparent. He appears to recognize even that the inward force which constrains us to give our a.s.sent is still a matter for caution, and may come from deep-rooted prejudices. That is why he confesses that he who should furnish another criterion would have found something very advantageous to the human race. I have endeavoured to explain this criterion in a little _Discourse on Truth and Ideas_, published in 1684; and although I do not boast of having given therein a new discovery I hope that I have expounded things which were only confusedly recognized. I distinguish between truths of fact and truths of reason. Truths of fact can only be verified by confronting them with truths of reason, and by tracing them back to immediate perceptions within us, such as St. Augustine and M. Descartes very promptly acknowledged to be indubitable; that is to say, we cannot doubt that we think, nor indeed that we think this thing or that. But in order to judge whether our inward notions have any reality in things, and to pa.s.s from thoughts to objects, my opinion is that it is necessary to consider whether our perceptions are firmly connected among themselves and with others that we have had, in such fas.h.i.+on as to manifest the rules of mathematics and other truths of [410]

reason. In this case one must regard them as real; and I think that it is the only means of distinguis.h.i.+ng them from imaginations, dreams and visions. Thus the truth of things outside us can be recognized only through the connexion of phenomena. The criterion of the truths of reason, or those which spring from conceptions, is found in an exact use of the rules of logic. As for ideas or notions, I call _real_ all those the possibility of which is certain; and the _definitions_ which do not mark this possibility are only _nominal_. Geometricians well versed in a.n.a.lysis are aware what difference there is in this respect between several properties by which some line or figure might be defined. Our gifted author has not gone so far, perhaps; one may see, however, from the account I have given of him already, and from what follows, that he is by no means lacking in profundity or reflexion.

6. Thereafter he proceeds to examine whether motion, matter and s.p.a.ce spring from themselves; and to that end he considers whether it is possible to conceive that they do not exist. He remarks upon this privilege of G.o.d, that as soon as it is a.s.sumed that he exists it must be admitted that he exists of necessity. This is a corollary to a remark which I made in the little discourse mentioned above, namely that as soon as one admits that G.o.d is possible, one must admit that he exists of necessity. Now, as soon as one admits that G.o.d exists, one admits that he is possible. Therefore as soon as one admits that G.o.d exists, one must admit that he exists of necessity. Now this privilege does not belong to the three things of which we have just spoken. The author believes also especially concerning motion, that it is not sufficient to say, with Mr. Hobbes, that the present movement comes from an anterior movement, and this one again from another, and so on to infinity. For, however far back you may go, you will not be one whit nearer to finding the reason which causes the presence of motion in matter. Therefore this reason must be outside the sequence; and even if there were an eternal motion, it would require an eternal motive power. So the rays of the sun, even though they were eternal with the sun, would nevertheless have their eternal cause in the sun. I am well pleased to recount these arguments of our gifted author, that it may be seen how important, according to him, is the principle of sufficient reason. For, if it is permitted to admit something for which it is acknowledged there is no reason, it will be easy for an atheist to overthrow this argument, by [411]

saying that it is not necessary that there be a sufficient reason for the existence of motion. I will not enter into the discussion of the reality and the eternity of s.p.a.ce, for fear of straying too far from our subject.

It is enough to state that the author believes that s.p.a.ce can be annihilated by the divine power, but in entirety and not in portions, and that we could exist alone with G.o.d even if there were neither s.p.a.ce nor matter, since we do not contain within ourselves the notion of the existence of external things. He also puts forward the consideration that in the sensations of sounds, of odours and of savours the idea of s.p.a.ce is not included. But whatever the opinion formed as to s.p.a.ce, it suffices that there is a G.o.d, the cause of matter and of motion, and in short of all things. The author believes that we can reason about G.o.d, as one born blind would reason about light. But I hold that there is something more in us, for our light is a ray from G.o.d's light. After having spoken of some attributes of G.o.d, the author acknowledges that G.o.d acts for an end, which is the communication of his goodness, and that his works are ordered aright. Finally he concludes this chapter very properly, by saying that G.o.d in creating the world was at pains to give it the greatest harmony amongst things, the greatest comfort of beings endowed with reason, and the greatest compatibility in desires that an infinite power, wisdom and goodness combined could produce. He adds that, if some evil has remained notwithstanding, one must believe that these infinite divine perfections could not have (I would rather say ought not to have) taken it away.

7. Chapter II anatomizes evil, dividing it as we do into metaphysical, physical and moral. Metaphysical evil consists in imperfections, physical evil in suffering and other like troubles, and moral evil in sin. All these evils exist in G.o.d's work; Lucretius thence inferred that there is no providence, and he denied that the world can be an effect of divinity: