The Theological Tractates and The Consolation of Philosophy Part 26

IV.

Then said I, "I confess and perceive that thou affirmest not without cause that the vicious, though they keep the outward shape of men, are in their inward state of mind changed into brute beasts. But I would have had them whose cruel and wicked heart rageth to the harm of the good, restrained from executing their malice." "They are restrained,"

quoth she, "as shall be proved in convenient place. But yet if this liberty which they seem to have be taken away, their punishment also is in great part released. For (which perhaps to some may seem incredible) evil men must necessarily be more unhappy when they have brought to pa.s.s their purposes than if they could not obtain what they desire. For if it be a miserable thing to desire that which is evil, it is more miserable to be able to perform it, without which the miserable will could not have any effect. Wherefore since everyone of these hath their peculiar misery, they must of force be oppressed with a threefold wretchedness, whom thou seest desire, be able, and perform wickedness." "I grant it,"

quoth I, "but earnestly wish that they may soon be delivered from this misery, having lost the power to perform their malice." "They will lose it," quoth she, "sooner than perhaps either thou wouldst, or they themselves suppose. For in the short compa.s.s of this life there is nothing so late that any one, least of all an immortal soul, should think it long in coming; so that the great hope and highest attempts of the wicked are many times made frustrate with a sudden and unexpected end, which in truth setteth some end to their misery.

For if wickedness make men miserable, the longer one is wicked, the more miserable he must needs be; and I should judge them the most unhappy men that may be, if death at least did not end their malice. For if we have concluded truly of the misery of wickedness, it is manifest that the wretchedness which is everlasting must of force be infinite." "A strange illation," quoth I, "and hard to be granted; but I see that those things which were granted before agree very well with these." "Thou thinkest aright," quoth she, "but he that findeth difficulty to yield to the conclusion must either show that something which is presupposed is false, or that the combination of the propositions makes not a necessary conclusion; otherwise, granting that which went before, he hath no reason to doubt of the inference. For this also which I will conclude now will seem no less strange, and yet followeth as necessarily out of those things which are already a.s.sumed." "What?" quoth I. "That wicked men," quoth she, "are more happy being punished than if they escaped the hands of justice. Neither do I now go about to show that which may come into every man's mind, that evil customs are corrected by chastis.e.m.e.nt, and are reduced to virtue by the terror of punishment, and that others may take example to avoid evil, but in another manner also I think vicious men that go unpunished to be more miserable, although we take no account of correction and pay no regard to example." "And what other manner shall this be," quoth I, "besides these?" "Have we not granted,"

quoth she, "that the good are happy, and the evil miserable?" "We have,"

quoth I. "If then," quoth she, "something that is good be added to one's misery, is he not happier than another whose misery is desolate and solitary, without any partic.i.p.ation of goodness?" "So it seemeth," quoth I. "What if there be some other evil annexed to this miserable man who is deprived of all goodness, besides those which make him miserable, is he not to be accounted much more unhappy than he whose misery is lightened by partaking of goodness?" "Why not?" quoth I. "But it is manifest that it is just that the wicked be punished, and unjust that they should go unpunished." "Who can deny that?" "But neither will any man deny this," quoth she, "that whatsoever is just, is good, and contrariwise, that whatsoever is unjust, is evil." "Certainly," I answered. "Then the wicked have some good annexed when they are punished, to wit, the punishment itself, which by reason of justice is good, and when they are not punished, they have a further evil, the very impunity which thou hast deservedly granted to be an evil because of its injustice." "I cannot deny it." "Wherefore the vicious are far more unhappy by escaping punishment unjustly, than by being justly punished."

"This followeth," quoth I, "out of that which hath been concluded before.

But I pray thee, leavest thou no punishments for the souls after the death of the body?" "And those great too," quoth she. "Some of which I think to be executed as sharp punishments, and others as merciful purgations.[152] But I purpose not now to treat of those. But we have hitherto laboured that thou shouldest perceive the power of the wicked, which to thee seemed intolerable, to be none at all, and that thou shouldest see, that those whom thou complainedst went unpunished, do never escape without punishment for their wickedness. And that thou shouldest learn that the licence which thou wishedst might soon end, is not long, and yet the longer the more miserable, and most unhappy if it were everlasting. Besides, that the wicked are more wretched being permitted to escape with unjust impunity, than being punished with just severity. Out of which it followeth that they are then more grievously punished, when they are thought to go scot-free."

"When I consider thy reasons," quoth I, "I think nothing can be said more truly. But if I return to the judgments of men, who is there that will think them worthy to be believed or so much as heard?" "It is true," quoth she, "for they cannot lift up their eyes accustomed to darkness, to behold the light of manifest truth, and they are like those birds whose sight is quickened by the night, and dimmed by the day. For while they look upon, not the order of things, but their own affections, they think that licence and impunity to sin is happy. But see what the eternal law establisheth. If thou apply thy mind to the better, thou needest no judge to reward thee: thou hast joined thyself to the more excellent things. If thou declinest to that which is worse, never expect any other to punish thee: thou hast put thyself in a miserable estate; as if by turns thou lookest down to the miry ground, and up to heaven, setting aside all outward causes, by the very law of sight thou seemest sometime to be in the dirt, and sometime present to the stars. But the common sort considereth not these things. What then? Shall we join ourselves to them whom we have proved to be like beasts? What if one having altogether lost his sight should likewise forget that he ever had any, and should think that he wanted nothing which belongeth to human perfection: should we likewise think them blind, that see as well as they saw before? For they will not grant that neither, which may be proved by as forcible reasons, that they are more unhappy that do injury than they which suffer it." "I would," quoth I, "hear these reasons."

"Deniest thou," quoth she, "that every wicked man deserveth punishment?"

"No." "And it is many ways clear that the vicious are miserable?" "Yes,"

quoth I. "Then you do not doubt that those who deserve punishment are wretched?" "It is true," quoth I. "If then," quoth she, "thou wert to examine this cause, whom wouldest thou appoint to be punished, him that did or that suffered wrong?" "I doubt not," quoth I, "but that I would satisfy him that suffered with the sorrow of him that did it." "The offerer of the injury then would seem to thee more miserable than the receiver?" "It followeth," quoth I. "Hence therefore, and for other causes grounded upon that principle that dishonesty of itself maketh men miserable, it appeareth that the injury which is offered any man is not the receiver's but the doer's misery." "But now-a-days," quoth she, "orators take the contrary course. For they endeavour to draw the judges to commiseration of them who have suffered any grievous afflictions; whereas pity is more justly due to the causers thereof, who should be brought, not by angry, but rather by favourable and compa.s.sionate accusers to judgment, as it were sick men to a physician, that their diseases and faults might be taken away by punishments; by which means the defenders' labour would either wholly cease, or if they had rather do their clients some good, they would change their defence into accusations. And the wicked themselves, if they could behold virtue abandoned by them, through some little rift, and perceive that they might be delivered from the filth of sin by the affliction of punishments, obtaining virtue in exchange, they would not esteem of torments, and would refuse the a.s.sistance of their defenders, and wholly resign themselves to their accusers and judges. By which means it cometh to pa.s.s, that in wise men there is no place for hatred. For who but a very fool would hate the good? And to hate the wicked were against reason. For as faintness is a disease of the body, so is vice a sickness of the mind. Wherefore, since we judge those that have corporal infirmities to be rather worthy of compa.s.sion than of hatred, much more are they to be pitied, and not abhorred, whose minds are oppressed with wickedness, the greatest malady that may be.

[152] See discussion of this pa.s.sage in _Boethius, An Essay,_ H. F.

Stewart (1891), pp. 98 ff.

IV.

Quod tantos iuuat excitare motus Et propria fatum sollicitare manu?

Si mortem pet.i.tis, propinquat ipsa Sponte sua uolucres nec remoratur equos.

Quos serpens leo tigris ursus aper 5 Dente petunt, idem se tamen ense petunt.

An distant quia dissidentque mores, Iniustas acies et fera bella mouent Alternisque uolunt perire telis?

Non est iusta satis saeuitiae ratio. 10 Vis aptam meritis uicem referre?

Dilige iure bonos et miseresce malis."

IV.

Why should we strive to die so many ways, And slay ourselves with our own hands?

If we seek death, she ready stands, She willing comes, her chariot never stays.

Those against whom the wild beasts armed be, Against themselves with weapons rage.[153]

Do they such wars unjustly wage, Because their lives and manners disagree, And so themselves with mutual weapons kill?

Alas, but this revenge is small.

Wouldst thou give due desert to all?

Love then the good, and pity thou the ill."

[153] Literally, "Men whom serpent, lion, tiger, bear, and boar attack with tooth, yet attack each other with the sword."

V.

Hic ego: "Video," inquam, "quae sit uel felicitas uel miseria in ipsis proborum atque improborum meritis const.i.tuta. Sed in hac ipsa fortuna populari non nihil boni maliue inesse perpendo. Neque enim sapientum quisquam exul inops ignominiosusque esse malit, potius quam pollens opibus, honore reuerendus, potentia ualidus, in sua permanens urbe florere. Sic enim clarius testatiusque sapientiae tractatur officium, c.u.m in contingentes populos regentium quodam modo beat.i.tudo transfunditur, c.u.m praesertim carcer, nex[154] ceteraque legalium tormenta poenarum perniciosis potius ciuibus propter quos etiam const.i.tuta sunt debeantur.

Cur haec igitur uersa uice mutentur scelerumque supplicia bonos premant, praemia uirtutum mali rapiant, uehementer admiror, quaeque tam iniustae confusionis ratio uideatur ex te scire desidero. Minus etenim mirarer, si misceri omnia fortuitis casibus crederem. Nunc stuporem meum deus rector exaggerat. Qui c.u.m saepe bonis iucunda, malis aspera contraque bonis dura tribuat, malis optata concedat, nisi causa deprehenditur, quid est quod a fortuitis casibus differre uideatur?" "Nec mirum," inquit, "si quid ordinis ignorata ratione temerarium confusumque credatur. Sed tu quamuis causam tantae dispositionis ignores, tamen quoniam bonus mundum rector temperat, recte fieri cuncta ne dubites.

[154] lex _plerique codd._

V.

"I see," quoth I, "what felicity or misery is placed in the deserts of honest and dishonest men. But I consider that there is somewhat good or evil even in this popular fortune. For no wise man had rather live in banishment, poverty, and ignominy, than prosper in his own country, being rich, respected, and powerful. For in this manner is the office of wisdom performed with more credit and renown, when the governors'

happiness is partic.i.p.ated by the people about them; so chiefly because prisons, death, and other torments of legal punishments are rather due to pernicious subjects, for whom they were also ordained. Wherefore I much marvel why these things are thus turned upside down, and the punishments of wickedness oppress the good, while evil men obtain the rewards of the good. And I desire to know of thee what may seem to be the reason of so unjust confusion. For I would marvel less if I thought that all things were disordered by casual events. Now G.o.d being the Governor, my astonishment is increased. For since that He distributeth oftentimes that which is pleasant to the good, and that which is distasteful to the bad, and contrariwise adversity to the good, and prosperity to the evil, unless we find out the cause hereof, what difference may there seem to be betwixt this and accidental chances?"

"It is no marvel," quoth she, "if anything be thought temerarious and confused, when we know not the order it hath. But although thou beest ignorant of the causes why things be so disposed, yet because the world hath a governor, doubt not but all things are well done.

V.

Si quis Arcturi sidera nescit Propinqua summo cardine labi, Cur legat tardus plaustra Bootes Mergatque seras aequore flammas, c.u.m nimis celeres explicet ortus, 5 Legem stupebit aetheris alti.

Palleant plenae cornua lunae Infecta metis noctis opacae Quaeque fulgenti texerat ore Confusa Phoebe detegat astra, 10 Commouet gentes publicus error La.s.santque crebris pulsibus aera.

Nemo miratur flamina Cori Litus frementi tundere fluctu Nec niuis duram frigore molem 15 Feruente Phoebi soluier aestu.

Hic enim causas cernere promptum est, Illic latentes pectora turbant.

Cuncta quae rara prouehit aetas Stupetque subitis mobile uulgus, 20 Cedat inscitiae nubilus error, Cessent profecto mira uideri."

V.

Who knows not how the stars near to the poles do slide, And how Bootes his slow wain doth guide, And why he sets so late, and doth so early rise, May wonder at the courses of the skies.

If when the moon is full her horns seem pale to sight, Infested with the darkness of the night, And stars from which all grace she with her brightness took, Now show themselves, while she doth dimly look, A public error straight through vulgar minds doth pa.s.s, And they with many strokes beat upon bra.s.s.[155]

None wonders why the winds upon the waters blow.

Nor why hot Phoebus' beams dissolve the snow.

These easy are to know, the other hidden lie, And therefore more our hearts they terrify.

All strange events which time to light more seldom brings, And the vain people count as sudden things, If we our clouded minds from ignorance could free, No longer would by us admired be."

[155] See Tylor's _Primitive Culture_, pp. 296 ff. Cf "carmina uel caelo possunt deducere lunam," Virg. _Ecl._ viii. 69, and Juvenal, _Sat._ vi. 440 sq.

VI