The Theological Tractates and The Consolation of Philosophy Part 20

Quid autem de corporis uoluptatibus loquar, quarum appetentia quidem plena est anxietatis; satietas uero poenitentiae? Quantos illae morbos, quam intolerabiles dolores quasi quendam fructum nequitiae fruentium solent referre corporibus! Quarum motus quid habeat iucunditatis, ignoro. Tristes uero esse uoluptatum exitus, quisquis reminisci libidinum suarum uolet, intelleget. Quae si beatos explicare possunt, nihil causae est quin pecudes quoque beatae esse dicantur quarum omnis ad explendam corporalem lacunam festinat intentio. Honestissima quidem coniugis foret liberorumque iucunditas, sed nimis e natura dictum est nescio quem filios inuenisse tortorem; quorum quam sit mordax quaec.u.mque condicio, neque alias expertum te neque nunc anxium necesse est admonere. In quo Euripidis mei sententiam probo, qui carentem liberis infortunio dixit esse felicem.

VII.

Now what should I speak of bodily pleasures, the desire of which is full of anxiety, and the enjoying of them breeds repentance? How many diseases, how intolerable griefs bring they forth in the bodies of their possessors, as it were the fruits of their own wickedness! I know not what sweetness their beginnings have, but whosoever will remember his l.u.s.ts shall understand that the end of pleasure is sadness. Which if it be able to cause happiness, there is no reason why beasts should not be thought blessed, whose whole intention is bent to supply their corporal wants. That pleasure which proceedeth from wife and children should be most honest; but it was too naturally spoken, that some tormentor invented children, whose condition, whatsoever it be, how biting it is, I need not tell thee, who hast had experience heretofore, and art not now free from care. In which I approve the opinion of Euripides, who said that they which had no children are happy by being unfortunate.[129]

[129] Cf. _Androm._ 420.

VII.

Habet hoc uoluptas omnis, Stimulis agit fruentes Apiumque par uolantum Vbi grata mella fudit, Fugit et nimis tenaci 5 Ferit icta corda morsu.

VII.

All pleasure hath this property, She woundeth those who have her most.

And, like unto the angry bee Who hath her pleasant honey lost, She flies away with nimble wing And in our hearts doth leave her sting.

VIII.

Nihil igitur dubium est quin hae ad beat.i.tudinem uiae deuia quaedam sint nec perducere quemquam eo ualeant ad quod se perducturas esse promittunt.

Quantis uero implicitae malis sint, breuissime monstrabo. Quid enim?

Pecuniamne congregare conaberis? Sed eripies habenti. Dignitatibus fulgere uelis? Danti supplicabis et qui praeire ceteros honore cupis, poscendi humilitate uilesces. Potentiamne desideras? Subiectorum insidiis obnoxius periculis subiacebis. Gloriam petas? Sed per aspera quaeque distractus securus esse desistis. Voluptariam uitam degas? Sed quis non spernat atque abiciat uilissimae fragilissimaeque rei corporis seruum? Iam uero qui bona prae se corporis ferunt, quam exigua, quam fragili possessione nituntur!

Num enim elephantos mole, tauros robore superare poteritis, num tigres uelocitate praeibitis? Respicite caeli spatium, firmitudinem, celeritatem et aliquando desinite uilia mirari. Quod quidem caelum non his potius est quam sua qua regitur ratione mirandum. Formae uero nitor ut rapidus est, ut uelox et uernalium florum mutabilitate fugacior! Quod si, ut Aristoteles[130] ait, Lynceis oculis homines uterentur, ut eorum uisus obstantia penetraret, nonne introspectis uisceribus illud Alcibiadis superficie pulcherrimum corpus turp.i.s.simum uideretur? Igitur te pulchrum uideri non tua natura sed oculorum spectantium reddit infirmitas. Sed aestimate quam uultis nimio corporis bona, dum sciatis hoc quodc.u.mque miramini triduanae febris igniculo posse dissolui! Ex quibus omnibus illud redigere in summam licet, quod haec quae nec praestare quae pollicentur bona possunt nec omnium bonorum congregatione perfecta sunt, ea nec ad beat.i.tudinem quasi quidam calles ferunt nec beatos ipsa perficiunt.

[130] Probably from the lost _Protrepticus_ of Aristotle. See Bywater, _Journal of Philology_, ii. (1869), 59, and Hartlich, _Leipz. Stud._ xi.

(1889), 250.

VIII.

Wherefore there is no doubt but that these ways to happiness are only certain by-paths, which can never bring any man thither whither they promise to lead him. And with how great evils they are beset, I will briefly show. For what? Wilt thou endeavour to gather money? But thou shalt take it away from him who hath it. Wilt thou excel in dignities?

Thou shalt crouch to the giver, and thou who desirest to surpa.s.s others in honour shalt become vile by thy baseness in begging. Wishest thou for power? Thou shalt be in danger of thy subjects' treacheries. Seekest thou for glory? But, drawn into many dangers, thou shalt lose thy safety. Wilt thou live a voluptuous life? But who would not despise and neglect the service of so vile and frail a thing as his body? Now they who boast of the habilities of their body, upon how unsteadfast a possession do they ground themselves! For can you be bigger than elephants, or stronger than bulls? Or swifter than tigers? Look upon the s.p.a.ce, firmness, and speedy motion of the heavens, and cease at length to have in admiration these base things. Which heavens are not more to be admired for these qualities than for the manner of their government.

As for the glittering of beauty, how soon and swiftly doth it vanish away! As suddenly decaying and changing as the frail flowers in the spring. And if, as Aristotle saith, men had Lynceus's eyes, that they could see through stone walls, would not they judge that body of Alcibiades, seeming outwardly most fair, to be most foul and ugly by discovering his entrails? Wherefore not thy nature but the weakness of the beholders' eyes maketh thee seem fair. But esteem the goods of the body as much as you will, so that you acknowledge this, that whatsoever you admire may be dissolved with the burning of an ague of three days.

Out of which we may briefly collect this sum; that these goods, which can neither perform that they promise, nor are perfect by having all that is good, do neither, as so many paths, lead men to happiness, nor make men happy of themselves.

VIII.

Eheu quae miseros tramite deuios Abducit ignorantia!

Non aurum in uiridi quaeritis arbore Nec uite gemmas carpitis, Non altis laqueos montibus abditis 5 Vt pisce ditetis dapes Nec uobis capreas si libeat sequi, Tyrrhena captatis uada.

Ipsos quin etiam fluctibus abditos Norunt recessus aequoris, 10 Quae gemmis niueis unda feracior Vel quae rubentis purpurae Nec non quae tenero pisce uel asperis Praestent echinis litora.

Sed quonam lateat quod cupiunt bonum, 15 Nescire caeci sustinent, Et quod stelliferum trans abiit polum, Tellure demersi petunt.

Quid dignum stolidis mentibus inprecer?

Opes honores ambiant; 20 Et c.u.m falsa graui mole parauerint, Tum uera cognoscant bona.

VIII.

Alas, how ignorance makes wretches stray Out of the way!

You from green trees expect no golden mines Nor pearls from vines, Nor use you on mountains to lay your net Fishes to get, Nor, if the pleasant sport of hunting please, Run you to seas.

Men will be skilful in the hidden caves Of the ocean waves, And in what coasts the orient pearls are bred, Or purple red, Also, what different sorts of fishes store Each several sh.o.r.e.

But when they come their chiefest good to find, Then are they blind, And search for that under the earth, which lies Above the skies.

How should I curse these fools? Let thirst them hold Of fame and gold, That, having got false goods with pain, they learn True to discern.

IX.

"Hactenus mendacis formam felicitatis ostendisse suffecerit, quam si perspicaciter intueris, ordo est deinceps quae sit uera monstrare." "Atqui uideo," inquam, "nec opibus sufficientiam nec regnis potentiam nec reuerentiam dignitatibus nec celebritatem gloria nec laet.i.tiam uoluptatibus posse contingere." "An etiam causas, cur id ita sit, deprehendisti?" "Tenui quidem ueluti rimula mihi uideor intueri, sed ex te apertius cognoscere malim."

"Atqui promptissima ratio est. Quod enim simplex est indiuisumque natura, id error huma.n.u.s separat et a uero atque perfecto ad falsum imperfectumque traducit. An tu arbitraris quod nihilo indigeat egere potentia?" "Minime,"

inquam. "Recte tu quidem. Nam si quid est quod in ulla re inbecillioris ualentiae sit, in hac praesidio necesse est egeat alieno." "Ita est,"

inquam. "Igitur sufficientiae potentiaeque una est eademque natura." "Sic uidetur." "Quod uero huiusmodi sit, spernendumne esse censes an contra rerum omnium ueneratione dignissimum?" "At hoc," inquam, "ne dubitari quidem potest." "Addamus igitur sufficientiae potentiaeque reuerentiam, ut haec tria unum esse iudicemus." "Addamus, si quidem uera uolumus confiteri."

"Quid uero," inquit, "obscurumne hoc atque ign.o.bile censes esse an omni celebritate clarissimum? Considera uero, ne quod nihilo indigere, quod potentissimum, quod honore dignissimum esse concessum est, egere claritudine quam sibi praestare non possit atque ob id aliqua ex parte uideatur abiectius." "Non possum," inquam, "quin hoc uti est ita etiam celeberrimum esse confitear." "Consequens igitur est ut claritudinem superioribus tribus nihil differre fateamur." "Consequitur," inquam. "Quod igitur nullius egeat alieni, quod suis cuncta uiribus possit, quod sit clarum atque reuerendum, nonne hoc etiam constat esse laetissimum?" "Sed unde huic," inquam, "tali maeror ullus obrepat ne cogitare quidem possum; quare plenum esse laet.i.tiae, si quidem superiora manebunt, necesse est confiteri." "Atqui illud quoque per eadem necessarium est sufficientiae, potentiae, claritudinis, reuerentiae, iucunditatis nomina quidem esse diuersa, nullo modo uero discrepare substantiam." "Necesse est," inquam.

"Hoc igitur quod est unum simplexque natura, prauitas humana dispert.i.t et dum rei quae partibus caret partem conatur adipisci, nec portionem quae nulla est nec ipsam quam minime affectat a.s.sequitur." "Quonam," inquam, "modo?" "Qui diuitias," inquit, "pet.i.t penuriae fuga, de potentia nihil laborat, uilis obscurusque esse mauult, multas etiam sibi naturales quoque subtrahit uoluptates, ne pecuniam quam parauit amittat. Sed hoc modo ne sufficientia quidem contingit ei quem ualentia deserit, quem molestia pungit, quem uilitas abicit, quem recondit obscuritas. Qui uero solum posse desiderat, profligat opes, despicit uoluptates honoremque potentia carentem gloriam quoque nihili pendit. Sed hunc quoque quam multa deficiant uides.

Fit enim ut aliquando necessariis egeat, ut anxietatibus mordeatur c.u.mque haec depellere nequeat, etiam id quod maxime petebat potens esse desistat.

Similiter ratiocinari de honoribus, gloria, uoluptatibus licet. Nam c.u.m unumquodque horum idem quod cetera sit, quisquis horum aliquid sine ceteris pet.i.t, ne illud quidem quod desiderat apprehendit." "Quid igitur?" inquam.

"Si qui cuncta simul cupiat adipisci, summam quidem ille beat.i.tudinis uelit. Sed num in his eam reperiet, quae demonstrauimus id quod pollicentur non posse conferre?" "Minime," inquam. "In his igitur quae singula quaedam expetendorum praestare creduntur, beat.i.tudo nullo modo uestiganda est."

"Fateor," inquam, "et hoc nihil dici uerius potest." "Habes igitur,"

inquit, "et formam falsae felicitatis et causas. Deflecte nunc in aduersum mentis intuitum; ibi enim ueram quam promisimus statim uidebis." "Atqui haec," inquam, "uel caeco perspicua est eamque tu paulo ante monstrasti, dum falsae causas aperire conaris. Nam nisi fallor ea uera est et perfecta felicitas quae sufficientem, potentem, reuerendum, celebrem laetumque perficiat. Atque ut me interius animaduertisse cognoscas, quae unum horum, quoniam idem cuncta sunt, ueraciter praestare potest hanc esse plenam beat.i.tudinem sine ambiguitate cognosco." "O te alumne hac opinione felicem, si quidem hoc," inquit, "adieceris...." "Quidnam?" inquam. "Essene aliquid in his mortalibus caducisque rebus putas quod huiusmodi statum possit afferre?" "Minime," inquam, "puto idque a te, nihil ut amplius desideretur, ostensum est." "Haec igitur uel imagines ueri boni uel inperfecta quaedam bona dare mortalibus uidentur, uerum autem atque perfectum bonum conferre non possunt." "a.s.sentior," inquam. "Quoniam igitur agnouisti quae uera illa sit, quae autem beat.i.tudinem mentiantur, nunc superest ut unde ueram hanc petere possis agnoscas." "Id quidem," inquam, "iam dudum uehementer exspecto." "Sed c.u.m, ut in Timaeo[131] Platoni," inquit, "nostro placet, in minimis quoque rebus diuinum praesidium debeat implorari, quid nunc faciendum censes, ut illius summi boni sedem reperire mereamur?"

"Inuocandum," inquam, "rerum omnium patrem, quo praetermisso nullum rite fundatur exordium." "Recte," inquit, ac simul ita modulata est.

[131] uti Timaeo _codd. optimi._