The Story of General Pershing Part 7

Pers.h.i.+ng's information soon proved to be correct. After a few days, in small detachments the Moros did their utmost to gain the open jungle by das.h.i.+ng through the surrounding lines. But every dash was frustrated, although the fanatical fighters recklessly threw themselves into what was certain death. The failure of one band to break through was merely a clarion call to others of their fellows to renew the attempt. The mad and useless efforts were all baffled.

At last on Christmas Day, 1911, the Moros in the little fortress did what Moros had not done before,--they marched down the mountain side and surrendered,--that is, all did save a few who made a final wild attempt to break through the jungle. The effort was vain, however, for the regulars hotly pursued the little brown fighters and the desperadoes paid the penalty of their daring.

A second fortress was taken in a similar manner. But the leader was as wise as he was brave and determined. After he had permitted the knowledge of the fall of the first forts to be carried throughout the tribe, soon after the beginning of the siege, he sent a message within the third fort that the inmates, if they surrendered, would receive the same generous treatment the defenders of the other forts had received.

Soon the brown fighters were convinced and promptly acted accordingly.

They discovered that they were dealing with a leader different from any they had previously known. He did exactly what he said he would do. His promise could be trusted. His word was reliable; and forty forts soon were given over to the Americans.

The subjection of all the Moros, however, had not yet been accomplished.

Some still distrusted the white men and, as they believed, fought to retain and defend their homes. At last, however, at the Battle of Bagsag in June, 1913, the task was completed, though Pers.h.i.+ng's work was not yet all done. What he had believed to be only a temporary task had now a.s.sumed larger and longer proportions. He had done so well that he was retained not only in command but also was the governor of the newly conquered, but not yet friendly province. Perhaps there is no better proof of the ability and sterling character of General Pers.h.i.+ng anywhere to be found than the fact that the little brown Moros whom he defeated and overthrew, later made him a datto of their tribe--an official position that granted him full power of life and death over every man, woman and child in their numbers and also made him a judge as well as a ruler over them.

In his quiet, efficient, modest manner General Pers.h.i.+ng in a larger way had manifested the same qualities that had marked the lad at Laclede, the student at West Point, and the young lieutenant leading his black troops in Cuba. To-day all Americans are proud as well as pleased that there were leaders able to recognize, and brave enough to reward, the services of a soldier who had filled with honor every position to which he had been a.s.signed.

In the reports to the War Department there are many interesting incidents descriptive of the daring and labors of General Pers.h.i.+ng, who was not only in command of the troops, but also, as has been said, the military governor of the Province of Mindanao. In his own reports there are general as well as specific recommendations and the directness with which he states what to him appear to be needful for the good of the Filipinos as well as of the American troops, is marked.

[From the Report of June 30, 1910.]

To the Adjutant-General of the United States Army:

To keep down the lawless element among the Moros and pagan tribes a relatively large force must be maintained in this department. We have now occupied these Islands long enough to determine quite definitely where such posts should be located. There should be a regiment post on the Island of Jolo, a brigade post in the Lake Lanoa division and the regimental post in some point in the vicinity of Zamboanga, besides smaller posts at Fort Overton and Malabang.

Jolo is the strategical site for the post in the Sulu Archipelago. From there any point in the Island can be quickly reached and the other islands of the Sulu group can be easily controlled. It possesses a good harbor and is otherwise well situated as a military station.

Mounted troops can go anywhere on the Island and they exert more influence over the Moros than dismounted troops.

The Lake Lanoa Moros are turbulent and unruly and the presence of a relatively large force in that region will be required for years to come. The sh.o.r.es of Lake Lanoa afford a very desirable place for a military post. The country is very fertile and in case of necessity troops could maintain themselves there almost indefinitely.

The erection of a permanent post at Zamboanga is in every way desirable. Troops located at Zamboanga could be sent to any place in the department more quickly than from any other point.

After stating that many of the barracks and quarters will not last long, he comments:

Permanent posts should be built entirely of concrete or of a combination of concrete and most durable hard woods.

The khaki uniform furnished by the quartermasters'

department for tropical service is poorly made and ill-fitting. The American made cotton khaki cloth is heavy, shrinks badly, fades rapidly and is almost as warm as woolen cloth. This clothing is as poor an excuse for a military uniform as can be imagined. Instead of offering inducements to soldiers to enter and remain in foreign service by giving them good-looking and well-fitted clothes, we force upon them these unbecoming, hot, heavy, ill-fitting uniforms. The best khaki cloth is of English manufacture and should be prescribed for the army. It is light, cool, holds its color and does not shrink. All uniform cloth ought to be manufactured by tailors enlisted for the purpose.

He goes on to discuss the water supply, public animals, s.h.i.+ps and drydocks, and pack and wagon transportation, water and sewer systems, the roads and the works, ice and cold storage plants and also makes suggestions for the engineering and ordnance departments. He asks for the construction, for military purposes, of a telegraph line of communication with the District of Davao. He speaks also of the marked improvement in the target practice, especially in small arms. He gives the details of the eighteen expeditions entered upon and has a complete description of the Subano uprising, which occurred in November, 1909, among the hill people of Zamboanga. Certain Moro chiefs from Lake Lanoa, a.s.sisted by pagan and Christian outcasts and criminals from the Misamis Strip, planned to gather the hill people into an inaccessible part of the "Bolman Country." This plan was carried out by resorting to false prophecies, and, in many cases, to violence. Thousands of these small pastoral Subanos were driven into camps, where they would be more completely under the control of these self-appointed leaders. Large camps were built, one at Bolman and one at Dampalan, and preparations were made for defending them. The positions were well selected. The occupants were armed with spears, krises, kampilans and barongs. A constabulary force from Capitan was sent November 28th, by the Governor of the Moro provinces, to the outskirts of the Barbon camp. The Subanos, under the leaders.h.i.+p of their Moro chiefs, attacked the constabulary with spears, and several of the men were killed. Upon the call of the Provincial Governor for troops, the second company of Philippine scouts, commanded by Captain Moses T. Barlow, was sent to Dipolog to report to Major John J. Finley, Governor of the District of Zamboanga, who was placed in command.

In the report of Major Finley that officer writes:

"The considerable reward offered for the apprehension of the leaders did not stimulate the natives to search for them. The Subanos were thoroughly subdued and terrorized by the rigorous discipline of the camp and after the fight of November 28th they were only too glad to hide themselves in the woods and mountains. The Philippines made no effort whatever to earn the reward.

"Ample time was given for the hill people to take a look at the troops and become convinced that this form of governmental power was friendly and really interested in their salvation and prosperity. After becoming thus convinced, the good influence of the government spread with rapidity among the Subanos. They returned to their farms by hundreds daily, they preferred their services to the government and declined remuneration. The important witnesses emerged from their hiding places and the apprehension of the leaders became a possibility. The leaders were caught, the witnesses came forward from their hiding places to convict them, and the wondering Subanos reclaimed their homes and began life anew.

There was a general rejoicing among them."

He reports a shortage of officers and states that two-year troops hardly get acquainted with the people or really become interested in the larger problems that are being worked out under American control. "The army cannot do itself full justice in the administration of civil affairs in a Moro Province unless the period of service be extended." He declares that service in the Philippine Islands is not more arduous than service in Texas or Arizona. "There is no reason why enlisted men should be given credit for double service for every year spent in the Islands."

He reports also that the Philippine Scouts are in excellent condition. A high state of discipline exists among them. Their officers are enthusiastic and willing, and the same spirit extends to the men.

In 1911, similar reports are made concerning uniforms, clothing, etc.

The general good health of the soldiers is described. Only three cases of typhoid fever occurred in the entire department. "Too much time is devoted to target practice in comparison with other cla.s.ses of training.

The increased pay for expert riflemen, sharpshooters and marksmen does not serve to increase appreciation and the efficiency in rifle fire." He recommended that extra pay be discontinued.

He reports nineteen expeditions of the troops and gives a clear account of the pagan uprising. He urges an increase in the regular regiments of infantry in time of peace, to form a substantial basis in the first line when war comes. "Under no circ.u.mstances should the enlisted strength of a regiment be less than one thousand men, in time of peace. In war this should be increased to two thousand four hundred or even three thousand." He recommends that the cavalry regiments be made smaller. He states that the efficiency of the cavalry is not as high as it should be, while the field artillery is below the recognized requirements. The Philippine Scouts sometimes are inclined to consider themselves on the same footing as the white troops, with a consequent disinclination to perform duties away from well-equipped and centrally located garrisons.

"Considering their low cost of maintenance I believe it poor policy not to keep them up to the authorized maximum strength of 12,000, reducing the garrison of American troops accordingly.

"I believe the time is propitious for the organization of Philippine cavalry, mounted on hardy native ponies which require none of the expensive hay of the American horse.

"The post exchange ought to be authorized to sell beer and light wines. Conducted under proper regulations and under official supervision this feature formerly served as a means to furnish soldiers with a club of their own and save many from the grog shops and the brothels. The reestablishment of that part of the exchange would go far to reduce desertion, venereal diseases and alcoholism among our troops."

In 1914 General Pers.h.i.+ng was recalled from the Philippine Islands.

His work and that of General Funston was now fully recognized by his countrymen. Peace had come in the Philippines and the victorious leaders had been successful not only with their enemies, but also in winning the confidence of most of the tribes they conquered. It is said there was no man in the islands who was more deeply respected and loved by the natives than was General Pers.h.i.+ng. They were fearful of him, also, because they knew that he would do exactly what he said he would do.

Strict with offenders against the laws, he was at the same time gentle and friendly to the deserving, and it was not long before all were aware that he was working not for conquest or for the glory of his nation, but to help his country solve one of the most difficult problems left by the Spanish War. That problem was to reconstruct and reorganize the life among the Filipinos in such a way that they themselves should be helped and not hurt by the plan. When General Pers.h.i.+ng returned to America, hope was strong that not many years would elapse before the little brown men would be able to care for themselves and be recognized as an independent nation.

For a brief time he was stationed at the Presidio in San Francisco, California, but soon afterward was placed in command of the southwestern division, along the Mexican border. It was while he was stationed there in command of a scant and greatly extended line, which required constant change on his own part in order to keep in touch with the various elements in his command, that the great tragedy of the death of his wife and three little daughters occurred.

On August 27, 1915, while he was in command at El Paso, word came to him over the telephone of the awful fire in the Presidio at San Francisco, where his family, then consisting of his wife, three little daughters and a little son, were residing in his enforced absence. Of these, all except Warren, the little boy, perished in the fire, a maid having succeeded in rescuing the little fellow. When the terrible message was received by the general it is said that at last he inquired, "Is there anything more to be told?"

Upon being a.s.sured that he now knew not only the worst but had heard all, he quietly hung up the receiver and turned away. There was to be no manifestation of his almost crus.h.i.+ng sorrow. It was his own, and there we too must leave it. There are few who can fail to understand. The lines in his strong face were soon deeper, the graying hair became lighter still, but General Pers.h.i.+ng's suffering and sorrow were his own, not even to be referred to except as one of the facts in the life of a man who belongs not to himself alone, but also to his country.

It has been reported that the general requested that he might be sent on the most dangerous service to which his country could a.s.sign him.

Whether or not he ever made the request the writer does not know, but that he might have had such a feeling in his heart can readily be understood by all. The little motherless lad, Warren, has been cared for by the general's sisters, who now reside in Lincoln, Nebraska.

CHAPTER IX

IN PURSUIT OF VILLA

GENERAL PERs.h.i.+NG had been sent to the Mexican border in command of the Southwestern Division early in 1915. In command of the El Paso patrol district, he necessarily was busy much of his time in guarding and patrolling the long thin lines of our men on duty there.

The troubles with Mexico had been steadily increasing in seriousness.

The rivalry and warfare between various leaders in that country had not only brought their own country into a condition of distress, but also had threatened to involve the United States as well. Citizens of the latter country had invested large sums in mining, lumber and other industries in Mexico and were complaining bitterly of the failure of our Government either to protect them or their investments. Again and again, under threats of closing their mines or confiscating their property, they had "bought bonds" of the rival Mexican parties, which was only another name for blackmail.

Raids were becoming increasingly prevalent near the border and already Americans were reported to have been slain by these irresponsible bandits who were loyal only to their leaders and not always to them. The condition was becoming intolerable.

Germany, too, had her agents busy within the borders of Mexico, artfully striving not only to increase her own power in the rich and distracted country, but also to create and foment an unreasonable anger against the United States, vainly hoping in this way to prevent the latter country from entering the World War by compelling her to face these threatening attacks from her neighbor on the south. President Wilson was doing his utmost to hold a steady course through the midst of these perils, which daily were becoming more threatening and perplexing.

The climax came early in March, 1915, when Francesco Villa, the most daring and reckless leader of all the Mexican bandit bands, suddenly with his followers made an attack on the post at Columbus, New Mexico.

The American soldiers were taken completely by surprise. Their machine guns (some said there was only one at the post) jammed and their defense was inadequate. They were not prepared. When Villa withdrew he left nine dead civilians and eight dead American soldiers behind him.

Instantly the President decided that the time had come when he must act.

There was still the same strong desire to avoid war with Mexico if possible. The same suspicion of Germany was in his mind, but in spite of these things Villa must be punished and Americans must be protected.

Quickly a call for regulars and State troops was made and General Pers.h.i.+ng was selected as the leader of the punitive expedition.