Argentina Part 7

The detachment of Pena from political parties had been expected to prove advantageous, but in practice this was not the case, for the President, having no party, had no supporters in the Congress, and matters approached a deadlock. At the beginning of 1895 the President found it impossible to induce the Congress to vote the Budget, and there was also a split in the Cabinet about the fate of two naval officers condemned for partic.i.p.ation in the Santa Fe outbreak. Pena wished to confirm the death sentence; there was strong opposition, and Pena was probably glad of the excuse to resign and disappear from political life. This took place on January 21, 1895. The sentence upon the two officers was commuted to one of imprisonment.

He was succeeded by the Vice-President Uriburu, who had also been chosen on account of his neutrality; but he was more successful, and he had the powerful support of Roca and Pellegrini. During his first year of office it seemed probable that a foreign war would be added to all the other troubles of the Republic, for the boundary dispute with Chile was a.s.suming a threatening att.i.tude and continued to disturb public tranquillity for seven years. This subject can be treated more conveniently in the history of the next administration, when it was settled. In this year a boundary dispute with Brazil about the Misiones was settled by the arbitration of President Cleveland in favour of the latter country.[54]

Little progress in settling the nation's difficulties was made under Uriburu, but internal and external peace was maintained. In 1898 General Roca succeeded him as President, and it was generally felt that a man had appeared who was competent to steer the s.h.i.+p of State into smoother waters. He had been of great service during the troubles which had attended the resignation of Celman, and had kept the disorderly elements in check. He had, all through the troubles of ten years, been on the side of law and order, and he was practically the leader of a national party.

In May, 1898, the President in his message to Congress denounced judicial corruption, and the publicity which he gave to these abuses resulted in several improvements; but there is still much matter for adverse criticism in the administration of justice in Argentina. The improvements in Government methods led to gradual general improvement, which, however, was also the result of natural causes, and Argentina became undoubtedly the most prosperous country in South America. The fear of political disintegration has become a thing of the past, owing to the preponderance of the capital in wealth and influence, but neither Roca himself nor any other successor has been able to banish a serious evil from which Argentina suffers, and which, though not causing civil war on a large scale, brings about disquieting strikes and riots. This is due to defective methods of government. The President may be said to have been the "saviour of his country" in the sense that a weaker or dishonest man would probably have plunged the country into both domestic and foreign war, and neutralised all the progress of a generation. But he could not bequeath political capacity to his colleagues, nor could he eradicate many bad traditions of long standing.

His last work was the settlement of the boundary dispute with Chile.

It is not necessary to go into the history of the subject previous to the Treaty of 1881. In the old Spanish days there had been uncertainty about the boundary, and during the existence of the two Republics the quarrel had never slept. "During the whole of its progress the Argentine Republic contended that her western boundary from north to south was the Cordillera de los Andes, and that, in consequence, she had dominion over all the territory eastward of the crest of the Cordillera, the greater part of the Straits of Magellan, and the whole of Tierra del Fuego. Chile on her part accepted the natural boundary of the Cordillera, to a great extent, but maintained that this boundary did not rule in the southern part of the continent; that in Patagonia the territory on both sides of the Andes were Chilian, from the Pacific to the Atlantic; that the Straits of Magellan were Chilian; and that Tierra del Fuego was also Chilian."[55]

The two Republics made a Treaty in 1881. They agreed that down to 52 S., _i.e._, to the Straits of Magellan, the boundary was to be the Cordilleras de los Andes. The line was to pa.s.s over the highest points of the watershed. The southern boundary was also determined. The Treaty represents a concession on the part of Chile, who gave up her extravagant claims to the east of Patagonia. But she still claimed that the line should follow the highest points in the watershed, while the Argentine Government insisted that the line should run from highest peak to highest peak.

This Treaty was ratified, but not carried out. In 1883 the Argentine Government informed its Amba.s.sador at Santiago that the time had come to trace the boundary line. But procrastination is a South American characteristic, and the affair drifted on until, in 1888, a Convention was made. In accordance with the Treaty of 1881, this Convention appointed experts to trace the line. The matter, in fact, was one of great difficulty, for unfortunately it turned out that the watersheds and the highest summits did not coincide, and the experts disagreed hopelessly.

The question of the rivers had raised fresh obstacles, and the experts had brought matters to such a tangle that it was necessary in 1893 to draw up a Protocol to explain them further. The main principle which it fixed was that in case the high peaks of the Cordillera should be crossed by any river, that river should be cut by the boundary line.

The experts continued their work, which was extremely arduous, for the boundary line ran through unexplored forests and mountains. But in 1895 feelings ran to a dangerous height in both countries, and the people of Argentina declared that the Chilians were a.s.suming an aggressive att.i.tude and were likely to attack them. They were made the more uneasy by the discovery that the army and stores had, like everything else, suffered from long years of misrule, and Congress voted fifty million gold dollars for military preparations. In July, 1898, a further controversy arose. The Puna de Atacama is a great salt waste of rugged tableland, volcanic, gra.s.sless, and inhospitable.

Working from the north, the experts had found no great difficulty until they reached this savage territory. Here there was a deadlock, and the Chilians claimed the whole district. Possibly the belief that the disputed territory contained considerable borax deposits accentuated the quarrel, but the main source of it was national pride, for the majority of the Andine territory was of small value. The experts south of the Atacama waste proceeded more smoothly till they reached Patagonia. "Here,[56] indeed, the fundamental condition of ident.i.ty between the "highest crest" and the "water parting" (or "divide," as it is called in North America), existed in full force, and no ground for dispute presented itself, the "main range" of the Andes being exceptionally well adapted by position and structure for an international boundary. It was the divergence of these two essential conditions in Patagonia which imperilled the peace of South America. The Patagonian rivers were found to flow from east to west right athwart, or transverse to, the general trend of the Andine mountain system from north to south. They were found to break across the great mountain ma.s.ses, and to intersperse wide valleys, across which the boundary must either be carried from one ma.s.s of peaks to the next or else be made to skirt the indefinite edge of cordillera and pampas, where the two insensibly combine and where the rivers rise. A very little examination proved the incompatibility of "higher crests" with "water parting" as a fixed principle of demarcation in these parts."[57]

With this fruitful field of dispute before them it is not surprising that angry feelings were engendered, especially among the Chilians, who have narrow territory, and were unwilling to give up a square mile without a struggle. In August Chile despatched an ultimatum demanding arbitration, and Roca induced his Cabinet to a.s.sent to the demand.

[Ill.u.s.tration: BOUNDARY LINE IN THE ANDES.]

The smaller question--the Atacama territory--was referred to the United States. Mr. Buchanan was appointed arbiter, and he was a.s.sisted by one Chilian and one Argentine Commissioner. Mr. Buchanan drew a boundary line which he considered to be just, and by an ingenious device contrived that both the agreement and the disagreement of the Commissioners should preserve its integrity.[58] The dispute was thus happily settled, and not long afterwards Roca met the Chilian President at Punta Arenas, and an agreement to restrict armaments was made.

But the Patagonian boundary was a matter of much greater difficulty. It was referred to Great Britain, and in December, 1899, the Commission in London issued a most exhaustive report. It was necessary to proceed very slowly in such a perplexing matter, and public feeling was greatly excited, both countries appearing to be eager for war. Such a catastrophe seemed to be probable, for Senor Alcorta, the Argentine War Minister, was extremely bellicose, but on January 31, 1902, Sir Thomas Holdich was sent with a small Commission to endeavour to determine the boundary line, and it was intimated to both Governments that if hostile preparations continued King Edward VII. would be compelled to withdraw from his position as arbiter. The tension was somewhat relieved by the sudden death of Senor Alcorta, and Roca acted a statesmanlike part in working for peace, and it was largely through his exertions that in June, 1902, a Treaty was signed to restrict armaments. When Sir Thomas Holdich's Commission gave its decision a few months later, the award was loyally accepted.

This settlement of a great question is one of the most signal triumphs for the principle of arbitration, for on this occasion neither party was willing to make concessions and the disposition of both was rather to war than to peace. The benefit of the settlement was incalculable, for it preserved the two most flouris.h.i.+ng States in South America from a war which would have gone far towards ruining both.[59] This example has been of the utmost value to South America, and arbitration is undoubtedly beginning to replace the appeal to arms.

With this triumph of peace this modern history of Argentina may fitly be closed. President Roca, who had deserved so well of his country, was succeeded in 1904 by Dr. Manuel Quintana, who still holds that post, and his term of office has been one of great material prosperity for the Republic.

FOOTNOTES:

[53] During forty-five years before 1857 the population had only a little more than doubled; during the forty-five years since that date the increase has been 450 per cent. (Dawson, "South American Republics"

i. 143).

[54] "The boundary line between the Argentine Republic and the United States of Brazil, in that part submitted to me for arbitration and decision, is const.i.tuted and shall be established by and upon the rivers Pepiri (also called Pepiri-guazu) and San Antonio" ("The Misiones Award," Article VI.).

[55] Report, i. 152.

[56] _I.e._, north of Patagonia.

[57] Sir T. H. Holdich, "The Countries of the King's Award," p. 50.

[58] "Where the boundary was adverse to Chile the Argentine Commissioner voted for it, and Mr. Buchanan siding with him gave a majority against the Chilian representative. Where the conditions were reversed, Mr. Buchanan agreed with the Chilian Commissioner. In this manner the work was concluded in three days" (Akers "A History of South America," p. 114).

[59] "Political combination is now possible between two strong and self-reliant Republics, recognising a common ancestry, bound by the ties of ethnic affinity, owning and revering the same splendid history (which has before now included concerted action in the common cause of South American freedom), and rejoicing in the present possession and future prospect of magnificent material advantages, such as never could possibly be secured, except under conditions of peaceful development, unchecked and unhindered by the recurrent threat of war.

It is difficult to overestimate the results of such a combination on the future of South America" ("Holdich," Ibid. pp. 413, 14).

CHAPTER X

THE CONSt.i.tUTION--THE ARMY AND NAVY--GENERAL POLITICAL CONDITIONS

Argentina is nominally a Federal Republic and her Const.i.tution closely resembles that of the United States. But, in fact, the federal element is much fainter in the southern Republic, for, as has been shown, the struggles between the two great parties eventually led to the attainment by the central Government at Buenos Aires of that preponderance which was inevitable in view of the vast superiority of the capital to the Provinces in population, civilisation, and geographical position. But the Spanish distaste for centralised administration shows itself in the reluctance to admit the facts, and of this the town of La Plata is an almost comic instance. When, in 1882, it was decided to make this place, which is distant about thirty-five miles from Buenos Aires, the capital of the Province, the authorities spared no effort in planning and building a magnificent city which should be an effectual counterpoise to the federal capital and a standing protest against Unitarian theory. But to build a town is one thing and to people it another; the vast political and commercial interests of Buenos Aires completely overshadowed the upstart city, and it remains a mere lifeless husk, unvitalised by the comparatively insignificant Provincial business. In the United States interference by the Federal Government in State rights is extremely rare and would be liable to cause real civil war; in the Argentina it is common and only brings about a "revolution"--a political phenomenon which has been very mild in type in Argentina during the last decade or two, and indeed public opinion generally seems to applaud the President when he brings an unruly Governor to book.

[Ill.u.s.tration: PASEO AL BOSQUE, LA PLATA (PROVINCIAL CAPITAL).]

The President is the outstanding feature of the Const.i.tution.

Important as the head of the State is in the North American Republic, in Argentina the President might almost say "L'etat c'est moi," for the well-being of Argentina has practically been conditioned by the character of the Presidents. The wickedness of a Rosas or the folly of a Celman formerly made her a byword among nations, while the sagacity and patriotism of a Rivadavia or a Roca have turned imminent disaster into prosperity. The President and Vice-President are elected by Presidential electors who are chosen in each Province by the direct vote of the people, and who, as in the United States, are chosen for that purpose alone. The office of President is held for six years, and the holder of it is Commander-in-Chief and has all the State patronage, including the ecclesiastical. In him, of course, the executive power is embodied. He is a.s.sisted by eight Secretaries of State--the Interior, Foreign Affairs, Finance, War, Justice, Agriculture, Marine, and Public Works--but they are appointed by him and may be dismissed at pleasure, so it will be easily understood that his power is enormous.

The Legislature is of the familiar type. The upper house is the Senate with thirty members, two for each of the fourteen Provinces and two for the city of Buenos Aires, and their term of office is for nine years, but one third of them is renewed every three years. The provincial senators are elected by the Legislatures of the Provinces, the two for Buenos Aires by a special body of electors. The House of Deputies, which is the lower branch of the National Congress, consists of 120 members, elected by the people, and there is supposed to be one deputy for every 33,000 inhabitants. Each member of Congress receives the somewhat extravagant allowance of 12,000 dollars, or about 1,060.

The Vice-President is Chairman of the Senate--and here it will be noticed how very closely the Argentines follow the northern practice--and it has also sometimes happened that the apparent sinecure of the Vice-Presidency has been the step to the great office.

The President now in power, Dr. Jose Figueroa Alcorta,[60] was Vice-President till March, 1906, when he succeeded on the death of President Quintana. Like our House of Commons, the House of Deputies is the money chamber, and it has the right of impeaching guilty officials before the Senate.

The various Provinces have their own Const.i.tution and in theory have complete local self-government, even to the right of framing their own fiscal policy, but, as hinted above, they have not in practice very great power. There are also a number of Gobernaciones, thinly populated and governed in more or less absolute fas.h.i.+on. For convenience of reference, the list of Provinces and Gobernaciones, with their areas and estimated population, may be given.

PROVINCES.

Area in Square Miles. Populations.

Buenos Aires City 72 1,125,693 " " Province 117,777 1,550,372 Santa Fe 50,916 751,298 Entre Rios 28,784 383,816 Corrientes 32,580 315,234 La Rioja 34,546 85,388 Catamarca 47,531 109,434 San Juan 33,715 110,035 Mendoza 56,502 201,467 Cordoba 62,160 540,866 San Luis 28,535 106,315 Santiago del Estero 39,764 193,211 Tuc.u.man 8,926 295,213 Salta 62,184 143,629 Jujuy 18,997 59,317

TERRITORIES.

Misiones 11,282 41,814 Formosa 41,402 14,186 El Chaco 52,741 27,414 Pampa 56,320 70,388 Rio Negro 75,924 28,166 Nequen 42,345 29,793 Chubut 93,427 17,561 Santa Cruz 109,142 4,927 Tierra del Fuego 8,299 1,703 Los Andes 21,989 2,768

The Supreme Federal Court with its five judges administers justice and is also the Court of Appeal. Trial by jury appears in the Const.i.tution but it is never practised. The administration of justice has long been acknowledged to be in an unsatisfactory state and attempts to improve it have not borne much fruit. Cases are known in which Englishmen have been kept twelve months in prison awaiting trial, and if this is the case with foreigners it may be supposed that natives have much cause for complaint. In his last Message to Congress (May, 1909) the President, while paying a tribute to "the patriotic diligence of our magistrates," remarked that the ordinary Courts of Justice of the capital still leave something to be desired as regards rapidity of action, and he attributes the delay to the fact that the population has outgrown the system, which, he said, "is too cramped to cope with the demands on it, and I think there is urgent and imperious need for reform if we desire to avert a permanent cause for complaint and discredit." Undoubtedly the foreign man of business, whose capital and enterprise is essential to the development of Argentina, will be more deterred by defects in the administration of justice than any other circ.u.mstance, for if there is the probability of pecuniary loss in civil cases and discomfort and persecution for his subordinates in the criminal Courts, the advantages of the country as a field for capital must be seriously discounted. It is, however, in far-away, scantily populated districts where the hard cases occur, but it is generally acknowledged that there is considerable room for improvement in the administration of justice.

The position in the world of a great State depends upon the courage and endurance of its people, and these qualities are typified by the efficiency which they demand in the army and navy. Argentina is advancing on the road to greatness, and therefore her military position is a matter of increasing importance. It may be hoped that conditions are now no longer favourable to the unprofitable wars which in the past have been perpetually waged between South American States, for foreign capital has a steadying influence and the sense of kins.h.i.+p between Latin Americans is becoming stronger. However, it must be remembered that the fraternal spirit of the Greeks did not preserve them from internecine wars, and Argentina, flanked by each of the other two powerful South American Republics, cannot afford to neglect her armaments. It may be that the wars _nullos habitura triumphos_ are at an end; it is almost certain that they will be less frequent; but there is now the question of foreign interference, and every Republic, however small and weak, jealously guards its own independence and wishes to be safe from the possibility of dictation from either the United States or j.a.pan. None of the Republics as yet are World States, but South America is a World Power, though not a political ent.i.ty, and as time goes on it is safe to predict that Pan-Americanism will become a powerful force. Accordingly, Argentina, Chile, and Brazil, at least, are busily strengthening their defences.

Military service is compulsory upon all citizens, and, it may be added, every person born in Argentina, whatever his parentage, is liable. At the age of twenty the young recruit has to serve for two years[61] and in some cases he prolongs his term for three years more.

Thus the Republic is certain of having a tolerably large amount of disciplined material upon which to draw for an army. The peace strength of the army consists of sixteen thousand or seventeen thousand officers[62] and men, and is made up as follows: There are eighteen batteries of artillery and two mountain batteries, two battalions of cha.s.seurs of the Andes, nine regiments of cavalry, two regiments of gendarmes, five batteries of field artillery, three mountain batteries, and five companies of engineers. For ten years after the first enlistment the Argentine soldier belongs to the active army, and is liable to frequent drill and must attend the annual rifle meeting of his district. Then, for ten years, he pa.s.ses into the National Guard, and subsequently serves for another five years in the Territorial Guard. In these two forces the drilling is, of course, much less frequent. In war ten divisions of twelve thousand men would be available, but there might be a difficulty in obtaining them in full strength and satisfactory condition. Sir Thomas Holdich speaks of sixty thousand infantry, twenty-five thousand cavalry, and twenty thousand artillery. There is, however, little doubt that Argentina possesses a good army, sufficient for the defence of even her very vulnerable frontier. Upon the Argentine army, at least as regards the cavalry[63] and artillery, favourable judgments have been pa.s.sed. The cavalry is, to a large extent, ready-made. In England two years of incessant training is required to make an efficient cavalry trooper, but the Gaucho is a horseman from his childhood; he and all his ancestors have pa.s.sed all their life with horses, and horsemans.h.i.+p is part of his nature. Consequently, although Argentine soldiers, as a rule, have very little service to their credit, they learn their trade in an astonis.h.i.+ngly short time. The troops are also well mounted--not on the common Criollo horse, which is gra.s.s-fed, and, except under Pampa conditions, not over-hardy. The artillery are armed with 75-millimetre Krupp guns; the infantry have Mauser rifles; the arms and stores are in a high state of efficiency. The infantry some years ago was condemned as untidy and undisciplined, and its officers as ignorant of their duties, but Sir Thomas Holdich considers that there is no ground for sweeping condemnation. It is, however, undoubtedly much inferior to the cavalry, and pains are being taken to improve it.

Possibly the training of officers is too short, and there is reason to believe that military service is not popular among Argentines of the highest cla.s.s. An excellent inst.i.tution has been started in a technical school for warrant officers (we should call them non-commissioned), which has five hundred pupils, and has already provided 278 corporals to various regiments. At the same time the pay and condition of the sergeants have been improved. As the backbone of the army is the non-commissioned man, these steps will doubtless be most effective. Sir T. Holdich[64] remarks: "The fighting army of South America, generally will, however, never be infantry in the future, unless it be mounted infantry. In Argentina especially, where a horse can readily be found for every man, and where every man knows how to ride, and where there is a large population (diminis.h.i.+ng, unfortunately, day by day) which habitually exists on the very scantiest of a meat supply which needs no special transport, caring nothing for those extras which make so large a demand on English commissariat, efficient mounted infantry is almost ready-made. The mobilisation of such a force would be as effective as that of the Boers, and its discipline far superior."

The Argentines are proud of their army, and with reason, for its history is more ill.u.s.trious than that of any other Latin American people. They twice conquered the English under some of our best (and one of our worst) generals. The exploits of San Martin in Chile are among the most glorious in the history of the continent. The Argentine army also had a large share in the reduction of Paraguay, then the strongest military power in South America, and there seems to be every probability that it will maintain its reputation. It may, however, be reasonably doubted whether it is equal in military efficiency to the army of Chile, and it rests with wealthy and influential Argentines to make the choice of Hercules, and, preferring the national good to luxury and pleasure, encourage by their active example the military traditions of the race.

The naval efficiency of Argentina is a matter of equal moment. Her Atlantic sea-board extends for 1,000 miles and her southern ports are increasing in size and number. In South America sea-power is of vital importance; on the Pacific coast the ocean is the only highway, and on the eastern coast also journeys from north to south must be almost invariably made by sea. If Peru had possessed one or two more efficient wars.h.i.+ps, she might have defeated Chile, and the Paraguayan war was decided by the fact that the allies commanded the rivers.

Indeed, the whole history of South America affords the clearest proof of the capital importance of sea-power. It is, therefore, necessary that Argentina should have a navy; but in forming it there are serious obstacles to be encountered. Her sons are not sea-faring men; they have ever found the vast plains of the interior too tempting, and have avoided the coasts. There are no fis.h.i.+ng villages and no natural nurseries of sailors. It seems strange that the Government, which is only too ready to attempt to create industries, suitable or unsuitable, has not attempted to bring into being a maritime population which would serve for defence as well as opulence. There is, in fact, little interest in any such matters on the part of the population, and the President is now lamenting the disinclination to a sea-faring life, and of recent years steps have been taken to obtain more satisfactory results; but the total mercantile marine, as yet, amounts to barely 100,000 tons. There is, however, a College for training officers, and also engineers and stokers for the mercantile marine, and there is a Pilot School, and various measures show that the authorities are alive to the importance of the question. In his last Message to Congress the President said: "One of the princ.i.p.al reasons for granting privileges to s.h.i.+ps flying the Argentine flag is the employment of native crews, so that the nation's sons may find a new path of life, and the navy a fresh source from which to draw sailors in case of an emergency." The Argentine sailor is a land-conscript, laboriously taught an unfamiliar art, which he learns wonderfully well. It is quite possible to create an efficient navy out of landsmen, but the lack of natural seamen will always be a great handicap, which, doubtless, the Government will do its best to remove. It will thus be gathered that Argentina, in spite of her geographical position, is not by nature a sea Power, and indeed she appears to devote attention to the navy only under external pressure. It was apprehension of war with Chile during the boundary dispute that induced the Government to buy the _Buenos Aires_ in 1896, the _Garribaldi_ in 1897, and in 1898 the _San Martin_, the _Puerryedon_, and the _Belgrano_. Again, the present naval programme is due to the activity of the Brazilian naval preparations. The following table gives the strength of the fleet:--

------+--------------------------+----------------+---------- Date. Battles.h.i.+ps. Displacement Speed in in Tons. Knots.

------+--------------------------+----------------+---------- 1879 _Almirante Brown_ 4,267 14 1889 _Independencia Libertad_ 2,336 14 Armoured Cruisers. 1894 _Garribaldi_ 6,840 20 " _San Martin_ 6,840 20 1896 _Puerryedon_ 7,000 20 " _Belgrano_ 7,000 20 Protected Cruisers. 1889 _25 de Maio_ 3,200 22 1891 _de Juilio_ 3,500 225 1894 _Buenos Aires_ 4,500 24 ------+--------------------------+----------------+----------

[Ill.u.s.tration: CRUISER, _SAN MARTIN_.]

In 1908 the naval officers numbered 493 and the petty officers and seamen nearly 6,000. There has been constructed at Belgrano, about 27 miles from Bahia Blanca, a naval port which will admit of the docking of vessels of 12,000 tons. In 1908 the cost of the army and fleet was 1,849,300. But in the future Argentina, like most other countries, will have to bear a heavier burden, for a scheme is being carried out which, it is hoped, will be completed in five years and will cost about seven million sterling. The new vessels will consist of three battles.h.i.+ps of 15,000 tons each, nine destroyers, and twenty-one torpedo boats, as well as several vessels for harbour defence. In the course of a few years, therefore, Argentina will have a fairly powerful fleet. That there is any risk of a conflict between Brazil and Argentina no one believes. In both countries the same opinion is invariably expressed that as one country is building wars.h.i.+ps, it is necessary for the other to follow suit, and that though there is some jealousy there is little animosity and no material whatever for quarrel or any probability of war. It may be added that Argentina, at any rate, is well able to bear the extra burden, that it is for many reasons desirable that the princ.i.p.al South American States should possess some naval strength, and that an adequate fleet will add to the weight and dignity of Argentina in the councils of South America.

For example, the decision of Argentina in the recent Peruvian-Bolivian arbitration case might have been repudiated by Bolivia and the insult to the Argentine Legation at La Paz might have been condoned, had Argentina been weak; and thus it was proved once more that it is strength and not weakness that preserves peace. In this case, of course, the fleet does not enter into the question, as Bolivia, like Bohemia, has no sea-coast, but the people of Argentina deserve every credit for the efforts and sacrifices which they are making to secure an efficient army and navy, and, in all probability, the money will be handsomely repaid merely in the matter of preservation from costly wars.