Germany, The Next Republic? Part 9

The real object of this meeting was to discuss means of acquainting the German people with the American organisation ent.i.tled the League to Enforce Peace. An American business man, who was a charter member of the American organisation, was there to explain the purposes of the League. The meeting decided upon the publication in as many German newspapers as possible of explanatory articles. The newspaper editor present promised to prepare them and urged their publication in various journals. The first article appeared in _Die Welt Am Montag_, one of the weekly newspapers of Berlin. It was copied by a number of progressive newspapers throughout the Empire but when the attention of the military and naval authorities was called to this propaganda an order was issued prohibiting any newspaper from making any reference to the League to Enforce Peace. The anti-American editorial writers were inspired to write brief notices to the effect that the League was in reality to be a League against Germany supported by England and the United States.

Throughout the summer and fall there appeared in various newspapers, including the influential _Frankfurter Zeitung_, inspired articles about the possibilities of annexing the industrial centres and important harbours of Belgium. In Munich and Leipsic a book by Dr.

Schumacher, of Bonn University, was published, ent.i.tled, "Antwerp, Its World Position and Importance for Germany's Economic Life." Another writer named Ulrich Bauschey wrote a number of newspaper and magazine articles for the purpose of showing that Germany would need Antwerp after this war in order to successfully compete with Holland, England and France in world commerce. He figured that the difference between the cost of transportation from the Rhine Valley industrial cities to Antwerp and the cost of transportation from the Rhine Valley to Hamburg and Bremen would be great enough as to enable German products to be sold in America for less money than products of Germany's enemies.

These articles brought up the old question of the "freedom of the seas." Obviously, if the Allies were to control the seas after the war, as they had during the war, Germany could make no plans for the re-establishment of her world commerce unless there were some a.s.surances that her merchant fleet would be as free on the high seas as that of any other nation. During the war Germany had talked a great deal about the freedom of the seas. When the _Lusitania_ was torpedoed von Jagow said in an interview that Germany was fighting for the free seas and that by attacking England's control, Germany was acting in the interests of the whole world. But Germany was really not sincere in what she said about having the seas free. What Germany really desired was not freedom of the seas in peace time because the seas had been free before the war. What Germany wanted was free seas in war time,--freedom for her own merchant s.h.i.+ps to go from Germany to any part of the world and return with everything except absolute contraband. Germany's object was to keep from building a navy great enough to protect her merchant fleet in order that she might devote all her energies to army organisation. But the freedom of the seas was a popular phrase. Furthermore it explained to the German people why their submarine warfare was not inhuman because it was really fighting for the freedom of all nations on the high seas!

[Ill.u.s.tration: This is the photograph of von Hindenburg which very German has in his home.]

While these public discussions were going on, the fight on the Chancellor began to grow. It was evident that when the Reichstag met again in September that there would be bitter and perhaps a decisive fight on von Bethmann-Hollweg. The division in Germany became so p.r.o.nounced that people forgot for a time the old party lines and the newspapers and party leaders spoke of the "Bethmann parties" and the "von Tirpitz party." Whether the submarine should be used ruthlessly against all s.h.i.+pping was the issue which divided public sentiment. The same democratic forces which had been supporting the Chancellor in other fights again lined up with the Foreign Office. The reactionaries supported Major Ba.s.sermann, who really led the fight against the Chancellor. During this period the Chancellor and the Foreign Office saw that the longer the war lasted the stronger the von Tirpitz party would become because the people were growing more desperate and were enthused by the propaganda cry of the Navy, "Down with England." The Chancellor and the Foreign Office tried once more to get the world to talk about peace. After the presidential nominations in America the press began to discuss the possibilities of American peace intervention. Every one believed that the campaign and elections in America would have an important effect on the prospects of peace.

Theodore Wolff, editor of the Berlin _Tageblatt_, who was the Chancellor's chief supporter in newspaper circles, began the publication of a series of articles to explain that in the event of the election of Charles E. Hughes, Germany would be able to count upon more a.s.sistance from America and upon peace. At the time the Allies were pounding away at the Somme and every effort was being made to bring about some kind of peace discussions when these battles were over.

On September 20th a convention of Socialists was held in Berlin for the purpose of uniting the Socialist party in support of the Chancellor.

The whole country was watching the Socialist discussions because every one felt that the Socialist party represented the real opinion of the people. After several days of discussion all factional differences were patched up and the Socialists were ready to present a solid front when the fight came in the Reichstag on September 28th. On the 27th, Berlin hotels began to buzz with excitement over the possibilities of overthrowing the Chancellor. The fight was led by the National Liberals and Centre Party groups. It was proposed by Dr. Coerting, an industrial leader from Hannover, to move a vote of lack of confidence in the Chancellor. Coerting was supported by the big ammunition interests and by the von Tirpitz crowd. Before the Reichstag convened the Chancellor went to Great Headquarters for a final conference with the Kaiser and Field Marshal von Hindenburg. Before he left it looked as if the Chancellor would be overthrown. But when he returned he summoned the Reichstag leaders who were supporting him and several editors of Liberal newspapers. The Chancellor told them that von Hindenburg would support him. The next day editorials appeared in a number of newspapers, saying that von Hindenburg and the Chancellor were united in their ideas. This was the most successful strategic move the Chancellor had made, for the public had such great confidence in von Hindenburg that when it was learned that he was opposed to von Tirpitz the backbone of opposition to the Chancellor was broken. On the 28th as von Bethmann-Hollweg appeared in the Reichstag, instead of facing a hostile and belligerent a.s.sembly, he faced members who were ready to support him in anything he did. The Chancellor, however, realised that he could take some of the thunder out of the opposition by making a strong statement against England. "Down with England," the popular cry, was the keynote of the Chancellor's remarks. In this one speech he succeeded in uniting for a time at least public sentiment and the political parties in support of the Government.

A few days afterward I saw Major Ba.s.sermann at his office in the Reichstag and asked him whether the campaign for an unlimited submarine warfare would be resumed after the action of the Reichstag in expressing confidence in the Chancellor. He said:

"That must be decided by the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Marine and the General Staff. England is our chief enemy and we must recognise this and defeat her."

With his hands in his pocket, his face looking down, he paced his office and began a bitter denunciation of the neutrality of the United States. I asked him whether he favoured the submarine warfare even if it brought about a break with the United States.

"We wish to live in peace and friends.h.i.+p with America," he began, "but undoubtedly there is bitter feeling here because American supplies and ammunition enable our enemies to continue the war. If America should succeed in forcing England to obey international law, restore freedom of the seas and proceed with American energy against England's brutalisation of neutrals, it would have a decisive influence on the political situation between the two countries. If America does not do this then we must do it with our submarines."

In October I was invited by the Foreign Office to go with a group of correspondents to Essen, Cologne and the Rhine Valley Industrial centres. In Essen I met Baron von Bodenhausen and other directors of Krupps. In Dusseldorf at the Industrie Klub I dined with the steel magnates of Germany and at Homburg-on-the-Rhine I saw August Thyssen, one of the richest men in Germany and the man who owns one-tenth of Germany's coal and iron fields. The most impressive thing about this journey was what these men said about the necessity for unlimited warfare. Every man I met was opposed to the Chancellor. They hated him because he delayed mobilisation at the beginning of the war. They stated that they had urged the invasion of Belgium because if Belgium had not been invaded immediately France could have seized the Rhine Valley and made it impossible for Germany to manufacture war munitions and thereby to fight a war. They said they were in favour of an unlimited, ruthless submarine warfare against England and all s.h.i.+ps going to the British Isles. Their opinions were best represented in an inspired editorial appearing in the _Rhieinische Westfalische Zeitung_, in which it was stated:

"The war must be fought to a finish. Either Germany or England must win and the interests here on the Rhine are ready to fight until Germany wins."

"Do you think Germany wants war with America?" I asked Thyssen.

"Never!" was his emphatic response. "First, because we have enemies enough, and, secondly, because in peace times, our relations with America are always most friendly. We want them to continue so after the war."

Thyssen's remarks could be taken on their face value were it not for the fact that the week before we arrived in these cities General Ludendorf, von Hindenhurg's chief a.s.sistant and co-worker, was there to get the industrial leaders to manufacture more ammunition. Von Falkenhayn had made many enemies in this section because he cut down the ammunition manufacturing until these men were losing money. So the first thing von Hindenburg did was to double all orders for ammunition and war supplies and to send Ludendorf to the industrial centres to make peace with the men who were opposed to the Government.

Thus from May to November German politics went through a period of transformation. No one knew exactly what would happen,--there were so many conflicting opinions. Political parties, industrial leaders and the press were so divided it was evident that something would have to be done or the German political organisation would strike a rock and go to pieces. The Socialists were still demanding election reforms during the war. The National Liberals were intriguing for a Reichstag Committee to have equal authority with the Foreign Office in dealing with all matters of international affairs. The landowners, who were losing money because the Government was confiscating so much food, were not only criticising von Bethmann-Hollweg but holding back as much food as they could for higher prices. The industrial leaders, who had been losing money because von Falkenhayn had decreased ammunition orders, were only partially satisfied by von Hindenburg's step because they realised that unless the war was intensified the Government would not need such supplies indefinitely. They saw, too, that the att.i.tude of President Wilson had so injured what little standing they still had in the neutral world that unless Germany won the war in a decisive way, their world connections would disappear forever and they would be forced to begin all over after the war. Faced by this predicament, they demanded a ruthless submarine warfare against all s.h.i.+pping in order that not only England but every other power should suffer, because the more s.h.i.+ps and property of the enemies destroyed the more their chances with the rest of the world would be equalised when the war was over. Food conditions were becoming worse, the people were becoming more dissatisfied; losses on the battlefields were touching nearly every family. Depression was growing. Every one felt that something had to be done and done immediately.

The press referred to these months of turmoil as a period of "new orientation." It was a time of readjustment which did not reach a climax until December twelfth when the Chancellor proposed peace conferences to the Allies.

WHAT YOU CANNOT EAT OR DRINK

FOODSTUFFS WHICH ARE COMPLETELY EXHAUSTED IN GERMANY

1. Rice. 12. Nuts.

2. Coffee. 13. Candy (a very limited 3. Tea. number of persons can buy 4. Cocoa. one-quarter of a pound 5. Chocolate. about once a week).

6. Olive oil. 14. Malted milk.

7. Cream. 15. Beer made of either 8. Fruit flavorings. malt or hops.

9. Canned soups or 16. Caviar.

soup cubes. 17. Ice cream.

10. Syrups. 18. Macaroni.

11. Dried vegetables, beans, peas, etc.

WHAT YOU MAY EAT

FOOD OBTAINABLE ONLY BY CARDS

1. Bread, 1,900 grams per week per person.

2. Meat, 250 grams (1/2 pound) per week per head.

3. Eggs, 1 per person every two weeks.

4. b.u.t.ter, 90 grams per week per person.

5. Milk, 1 quart daily only for children under ten and invalids.

6. Potatoes, formerly 9 pounds per week; lately in many parts of Germany no potatoes were available.

7. Sugar, formerly 2 pounds per month, now 4 pounds, but this will not continue long.

8. Marmalade, or jam, 1/4 of a pound every month.

9. Noodles, 1/2 pound per person a month.

10. Sardines, or canned fish, small box per month.

11. Saccharine (a coal tar product subst.i.tute for sugar), about 25 small tablets a month.

12. Oatmeal, 1/2 of a pound per month for adults or 1 pound per month for children under twelve years.

WHAT YOU CAN EAT

FOODS WHICH EVERY ONE WITH MONEY CAN BUY

1. Geese, costing 8 to 10 marks per pound ($1.60 to $2 per pound).

2. Wild game, rabbits, ducks, deer, etc.

3. Smuggled meat, such as ham and bacon, for $2.50 per pound.

4. Vegetables, carrots, spinach, onions, cabbage, beets.

5. Apples, lemons, oranges.

6. Bottled oil made from seeds and roots for cooking purposes, costing $5 per pound.

7. Vinegar.

8. Fresh fish.

9. Fish sausage.

10. Pickles.

11. Duck, chicken and geese heads, feet and wings.

12. Black crows.

THE FOOD SITUATION AT A GLANCE