The Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary by Sankaracarya Part 2

Adhik. II (3) extends the same line of argumentation to the Yoga-sm/ri/ti.

Adhik. III (4-11) shows that Brahman, although of the nature of intelligence, yet may be the cause of the non-intelligent material world, and that it is not contaminated by the qualities of the world when the latter is refunded into Brahman. For ordinary experience teaches us that like does not always spring from like, and that the qualities of effected things when the latter are refunded into their causes--as when golden ornaments, for instance, are melted and thereby become simple gold again--do not continue to exist in those causes.--Here also the argumentation is specially directed against the [email protected], who, in order to account for the materiality and the various imperfections of the world, think it necessary to a.s.sume a causal substance partic.i.p.ating in the same characteristics.

Adhik. IV (12) points out that the line of reasoning followed in the preceding adhikara/n/a is valid also against other theories, such as the atomistic doctrine.

The one Sutra (13) const.i.tuting Adhik. V teaches, according to /S/[email protected], that although the enjoying souls as well as the objects of fruition are in reality nothing but Brahman, and on that account identical, yet the two sets may practically be held apart, just as in ordinary life we hold apart, and distinguish as separate individual things, the waves, ripples, and foam of the sea, although at the bottom waves, ripples, and foam are all of them identical as being neither more nor less than sea-water.--The /S/ri-bhashya gives a totally different interpretation of the Sutra, according to which the latter has nothing whatever to do with the eventual non-distinction of enjoying souls and objects to be enjoyed. Translated according to Ramanuja's view, the Sutra runs as follows: 'If non-distinction (of the Lord and the individual souls) is said to result from the circ.u.mstance of (the Lord himself) becoming an enjoyer (a soul), we refute this objection by instances from every-day experience.' That is to say: If it be maintained that from our doctrine previously expounded, according to which this world springs from the Lord and const.i.tutes his body, it follows that the Lord, as an embodied being, is not essentially different from other souls, and subject to fruition as they are; we reply that the Lord's having a body does not involve his being subject to fruition, not any more than in ordinary life a king, although himself an embodied being, is affected by the experiences of pleasure and pain which his servants have to undergo.--The construction which Ramanuja puts on the Sutra is not repugnant either to the words of the Sutra or to the context in which the latter stands, and that it rests on earlier authority appears from a quotation made by Ramanuja from the Drami/d/abhashyakara[13].

Adhik. VI (14-20) treats of the non-difference of the effect from the cause; a Vedanta doctrine which is defended by its adherents against the Vai/s/es.h.i.+kas according to whom the effect is something different from the cause.--The divergent views of /S/[email protected] and Ramanuja on this important point have been sufficiently ill.u.s.trated in the general sketch of the two systems.

Adhik. VII (21-23) refutes the objection that, from the Vedic pa.s.sages insisting on the ident.i.ty of the Lord and the individual soul, it follows that the Lord must be like the individual soul the cause of evil, and that hence the entire doctrine of an all-powerful and all-wise Lord being the cause of the world has to be rejected. For, the Sutrakira remarks, the creative principle of the world is additional to, i.e.

other than, the individual soul, the difference of the two being distinctly declared by Scripture.--The way in which the three Sutras const.i.tuting this adhikara/n/a are treated by /S/[email protected] on the one hand and Ramanuja on the other is characteristic. Ramanuja throughout simply follows the words of the Sutras, of which Sutra 21 formulates the objection based on such texts as 'Thou art that,' while Sutra 22 replies that Brahman is different from the soul, since that is expressly declared by Scripture. /S/[email protected], on the other hand, sees himself obliged to add that the difference of the two, plainly maintained in Sutra 22, is not real, but due to the soul's fict.i.tious limiting adjuncts.

Adhik. VIII (24, 25) shows that Brahman, although dest.i.tute of material and instruments of action, may yet produce the world, just as G.o.ds by their mere power create palaces, animals, and the like, and as milk by itself turns into curds.

Adhik. IX (26-29) explains that, according to the express doctrine of Scripture, Brahman does not in its entirety pa.s.s over into the world, and, although emitting the world from itself, yet remains one and undivided. This is possible, according to /S/[email protected], because the world is unreal; according to Ramanuja, because the creation is merely the visible and tangible manifestation of what previously existed in Brahman in a subtle imperceptible condition.

Adhik. X (30, 31) teaches that Brahman, although dest.i.tute of instruments of action, is enabled to create the world by means of the manifold powers which it possesses.

Adhik. XI (32, 33) a.s.signs the motive of the creation, or, more properly expressed, teaches that Brahman, in creating the world, has no motive in the strict sense of the word, but follows a mere sportive impulse.

Adhik. XII (34-36) justifies Brahman from the charges of partiality and cruelty which might be brought against it owing to the inequality of position and fate of the various animate beings, and the universal suffering of the world. Brahman, as a creator and dispenser, acts with a view to the merit and demerit of the individual souls, and has so acted from all eternity.

Adhik. XIII (37) sums up the preceding argumentation by declaring that all the qualities of Brahman--omniscience and so on--are such as to capacitate it for the creation of the world.

PaDA II.

The task of the second pada is to refute, by arguments independent of Vedic pa.s.sages, the more important philosophical theories concerning the origin of the world which are opposed to the Vedanta view.--The first adhikara/n/a (1-10) is directed against the [email protected], whose doctrine had already been touched upon incidentally in several previous places, and aims at proving that a non-intelligent first cause, such as the pradhana of the [email protected], is unable to create and dispose.--The second adhikara/n/a (11-17) refutes the Vai/s/es.h.i.+ka tenet that the world originates from atoms set in motion by the ad/ri/sh/t/a.--The third and fourth adhikara/n/as are directed against various schools of Bauddha philosophers. Adhik. III (18-27) impugns the view of the so-called sarvast.i.tvavadins, or bahyarthavadins, who maintain the reality of an external as well as an internal world; Adhik. IV (28-32) is directed against the vij/n/anavadins, according to whom ideas are the only reality.--The last Sutra of this adhikara/n/a is treated by Ramanuja as a separate adhikara/n/a refuting the view of the Madhyamikas, who teach that everything is void, i.e. that nothing whatever is real.--Adhik. V (33-36) is directed against the doctrine of the Jainas; Adhik. VI (37-41) against those philosophical schools which teach that a highest Lord is not the material but only the operative cause of the world.

The last adhikara/n/a of the pada (42-45) refers, according to the unanimous statement of the commentators, to the doctrine of the Bhagavatas or Pa/nk/aratras. But /S/[email protected] and Ramanuja totally disagree as to the drift of the Sutrakara's opinion regarding that system. According to the former it is condemned like the systems previously referred to; according to the latter it is approved of.--Sutras 42 and 43, according to both commentators, raise objections against the system; Sutra 42 being directed against the doctrine that from the highest being, called Vasudeva, there is originated [email protected]/n/a, i.e. the jiva, on the ground that thereby those scriptural pa.s.sages would be contradicted which teach the soul's eternity; and Sutra 43 impugning the doctrine that from [email protected]/n/a there springs Pradyumna, i.e. the manas.--The Sutra on which the difference of interpretation turns is 44. Literally translated it runs, 'Or, on account of there being' (or, 'their being') 'knowledge and so on, there is non-contradiction of that.'--This means, according to /S/[email protected], 'Or, if in consequence of the existence of knowledge and so on (on the part of [email protected]/n/a, &c. they be taken not as soul, mind, &c. but as Lords of pre-eminent knowledge, &c.), yet there is non-contradiction of that (viz. of the objection raised in Sutra 42 against the Bhagavata doctrine).'--According to Ramanuja, on the other hand, the Sutra has to be explained as follows: 'Or, rather there is noncontradiction of that (i.e. the Pa/nk/aratra doctrine) on account of their being knowledge and so on (i.e. on account of their being Brahman).' Which means: Since [email protected]/n/a and so on are merely forms of manifestation of Brahman, the Pa/nk/aratra doctrine, according to which they spring from Brahman, is not contradicted.--The form of the Sutra makes it difficult for us to decide which of the two interpretations is the right one; it, however, appears to me that the explanations of the 'va' and of the 'tat,' implied in Ramanuja's comment, are more natural than those resulting from /S/[email protected]'s interpretation. Nor would it be an unnatural proceeding to close the polemical pada with a defence of that doctrine which--in spite of objections--has to be viewed as the true one.

PaDA III.

The third pada discusses the question whether the different forms of existence which, in their totality, const.i.tute the world have an origin or not, i.e. whether they are co-eternal with Brahman, or issue from it and are refunded into it at stated intervals.

The first seven adhikara/n/as treat of the five elementary substances.--Adhik. I (1-7) teaches that the ether is not co-eternal with Brahman, but springs from it as its first effect.--Adhik. II (8) shows that air springs from ether; Adhik. IV, V, VI (10; 11; 12) that fire springs from air, water from fire, earth from water.--Adhik. III (9) explains by way of digression that Brahman, which is not some special ent.i.ty, but quite generally 'that which is,' cannot have originated from anything else.

Adhik. VII (13) demonstrates that the origination of one element from another is due, not to the latter in itself, but to Brahman acting in it.

Adhik. VIII (14) teaches that the reabsorption of the elements into Brahman takes place in the inverse order of their emission.

Adhik. IX (15) remarks that the indicated order in which the emission and the reabsorption of the elementary substances take place is not interfered with by the creation and reabsorption of the organs of the soul, i.e. the sense organs and the internal organ (manas); for they also are of elemental nature, and as such created and retracted together with the elements of which they consist.

The remainder of the pada is taken up by a discussion of the nature of the individual soul, the jiva.--Adhik. X (16) teaches that expressions such as 'Devadatta is born,' 'Devadatta has died,' strictly apply to the body only, and are transferred to the soul in so far only as it is connected with a body.

Adhik. XI (17) teaches that the individual soul is, according to Scripture, permanent, eternal, and therefore not, like the ether and the other elements, produced from Brahman at the time of creation.--This Sutra is of course commented on in a very different manner by /S/[email protected] on the one hand and Ramanuja on the other. According to the former, the jiva is in reality identical--and as such co-eternal--with Brahman; what originates is merely the soul's connexion with its limiting adjuncts, and that connexion is moreover illusory.--According to Ramanuja, the jiva is indeed an effect of Brahman, but has existed in Brahman from all eternity as an individual being and as a mode (prakara) of Brahman. So indeed have also the material elements; yet there is an important distinction owing to which the elements may be said to originate at the time of creation, while the same cannot be said of the soul. Previously to creation the material elements exist in a subtle condition in which they possess none of the qualities that later on render them the objects of ordinary experience; hence, when pa.s.sing over into the gross state at the time of creation, they may be said to originate. The souls, on the other hand, possess at all times the same essential qualities, i.e. they are cognizing agents; only, whenever a new creation takes place, they a.s.sociate themselves with bodies, and their intelligence therewith undergoes a certain expansion or development (vikasa); contrasting with the unevolved or contracted state (sanko/k/a) which characterised it during the preceding pralaya. But this change is not a change of essential nature (svarupanyathabhava) and hence we have to distinguish the souls as permanent ent.i.ties from the material elements which at the time of each creation and reabsorption change their essential characteristics.

Adhik. XII (18) defines the nature of the individual soul. The Sutra declares that the soul is 'j/n/a.' This means, according to /S/[email protected], that intelligence or knowledge does not, as the Vai/s/es.h.i.+kas teach, const.i.tute a mere attribute of the soul which in itself is essentially non-intelligent, but is the very essence of the soul. The soul is not a knower, but knowledge; not intelligent, but intelligence.--Ramanuja, on the other hand, explains 'j/n/a' by 'j/n/at/ri/,' i.e. knower, knowing agent, and considers the Sutra to be directed not only against the Vai/s/es.h.i.+kas, but also against those philosophers who--like the [email protected] and the Vedantins of /S/[email protected]'s school--maintain that the soul is not a knowing agent, but pure /k/aitanya.--The wording of the Sutra certainly seems to favour Ramanuja's interpretation; we can hardly imagine that an author definitely holding the views of /S/[email protected] should, when propounding the important dogma of the soul's nature, use the term j/n/a of which the most obvious interpretation j/n/at/ri/, not j/n/anam.

Adhik. XIII (19-32) treats the question whether the individual soul is a/n/u, i.e. of very minute size, or omnipresent, all-pervading (sarvagata, vyapin). Here, again, we meet with diametrically opposite views.--In /S/[email protected]'s opinion the Sutras 19-38 represent the purvapaksha view, according to which the jiva is a/n/u, while Sutra 29 formulates the siddhanta, viz. that the jiva, which in reality is all-pervading, is spoken of as a/n/u in some scriptural pa.s.sages, because the qualities of the internal organ--which itself is a/n/u--const.i.tute the essence of the individual soul as long as the latter is implicated in the sa/m/sara.--According to Ramanuja, on the other hand, the first Sutra of the adhikara/n/a gives utterance to the siddhanta view, according to which the soul is of minute size; the Sutras 20-25 confirm this view and refute objections raised against it; while the Sutras 26-29 resume the question already mooted under Sutra 18, viz. in what relation the soul as knowing agent (j/n/at/ri/) stands to knowledge (j/n/ana).--In order to decide between the conflicting claims of these two interpretations we must enter into some details.--/S/[email protected] maintains that Sutras 19-28 state and enforce a purvapaksha view, which is finally refuted in 29. What here strikes us at the outset, is the unusual length to which the defence of a mere prima facie view is carried; in no other place the Sutras take so much trouble to render plausible what is meant to be rejected in the end, and an unbia.s.sed reader will certainly feel inclined to think that in 19-28 we have to do, not with the preliminary statement of a view finally to be abandoned, but with an elaborate bona fide attempt to establish and vindicate an essential dogma of the system. Still it is not altogether impossible that the purvapaksha should here be treated at greater length than usual, and the decisive point is therefore whether we can, with /S/[email protected], look upon Sutra 29 as embodying a refutation of the purvapaksha and thus implicitly acknowledging the doctrine that the individual soul is all-pervading. Now I think there can be no doubt that /S/a[email protected]'s interpretation of the Sutra is exceedingly forced.

Literally translated (and leaving out the non-essential word 'praj/n/avat') the Sutra runs as follows: 'But on account of that quality (or "those qualities;" or else "on account of the quality--or qualities--of that") being the essence, (there is) that designation (or "the designation of that").' This /S/[email protected] maintains to mean, 'Because the qualities of the buddhi are the essence of the soul in the sa/m/sara state, therefore the soul itself is sometimes spoken of as a/n/u.' Now, in the first place, nothing in the context warrants the explanation of the first 'tat' by buddhi. And--which is more important--in the second place, it is more than doubtful whether on /S/[email protected]'s own system the qualities of the buddhi--such as pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, &c.--can with any propriety be said to const.i.tute the essence of the soul even in the sa/m/sara state. The essence of the soul in whatever state, according to /S/[email protected]'s system, is knowledge or intelligence; whatever is due to its a.s.sociation with the buddhi is non-essential or, more strictly, unreal, false.

There are no similar difficulties in the way of Ramanuja's interpretation of the adhikara/n/a. He agrees with /S/[email protected] in the explanation of Sutras 19-35, with this difference that he views them as setting forth, not the purvapaksha, but the siddhanta. Sutras 26-28 also are interpreted in a manner not very different from /S/[email protected]'s, special stress being laid on the distinction made by Scripture between knowledge as a mere quality and the soul as a knowing agent, the substratum of knowledge. This discussion naturally gives rise to the question how it is that Scripture in some places makes use of the term vij/n/ana when meaning the individual soul. The answer is given in Sutra 29, 'The soul is designated as knowledge because it has that quality for its essence,' i.e. because knowledge is the essential characteristic quality of the soul, therefore the term 'knowledge' is employed here and there to denote the soul itself. This latter interpretation gives rise to no doubt whatever. It closely follows the wording of the text and does not necessitate any forced supplementation. The 'tu' of the Sutra which, according to /S/[email protected], is meant to discard the purvapaksha, serves on Ramanuja's view to set aside a previously-raised objection; an altogether legitimate a.s.sumption.

Of the three remaining Sutras of the adhikara/n/a (30-32), 30 explains, according to /S/[email protected], that the soul may be called a/n/u, since, as long as it exists in the sa/m/sara condition, it is connected with the buddhi. According to Ramanuja the Sutra teaches that the soul may be called vij/n/ana because the latter const.i.tutes its essential quality as long as it exists.--Sutra 31 intimates, according to /S/[email protected], that in the states of deep sleep, and so on, the soul is potentially connected with the buddhi, while in the waking state that connexion becomes actually manifest. The same Sutra, according to Ramanuja, teaches that j/n/at/ri/tva is properly said to const.i.tute the soul's essential nature, although it is actually manifested in some states of the soul only.--In Sutra 32, finally, /S/[email protected] sees a statement of the doctrine that, unless the soul had the buddhi for its limiting adjunct, it would either be permanently cognizing or permanently non-cognizing; while, according to Ramanuja, the Sutra means that the soul would either be permanently cognizing or permanently non-cognizing, if it were pure knowledge and all-pervading (instead of being /jn/at/ri/ and a/n/u, as it is in reality).--The three Sutras can be made to fit in with either interpretation, although it must be noted that none of them explicitly refers to the soul's connexion with the buddhi.

Adhik. XIV and XV (33-39; 40) refer to the kart/ri/tva of the jiva, i.e.

the question whether the soul is an agent. Sutras 33-39 clearly say that it is such. But as, according to /S/[email protected]'s system, this cannot be the final view,--the soul being essentially non-active, and all action belonging to the world of upadhis,--he looks upon the next following Sutra (40) as const.i.tuting an adhikara/n/a by itself, and teaching that the soul is an agent when connected with the instruments of action, buddhi, &c., while it ceases to be so when dissociated from them, 'just as the carpenter acts in both ways,' i.e. just as the carpenter works as long as he wields his instruments, and rests after having laid them aside.--Ramanuja, perhaps more naturally, does not separate Sutra 40 from the preceding Sutras, but interprets it as follows: Activity is indeed an essential attribute of the soul; but therefrom it does not follow that the soul is always actually active, just as the carpenter, even when furnished with the requisite instruments, may either work or not work, just as he pleases.

Adhik. XVI (41, 42) teaches that the soul in its activity is dependent on the Lord who impels it with a view to its former actions.

Adhik. XVII (43-53) treats of the relation of the individual soul to Brahman. Sutra 43 declares that the individual soul is a part (a/ms/a) of Brahman, and the following Sutras show how that relation does not involve either that Brahman is affected by the imperfections, sufferings, &c. of the souls, or that one soul has to partic.i.p.ate in the experiences of other souls. The two commentators of course take entirely different views of the doctrine that the soul is a part of Brahman.

According to Ramanuja the souls are in reality parts of Brahman[14]; according to [email protected] the 'a/ms/a' of the Sutra must be understood to mean 'a/ms/a iva,' 'a part as it were;' the one universal indivisible Brahman having no real parts, but appearing to be divided owing to its limiting adjuncts.--One Sutra (50) in this adhikara/n/a calls for special notice. According to [email protected] the words 'abhasa eva /k/a' mean '(the soul is) a mere reflection,' which, as the commentators remark, is a statement of the so-called pratibimbavada, i.e. the doctrine that the so-called individual soul is nothing but the reflection of the Self in the buddhi; while Sutra 43 had propounded the so-called ava/kkh/edavada, i.e. the doctrine that the soul is the highest Self in so far as limited by its adjuncts.--According to Ramanuja the abhasa of the Sutra has to be taken in the sense of hetvabhasa, a fallacious argument, and the Sutra is explained as being directed against the reasoning of those Vedantins according to whom the soul is Brahman in so far as limited by non-real adjuncts[15].

PaDA IV.

Adhik. I, II, III (1-4; 5-6; 7) teach that the pra/n/as (by which generic name are denoted the buddhindriyas, karmen-driyas, and the manas) spring from Brahman; are eleven in number; and are of minute size (a/n/u).

Adhik. IV, V, VI (8; 9-12; 13) inform us also that the mukhya pra/n/a, i.e. the vital air, is produced from Brahman; that it is a principle distinct from air in general and from the pra/n/as discussed above; and that it is minute (a/n/u).

Adhik. VII and VIII (14-16; 17-19) teach that the pra/n/as are superintended and guided in their activity by special divinities, and that they are independent principles, not mere modifications of the mukhya pra/n/a.

Adhik. IX (20-22) declares that the evolution of names and forms (the namarupavyakara/n/a) is the work, not of the individual soul, but of the Lord.

Notes:

[Footnote 13: Lokavat, Yatha loke raja/s/asananuvartina/m/ /k/a rajanugrahanigrahak/ri/takhadukhayoges'pi na sa/s/ariraivamatre/n/a sasake rajany api /s/asananuv/ri/ttyauv/ri/ttinimittasukhadukhayor bhokt/ri/[email protected]/h/. Yathaha Drami/d/abhashyakara/h/ yatha loke raja pra/k/uradanda/s/uke gh.o.r.es'narthasa/m/ka/t/es'pi prade/s/e vartamanoszpi vyajanadyavadhutadeho doshair na sprisyate abhipreta/ms/ /k/a lokan paripipalayishati bhoga/ms/ /k/a gandhadin avi/s/vajanopabhogyan dharayati tathasau loke/s/varo bhramatsvasamait/h/ya/k/amato doshair na sp/ris/yate rakshati /k/a lokan brahmalokadi/ms/ /k/avi/s/vajanopabhogyan dharayat.i.ti.]

[Footnote 14: Givasya kart/ri/tva/m/ paramapurushayattam ity uktam.

Idanim kim aya/m/ giva/h/ parasmad atyantabhinna/h/ uta param eva brahma bhrantam uta brahmaivopadhyava/kkh/innam atha brahma/ms/a iti sa/m/sayyate /s/rutivipraticpatte/h/ sa/m/saya/h/. Nanu tadananyam arambha/n/a/s/abdadibhya/h/ adhika/m/ tu bhedanirdesad ity atraivayam aitho nir/n/ita/h/ Satya/m/ sa eva nanatvaikatva/s/rutivipratipattya sks.h.i.+pya jivasya brahma/ms/atvopapadanena vi/s/eshato nir/n/iyate. Yavad dhi jivasya brahma/m/satva/m/ na nir/n/itam tavaj jivasya brahmanosnanyatva/m/ brahma/n/as tasmad adhikatva/m/ /k/a na prat.i.tish/th/ati. Ki/m/ tavat praptam. Atyanta/m/ bhinna iti. Kuta/h/.

J/n/aj/n/nau dvav ityadibhedanirde/s/at. J/n/aj/n/ayor abheda/s/rutayas tv agnina si/nk/ed itivad viruddharthapratipadanad aupa/k/arikya/h/, Brahma/n/os/ms/o jiva ity api na sadhiya/h/, ekavastvekade/s/ava/k/i hy a/ms/a/s/sabda/h/, jivasya brahmaikade/s/atve tadgata dosha brahma/n/i bhaveyu/h/. Na /k/a brahmakha/nd/o jiva ity a/ms/atvopapatti/h/ kha/nd/ananarhatvad brahma/n/a/h/ /k/ /k/a, tasmad atyantabhinnasya tada/ms/atva/m/ durupapadam. Yadva bhranta/m/ brahmaiva jiva/h/. Kuta/h/. Tat tvam asi ayam atma brahmetyadibrahmatmabhavopade/s/at, nanatmatvavadinyas tu pratyakshadisiddharthanuvaditvad ananyathasiddhadvaitopade/s/aparabhi/h/ /s/rutibhi/h/ pratyakshadaya/s/ /k/a avidyantargata/h/ khyapyante.--Athava brahmaivanadyupadhyava/kkh/inna/m/ jiva/h/. Kuta/h/.

Tata eva brahmatmabhavopade/s/at. Na /k/ayam upadhir bhrantiparikalpita ita vaktu/m/ sakya/m/ bandhamokshadivyavasthanupapatter. Ity eva/m/ pratptesbhidhiyate. Brahma/ms/a iti. Kuta/h/. Nanavyapade/s/ad anyatha /k/aikatvena vyapade/s/ad ubhayatha hi vyapade/s/o d/ris/yate.

Navavyapade/s/as tavat srash/tri/tva/rig/yatva--niyant/ri/tvaniyamyatva--sarvaj/n/atvaj/n/atva-- svadhinatvaparadhinatva--/s/uddhatva/s/uddhatva-- kalya/n/agu/n/akaratvaviparitatva--pat.i.tva/s/eshatvadibhir d/ris/yate.

Anyatha /k/abhedena vyapade/s/os pi tat tvam asi ayam atma brahmetyadibhir d/ris/yate. Api da/s/akitavaditvam apy adhiyate eke, brahma dasa brahma dasa brahmeme kitava ity atharva/n/ika brahma/n/o da/s/akitavaditvam apy adhiyate, tata/s/ /k/a sarvajivavyapitvena abhedo vyapadi/s/yata it artha/h/. Evam ubhayavyapade/s/amukhyatvasiddhaye jivosya/m/ brahma/n/os/ms/a ity abhyupagantavya/h/.]

[Footnote 15: Nanu bhrantabrahmajivavadeszpy avidyak/ri/topadhibhedad bhogavyavasthadaya upapadyanta ata aha, abhasa eva /k/a.

Akha/nd/aikarasapraka/s/amatratvarupasya svarupatirodhanapurvakopadhibhedopapadanahetur abhasa eva.

Praka/s/aikasvarupasya praka/s/atirodhana/m/ praka/s/ana/s/a eveti prag evopapaditam. abhasa eveti va pa/th/a/h/, tatha sati hetava abhasa/h/.]

THIRD ADHYaYA.

PaDA I.