Malplaquet Part 8

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_A DRAMA WITHOUT ARTIFICIALITY_

This play is that rarity, an English drama of ideas which is not in any sense imitative of Mr Bernard Shaw. It presents an intellectual conflict which is also a pa.s.sionate conflict of individualities, and the theme is treated with sympathy and humanity. The portrait of life in a colony of revolutionists alone would make "Civil War" something of a dramatic curiosity, but it is more than that. It is at once effective and original.

The play was given for the first time by the Incorporated Stage Society in June 1910, with remarkable success, and it will shortly be revived by several of our newer repertory theatres. It should be read as well as seen, however, for it is dramatic without artificiality, and literary without affectation.

_The following is what some of the Press think of the play:_

_Pall Mall Gazette_:--"A very interesting, sincere, and artistic piece of work."

_Westminster Gazette_:--"In producing 'Civil War,' by Mr Ashley Dukes, the Stage Society has rendered a real service to drama.... The play shows that the dramatist possesses in a high degree the capacity for writing dialogue--for finding phrases characteristic of the persons of the comedy, useful for the situations, and exhibiting a certain style that is rare and indefinable. There were scenes, notably one of great beauty between the old Socialist and his daughter, where, apart from the dramatic effect, one had real pleasure from the phrases, and this without there being any obvious attempt to write in a literary style."

_Times_:--"A piece of sound and promising work."

_Daily News_:--"His 'Civil War' has a strong motive, and, best of all, there is humanity and understanding in his treatment of it.... It is rarely indeed that we are given a play in which the drama is made inevitable by a clash of temperament and ideas."

London: STEPHEN SWIFT & CO., LTD., 10 John St., Adelphi

THE MAID'S COMEDY

A Chivalric Romance in Thirteen Chapters

_Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d. net_

_UNIQUE_

I. In which, by favour and fortune, three gentle persons may interest at least three others.

II. Wherein is founded a new Order of Chivalry, and matters for simple and wise alike may be discovered.

III. Exhibiting a partner in an old-established business pursuing her occupation.

IV. Wherein one character is left in a delicate situation, another loses her way, and a third is brought to a pretty pa.s.s.

V. Containing the din of arms, thrust and parry and threat of slaughter, but gently concluding with the first canon of feminine craft.

VI. Displaying a standing example of feminine folly and a rally of heroes.

VII. Concerning, mainly, the pa.s.sions as toys for the great G.o.d, Chance, to fool with.

VIII. Wherein an oft-defeated, yet indestructible, ideal is realised.

IX. Of matters for old and young, facts and fancies, aspirations and exhortations, and chronicling a feat worthy the grand tradition of chivalry.

X. A magical chapter, of whose content those who doubt may likely believe what should be doubted, and those who believe may doubt what is perfectly true.

XI. Confirming the adage that happy beginnings tend to happy endings, and showing how Heaven will still preserve Virtue, even at the cost of working a miracle.

XII. Which relates the Happy Ending.

XIII. Wherein the Romancer takes courteous leave of the Three Gentle Readers.

London: STEPHEN SWIFT & CO., LTD., 10 John St., Adelphi

Footnotes:

[1] From which little place the lines as a whole take the name in history of "Lines of La Ba.s.see."

[2] As is common in the history of military affairs, the advocates of either party present these confused movements before the lines of La Ba.s.see upon the eve of the siege of Tournai in very different and indeed contradictory lights.

The cla.s.sical work of Mr Fortescue, to which I must, here as elsewhere, render homage, will have the whole movement, from its inception, to be deliberately designed; no battle intended, the siege of Tournai to be the only real object of the allies.

The French apologists talk of quarrels between Eugene and Marlborough, take for granted a plan of a.s.sault against Villars, and represent the turning off of the army to the siege of Tournai as an afterthought. The truth, of course, is contained in both versions, and lies between the two.

Eugene and Marlborough did intend a destructive a.s.sault upon Villars and his line, but they were early persuaded--especially by the reconnoitring of Cadogan--that the defensive skill of the French commander had proved formidable, and we may take it that the determination to besiege Tournai and to abandon an a.s.sault upon the main of the French forces had been reached at least as early as the 26th. There is no positive evidence, however, one way or the other, to decide these questions of motive. I rely upon no more than the probable intention of the men, to be deduced from their actions, and I do not believe that the Dutch would have had orders to move as early as they did unless Marlborough had decided--not later than the moment I have mentioned--to make Tournai the first objective of the campaign.

[3] Mr Fortescue in his work makes it the 23rd. I cannot conceive the basis for such an error. The whole story of the 24th, 25th, 26th, 27th, 28th, and 29th is in the French archives, together with full details of the capitulation on the 29th and 30th.

[4] As usual, there is a contradiction in the records. The French record definitely ascribes the proposal to Marlborough. Marlborough, in a letter to his wife of 5th August, as definitely ascribes it to Surville; and there is no positive evidence one way or the other, though Louis'

rejection of the terms and the ability of calculation and the character of the two men certainly make it more probable that Marlborough and not Surville was the author of the proposition.

[5] The dispute as to who was the author of the suggestion for an armistice is further illumined by this refusal on the part of the allies.

The proposal to contain Tournai and yet to have free their vast forces in operation elsewhere, if a trifle crude, was certainly to their advantage, and as certainly to the disadvantage of the French.

[6] This excellent phrase is Mr Fortescue's.

[7] Technically the line of defence was forced, for the line of Trouille was but a continuation of the lines of La Ba.s.see--Douai--Valenciennes. So far as strategical results were concerned, the withdrawal of Villars behind the forest barrier was equivalent to the reconstruction of new lines, and in the event the action of Malplaquet proved that new defensive position to be strong enough to prevent the invasion of France. On the other hand, there is little doubt that if Villars had been in a little more strength he would have elected to fight on the old lines and not behind the woods.

It must further be remarked that if the operations had not been prolonged as they were by the existence of the posts on the lines, notably at St Ghislain, the defensive position of the French would probably have been forced and their whole line broken as early as September 4th.

[8] It is remarkable that these two roads, which are the chief feature both of the landscape and the local military topography, and which are of course as straight as taut strings, are represented upon Mr Fortescue's map (vol. i. p. 424) as winding lanes, or, to speak more accurately, are not represented at all. In this perhaps the learned historian of the British army was misled by c.o.xe's atlas to Marlborough's campaign, a picturesque but grossly inaccurate compilation. The student who desires to study this action in detail will do well to consult the Belgian Ordnance Map on the scale of 1/40,000 contours at 5 metres, section Roisin, and the French General Staff Map, 1/80,000, section Maubeuge, south-western quarter; the action being fought exactly on the frontier between Belgium and France, both maps are necessary. For the general strategic position the French 1/200,000 in colours, sheet Maubeuge, and the adjoining sheet, Lille, are sufficient.

[9] The reader who may compare this account of Malplaquet with others will be the less confused if he remembers that the forest of Sars is called on that extremity nearest to the gap the wood of Blaregnies, and that this name is often extended, especially in English accounts, to the whole forest.

[10] These 9000 found at St Ghislain a belated post of 200 French, who surrendered. Someone had forgotten them.

[11] For the discussion of this see later on p. 75.

[12] They were commanded by Hamilton and Tullibardine. It is to be remarked that the command of the whole of the left of the Prince of Orange's force, though it was not half Scotch, was under the command of Hamilton and Douglas. The two regiments of Tullibardine and Hepburn were under the personal command of the Marquis of Tullibardine, the heir of Atholl.

[13] Nominally under Tilly, but practically under the young Royal commander.

[14] Villars, wounded and fainting with pain, had been taken from the field an hour or two before, and the whole command was now in the hands of Boufflers.