The Franco-German War of 1870-71 Part 10

On the 20th of August Marshal Bazaine had written to Chalons: "I will give due notice of my march if, taking everything into consideration, I can undertake any such attempt." On the 23rd he reported to the Emperor: "If the news of the extensive reductions in the besieging army is confirmed, I shall set out on the march, and that by way of the northern fortresses, in order to risk nothing."

SORTIE FROM METZ.

(August 26th.)

On the 26th of August, when the Army of Chalons was still nearly seventy miles distant from the Ardennes Ca.n.a.l, and its advance on Metz was as yet not generally known, Marshal Bazaine collected his main forces on the right bank of the Moselle.

This movement had not escaped the notice of the German posts of observation, and the field-telegraph at once disseminated the information.

To support the 3rd Reserve Division at Malroy, ten battalions of the Xth Corps crossed from the left bank of the Moselle to Argancy on the right bank. The 25th Division held itself in readiness at the bridge of Hauconcourt, and the Ist Corps closed up towards Servigny. In the event of the success of a breach towards the north, the IIIrd, IVth, and part of the IXth Corps were available to intercept the enemy's march about Thionville.

The crossing from the island of Chambiere by the field-bridges which had been built, seriously delayed the French advance; the IIIrd, IInd, IVth, and VIth Corps, however, by about noon stood closely concentrated between Mey and Grimont. Advanced detachments had already at several points driven in the German posts south-east of Metz, but instead of now entering upon a general attack, Marshal Bazaine summoned all his Corps Commanders to a conference at Grimont. The Commandant of Metz then made it known that the artillery ammunition in hand would suffice for only one battle, that when it was exhausted the army would find itself defenceless in midst of the German hosts; the fortress, he continued, was not defensible in its present state, and could not stand a siege if the army were to be withdrawn from the place. All those things might certainly have been seen into during the stay in Metz; and much more did they behove to have been known before the army should cut loose. It was particularly enforced, "That the preservation of the Army was the best service that could be rendered to the country, more especially if negotiations for peace should be entered into." The generals present all spoke against the prosecution of the proposed movement; and the Commander-in-Chief, who had refrained from expressing any opinion in the matter, gave the order to retire at four o'clock.

The whole affair of the 26th of August can only be regarded in the light of a parade manoeuvre. Bazaine reported to the Minister of War that the scarcity of artillery ammunition made it "impossible" to break through the hostile lines, unless an offensive operation from the outside "should force the enemy to raise the investment." Information as to the "temper of the people" was earnestly requested.

There is no doubt that Bazaine was influenced, not wholly by military, but also by political considerations; still it may be asked whether he could have acted differently in the prevailing confusion of France. From the correspondence referred to, and his behaviour in the battles before Metz, his reluctance to quit the place was evident. Under its walls he could maintain a considerable army in unimpaired condition till the given moment. At the head of the only French army not yet shattered,[26] he might find himself in a position of greater power than any other man in the country. This army must, of course, first be freed from the bonds which now confined it. Even if it should succeed in forcibly breaking out it would be greatly weakened; and it was not inconceivable that the Marshal, as the strongest power in the land, might be able to offer a price which should induce the enemy to grant him a pa.s.sage. Then when at length the time for making peace should come, the Germans would no doubt ask: "Who in France is the authority with whom we can negotiate now that the Empire is overthrown, and who is strong enough to give a guarantee that the obligations which he will have undertaken shall be performed?" That the Marshal, if his plans had come to fulfilment, would have acted otherwise than in the interest of France is neither proved nor to be a.s.sumed.

But presently a number of men combined in Paris, who, without consulting the nation, const.i.tuted themselves the Government of the country, and took the direction of its affairs into their own hands. In opposition to this party, Marshal Bazaine, with his army at his back, could well come forward as a rival or a foe; nay, and--this was his crime in the eyes of the Paris Government--he might restore the authority of the Emperor to whom he had sworn allegiance. Whether he might not thus have spared his country longer misery and greater sacrifices may be left undecided. But that he was subsequently charged with treason obviously arose, no doubt, from the national vanity of the French, which demanded a "Traitor" as a scapegoat for the national humiliation.

Soon after this demonstration, for it was nothing more, of the besieged army, the investing forces were, in fact, reduced by the despatch, on the 29th, in accordance with orders from the supreme Headquarter, of the IInd and IIIrd Corps to Briey and Conflans, there to remain. To be sure, from those positions it was in their power to attack either of the French Marshals, as might prove requisite; while the XIIIth Corps, newly formed of the 17th Division, hitherto retained to defend the coast, and from the Landwehr, was already within a short distance of Metz.

Meanwhile Marshal Bazaine might have realized that he must abandon his delusion as to a release by means of negotiations; and he now firmly resolved to cut his way out by dint of force. The troops were served out with three days' provisions, and the intendance was furnished with a supply of "iron rations" from the magazines of the fortress. That the attempt should again be made on the right bank of the Moselle was only to be expected; since by far the larger portion of the enemy's forces stood entrenched on the left bank. It would have been very difficult to traverse that hilly region, intersected by deep ravines; and finally the army of the Crown Prince on the march to Paris would have had to be encountered. East of Metz, on the other hand, there afforded ample s.p.a.ce for the full development of the French forces. By bending of the south the open country was to be reached, offering no effective intercepting position to the enemy, whose line of investment was weakest in that direction. The march to the north and along the Belgian frontier entailed more danger and greater obstacles, yet the Marshal had explicitly indicated this particular road as that by which he intended to move. The Army of Chalons was also marching in that direction; its approach was already reported; and on the 31st of August, on which day, in fact, Marshal MacMahon's forces reached Stenay[27] in such disastrous circ.u.mstances, Bazaine's army also issued from Metz.

FOOTNOTES:

[26] The Army of Chalons was still unimpaired on August 26th.

[27] "Stenay," probably a slip of the pen for "Sedan," where MacMahon's army was gathered on August 31st. It never reached Stenay.

BATTLE OF NOISSEVILLE.

(August 31st.)

Of the French Corps then located on the right bank of the Moselle,[28]

the IIIrd was to cover on the right flank the advance of the others; one Division was ordered to move early in a south-easterly direction with intent to mislead the enemy, its other three Divisions to take position threatening Noisseville. Three pontoon bridges were constructed for the crossing of the rest of the army, and accesses to the heights in front of St. Julien were prepared. The pa.s.sage of the IVth and VIth Corps was to begin at six o'clock, and they were to take a position which, linking on its right with the IIIrd Corps, should extend from the village of Mey by Grimont to the Moselle; the IInd Corps and the Guard were to follow and form a second line. With the pa.s.sage of the artillery reserve and the cavalry it was expected that the crossing of the Moselle should be finished by ten o'clock; the trains were halted on the Isle of Chambiere. Thus it was intended that by noon five Corps should be ready for the a.s.sault of the section of the line of investment from Retonfay (on the French right) to Argancy (on the left), a distance of about seven miles, which s.p.a.ce had for its defenders only two German Divisions.

So early as seven o'clock Montaudon's Division issued from Fort Queuleu, and heading eastward drove the opposing outposts back on Aubigny. But this demonstration did not in the least deceive the Germans. The stir in the French camp had been observed quite early, and when the mist cleared off and great ma.s.ses of French troops were seen in front of Fort St.

Julien, an attempt to break through to the north was antic.i.p.ated with certainty, and the necessary dispositions were immediately undertaken to foil the effort.

The 28th Brigade of the VIIth Corps was dispatched to protect Courcelles, so that thus the 3rd Brigade of the Ist Corps could be brought nearer to Servigny. The troops of the Xth Corps which could be spared from their own section of the line of defence on the left bank were again set in motion to cross to the right, and the IXth Corps was held in readiness in antic.i.p.ation of its having eventually to follow.

The IIIrd Corps and the Ist Cavalry Division were recalled from Briey and directed to the plateau of Privat; the IInd was to stand ready to move off.

The attempt of the French to break out proved on this day even less successful than on the 26th; the IVth and VIth Corps crossed each other at the bridges, and they only reached their rendezvous position at one o'clock, though it was little more than three miles further; they then abandoned the intention of an immediate a.s.sault, and set about cooking.

A few skirmishes on the east of Aubigny and on the north towards Rupigny came to nothing. The Imperial Guard did not come up till three o'clock, the artillery and cavalry were still behind.

As entire quiescence now supervened, the Germans came to the conclusion that the attack must be intended for the following day. To save the strength of the troops, part of the reinforcements ordered up had already been sent back, when, at about four o'clock, the French suddenly opened a heavy artillery fire.

The Marshal had again summoned his commanders to a.s.semble at Grimont, this time to inform them of his dispositions for the attack. It was evident that the French could not advance towards the north until they had gained elbow-room by means of an offensive movement in the eastern direction, and had secured their right flank. For even if they succeeded in breaking through the Malroy-Charly line, they could get no further so long as the Germans were at Servigny and swept with their fire the plain as far as the Moselle, a s.p.a.ce not more than 5000 paces broad. The Marshal could not in any case reckon on carrying through his Artillery Reserve, which did not reach the battle-field until six o'clock, and the extrication of the baggage trains which had been left behind on the Isle of Chambiere was clearly impossible. The Cavalry Corps was still defiling, and could not come up until nine o'clock in the evening.

This unsatisfactory aspect of affairs was in complete accord with the character of the dispositions of the French commanders.

Marshal Le Boeuf received orders to advance with the IInd and IIIrd Corps on both sides of the valley of St. Barbe, and outflank from the south the 1st Prussian Division at Servigny, while the IVth Corps a.s.sailed it in front. The VIth Corps had the task of thrusting forward against the Reserve Division at Charly-Malroy. Marshal Canrobert was to command the two latter Corps, and the Guard was to be held back as reserve.

Thus General von Manteuffel had at first to confront with a small force a greatly superior enemy. This opposition might be undertaken either in the St. Barbe position, to outflank which was by no means easy, or on the line of Servigny--Poix--Failly, which, though more exposed, afforded much greater scope for the use of artillery. The latter position was chosen on the advice of General von Bergmann commanding the artillery, and the Landwehr Brigade was ordered into it from Antilly, where its place was taken by the 25th Division. Ten batteries were advanced to a distance of 1000 paces in front of the line of villages held by the infantry. Their fire proved so superior to that of the enemy, that the hostile batteries were soon silenced. The attack on Rupigny by the French IVth Corps, supported on the flank though it was by three batteries, remained stationary for a considerable time, and as the Prussians had not yet been driven back on St. Barbe, the VIth French Corps meanwhile could not enter upon any serious attack on the Reserve Division at Malroy-Charly. For the same reason Marshal Canrobert received the order for the present only to send a detachment of his force to the attack of the village of Failly, the northern point of support of the Servigny position.

Tixier's Division therefore moved out at 7.30 in the evening from Villers L'Orme, but met with a most obstinate resistance at Failly.

Though attacked on two sides, pelted by a storm of projectiles, and, as regarded a part of them, engaged in hand-to-hand fighting, the East Prussians stoutly held possession of their ground till the Landwehr Brigade came to their a.s.sistance from Vremy.

Up till now the situation southward of Servigny had worn a more favourable aspect for the French than in this northern re-entering angle between two hostile positions; their IInd and IIIrd Corps in the former quarter had only the 3rd Brigade of the Ist Prussian Corps to deal with in front of Retonfay. Montaudon's and Metman's Divisions moved down by way of Nouilly into the valley of the Vallieres brook; Clinchant's Brigade stormed the brewery in the face of strong resistance, and by seven o'clock the defenders of Noisseville were forced to evacuate the place. Montoy and Flanville were also taken possession of by the French, and further south the outposts of the German 4th Brigade were thrown back through Coincy and Chateau Aubigny. The batteries of the 1st Division, after enduring for a long time the fire of strong swarms of tirailleurs from the deep hollow south of them, were forced about seven o'clock to retire in echelon to the infantry position on the Poix--Servigny line, fending off for a time the pursuing enemy with case-shot.

But to this position the Prussians now held on staunchly, although completely out-flanked on their left. Potier's Brigade ascended the northern slope of the Vallieres valley, but found it impossible to reach Servigny. A moment later Cissey's Brigade rushed forward from the west, and seized the graveyard outside the village. The French IVth Corps struck at the centre of the Prussian position, but without success. Its effort to penetrate between Poix and Servigny was frustrated by the offensive stroke delivered by the battalions of the 2nd Brigade const.i.tuting the last reserve--a counter attack in which all the troops at hand at once joined. With drums beating they hurled themselves on the French, swept them out of the graveyard, and drove them back down the slope.

In support of the fierce fight here, the 3rd Brigade about half-past eight marched on Noisseville, whence it promptly expelled the small detachment found in possession, but subsequently yielded to superior numbers, and withdrew to St. Marais.

The din of strife had now fallen silent at all points, and the fight seemed to be ended. The infantry of the 1st Division were moving into the villages, and the artillery was going into bivouac, when suddenly at nine o'clock a great ma.s.s of French infantry advanced in the darkness to an attack on Servigny. This proved to be Aymard's Division; it entered the village without firing a shot, surprised the garrison, and drove it out after a fierce hand-to-hand fight. This episode remained unnoticed for a long time, even by the nearest troops; but these then rushed to arms, and pouring in from all sides, drove the French back beyond the graveyard, which thenceforth remained in German possession.

It was now ten o'clock at night. The 1st Division had kept its ground against an enemy of superior strength; but the French had penetrated into the unoccupied gap between the 3rd and 4th Brigades, and were a standing menace to the German flank at Servigny from their position at Noisseville.

_September 1st._--The 18th Division, by a night-march, crossed from the left to the right bank of the Moselle at four o'clock in the morning, and reinforced with a brigade both flanks of the line Malroy--Charly--Bois de Failly. The 25th Division was now able to fall back from Antilly to St. Barbe, where, with the 6th Landwehr Brigade, it formed a reserve for the Poix--Servigny position.

On the morning of the 1st of September a thick mist still shrouded the plain when all the troops stood to arms.

Marshal Bazaine now again indicated to his generals the seizure of St.

Barbe as the prime objective, since that alone could render possible the march to the north; and he added, "In the event of failure, we shall maintain our positions." This expression could only indicate the intention, in the event specified, of remaining under shelter of the cannon of Metz, and evinced but little confidence in the success of the enterprise now engaged in.[29]

So early as five o'clock the 3rd Brigade had deployed on the Saarlouis road to prevent the further progress of the enemy on the left flank of the 1st Division. It swept the slopes in the direction of Montoy with the fire of twenty guns, and when Noisseville had been well plied for a considerable time by the fire of the artillery of the 2nd Brigade, about seven o'clock the 43rd Regiment carried the village by storm. A fierce fight ensued in and about the houses: two French brigades struck into the combat, and after a long whirl of fighting the German regiment was driven out again. Battalions of the 3rd Brigade came up just as the fight was over, but the attack was not renewed.

Now that the direction of the French effort to break out was no longer doubtful, the 28th Brigade had started from Courcelles at six in the morning to reinforce the Ist Corps. Its two batteries silenced those of the French at Montoy, and then directed their fire on Flanville. The enemy soon began to abandon the burning village, which, at nine o'clock, the Rhinelanders entered from the south and the East Prussians from the north. Marshal Le Boeuf again sent forward Bastoul's Division on Montoy, but the extremely effective fire of the Prussian artillery compelled it to turn back.

The 3rd Brigade had meanwhile taken up a position on the upland of Retonfay, where it was now joined by the 28th. The 3rd Cavalry Division was reinforced by the Hessian Horse Brigade, and these troops with the artillery ma.s.s made up presently to 114 guns, formed a rampart against any further progress of the IInd and IIIrd French Corps.

The fighting had now died out on the right wing of the French army; but the IVth Corps had been enjoined to await the direct advance of the troops of that wing before renewing its attack on the artillery-front and village entrenchments of the line from Servigny to Poix, whose strength had been proved on the previous day. But towards eleven o'clock, after Noisseville had been heavily bombarded, the 3rd Prussian Brigade, supported by the Landwehr, advanced southward of the position, pushed its attack against that point, and compelled the French to withdraw from the burning village.

Marshal Canrobert, on the northern front of the sortie, had brought up his batteries at Chieulles by half-past eight, and their fire, seconded by that of the artillery of the fortress, caused a temporary evacuation of Rupigny; but the village was soon reoccupied. Tixier's Division had made two fruitless attempts to seize Failly, and now, on the other hand, the 36th Brigade of the 18th Division came up, and taking the offensive in conjunction with the Reserve Division, at ten o'clock drove the French back over the Chieulles stream. They made still another onslaught on Failly, but the flanking fire made this also a failure.

Marshal Le Boeuf, though he still had more than two Divisions to oppose it, held himself obliged to retreat on account of the approach of the Prussian 3rd Brigade on his right flank; and in consequence of the receipt of this intelligence, Marshal Bazaine at mid-day ordered the fighting to be broken off at all other points.

The Army of the Rhine which issued from Metz on August 31st, with a strength of 137,000 men,[30] had been successfully opposed by no more than 36,000 Prussians. In this battle for the first time in the war the French were the a.s.sailants, the Germans had the role of the defence.

That the Germans lost 3400 men against the loss of 3000 by the French, must be attributed to the higher properties of the infantry weapon of the latter. But the superiority of the Prussian artillery was decisively proved, and this it was which rendered possible General von Manteuffel's unshaken resistance.

The VIIth Corps remained on the right bank of the Norelle, where the line of investment was now further strengthened by the arrival of the XIIIth Corps under the command of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg. On the left bank the IInd and IIIrd Corps were now able to return to their respective previous positions. On the same day and at about the same hour when the destruction of one French army was completed at Sedan, the other was returning to an apparently more and more hopeless detention in Metz. Thus the issue of the war was already beyond doubt after a campaign of but two months' duration; though the war itself was far from being ended.