The Gospels in the Second Century Part 28

But we must not forget that there is a double challenge to be met.

The first part of it--that which relates to the evidence for the existence of the Gospels--has been answered. It remains to consider how far the external evidence for the Gospels goes to prove their authenticity. It may indeed well be asked how the external evidence can be expected to prove the authenticity of these records. It does so, to a considerable extent, indirectly by throwing them back into closer contact with the facts. It also tends to establish the authority in which they were held, certainly in the last quarter of the second century, and very probably before. By this time the Gospels were acknowledged to be all that is now understood by the word 'canonical.' They were placed upon the same footing as the Old Testament Scriptures. They were looked up to with the same reverence and regarded as possessing the same Divine inspiration. We may trace indeed some of the steps by which this position was attained. The [Greek: gegraptai] of the Epistle of Barnabas, the public reading of the Gospels in the churches mentioned by Justin, the [Greek: to eiraemenon] of Tatian, the [Greek: guriakai graphai] of Dionysius of Corinth, all prepare the way for the final culmination in the Muratorian Canon and Irenaeus. So complete had the process been that Irenaeus does not seem to know of a time when the authority of the Gospels had been less than it was to him. Yet the process had been, of course, gradual. The canonical Gospels had to compete with several others before they became canonical. They had to make good their own claims and to displace rival doc.u.ments; and they succeeded. It is a striking instance of the 'survival of the fittest.' That they were really the fittest is confirmed by nearly every fragment of the lost Gospels that remains, but it would be almost sufficiently proved by the very fact that they survived.

In this indirect manner I think that the external evidence bears out the position a.s.signed to the canonical Gospels. It has preserved to us the judgment of the men of that time, and there is a certain relative sense in which the maxim, 'Securus judicat orbis terrarum,' is true. The decisions of an age, especially decisions such as this where quite as much depended upon pious feeling as upon logical reasoning, are usually sounder than the arguments that are put forward to defend them. We should hardly endorse the arguments by which Irenaeus proves _a priori_ the necessity of a 'four-fold Gospel,' but there is real weight in the fact that four Gospels and no more were accepted by him and others like him. It is difficult to read without impatience the rough words that are applied to the early Christian writers and to contrast the self-complacency in which our own superior knowledge is surveyed. If there is something in which they are behind us, there is much also in which we are behind them. Among the many things for which Mr. Arnold deserves our grat.i.tude he deserves it not least for the way in which he has singled out two sentences, one from St. Augustine and the other from the Imitation, 'Domine fecisti nos ad te et irrequietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in te,' and, 'Esto humilis et pacificus et erit tec.u.m, Jesus.' The men who could write thus are not to be despised.

But beyond their more general testimony it is not clear what else the early Fathers could be expected to do. They could not prove-- at least their written remains that have come down to us could not prove--that the Gospels were really written by the authors traditionally a.s.signed to them. When we say that the very names of the first two Evangelists are not mentioned before a date that may be from 120-166 (or 155) A.D. and the third and fourth not before 170-175 A.D., this alone is enough, without introducing other elements of doubt, to show that the evidence must needs be inconclusive. If the author of 'Supernatural Religion' undertook to show this, he undertook a superfluous task. So much at least, Mr. Arnold was right in saying, 'might be stated in a sentence and proved in a page.' There is a presumption in favour of the tradition, and perhaps, considering the relation of Irenaeus to Polycarp and of Polycarp to St. John, we may say, a fairly strong one; but we need now-a-days, to authenticate a doc.u.ment, closer evidence than this. The cases are not quite parallel, and the difference between them is decidedly in favour of Irenaeus, but if Clement of Alexandria could speak of an Epistle written about 125 A.D. is the work of the apostolic Barnabas the companion of St.

Paul [Endnote 346:1], we must not lay too much stress upon the direct testimony of Irenaeus when he attributes the fourth Gospel to the Apostle St. John.

These are points for a different set of arguments to determine.

The Gospel itself affords sufficient indications as to the position of its author. For the conclusion that he was a Palestinian Jew, who had lived in Palestine before the destruction of Jerusalem, familiar with the hopes and expectations of his people, and himself mixed up with the events which he describes, there is evidence of such volume and variety as seems exceedingly difficult to resist. As I have gone into this subject at length elsewhere [Endnote 347:1], and as, so far as I can see, no new element has been introduced into the question by 'Supernatural Religion,' I shall not break the unity of the present work by considering the objections brought in detail. I am very ready to recognise the ability with which many of these are stated, but it is the ability of the advocate rather than of the impartial critic. There is a constant tendency to draw conclusions much in excess of the premisses. An observation, true in itself with a certain qualification and restriction, is made in an unqualified form, and the truth that it contains is exaggerated. Above all, wherever there is a margin of ignorance, wherever a statement of the Evangelist is not capable of direct and exact verification, the doubt is invariably given against him and he is brought in guilty either of ignorance or deception. I have no hesitation in saying that if the principles of criticism applied to the fourth Gospel--not only by the author of 'Supernatural Religion,' but by some other writers of repute, such as Dr. Scholten--were applied to ordinary history or to the affairs of every-day life, much that is known actually to have happened could be shown on _a priori_ grounds to be impossible. It is time that the extreme negative school should justify more completely their canons of criticism.

As it is, the laxity of these repels many a thoughtful mind quite as firmly convinced as they can be of the necessity of free enquiry and quite as anxious to reconcile the different sides of knowledge. The question is not one merely of freedom or tradition, but of reason and logic; and until there is more agreement as to what is reasonable and what the laws of logic demand, the arguments are apt to run in parallel lines that never meet [Endnote 348:1].

But, it is said, 'Miracles require exceptional evidence.' True: exceptional evidence they both require and possess; but that evidence is not external. Incomparably the strongest attestation to the Gospel narratives is that which they bear to themselves. Miracles have exceptional evidence because the non-miraculous portions of the narrative with which they are bound up are exceptional. These carry their truth stamped upon their face, and that truth is reflected back upon the miracles. It is on the internal investigation of the Gospels that the real issue lies. And this is one main reason why the belief of mankind so little depends upon formal apologetics. We can all feel the self- evidential force of the Gospel story; but who shall present it adequately in words? We are reminded of the fate of him who thought the ark of G.o.d was falling and put out his hand to steady it--and, for his profanity, died. It can hardly be said that good intentions would be a sufficient justification, because that a man should think himself fit for the task would be in itself almost a sufficient sign that he was mistaken. It is not indeed quite incredible that the qualifications should one day be found. We seem almost to see that, with a slight alteration of circ.u.mstances, a little different training in early life, such an one has almost been among us. There are pa.s.sages that make us think that the author of 'Parochial and Plain Sermons' might have touched even the Gospels with cogency that yet was not profane. But the combination of qualities required is such as would hardly be found for centuries together. The most fine and sensitive tact of piety would be essential. With it must go absolute sincerity and singleness of purpose.

Any dash of mere conventionalism or self-seeking would spoil the whole.

There must be that clear illuminated insight that is only given to those who are in a more than ordinary sense 'pure in heart.' And on the other hand, along with these unique spiritual qualities must go a sound and exact scientific training, a just perception of logical force and method, and a wide range of knowledge. One of the great dangers and drawbacks to the exercise of the critical faculty is that it tends to destroy the spiritual intuition. And just in like manner the too great reliance upon this intuition benumbs and impoverishes the critical faculty. Yet, in a mind that should present at all adequately the internal evidence of the Gospels, both should co-exist in equal balance and proportion. We cannot say that there will never be such a mind, but the asceticism of a life would be a necessary discipline for it to go through, and that such a life as the world has seldom seen.

In the meantime the private Christian may well be content with what he has. 'If any man will do His will, he shall know of the doctrine whether it be of G.o.d.'

CHAPTER XIV.

CONCLUSION.

And now that we have come to the end of the purely critical portion of this enquiry, I may perhaps be allowed to say a few words on its general tendency and bearing. As critics we have only the critical question to deal with. Certain evidence is presented to us which it is our duty to weigh and test by reference to logical and critical laws. It must stand or fall on its own merits, and any considerations brought in from without will be irrelevant to the question at issue. But after this is done we may fairly look round and consider how our conclusion affects other conclusions and in what direction it is leading us. If we look at 'Supernatural Religion' in this way we shall see that its tendency is distinctly marked. Its attack will fall chiefly upon the middle party in opinion. And it will play into the hands of the two extreme parties on either side. There can be little doubt that indirectly it will help the movement that is carrying so many into Ultramontanism, and directly it is of course intended to win converts to what may perhaps be called comprehensively Secularism.

Now it is certainly true that the argument from consequences is one that ought to be applied with great caution. Yet I am not at all sure that it has not a real basis in philosophy as well as in nature. The very existence of these two great parties, the Ultramontane and the Secularist, over against each other, seems to be it kind of standing protest against either of them. If Ultramontanism is true, how is it that so many wise and good men openly avow Secularism? If 'Secularism is true, how is it that so many of the finest and highest minds take refuge from it--a treacherous refuge, I allow--in Ultramontanism? There is something in this more than a mere defective syllogism--more than an insufficient presentation of the evidence. Truth, in the widest sense, is that which is in accordance with the laws and conditions of human nature. But where beliefs are so directly ant.i.thetical as they are here, the repugnance and resistance which each is found to cause in so large a number of minds is in itself a proof that those laws and conditions are insufficiently complied with. To the spectator, standing outside of both, this will seem to be easily explained: the one sacrifices reason to faith; the other sacrifices faith to reason. But there is abundant evidence to show that both faith (meaning thereby the religious emotions) and reason are ineradicable elements in the human mind. That which seriously and permanently offends against either cannot be true.

For creatures differently const.i.tuted from man--either all reason or all pure disembodied emotion--it might be otherwise; but, for man, as he is, the epithet 'true' seems to be excluded from any set of propositions that has such results.

Even in the more limited sense, and confining the term to propositions purely intellectual, there is, I think we must say, a presumption against the truth of that which involves so deep and wide a chasm in human nature. Without importing teleology, we should naturally expect that the intellect and the emotions should be capable of working harmoniously together. They do so in most things: why should they not in the highest matters of all? If the one set of opinions is anti-rational and the other anti-emotional, as we see practically that they are, is not this in itself an antecedent presumption against either of them? It may not be enough to prove at once that the syllogism is defective: still less is it a sufficient warrant for establis.h.i.+ng an opposite syllogism. But it does seem to be enough to give the scientific reasoner pause, and to make him go over the line of his argument again and again and yet again, with the suspicion that there is (as how well there may be!) a flaw somewhere.

It would not, I think, be difficult to point out such flaws [Endnote 352:1]--some of them, as it appears, of considerable magnitude. But the subject is one that would take us far away out of our present course, and for its proper development would require a technical knowledge of the processes of physical science which I do not possess. Leaving this on one side, and regarding them only in the abstract, the considerations stated above seem to point to the necessity of something of the nature of a compromise.

And yet there is, strictly speaking, no such thing as compromise in opinions. Compromise belongs to the world of practice; it is only admitted by an illicit process into the world of thought. The author of 'Supernatural Religion' is doubtless right in deprecating that 'illogical zeal which flings to the pursuing wolves of doubt and unbelief, sc.r.a.p by sc.r.a.p,' all the distinctive doctrines of Christianity. Belief, it is true, must be ultimately logical to stand. It must have an inner cohesion and inter- dependence. It must start from a fixed principle. This has been, and still is, the besetting weakness of the theology of mediation.

It is apt to form itself merely by stripping off what seem to be excrescences from the outside, and not by radically reconstructing itself, on a firmly established basis, from within. The difficulty in such a process is to draw the line. There is a delusive appearance of roundness and completeness in the creeds of those who either accept everything or deny everything: though, even here, there is, I think we may say, always, some little loophole left of belief or of denial, which will inevitably expand until it splits and destroys the whole structure. But the moment we begin to meet both parties half way, there comes in that crucial question: Why do you accept just so much and no more? Why do you deny just so much and no more? [Endnote 354:1]

It must, in candour, be confessed that the synthetic formula for the middle party in opinion has not yet been found. Other parties have their formulae, but none that will really bear examination. _Quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus_, would do excellently if there was any belief that had been held 'always, everywhere, and by all,' if no discoveries had been made as to the facts, and if there had been no advance in the methods of knowledge. The ultimate universality and the absolute uniformity of physical antecedents has a plausible appearance until it is seen that logically carried out it reduces men to machines, annihilates responsibility, and involves conclusions on the a.s.sumption of the truth of which society could not hold together for a single day.

If we abandon these Macedonian methods for unloosing the Gordian knot of things and keep to the slow and laborious way of gradual induction, then I think it will be clear that all opinions must be held on the most provisional tenure. A vast number of problems will need to be worked out before any can be said to be established with a pretence to finality. And the course which the inductive process is taking supplies one of the chief 'grounds of hope' to those who wish to hold that middle position of which I have been speaking. The extreme theories which from time to time have been advanced have not been able to hold their ground. No doubt they may have done the good that extreme theories usually do, in bringing out either positively or negatively one side or another of the truth; but in themselves they have been rejected as at once inadequate and unreal solutions of the facts. First we had the Rationalism (properly so called) of Paulus, then the Mythical hypothesis of Strauss, and after that the 'Tendenz-kritik' of Baur. But what candid person does not feel that each and all of these contained exaggerations more incredible than the difficulties which they sought to remove? There has been on each of the points raised a more or less definite ebb in the tide. The moderate conclusion is seen to be also the reasonable conclusion. And not least is this the case with the enquiry on which we have been just engaged. The author of 'Supernatural Religion' has overshot the mark very much indeed. There is, as we have seen, a certain truth in some things that he has said, but the whole sum of truth is very far from bearing out his conclusions.

When we look up from these detailed enquiries and lift up our eyes to a wider horizon we shall be able to relegate them to their true place. The really imposing witness to the truth of Christianity is that which is supplied by history on the one hand, and its own internal attractiveness and conformity to human nature on the other. Strictly speaking, perhaps, these are but two sides of the same thing. It is in history that the laws of human nature a.s.sume a concrete shape and expression. The fact that Christianity has held its ground in the face of such long-continued and hostile criticism is a proof that it must have some deeply-seated fitness and appropriateness for man. And this goes a long way towards saying that it is true. It is a theory of things that is being constantly tested by experience. But the results of experience are often expressed unconsciously. They include many a subtle indication that the mind has followed but cannot reproduce to itself in set terms. All the reasons that go to form a judge's decision do not appear in his charge. Yet there we have a select and highly-trained mind working upon matter that presents no very great degree of complexity. When we come to a question so wide, so subtle and complex as Christianity, the individual mind ceases to be competent to sit in judgment upon it. It becomes necessary to appeal to a much more extended tribunal, and the verdict of that tribunal will be given rather by acts than in words. Thus there seems to have always been a sort of half-conscious feeling in men's minds that there was more in Christianity than the arguments for it were able to bring out. In looking back over the course that apologetics have taken, we cannot help being struck by a disproportion between the controversial aspect and the practical.

It will probably on the whole be admitted that the balance of argument has in the past been usually somewhat on the side of the apologists; but the argumentative victory has seldom if ever been so decisive as quite to account for the comparatively undisturbed continuity of the religious life. It was in the height of the Deist controversy that Wesley and Whitfield began to preach, and they made more converts by appealing to the emotions than probably Butler did by appealing to the reason.

A true philosophy must take account of these phenomena. Beliefs which issue in that peculiarly fine and chastened and tender spirit which is the proper note of Christianity, cannot, under any circ.u.mstances, be dismissed as 'delusion.' Surely if any product of humanity is true and genuine, it is to be found here. There are indeed truths which find a response in our hearts without apparently going through any logical process, not because they are illogical, but because the scales of logic are not delicate and sensitive enough to weigh them.

'Except ye be converted and become as little children, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven.' 'I will arise and go to my father, and will say unto him: Father, I have sinned against heaven and before thee, and am no more worthy to be called thy son.' 'Come unto me all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest.' The plummet of science--physical or metaphysical, moral or critical--has never sounded so deep as sayings such as these. We may pa.s.s them over unnoticed in our Bibles, or let them slip glibly and thoughtlessly from the tongue; but when they once really come home, there is nothing to do but to bow the head and cover the face and exclaim with the Apostle, 'Depart from me, for I am a sinful man, O Lord.'

And yet there is that other side of the question which is represented in 'Supernatural Religion,' and this too must have justice done to it.

There is an intellectual, as well as a moral and spiritual, synthesis of things. Only it should be remembered that this synthesis has to cover an immense number of facts of the most varied and intricate kind, and that at present the nature of the facts themselves is in many cases very far from being accurately ascertained. We are constantly reminded in reading 'Supernatural Religion,' able and vigorous as it is, how much of its force depends rather upon our ignorance than our knowledge.

It supplies us with many opportunities of seeing how easily the whole course and tenour of an argument may be changed by the introduction of a new element. For instance, I imagine that if the author had given a little deeper study to the seemingly minute and secondary subject of text-criticism, it would have aroused in him very considerable misgivings as to the results at which he seemed to have arrived. There is a solidarity in all the different departments of human knowledge and research, especially among those that are allied in subject. These are continually sending out offshoots and projections into the neighbouring regions, and the conclusions of one science very often have to depend upon those of another. The course of enquiry that has been taken in 'Supernatural Religion' is peculiarly unfortunate. It starts from the wrong end. It begins with propositions into which _a priori_ considerations largely enter, and, from the standpoint given by these, it proceeds to dictate terms in a field that can only be trodden by patient and unprejudiced study. A far more hopeful and scientific process would have been to begin upon ground where dogmatic questions do not enter, or enter only in a remote degree, and where there is a sufficient number of solid ascertainable facts to go upon, and then to work the way steadily and cautiously upwards to higher generalisations.

It will have been seen in the course of the present enquiry how many side questions need to be determined. It would be well if monographs were written upon all the quotations from the Old Testament in the Christian literature of the first two centuries, modelled upon Credner's investigations into the quotations in Justin. Before this is done there should be a new and revised edition of Holmes' and Parsons' Septuagint [Endnote 359:1].

Everything short of this would be inadequate, because we need to know not only the best text, but every text that has definite historical attestation. In this way it would be possible to arrive at a tolerably exact, instead of a merely approximate, deduction as to the habit of quotation generally, which would supply a firmer basis for inference in regard to the New Testament than that which has been a.s.sumed here. At the same time monographs should be written in English, besides those already existing in German, upon the date or position of the writers whose works come under review. Without any attempt to prove a particular thesis, the reader should be allowed to see precisely what the evidence is and how far it goes. Then if he could not arrive at a positive conclusion, he could at least attain to the most probable. And, lastly, it is highly important that the whole question of the composition and structure of the Synoptic Gospels should be investigated to the very bottom. Much valuable labour has already been expended upon this subject, but the result, though progress has been made, is rather to show its extreme complexity and difficulty than to produce any final settlement. Yet, as the author of 'Supernatural Religion' has rather dimly and inadequately seen, we are constantly thrown back upon a.s.sumptions borrowed from this quarter.

Pending such more mature and thorough enquiries, I quite feel that my own present contribution belongs to a transition stage, and cannot profess to be more than provisional. But it will have served its purpose sufficiently if it has helped to mark out more distinctly certain lines of the enquiry and to carry the investigation along these a little way; suggesting at the same time--what the facts themselves really suggest--counsels of sobriety and moderation.

What the end will be, it would be presumptuous to attempt to foretell. It will probably be a long time before even these minor questions--much more the major questions into which they run up-- will be solved. Whether they will ever be solved--all of them at least--in such a way as to compel entire a.s.sent is very doubtful.

Error and imperfection seem to be permanently, if we may hope diminis.h.i.+ngly, a condition of human thought and action. It does not appear to be the will of G.o.d that Truth should ever be so presented as to crush out all variety of opinion. The conflict of opinions is like that of Hercules with the Hydra. As fast as one is cut down another arises in its place; and there is no searing- iron to scorch and cicatrize the wound. However much we may labour, we can only arrive at an inner conviction, not at objective certainty. All the glosses and a.s.severations in the world cannot carry us an inch beyond the due weight of the evidence vouchsafed to us. An honest and brave mind will accept manfully this condition of things, and not seek for infallibility where it can find none. It will adopt as its motto that n.o.ble saying of Bishop Butler--n.o.ble, because so unflinchingly true, though opposed to a sentimental optimism--'Probability is the very guide of life.'

With probabilities we have to deal, in the intellectual sphere.

But, when once this is thoroughly and honestly recognised, even a comparatively small balance of probability comes to have as much moral weight as the most loudly vaunted certainty. And meantime, apart from and beneath the strife of tongues, there is the still small voice which whispers to a man and bids him, in no superst.i.tious sense but with the gravity and humility which befits a Christian, to 'work out his own salvation with fear and trembling.'

[ENDNOTES]

[2:1] With regard to the references in vol. i. p. 259, n. 1, I had already observed, before the appearance of the preface to the sixth edition, that they were really intended to apply to the first part of the sentence annotated rather than the second.

Still, as there is only one reference out of nine that really supports the proposition in immediate connection with which the references are made, the reader would be very apt to carry away a mistaken impression. The same must be said of the set of references defended on p. xl. sqq. of the new preface. The expressions used do not accurately represent the state of the facts. It is not careful writing, and I am afraid it must be said that the prejudice of the author has determined the side which the expression leans. But how difficult is it to make words express all the due shades and qualifications of meaning--how difficult especially for a mind that seems to be naturally distinguished by force rather than by exactness and delicacy of observation! We have all 'les defauts de nos qualites.'

[10:1] Much harm has been done by rashly pressing human metaphors and a.n.a.logies; such as, that Revelation is a _message_ from G.o.d and therefore must be infallible, &c. This is just the sort of argument that the Deists used in the last century, insisting that a revelation, properly so called, _must_ be presented with conclusive proofs, _must_ be universal, _must_ be complete, and drawing the conclusion that Christianity is not such a revelation. This kind of reasoning has received its sentence once for all from Bishop Butler. We have nothing to do with what _must_ be (of which we are, by the nature of the case, incompetent judges), but simply with what _is_.

[18:1] Cf. Westcott, _Canon_, p. 152, n. 2 (3rd ed. 1870).

[18:2] See Lightfoot, _Galatians_, p. 60; also Credner, _Beitrage_, ii. 66 ('certainly' from St. Paul).

[20:1] _The Old Testament in the New_ (London and Edinburgh, 1868).

[21:1] Mr. M'Clellan (_The New Testament_, &c., vol. i. p.

606, n. c) makes the suggestion, which from his point of view is necessary, that 'S. Matthew has cited a prophecy spoken by Jeremiah, but nowhere written in the Old Testament, and of which the pa.s.sage in Zechariah is only a partial reproduction.' Cf.

Credner, _Beitrage_, ii. 152.

[25:1] We do not stay to discuss the real origin of these quotations: the last is probably not from the Old Testament at all.

[27:1] The quotations in this chapter are continuous, and are also found in Clement of Alexandria.

[34:1] It should be noticed, however, that the same reading is found in Justin and other writers.

[38:1] _Clementis Romani quae feruntur Homiliae Viginti_ (Gottingae, 1853).

[39:1] _Beitrage zur Einleitung in die biblischen Schriften_ (Halle, 1832).

[40:1] _The Epistles of S. Clement of Rome_ (London and Cambridge, 1869).

[49:1] The Latin translation is not in most cases a sufficient guarantee for the original text. The Greek has been preserved in the shape of long extracts by Epiphanius and others. The edition used is that of Stieren, Lipsiae, 1853.