Mexico, Aztec, Spanish and Republican Part 34

As soon as the armistice was terminated bold reconnoissances were made by our engineers in the direction of Chapultepec and the Molino or King's Mill and Casa Mata. On the 7th of September Santa Anna's answer to Scott's despatch was received, and on the same day the Commander-in-Chief and General Worth examined the enemy's formidable dispositions near and around the castle-crowned hill. The Mexican array was found to consist of an extended line of cavalry and infantry, sustained by a field battery of four guns, either occupying directly or supporting a system of defences collateral to the castle and summit; _but as the lines were skilfully masked a very inadequate idea of the extent of the forces was obtained_. Captain Mason's reconnoissance on the morning of the same day, represented the enemy's left as resting on and occupying the group of strong stone buildings at the Molino adjacent to the grove at the foot of Chapultepec and directly under the castle's guns. The right of his line rested on the Casa Mata, at the foot of the ridge sloping gradually to the plain below from the heights above Tacubaya; while, midway between these buildings, were the field battery and infantry forces disposed on either side to support it. This reconnoissance indicated that the _centre_ was the weak point of the position, and that its left flank was the strongest. In the Mill or Molino, on the left, was the brigade of General Leon, reinforced by the brigade of General Rangel; in the Casa Mata, on the right, was the brigade of General Perez; and on the intermediate ground was the brigade of General Ramirez, with several pieces of artillery. The Mexican reserve was composed of the 1st and 3d light, stationed in the groves of Chapultepec, while the cavalry consisting of 4,000 men, rested at the hacienda of Morales, not very far from the field. Such was the arrangement of the Mexican forces made by Santa Anna in person on the 7th of September, though it has been alleged by Mexican writers that it was somewhat changed during the following night. The wily chief had not allowed the time to pa.s.s during the negotiation between Trist and the Commissioners in political discussion alone. Regarding the failure of the treaty as most probable, he had striven to strengthen once more the military arm of his nation, and the first result of this effort was demonstrated in his disposition of troops at El Molino del Rey. The Americans' attack upon Chapultepec, as commanding the nearest and most important access to the city had been foreseen by him as soon as the armistice ended, and as a military man, he well knew that the isolated hill and castle could not be protected by the defenders within its walls alone or by troops stationed either immediately at its base or on the sloping road along its sides.

General Scott's plan of a.s.sault upon the city seems now to have been matured, though it required several days for full development according to the reconnoissances of his engineers. He designed to make the main a.s.sault on the west and not on the south of the city.

Possessing himself suddenly of the Molino del Rey and the adjacent grounds he was to _retire_ after the capture _without carrying Chapultepec_, the key of the roads to the western _garitas_ of San Cosme and Belen. The immediate capture of Chapultepec would have been a signal to Santa Anna to throw his whole force into the western defence of the city; but by retiring, after the fall of the Molino or King's Mill, and by playing off skilfully on the south of the city in the direction of the garita of San Antonio Abad, Scott would effectually divert the attention of the Mexicans to that quarter and thus induce them to weaken the western defences and strengthen the southern. At length, at the proper moment, by a rapid inversion of his forces from the south to the west, he intended to storm the castle-crowned hill, and rush along the causeways to the capital before the enemy could recover his position.

In pursuance of this plan, an attack upon El Molino del Rey and La Casa Mata was the first great work to be accomplished, and as soon as Santa Anna's reply closing the armistice was received on the 7th the advance towards that place was ordered for the following morning. This important work was entrusted to General Worth, whose division was reinforced by three squadrons of dragoons; one command of 270 mounted riflemen under Major Sumner; three field pieces under Captain Drum; two twenty-four pounders under Captain Huger, and Cadwallader's brigade 784 strong. The reconnoissances had been completed; at three o'clock in the morning of the 8th of September the several columns were put in motion on as many different routes, and when the gray dawn enabled them to be seen they were as accurately posted as if in midday for review. Colonel Duncan was charged with the general disposition of the artillery, while the cavalry were under Major Sumner.

At the first glimmer of day Huger's powerful guns saluted the walls of El Molino and continued to play in that quarter until this point of the enemy's line became sensibly shaken. At that moment the a.s.saulting party, commanded by Wright of the 8th Infantry, dashed forward to a.s.sault the centre. Musketry and cannister were showered upon them by the aroused enemy, but on they rushed, driving infantry and artillerists at the point of the bayonet, capturing the field pieces and trailing them on the flying foe, until the Mexicans perceiving that they had been a.s.sailed by a mere handful of men suddenly rallied and reformed. In an instant the rea.s.sured and gallant foe opened upon the Americans a terrific fire of musketry, striking down eleven out of the fourteen officers who composed the command, and, for the time, staggering the staunch a.s.sailants. But this paralysis continued for an instant only. A light battalion which had been held to cover Huger's battery, commanded by Captain E. Kirby Smith, rushed forward to support, and executing its b.l.o.o.d.y task amid horrible carnage, finally succeeded in carrying the line and occupying it with our troops. In the meanwhile Garland's brigade, sustained by Drum's artillery a.s.saulted the enemy's left near the Molino, and after an obstinate contest drove him from his position under the protecting guns of Chapultepec. Drum's section and Huger's battering guns advanced to the enemy's position, and his captured pieces were now opened on the retreating force. While these efforts were successfully making on the Mexican centre and left, Duncan's battery blazed on the right, and Colonel Mackintosh was ordered to a.s.sault that point. The advance of his brigade soon brought it between the enemy and Duncan's guns, and their fire was of course discontinued. Onwards sternly and steadily moved the troops towards the Casa Mata, which, as it was approached, proved to be a ma.s.sive stone work surrounded with bastioned entrenchments and deep ditches, whence a deadly fire was delivered and kept up without intermission upon our advancing troops until they reached the very slope of the parapet surrounding the citadel. The havoc was dreadful. A large proportion of the command was either killed or wounded; but still the ceaseless fire from the Casa Mata continued its deadly work, until the maimed and broken band of gallant a.s.sailants was withdrawn to the left of Duncan's battery where its remnants rallied. Duncan and Sumner had meanwhile been hotly engaged in repelling a charge of Mexican cavalry on the left, and having just completed the work, the brave Colonel found his countrymen retired from before the Casa Mata and the field again open for his terrible weapons. Directing them at once upon the fatal fort he battered the Mexicans from its walls, and as they fled from its protecting enclosure he continued to play upon the fugitives as relentlessly as they had recently done upon Mackintosh and his doomed brigade.

The Mexicans were now driven from the field at every point. La Casa Mata was blown up by the conquerors. Captured ammunition and cannon moulds in El Molino were destroyed. And the Americans, according to Scott's order previous to the battle, returned to Tacubaya, with three of the enemy's guns, (a fourth being spiked and useless,) eight hundred prisoners including fifty-two commissioned officers, and a large quant.i.ty of small arms, with gun and musket ammunition. Three thousand two hundred and fifty-one Americans, had on this day, driven four times their number from a selected field; but they had paid a large and n.o.ble tribute to death for the victory. Nine officers were included in the one hundred and sixteen of our killed, and forty-nine officers in the six hundred and sixty-five of our wounded. The Mexicans suffered greatly in wounded and slain, while the gallant General Leon and Colonel Balderas fell fighting bravely on the field of battle.[75]

The battle was over by nine o'clock in the morning. The Americans, after collecting their dead and wounded, retired from the b.l.o.o.d.y field, but they were not allowed to mourn over their painful losses.

They had suffered severely, yet the battle had been most disastrous to the Mexicans. The fine commands of Generals Perez and Leon and of Colonel Balderas, were broken up; the position once destroyed, could not serve for a second defence, and the _morale_ of the soldiers had suffered. The Mexicans were beginning to believe that mere formidable ma.s.ses, if not directed by skilful chiefs, were, in truth, but harmless things, and not to be relied on very confidently for national defence. The new levies, the old regular army, and the volunteers of the city, had all been repeatedly beaten in the valley both before and since the armistice. Nevertheless, Santa Anna, in spite of all these defeats and disasters at the Molino and Casa Mata, caused the bells of the city to be merrily rung for a victory, and sent forth proclamations by extraordinary couriers, in every direction, announcing the triumph of Mexican valor and arms!

On the morning of the 11th, Scott proceeded to carry out the remainder of his projected capture of the capital. His troops had been already for some time hovering around the southern gates, and he now surveyed them closely covered by General Pillow's division and Riley's brigade of Twigg's command, and then ordered Quitman from Coyoacan to join Pillow by _daylight_, before the southern gates. _By night_ however, the two Generals with their commands were to pa.s.s the two intervening miles between their position and Tacubaya where they would unite with Worth's division, while General Twiggs was left, with Riley, Captain Taylor and Steptoe, in front of the gates to manuvre, threaten, or make false attacks so as to occupy and deceive the enemy. General Smith's brigade was halted in supporting distance at San Angel, in the rear, till the morning of the 13th, so as to support our general depot at Mixcoac. This stratagem against the south was admirably executed throughout the 12th and until the afternoon of the 13th, when it was too late for Santa Anna to recover from his delusion.

In the meanwhile preparations had been duly made for the operations on the west by the capture of Chapultepec. Heavy batteries were established and the bombardment and cannonade under Captain Huger, were commenced early on the morning of the 12th. Pillow and Quitman had been in position, as ordered, since early on the night of the 11th, and Worth was now commanded to hold his division in reserve near the foundry to support Pillow, while Smith was summoned to sustain Quitman. Twiggs still continued to inform us with his guns that he held the Mexicans on the defensive in that quarter and kept Santa Anna in constant anxiety. Scott's positions and strategy perfectly disconcerted him. One moment on the south--the next at Tacubaya--then reconnoitering the south again--and, at last, concentrating his forces so that they might be easily moved northward to Chapultepec or southward to the gate of San Antonio Abad. These movements rendered him constantly sensible of every hour's importance, yet he would not agree with the veteran Bravo who commanded Chapultepec and was convinced that the hill and castle would be the points a.s.sailed.

During the whole of the 12th the American pieces, strengthened by the captured guns, poured an incessant shower of shot into the fortress until nightfall, when the a.s.sailants slept upon their arms, to be in position for an early renewal on the 13th.

At half-past five in the morning the American guns recommenced upon Chapultepec; but still Santa Anna clung to the southern gates while Scott was silently preparing for the final a.s.sault according to a preconcerted signal. About 8 o'clock, judging that the missiles had done the work, the heavy batteries suddenly ceased firing, and instantaneously Pillow's division rushed forward from the conquered Molino del Rey, and overbearing all obstacles, and rapidly clambering up the steep acclivities, raised their scaling ladders and poured over the walls.[76]

Quitman, supported by Generals s.h.i.+elds and Smith, was meanwhile advancing rapidly towards the south-east of the works, over a causeway with cuts and batteries defended by an army strongly posted outside the works towards the east. But nothing could resist the impulse of the storming division, though staunchly opposed and long held at bay, and whilst it rushed to complete the work, the New York, South Carolina, and Pennsylvania volunteers, under s.h.i.+elds, crossed the meadows in front amid a heavy fire, and entered the outer enclosure of Chapultepec in time to join the enterprise from the west. The castle was now possessed at every point. The onslaught had been so rapid and resistless, that the Mexicans stood appalled as the human tide foamed and burst over their battlements. Men who had been stationed to fire the mines either fled or were shot down. Officers fell at their posts, and the brave old Bravo, fighting to the last, was taken prisoner with a thousand combatants.

Santa Anna was at last undeceived. He detached at once the greater portion of his troops from near the garita of San Antonio Abad; but it was too late;--the key to the roads of San Cosme and Belen had fallen; the advance works were weak, and the routed troops of Chapultepec fled rapidly along the causeways and over the meadows. Still as they retreated they fought courageously, and as our men approached the walls, the fresh troops in the neighborhood poured their volleys from behind parapets, windows and steeples. Nevertheless, Santa Anna dared not withdraw all his forces in the presence of Twigg's threatening division on the south.

Meanwhile Worth had seized the causeway and aqueduct of San Cosme, while Quitman advanced by the other towards the garita of Belen. The double roads on each side of these aqueducts which rested on open arches spanning ma.s.sive pillars, afforded fine points for attack and defence. Both the American Generals were prompt in pursuing the retreating foe, while Scott, who had ascended the battlements of Chapultepec and beheld the field spread out beneath him like a map, hastened onward all the stragglers and detachments to join the flushed victors in the final a.s.sault.

Worth speedily reached the street of San Cosme and became engaged in desperate conflict with the enemy from the houses and defences.

Ordering forward Cadwallader's brigade with mountain howitzers, preceded by skirmishers and pioneers with pick-axes and crow bars to force windows and doors and to burrow through the walls, he rapidly attained an equality of position with the enemy; and by 8 o'clock in the evening, after carrying two batteries in this suburb, he planted a heavy mortar and piece of artillery from which he might throw shot and sh.e.l.ls into the city during the night. Having posted guards and sentinels and sheltered his weary men, he at length found himself with no obstacle but the gate of San Cosme between his gallant band and the great square of Mexico.

The pursuit by Quitman on the road to the gate of Belen had been equally hot and successful. Scott originally designed that this General should only manuvre and threaten the point so as to favor Worth's more dangerous enterprise by San Cosme. But the brave and impetuous Quitman, seconded by the eager spirits of his division, longing for the distinction of which they had been hitherto deprived, heeded neither the external defences nor the more dangerous power of the neighboring citadel. Onward he pressed his men under flank and direct fires;--seized an intermediate battery of two guns;--carried the gate of Belen,--and thus, before two o'clock, was the first to enter the city and maintain his position with a loss proportionate to the steady firmness of his desperate a.s.sault. After nightfall, he added several new defences to the point he had won so gloriously, and sheltering his men as well as he was able, awaited the return of daylight under the guns of the formidable and unsubdued citadel.

So ended the battles of the 13th of September, 1847, and so, in fact, ended the great contests of the war. Santa Anna had been again "disconcerted" in his plan of battle, by Scott, as he had previously been thwarted by Valencia's disobedience and wilfulness. Scott would not attack the south of the city where he expected him, and consequently the American chief conquered the point where he had not expected him!

When darkness fell upon the city a council of disheartened officers a.s.sembled in the Mexican citadel. After the customary crimination and recrimination had been exhausted between Santa Anna and other officers, it was acknowledged that the time had come to decide upon future movements. Beaten in every battle, they now saw one American General already within the city gate, while another was preparing to enter on the following morning, and kept the city sleepless by the loud discharges of his heavy cannon or bursting bombs as they fell in the centre of the capital. General Carrera believed the demoralization of his army complete. Lombardini, Alcorta and Perez coincided in his opinion, and Santa Anna at length closed the panic stricken council by declaring that Mexico must be evacuated during the night and by naming Lombardini General-in-Chief, and General Perez second in command.

Between eight and nine o'clock Senor Trigueros called at the citadel with his coach, and bore away the luckless military President to the sacred town of Guadalupe Hidalgo, three miles north of the capital.

The retreat of the Mexican army began at midnight, and not long after, a deputation from the Ayuntamiento, or City Council, waited upon General Scott with the information that the federal government and troops had fled from the capital. The haggard visitors demanded terms of capitulation in favor of the church, the citizens and the munic.i.p.al authorities. Scott refused the ill-timed request, and promising no terms that were not self imposed, sent word to Quitman and Worth to advance as soon as possible on the following morning, and, guarding carefully against treachery, to occupy the city's strongest and most commanding points. Worth was halted at the Alameda, a few squares west of the Plaza, but Quitman was allowed the honor of advancing to the great square, and hoisting the American flag on the National Palace.

At 9 o'clock the Commander-in-Chief, attended by his brilliant staff, rode into the vast area in front of the venerable Cathedral and Palace, amid the shouts of the exulting army to whose triumphs his prudence and genius had so greatly contributed. It was a proud moment for Scott, and he might well have flushed with excitement as he ascended the Palace stairs and sat down in the saloon which had been occupied by so many Viceroys, Ministers, Presidents and Generals, to write the brief order announcing his occupation of the capital of Mexico. Yet the elation was but momentary. The cares of conquest were now exchanged for those of preservation. He was allowed no interval of repose from anxiety. His last victories had entirely disorganized the Republic. There was no longer a national government, a competent munic.i.p.al authority, or even a police force which could be relied on to regulate the fallen city. Having accomplished the work of destruction, the responsibility of reconstruction was now imposed upon him; and first among his duties was the task of providing for the safety and subordination of that slender band which had been so suddenly forced into a vast and turbulent capital.

NOTE.--We shall record as very interesting historical facts, the numbers with which General Scott achieved his victories in the valley.

FORCES.

He left Puebla with 10,738 rank and file.

At Contreras and Churubusco, there were 8,497 engaged.

At El Molino del Rey and La Casa Mata, 3,251 "

On 12th and 13th September, at Chapultepec, &c., 7,180 "

Final attack on city, after deducting killed, } wounded, garrison of Mixcoac and Chapultepec,} 6,000

LOSSES.

At Contreras and Churubusco, 137 killed. 877 wounded. 38 missing.

At El Molino, &c., 116 " 665 " 18 "

September 12th, 13th, and 14th, 130 " 703 " 29 "

Grand total of losses, 2,703.

"On the other hand," says Scott in his despatch of 18th September, 1847, "this small force has beaten on the same occasions, in view of the capital, the whole Mexican army, composed, at the beginning, of thirty odd thousand men, posted always in chosen positions, behind entrenchments or more formidable defences of nature and art;--killed or wounded of that number more than 7,000 officers and men,--taken 3,730 prisoners, one-seventh officers, including 13 generals, of whom 3 had been Presidents of this Republic;--captured more than 20 colors and standards, 75 pieces of ordnance, besides 57 wall pieces, 20,000 small arms, and an immense quant.i.ty of shot, sh.e.l.ls and powder." See Ex. Doc. No. 1 Senate, 30th Congress, 1st Session, p. 384.

[Footnote 74: See Lieut. Smith's Memoir, ut antea, p. 8.]

[Footnote 75: This was a great but a _rash_ victory. The American infantry relying chiefly on the bayonet and expecting to effect its object by surprise and even at an earlier hour of the morning, advanced with portions of the three thousand two hundred and fifty-one men to attack at least eleven or twelve thousand Mexicans upon a field selected by themselves, protected by stone walls and ditches, commanded by the fortress of Chapultepec and the ground swept by artillery, while four thousand cavalry threatened an overwhelming charge! We have no criticism to make as to inequality of numbers, but although we believe that our officers did not antic.i.p.ate so strong a resistance, we are satisfied that it would have been better to rely at _first_ upon the fatal work of mortars and _siege_ pieces, of which we had abundance, and, _then_, to have permitted the bayonet to complete the task the battering train had begun. If the difficulty of moving rapidly to the scene of action in the night, prevented a _night_ attack and surprise, it would probably have been better to change the plan of battle even at a late hour. In the end, Duncan's great guns, effectually destroyed a post which had been the slaughter house of many a n.o.ble American soldier. The Mexican cavalry behaved shamefully.

In Colonel Ramsey's notes on the translation of the Mexican _Apuntes para la historia de la Guerra_, &c., p. 347, he says: "it is _now known_ in Mexico that Santa Anna was in possession of General Scott's order to attack the Molino del Rey in a few hours after it was written, and during the whole of the 7th, troops were taking up their positions on that ground. It is believed further that Santa Anna knew the precise force that was to attack. When, therefore, Scott supposed that Worth would surprise the Mills and Casa Mata, he was met by what?

Shall the veil be raised a little further? There was a traitor among the list of high ranking officers in the Mexican army, and for gold he told the Mexican force. Scott had been betrayed by one not an American, not an officer or soldier, but Santa Anna was betrayed by one of his own officers and a Mexican. Santa Anna believed the information he received and acted on it. General Scott did _not_ believe what he learned at night, and--the victory was won!"]

[Footnote 76: The importance of the _previous_ capture of El Molino del Rey was proved in this a.s.sault upon Chapultepec, for Pillow's division started from this very Mill, from within the enemy's work, and found itself on an equality with the foe up to the very moment of scaling the walls at the crest of the mount, whereas the other a.s.saulting column under Quitman taking the only remaining road to the castle, a causeway leading from Tacubaya, was successfully held at bay by the outworks defending this road at the base of the hill, until after the castle was taken, and the opposing force was taken in rear by troops pa.s.sing through and around Chapultepec. Had El Molino still been held by the Mexicans, the siege pieces would not have been allowed to play uninterruptedly, nor would the a.s.saulting parties been able to take position or attack with impunity. See Lieut. Smith's Memoir, ut antea p. 8.]

CHAPTER XVII.

1847-1850.

ATTACK OF THE CITY MOB ON THE ARMY--QUITMAN GOVERNOR--PEnA PRESIDENT--CONGRESS ORDERED--SIEGE OF PUEBLA--LANE'S, LALLY'S AND CHILDS'S VICTORIES--GUERRILLEROS BROKEN UP--MEXICAN POLITICS--ANAYA PRESIDENT--PEACE NEGOTIATIONS--SCOTT'S DECREE--PEnA PRESIDENT--SANTA ANNA AND LANE--SANTA ANNA LEAVES MEXICO FOR JAMAICA--TREATY ENTERED INTO--ITS CHARACTER--SANTA CRUZ DE ROSALES--COURT OF INQUIRY--INTERNAL TROUBLES--AMBa.s.sADORS AT QUEReTARO--TREATY RATIFIED--EVACUATION--REVOLUTIONARY ATTEMPTS--CONDITION OF MEXICO SINCE THE WAR--CHARACTER OF SANTA ANNA--NOTE ON THE MILITARY CRITICS.

Scarcely had the divisions of the American army, after the enthusiastic expression of their joy, begun to disperse from the great square of Mexico in search of quarters, when the populace commenced firing upon them from within the deep embrasures of the windows and from behind the parapet walls of the house tops. This dastardly a.s.sault by the mob of a surrendered city lasted for two days, until it was terminated by the vigorous military measures of General Scott. Yet it is due to the Mexicans to state that this horrible scheme of a.s.sa.s.sination was not countenanced by the better cla.s.ses, but that the base outbreak was altogether owing to the liberation of about two thousand convicts by the flying government on the previous night. These miscreants,--the sc.u.m and outcasts of Mexico--its common thieves, stabbers and notorious vagrants,--banded with nearly an equal number of the disorganized army, had already thronged the Palace when Quitman arrived with his division, and it was only by the active exertion of Watson's marines, that the vagrant crowd was driven from the edifice.

[Ill.u.s.tration: GREAT SQUARE OF MEXICO.]

General Quitman was immediately appointed civil and military Governor of the conquered capital, and discharged his duties under the martial law proclaimed by Scott on the 17th September. The general order of the Commander-in-Chief breathes the loftiest spirit of self-respect, honor and national consideration. He points out clearly the crimes commonly incident to the occupation of subdued cities, and gives warning of the severity with which their perpetrators will be punished. He protects the administration of justice among the Mexicans in the courts of the country. He places the city, its churches, wors.h.i.+p, convents, monasteries, inhabitants and property, under the special safeguard of the faith and honor of the American army. And finally, instead of demanding, according to the custom of many generals in the old world, a splendid ransom from the opulent city, he imposed upon it a trifling contribution of one hundred and fifty thousand dollars,--twenty thousand of which he devoted to extra comforts for the sick and wounded; ninety thousand to purchase blankets and shoes for gratuitous distribution among the common soldiers, while but forty thousand were reserved for the military chest. This act of clemency and consideration is in beautiful contrast with the last malignant spitefulness of the conquered army, whose commander, unable to overthrow the invaders in fair combat, had released at midnight, the desperadoes from his prisons, with the hope that a.s.sa.s.sination might do the work which military skill and honorable valor had been unable to effect.

Meanwhile Santa Anna despatched a circular from the town of Guadalupe recounting to the Governors of the different States the loss of the capital, and, on the 16th, he issued a decree requiring Congress to a.s.semble at Queretaro, which was designated as the future seat of government. As president and politician, he at once saw that he could do nothing more without compromising himself still further. Resigning, therefore, the executive chair in favor of his const.i.tutional successor, Senor Pena-y-Pena, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, he despatched General Herrera with four thousand troops to Queretaro, and departed to a.s.sail the Americans in Puebla. On the 18th he evacuated Guadalupe, and took the road to the eastward, with two thousand cavalry commanded by General Alvarez. He knew that the communication with our base of operations in that quarter was seriously interrupted if not entirely cut off; and he vainly hoped to recover his military prestige by some brilliant feat of arms over detached or unequal squadrons.

When Scott marched into the valley of Mexico, Puebla was left in charge of Colonel Childs, with four hundred efficient men and nearly eighteen hundred in his hospitals. The watchful commander and his small band preserved order until the false news of Mexican success at Molino del Rey was received. But, at that moment, the ma.s.ses, joined by about three thousand troops under General Rea, a brave and accomplished Spaniard, rose upon, and besieged the slender garrison.

On the 22d, Santa Anna arrived, and increasing the a.s.sailants to nearly eight thousand, made the most vigorous efforts during the six following days and nights to dislodge the Americans from the position they had seized.

About the middle of the month, Brigadier General Lane left Vera Cruz with a fresh command, and at Jalapa joined the forces of Major Lally, who with nearly a thousand men and a large and valuable train, had fought his way thither against Jarauta and his guerrilleros at San Juan, Paso de Ovejas, Puente Nacional, Plan del Rio, Cerro-Gordo and Los Animas. As soon as the news of Puebla's danger reached these commanders they marched to support the besieged band, while Santa Anna believing that Rea could either conquer or hold Childs in check until his return, departed in quest of the advancing columns of Lane and Lally, who were reported to have convoyed from the coast an immense amount of treasure. The combined l.u.s.t of glory and gold perhaps stimulated this last effort of the failing chief. Rea continued the siege of Puebla bravely. Santa Anna, advancing eastward, and apparently confident of success, established his headquarters at Huamantla; but whilst manuvering his troops to attack our approaching columns, Lane fell upon him suddenly on the 9th of October, and after a sharp action, remained victor on the field. On the next day our eager general continued his march to Puebla, and entering it on the 13th of October, drove the Mexicans from all their positions and effectually relieved the pressed but pertinacious commander of the beleagured Americans.

It was now the turn of those who had been so long a.s.sailed to become a.s.sailants. Rea retired to Atlixco, about twenty-five miles from Puebla, but the inexorable Lane immediately followed in his steps, and reaching the retreat at sunset on the 19th, by a bright moonlight cannonaded the town from the overlooking heights. After an hour's incessant labor, Atlixco surrendered,--the enemy fled,--and thus was destroyed a nest in which many a guerrillero party had been fitted out for the annoyance or destruction of Americans.

Mexico possesses a wonderful facility in the creation of armies, or in the aggregation of men under the name of soldiers. Wherever a standard is raised, it is quickly surrounded by the idlers, the thriftless, and the improvident, who are willing, at least, to be supported if not munificently recompensed for the task of bearing arms. At this period, and notwithstanding all the recent disgraceful and disheartening defeats, a large corps had been already gathered in different parts of the republic. The recruits were, however, divided into small, undisciplined, and consequently inefficient bodies. It is reported that Lombardini and Reyes were in Queretaro with a thousand men; Santa Anna's command, now turned over to General Rincon by order of President Pena-y-Pena, consisted of four thousand; in Tobasco and Chiapas there were two thousand; Urrea, Carrabajal and Ca.n.a.les commanded two thousand; Filisola was at San Luis Potosi with three thousand; Pena y Barragan had two thousand at Toluca; one thousand were in Oajaca, while nearly three thousand guerrilleros hara.s.sed the road between Puebla and Vera Cruz and rendered it impa.s.sable after the victories in the valley. The conflict was now almost given up to these miscreants under Padre Jarauta and Zen.o.bio, for, in the eastern districts, General Lane with his ardent partizans held Rincon, Alvarez, and Rea in complete check.

These guerrilla bands had inflicted such injury upon our people that it became necessary to destroy them at all hazards. This severe task was accomplished by Colonel Hughes and Major John R. Kenly who commanded at Jalapa, and by General Patterson, whose division of four thousand new levies was shortly to be reinforced by General Butler with several thousand more. Patterson garrisoned the National Bridge in the midst of these bandit's haunts, and having executed, at Jalapa, two paroled Mexican officers captured in one of the marauding corps, and refused the surrender of Jarauta, he drove that recreant priest from the neighborhood into the valley of Mexico, in which Lane pursued and destroyed his reorganized band.