The Egyptian campaigns, 1882 to 1885 Part 7

"I had the honour to receive your letter of the 6th July, in which you state that you had been informed that two guns had been mounted and that other works are going on on the sea-sh.o.r.e, and in reply I a.s.sure you that these a.s.sertions are unfounded, and that this information is like the intimation given to you about the blocking up of the entrance to the harbour, of the falseness of which you were convinced. I rely on your feelings of humanity, and beg you to accept my respects.

"(Signed) TOULBA, "Commandant of Forces."

The Khedive during this period retained great self-possession. He realized perfectly the difficulties of his position, and sent for Sir Auckland Colvin, to whom he explained that should a bombardment be resolved upon he was determined to remain faithful to Egypt. He could not, he said, desert those who had stood by him during the crisis, nor could he, merely to secure his personal safety, abandon Egypt when attacked by a foreign Power. In the event of a bombardment taking place, His Highness announced his intention of retiring to a palace on the Mahmoudieh Ca.n.a.l, and added that the more rapidly the affair was conducted, the less danger there would be for himself personally.

On the 9th, Admiral Seymour telegraphed to the Admiralty that "there was no doubt about the armament. Guns were being mounted in Fort Silsileh.

He should give foreign consuls notice at daylight to-morrow, and commence action twenty-four hours after, unless forts on the isthmus and those commanding the entrance to the harbour were surrendered."

The information upon which Seymour proposed to act was partly a declaration made by Lieutenant Dorrien, of the _Invincible_, and which (omitting immaterial parts) was as follows:--

"On the morning of the 9th day of July, 1882, at about 7.30 a.m., I drove through the Rosetta Gate, and ... reached the old quarantine station, where I ... proceeded on foot to the fort marked on Admiralty Chart 'Tabia-el-Silsileh,' and when within fifty yards of the said fort I observed inside two working parties of Arabs about 200 strong, under the superintendence of soldiers, parbuckling two smooth-bore guns--apparently 32-pounders--towards their respective carriages and slides, which were facing in the direction of the harbour, and which seemed to have been lately placed ready for their reception."

On the 10th, the Admiralty telegraphed to the Admiral directing him to subst.i.tute for the word "surrendered" the words "temporarily surrendered for the purposes of disarmament."

The same day, the Admiral sent his ultimatum to the Military Commandant, in the terms following:--

"I have the honour to inform your Excellency that as hostile preparations, evidently directed against the squadron under my command, were in progress during yesterday at Forts Pharos and Silsileh, I shall carry out the intention expressed to you in my letter of the 6th instant, at sunrise to-morrow, the 11th instant, unless previous to that hour you shall have temporarily surrendered to me, for the purpose of disarming, the batteries on the isthmus of Ras-el-Tin and the southern sh.o.r.e of the harbour of Alexandria."

The actual danger to Admiral Seymour's s.h.i.+ps from the Egyptian preparations was at this time simply nil, and even were it otherwise he had only to make a slight change in the position of his vessels to place them completely out of harm's way. At the same time, the bombardment which he threatened, had, after the events of the 11th of June, become, in a certain sense, a necessity, if only to restore European prestige in Egypt: moreover, it formed the first step towards shattering the power of Arabi and his army, which was now, to a great extent, concentrated in Alexandria.

In hurrying on the bombardment, the Admiral was probably influenced not a little by the desire to allay the growing impatience of the officers and men under his command. Ever since the murder of an officer and two men of the fleet, on the day of the riot, a good deal of dissatisfaction was expressed at the continued inaction of the naval force, not only by the seamen, but by the officers as well.

It was foreseen that the arrival of British troops was only a question of days, and the bluejackets naturally desired that, as what had taken place was an insult to the fleet, to the fleet should be given the work of avenging it. They were unwilling, as they put it, that they should be employed merely "to carry Sir Garnet Wolseley's baggage on sh.o.r.e."

The Admiral himself, whilst sharing these sentiments, may not unnaturally have had in his mind the fact that the Channel Squadron, under Admiral Dowell, was on its way to share in the honours of the day.

On the receipt of Admiral Seymour's ultimatum, a Cabinet Council was held at Ras-el-Tin, presided over by the Khedive in person. It was decided to send a deputation to the Admiral, to inform him that no new guns were being mounted in the forts, and to tell him that he was at liberty to send one of his officers, if he desired to test the truth of this statement. The deputation came back with the answer that the Admiral insisted on the disarmament of the forts.

The Council again met in the afternoon, and decided that the Silsileh Fort and Fort Pharos, and the guns placed in them on the _Eastern_ Harbour, could not const.i.tute any threat towards the vessels which were in the _Western_ Harbour, and that the President of the Council should write to the Admiral in the terms of the despatch mentioned below. It was at the same time resolved that in the event of the Admiral persisting in opening fire, the forts should not answer until the fifth shot, when they were to reply.

"_Alexandria, July 10th, 1882._

"ADMIRAL,

"As I had the honour to promise in the conversation I had with you this morning, I have submitted to His Highness the Khedive, in a meeting of the Ministers and princ.i.p.al dignitaries of the State, the conditions contained in the letter you were good enough to address this morning to the Commandant of the place, according to the terms of which you will put into execution to-morrow, the 11th instant, at daybreak, the intentions expressed in your letter of the 6th instant to the Commandant of the place, if before that time the batteries on the isthmus of Ras-el-Tin and the southern sh.o.r.e of the port of Alexandria are not temporarily surrendered to you, to be disarmed.

"I regret to announce to you that the Government of His Highness does not consider this proposition as acceptable. It does not in the least desire to alter its good relations with Great Britain, but it cannot perceive that it has taken any measures which can be regarded as a menace to the English fleet by works, by the mounting of new guns, or by other military preparations.

"Nevertheless, as a proof of our spirit of conciliation, and of our desire, to a certain extent, to accede to your demands, we are disposed to dismount three guns in the batteries you have mentioned, either separated or together.

"If in spite of this offer you persist in opening fire, the Government reserves its freedom of action and leaves with you the responsibility of this act of aggression."[17]

The previous day the Acting British Consul-General visited the Khedive and urged his removal to Ramleh, a suburb about four miles to the east of Alexandria. On the 10th Sir Auckland Colvin called to say farewell to His Highness, and used every argument to induce him to embark in one of the British vessels, but in vain. Tewfik remained firm, and announced his intention of standing by his country.

At seven in the evening all the Consuls-General were warned to withdraw their subjects. The acting British Consul-General and Sir Auckland Colvin embarked on board the _Monarch_, and the few remaining British residents betook themselves to the P. & O. s.s. _Tanjore_.[18]

In the course of the day all the merchant vessels in the harbour left, and these were followed by the foreign men-of-war. One by one the latter steamed slowly out, and as they pa.s.sed the British flag-s.h.i.+p her band struck up the different national airs. The last s.h.i.+p to leave was the Austrian frigate _Landon_, and when darkness closed in, the English s.h.i.+ps of war were alone in the harbour of Alexandria.

At 9.20 p.m. the Admiral, in the _Invincible_, with the _Monarch_ in company, weighed anchor, and steamed to a position outside the harbour.

All lights were extinguished, and perfect silence was maintained as the s.h.i.+ps cautiously felt their way through the water. At 10.10 both vessels came to an anchor off Mex, where their consort, the _Penelope_, was already lying.

In the meantime, all the s.h.i.+ps, including the larger ironclads _Sultan_, _ Superb_, _Temeraire_, _Alexandra_, and _Inflexible_, which were lying in the offing, had struck their upper masts, sent down top-gallant and royal yards, and got everything ready for action. In this state they remained for the night.

In order to give the reader an idea of the comparative strength of the opposing forces, it is necessary, in the first place, to give a short description of the fortifications of Alexandria and their armaments.

Alexandria is situated on a strip of land between the Mediterranean and Lake Mareotis; a considerable portion of the town stands on a promontory, which, jutting out from the rest towards the north-west, is bounded on the north-east by the new or Eastern Harbour, and on the south-west by the old or Western Harbour.

The fortifications, which were intended to protect the city from an attack, not only by sea, but also from the direction of Lake Mareotis, are said to have been planned in Paris, and executed under the direction of French engineers. The whole of the works were originally well built, but had fallen much out of repair.

The material used was a soft limestone but little calculated to withstand modern artillery. The parapets were of sand, covered with a thin coating of cement. The scarps and counterscarps were reveted with stonework. The rifled guns, without exception, fired through embrasures, and nearly all the smooth-bore guns fired over parapets.

The buildings were none of them bomb-proof; nor, except in the case of Fort Pharos, were there any casemated or covered batteries. The forts on the sea face of Alexandria may be summed up as follows:--

West of Alexandria--Forts Marabout, Adjemi, and Marza-el-Kanat.

South-west of Alexandria--Citadel of Mex, Old Fort of Mex, and Mex Lines.

South of Alexandria--Forts Kamaria, Omuk Kubebe, Saleh Aga, and a small battery between the two last named works.

North of Alexandria--Lighthouse or Ras-el-Tin Fort, Lines of Ras-el-Tin (including the Hospital Battery), Fort Adda, Fort Pharos, and Fort Silsileh.

Of the above, Fort Adjemi took no part in the subsequent bombardment.

The British squadron consisted of the ironclads _Alexandra_, _Superb_, _Sultan_, _Temeraire_, _Inflexible_, _Monarch_, _Invincible_, and Penelope, the torpedo-vessel _Hecla_, the despatch boat _Helicon_, the gun-vessels _Condor_ and _Bittern_, and the gunboats _Beacon_, _Cygnet_, and _Decoy_. The battles.h.i.+ps, with the exception of the _Invincible_ and _Penelope_, were the most powerful then in the British navy. Their size and armament may be briefly summarized:--

The _Alexandra_, Captain C. F. Hotham, 9,490 tons, 8,610 h.p., 674 men, 2 11-inch 25-ton and 10 10-inch 18-ton guns.

The _Superb_, Captain Thomas Le Hunt-Ward, 9,170 tons, 6,580 h.p., 620 men, 8 18-ton and 4 12-1/2-ton guns.

The _Sultan_, Captain W. J. Hunt Grubbe, 9,290 tons, 7,720 h.p., 620 men, 8 18-ton and 4 12-1/2-ton guns.

The _Temeraire_, Captain H. F. Nicholson, 8,450 tons, 7,520 h.p., 530 men, 4 25-ton and 4 18-ton guns.

The _Inflexible_, Captain John Fisher, 11,407 tons, 8,010 h.p., 440 men, 4 80-ton guns (in two turrets).

The _Monarch_, Captain Henry Fairfax, 8,320 tons, 7,840 h.p., 530 men, 4 25-ton, 2 9-inch 12-ton and 1 7-inch 6-1/2-ton guns.

The _Invincible_, Captain R. H. Molyneux, 6,010 tons, 4,830 h.p., 480 men, 10 9-inch 12-ton and 4 64-pounder guns.

The _Penelope_, Captain St. G. D. A. Irvine, 4,390 tons, 4,700 h.p., 230 men, 8 8-inch 9-ton and 3 40-pounder guns.

The _Hecla_, torpedo vessel, 6,400 tons, 1,760 h.p., 251 men, and 6 guns.

The _Helicon_, despatch vessel, 1,000 tons, carrying 2 20-pounder guns.

The _Condor_ and _Bittern_, gun-vessels, 805 tons, 100 men, 1 7-inch and 2 40-pounder guns each.

The _Beacon_, gunboat, 603 tons, 80 men, 1 7-inch and 1 64-pounder gun.