The Egyptian campaigns, 1882 to 1885 Part 67

Major Wyndham's horse, after carrying him clear of the Dervishes, fell dead as he was mounting the slope of the khor. Captain Kenna, who was at the moment on foot searching for Grenfell, put the Major on Kenna's own horse and mounted behind him, and though the horse kicked them both off, they got safely out of the _melee_.

When the Lancers had reached the opposite side they continued their gallop for a distance of about 400 yards, when they rallied. Then taking up a position whence they could fire down the khor, they dismounted, and with their carbines opened fire on the enemy, eventually driving them off to the westward. As soon as the Dervishes had retired, a party of troopers advanced and recovered the bodies of Lieutenant Grenfell and others who had fallen. They were hastily buried on the spot.

The loss of the Lancers in the charge was one officer and twenty men killed, and four officers and forty-six men wounded. Besides this, there were 130 horses either killed or injured. The charge itself has been the subject of much criticism. Most military men appear to consider that for cavalry to charge unbroken infantry of unknown quant.i.ty, over unknown ground, was, to put it mildly, a mistake. Its result, so far as the enemy was concerned, was practically nil. By the loss which the cavalry sustained in horses alone they were put out of action, instead of being reserved for the moment when they were required for the purpose of pursuing the fugitives. With the public, however, these considerations were lost sight of in the gallantry displayed by both officers and men, and the charge has long been one of the most popular episodes of the fight.[172]

Meanwhile the Sirdar about 8.30 a.m. had given orders to evacuate the camp and march upon Omdurman. The army advanced _en echelon_ of brigades from the left, Collinson's brigade in reserve covering the rear of the transport column, and the Egyptian cavalry and camel corps on the right and left rear.

At 9.30, the front brigades having reached the sand ridge running from the west end of Jebel Surgham to the river, a halt was ordered to enable the rear brigades to get into position.

Information was then received that the Khalifa, with a large force, was present on the left slopes of Jebel Surgham, from the summit of which a party of the enemy were now firing.

It appears that the Dervish army had not returned to Omdurman on the previous night, but had bivouacked, some 40,000 strong, behind Jebel Surgham. When daylight appeared, and no attack was made on the Khalifa, he divided his forces into three sections. One of these, as already related, attacked the front and left of the Sirdar's position, the next moved towards the Kerreri heights with the object of enveloping his right, whilst the third, under Abdullah himself, remained concealed behind Jebel Surgham, ready to fall on the Sirdar's flank in the advance upon Omdurman.

The Sirdar realized the situation at once, and a change of front half right of the three leading brigades was ordered, whilst two companies of Maxwell's brigade stormed and occupied Jebel Surgham.

When the change of front was being effected, the sound of heavy firing on the right was heard, where Macdonald's brigade was by this time hotly engaged.

To enable Macdonald's men to take up position on the right of the echelon, his brigade had to change places with that of Lewis, and to move out to the right, so as to allow the latter to come into position on Macdonald's left front. Whilst carrying out this movement, and at the moment when he was separated by about a mile from the rest of the army, Macdonald found himself faced by a strong body of Dervishes, advancing from the west, from the direction of Jebel Surgham. He at once halted and deployed into line to the front to meet the attack. It was not long coming. The Dervishes, estimated at 20,000 in number, commanded by the Khalifa himself, made a determined onslaught on the brigade. The main attack was preceded by a charge of between 300 and 400 mounted Baggara, who, advancing in loose order, made straight for the long line of rifles which awaited them. The evident intention was to break Macdonald's line and give the men on foot an opening. The attempt was hopeless from the first; it was simply riding to certain death. Then the fusillade began, and horseman after horseman rolled in the dust.

[Ill.u.s.tration]

Undismayed by the fate of their comrades, the Dervish footmen next came on, only to see their front ranks swept away by Maxim and rifle fire.

Not a man got within 300 yards of the fighting line. The plain became dotted with white figures and black upturned faces. The Dervishes planted their banners in the ground and gathered round them, only to fall lifeless immediately after. At length the men behind, seeing the slaughter of those in front, stopped at a distance of about 400 yards, whence they continued firing, though a.s.sailed by the rifles of Lewis's brigade, which by this time was advancing to Macdonald's support.

The Sirdar, learning from General Hunter of Macdonald's position, despatched Wauchope's (British) brigade to his a.s.sistance, and ordered the remaining brigades to make a further change of front half right.

Before, however, the reinforcements reached Macdonald, he had practically disposed of the first great attack.

Still, the fight was not nearly over. Whilst Macdonald was yet engaged with the Khalifa's force, and just at the moment when the order to advance was about to be given, the Dervishes behind the Kerreri heights emerged into the plain, and moved rapidly forward to deliver a second attack.

This new onslaught necessitated a further complete change in the disposition of Macdonald's brigade. Seeing his front and rear both threatened, and finding himself also in danger of being outflanked, he moved some of his battalions to the right, and deployed them into line, so as to form with the remainder of his brigade a sort of arrow-head, one side facing north and the other west.

The Dervishes came on in two ma.s.ses, one commanded by Sheikh-el-Din, and the other by Wad Helu, and spread themselves out as if to envelop Macdonald's brigade. Between this and Lewis's there was a gap, into which the Warwicks, the Seaforths, and the Camerons were now rus.h.i.+ng at the double, whilst the Lincolns hurried off to complete the line on Macdonald's right. As the Dervishes advanced, Macdonald's Soudanese received them with a fire so deadly, delivered in the open ground, that nothing could live in the face of it.

Whilst Macdonald was repelling the new a.s.sault on his right, Lewis's brigade was enfilading the Khalifa's attack on the left.

The Dervish onslaught now began to weaken, and shortly after, as Wauchope's brigade came up, ceased altogether. The enemy, who had made their last despairing effort without having been able to push home, now broke and fled.

[Ill.u.s.tration]

Thus Macdonald, with the aid of Lewis's and Wauchope's brigades, crushed this second and determined attack. The masterly way in which he handled his force was the theme of general admiration.

The slaughter which took place is described as something appalling, and the ground around the scene of the fight was literally strewn with dead and dying Dervishes.

Meantime Maxwell's and Lyttelton's brigades, accompanied by the 32nd Field Battery, had been pushed on over the slopes of Jebel Surgham, and driving before them the Dervish forces under Sheikh-el-Din, they established themselves in a position which cut off the retreat on Omdurman of the bulk of the Khalifa's army, who were soon seen streaming off in a disorganized ma.s.s towards the high hills many miles to the west, closely pursued by the mounted troops, who cleared the right and front flanks of all hesitating and detached parties of the enemy.

The battle was now practically over, and Lyttelton's and Maxwell's brigades marched down to Khor Shambat, in the direction of Omdurman, which spot was reached at 12.30 a.m.; and here the troops rested and watered. The remainder of Hunter's division and Wauchope's brigade arrived at the same place an hour and a half later.

The result of the fight before Omdurman was declared in the Sirdar's despatch to be "the practical annihilation of the Khalifa's army, the consequent extinction of Mahdism in the Soudan, and the submission of nearly the whole country formerly ruled under Egyptian authority."

The Sirdar, for the skilful generals.h.i.+p and judicious disposition of his forces, which secured him the victory, is ent.i.tled to the highest praise, and no one will grudge him the honours with which his services were recognized.[173]

As to the fight itself, it was in many ways, no doubt, a walkover. At the same time it was a lesson in the power of modern arms such as had never been seen before. It showed that against weapons of precision such as those carried by the Anglo-Egyptian troops even an overwhelming superiority of numbers is not in itself of any avail. It demonstrated once more the pluck and endurance of the British soldier, as well as the good fighting material of which his Egyptian allies are composed.

Whilst giving the Sirdar every credit for his victory, it is impossible not to see that the Khalifa, by his repeated blunders, completely played into his adversary's hands.

The first mistake of the Dervish leader was in not remaining within the fortifications of Omdurman, from which it would have been impossible to have dislodged him, except at a great sacrifice, instead of advancing out into the open and exposing his imperfectly armed legions to the deadly fire of the Sirdar's rifles. In doing this the Khalifa chose the one form of attack which gave him the least chance of success. He knew that his men had on other occasions broken the British and Egyptian squares, and was desirous of seeing if it could not be done again. In making this calculation the Dervish leader totally lost sight of the fact that his enemies possessed both better weapons and superior organization than in days gone by.

A second and fatal mistake was in not making a night attack on the Sirdar's position, where, if the Dervishes had attacked in the darkness with the same impetuous courage which they displayed in daylight, it is by no means impossible that they might have got within the Anglo-Egyptian lines.

A third error was in not originally occupying Jebel Surgham, which, situated on the left front of the Anglo-Egyptian force, possessed for defensive purposes unquestionable advantages. Had the Khalifa occupied this commanding position, the Sirdar would have been left with two alternatives. He might either have accepted the challenge, and have taken the hill at a heavy loss, or he might have elected to pa.s.s it by, and by making a wide detour in the desert so reach Omdurman. This last operation, with the Khalifa's forces still unbroken in the Anglo-Egyptian rear, would have been a hazardous undertaking, and would, moreover, have left the Khalifa free to continue his resistance.

A further fault was in directing the first attack mainly on the Sirdar's left, where the British troops were posted, instead of a.s.sailing the Egyptian and Soudanese battalions on the front and right. By adopting these tactics the Khalifa attacked his enemy at the very strongest instead of the very weakest point.

In short, the Khalifa, as a general, may be said to have been a complete failure, leaving undone those things which he ought to have done and doing those things which he ought not to have done, and there was no skill in him.

The Dervish loss was immense. No less than 10,800 bodies were counted on the field of battle in addition to over 300 in the town of Omdurman.

Their wounded, estimated from the number who crawled down to the river and into the town, was 16,000 more, making a total of 27,000 altogether out of a fighting force of 52,000 men.[174] Besides these, 4,000 black troops surrendered and were made prisoners, and three of Gordon's old steamers were captured.

Bearing in mind the nature of the fight, the Anglo-Egyptian losses were remarkably slight.

The British killed were but two officers and twenty-five men; of these no less than twenty-one fell in the mistaken charge of the Lancers. The British wounded were eleven officers and 136 men. Of the Egyptian force one officer and twenty rank and file were killed, and thirteen officers and 222 rank and file were wounded. The total number of casualties in the Sirdar's entire army was forty-eight killed and 382 wounded.

The Sirdar in his despatch reporting the victory did full justice to the officers and men under his command, upwards of 300 of whom were specially mentioned for good service. Indeed, so long was the list that it excited a good deal of comment when the nature of the contest and the character of the enemy were taken into account. As a contrast to the above it may be mentioned that in Wellington's despatches after Waterloo, a fight in which the loss of the British alone was 1,759 killed and 5,892 wounded, only the names of thirty-two officers are specially mentioned.

CHAPTER LXVIII.

THE CAPTURE OF OMDURMAN.

At 2 p.m. on the day of the fight, the Sirdar, having ascertained that little or no resistance was to be expected in the town, advanced, with Maxwell's brigade and the 32nd Field Battery of Royal Artillery, through the suburbs of Omdurman to the great wall forming the Khalifa's inclosure.

On their way the force was met by a number of sheikhs, bearing a flag of truce, who informed the Sirdar that the inhabitants desired to surrender. This was accepted on condition that all the fighting men at once laid down their arms, and gave themselves up. The inhabitants then swarmed out in thousands from their houses, and cheered the troops.

Leaving two guns and three battalions to guard the approaches, the 13th Battalion and four guns of the field battery were pushed down by the north side of the wall to the river, and, covered by three gunboats, which had been previously ordered to be ready for this movement, the troops penetrated the breaches made in the walls by the howitzers of the 37th Battery, stationed on the opposite bank, marched south along the line of forts, and, turning in at the main gateway, found a straight road leading to the Khalifa's house and the Mahdi's tomb. The gates of the Khalifa's house were found to be barred, and the gunboats proceeded to sh.e.l.l the building from the river. In doing this they narrowly escaped killing the Sirdar, who had taken up a position close by. The Hon. Hubert Howard, one of the newspaper correspondents, was struck by a fragment of one of the last sh.e.l.ls fired into Omdurman, and killed on the spot. The house was shortly after entered, but not without resistance from some of the Baggaras concealed there, and who had to be killed.

On the house being taken, a move was made on the mosque containing the tomb of the Mahdi. Here a couple of Dervishes rushed out and charged Maxwell's men, killing one, and wounding another. Both the a.s.sailants were bayoneted. The mosque was then entered, and found to be quite deserted.

The portion of the mosque in which was the wooden sarcophagus containing the Mahdi's remains was thirty-six feet square, and was surmounted by a dome some seventy feet in height. The building was much damaged by the fire from the howitzer battery and gunboats.

To the great disappointment of every one, there were no signs of the Khalifa, whose capture was the only thing necessary to complete the Sirdar's triumph. It appears that the Dervish leader had quitted the town only a short time before the entry of the troops, and after he had made a vain effort to collect his men for further resistance. So rapid was his flight that some of the least attractive of his wives, and other inc.u.mbrances, were dropped on the road, and over 100 of the baggage camels, which had been told off to accompany him, fell into the hands of the victors.

On the subject of the Khalifa's last days at Omdurman and his subsequent flight, Mr. Charles Neufeld (a German subject, who after eleven years'

captivity was found and released by the Sirdar), in his lately published book, "A Prisoner of the Khalifa," writes as follows:--

"The Khalifa had been sitting for eight days in the mosque in communion with the Prophet and the Mahdi, and it was either on the Tuesday night or Wednesday morning immediately preceding the battle that the decision to move out of town was arrived at. On the Wednesday afternoon a grand parade of all the troops was held on the new parade ground, and, while it was being held, alarming news was brought by Abd-el-Baagi's messengers.... That night the rain came down in torrents, and the following day the army arose uncomfortable, and maybe a little dispirited, but Abdullah restored their good spirits by the relation of a vision. During the night the Prophet and the Mahdi had come to him and let him see beforehand the result of the battle; the souls of the faithful killed were all rising to paradise, while the legions of h.e.l.l were seen tearing into shreds the spirits of the infidels.