The Egyptian campaigns, 1882 to 1885 Part 63

Ka.s.sala, which, after being for many years lost to Egypt, was now about to be restored, is a place of such interest that any history of the Soudan would be imperfect without a reference to its past and present position.

The situation of Ka.s.sala is somewhat remarkable. As will be seen on referring to the map, it forms one of the corners of what may be considered an equilateral triangle, the other corners being at Berber and Khartoum. The distances between the three places are approximately the same.

Originally constructed by Mehemet Ali in 1840 for the protection of the fertile province of Taka against the Abyssinians, Ka.s.sala gradually acquired a large trade, and developed into a town of 60,000 inhabitants.

On the 30th July, 1885, after a siege which lasted twenty months, it fell into the hands of Osman Digna's followers.

Ka.s.sala, as a Dervish stronghold, const.i.tuted a grave danger to Egypt, which in 1891, being equally unable "to take it or leave it," at the suggestion of the British Government, consented to its transfer to the Italians, then established at Ma.s.sowah. By the terms of the agreement, Italy was to give back Ka.s.sala as soon as the Khedive's rule should be re-established in the Soudan.

It was not, however, till 1894, and then only after a hard fight between 2,600 Italian and the like number of Dervish troops, that the Italians, under General Baratieri, succeeded in occupying their new possession.

Even after Ka.s.sala had pa.s.sed into their hands, the Italians had anything but a happy time there. The Dervish hordes were constantly raiding round the place, and, though beaten off by the superior discipline and valour of the Italian troops, the Dervishes invariably returned and at times inflicted severe losses on the Italians and their native allies. In 1896 Ka.s.sala was regularly invested for three months by the Dervishes, and in March the situation reached a most critical stage. The Italians, numbering with their native allies 37,000 men, had been hopelessly defeated by the Abyssinians at Adowa on the 29th February, with a loss of 7,000 killed, wounded, and missing. The Abyssinians also captured 1,500 prisoners and fifty-two guns. As ill-luck would have it, the Italians had not only the Abyssinians, but the Mahdists, on their hands, and Ka.s.sala was then hemmed in by an immense force of Dervishes, and no means existed of relieving the Italian garrison.

This was the moment when the British Government, in the hope of creating a diversion in their favour, hurried forward the Dongola Expedition in the manner referred to in a previous chapter. This was followed by the Italians inflicting a severe defeat on the Dervishes, 5,000 in number, on the 2nd April, 1896, at Mount Mokram, killing some 800, and compelling the rest to retreat beyond the Atbara river.

In January, 1897, Ka.s.sala was again threatened by Dervishes, but General Vigano once more caused them to retire.

The Egyptian troops told off to occupy Ka.s.sala consisted of the 16th Egyptian Battalion and some artillery, in all 850 men, under Colonel Parsons.

Arriving at Ma.s.sowah from Souakim on the 29th November, 1897, they only waited long enough to be reviewed by the "Sirdar," and then marched through the Italian territory of Erythrea to Ka.s.sala. They encountered the greatest consideration and kindness at the different Italian posts.

On the force approaching Ka.s.sala on the 18th December, it was received by Major de Bernardis, the Governor, with a guard of honour; and a salute of twenty-one guns was fired from the fort as the Egyptian flag was hoisted side by side with that of Italy. Until the 25th, the date fixed for the formal cession, the Egyptians remained in camp about a mile from the fort.

Arrangements were now made for taking over a battalion of 700 natives which the Italians had raised from amongst the "friendlies," and who readily consented to take service under the Khedive.

In the interval before the 25th Colonel Parsons, by way of trying the qualities of the new levies, indulged them in a little fighting. Two places held by the Dervishes, El Fas.h.i.+r and Osobri, situated on the Atbara river, and about fifty miles from Ka.s.sala, were attacked and taken, the latter only, however, after a siege of six days.

Whilst the "friendlies" were thus engaged, Ka.s.sala, on Christmas Day, was handed over to Colonel Parsons. As the Italian flag was hauled down the Egyptian artillery saluted it with twenty-one guns, and the Italians quitting a place the defence of which had cost the lives of so many of their brave companions, marched away across the desert.[160]

CHAPTER LXIV.

FROM THE NILE TO THE ATBARA.

At the beginning of the year 1898, the position of the opposing forces was somewhat as follows:--The Khalifa's princ.i.p.al army, numbering upwards of 40,000 men, remained concentrated at Omdurman. Mahmoud, who had by this time been joined by Osman Digna, was still holding Metammeh with a force which had been increased to 20,000 men.

The Egyptian army was occupying Berber, with its most advanced post at Ed Damer. Abu Hamid, Merawi, Dongola, and all the other various positions along the line of communication down the river, were also held by Egyptian troops. Military posts had been established between Berber and Souakim, and Ka.s.sala was garrisoned by an Egyptian battalion and the "friendlies" taken over from the Italians. Progress had been made with the railway communications. The Egyptian line from Cairo had been extended to Luxor, and the military line across the desert from Wady Halfa had been brought forward from Abu Hamid to Abu Dis, or nearly a third of the distance to Berber.

On the last day of the previous year, the Intelligence Department learnt that Mahmoud, pressed, it was said, by the Khalifa, either to advance and destroy the Egyptians, or to fall back upon Omdurman, contemplated moving down the Nile on Berber. The 10,000 highly trained Egyptian soldiers, whom the Sirdar was able to put in the field, being deemed insufficiently strong to meet Mahmoud's undisciplined savages, a brigade of British troops was telegraphed for. In reply, Sir Francis Grenfell, commanding the Army of Occupation, gave orders on the 2nd January for the 1st Battalion of the Warwicks.h.i.+re Regiment, from Alexandria, and the 1st Battalions of the Lincolns.h.i.+re and the Cameron Highlanders, from Cairo, to proceed up the river at once. The Seaforth Highlanders were also ordered to Egypt, from Malta. No time was lost in sending forward the reinforcements, and before the end of the month they had reached Wady Halfa, with the exception of the Seaforths, which it was intended to station, in the first instance, at a.s.souan. Major-General Gatacre, an officer who had seen much service in Burmah, was despatched from Aldershot to take command of the British brigade.

Whilst the British troops were finding their way to the front, the Nile Valley railway from Kermeh was being utilized for the purpose of bringing down as many of the Egyptian soldiers as could be spared from the Dongola district to Wady Halfa, whence they were rapidly transported across the desert by the military railway to Abu Hamid, and thence to Abu Dis.[161]

To give warning of Mahmoud's advance, the gunboats made frequent reconnaissances to Shendy and Metammeh, and parties of "friendlies" also patrolled the river banks above Ed-Damer, and the adjacent desert. The Dervishes, on their part, were not wholly inactive, and occasionally indulged in a little raiding, as opportunities offered.

On the 10th February, Mahmoud, probably considering that if he were to advance at all, he should do so before the Egyptian force was strengthened by the arrival of the British soldiers, commenced to move his army across the Nile to Shendy preparatory to marching them to attack Berber. The Dervishes having only a few native boats and some hurriedly constructed rafts as a means of transport, the crossing occupied an entire fortnight. During this period, Commander Keppel, with two gunboats, steamed to Metammeh, and on one occasion dispersed with his Maxims a party of riflemen stationed to cover the crossing. No serious attempt, however, was made to oppose the movement of Mahmoud's force across the river, and by the 25th February the operation was completed. Apparently a great opportunity was thus lost. With the absolute command of the river which the Egyptians possessed in the gunboat flotilla, nothing would have been easier than to have taken advantage of the moment when Mahmoud's army was divided into two sections by the Nile, to fall upon and destroy each section separately.

That something of the kind was not attempted has been explained on the supposition that it formed part of the Sirdar's strategy to encourage Mahmoud to leave his fortified position at Metammeh, and attack the Egyptians on open ground.

Thanks to the facilities afforded by the railway, Gatacre's British brigade was, by this time, getting well forward. In the middle of February, the Warwicks, Lincolns, and Camerons were all a.s.sembled at Abu Dis, where they went into camp for some weeks. During this period, everything was done to get the men into good condition by means of route marching and field exercises. Following the precedent established by Lord Wolseley in previous campaigns, the most rigid abstinence in the matter of alcohol was enforced, even the use of the harmless and comforting beer being forbidden.[162] The result was that the men were in excellent condition, and, as Gatacre in one of his addresses to the soldiers told them, "there was an almost total absence of crime, and, he might say, of drunkenness also," the latter observation provoking roars of laughter.

The brigade was armed with the Lee-Metford magazine rifle. This weapon, though possessing great range and penetrating power, had, by reason of its small diameter (303), the disadvantage of making so small a hole as to render it more than doubtful if it would be effectual in stopping the headlong rush which forms the princ.i.p.al feature of a Dervish attack. To remedy this defect, the tips of the bullets were scooped out at the pointed end to the depth of about half an inch. Experiments showed that a bullet treated in this manner expands like an umbrella on striking an object, and thus makes a sufficiently large hole for the purpose required. Whilst in camp at Abu Dis, details from each regiment were told off to conduct this operation, and over a million of bullets were subjected to this treatment. The result was that a thoroughly effective missile, appropriately named a "man-stopper," was created.

Curiously enough, at the moment when General Gatacre was preparing his dum-dum bullets for use against the Dervishes General Kitchener decided to discontinue the use of the dumb-dumb missiles which he had been employing against the correspondents of the press. These weapons, which were equally "man-stoppers," were in the form of general orders by which correspondents were forbidden to go beyond that ever-changing point known as "rail head." As "rail head" was necessarily always somewhat in the rear of the operations, the prohibition was considered a great hards.h.i.+p, as it curtailed the power of the correspondents to send the earliest intelligence of what was going on at the front. A great agitation was made in the English journals at the time, and before further operations were proceeded with the Sirdar modified the restrictions within certain reasonable limits. The prohibition thenceforth extended only to going out on reconnaissances, to going near the Sirdar, not in itself a serious privation considering the past friction between him and the pressmen, and to standing in front of the firing line during general actions. This last, however, was, according to one writer, Mr. G. W. Steevens, the author of "With Kitchener to Khartoum," not strictly insisted upon.

s.p.a.ce does not allow of entering into the merits of the controversy on the subject of the relations between newspaper correspondents and military authorities. At the same time it may be observed that a general who puts unnecessary obstacles in the way of the press, or exercises too rigid a censors.h.i.+p, always lays himself open to the remark that, like Caesar, he prefers to write his own "Commentaries."

On the 25th February, when Mahmoud had completed his crossing to the east bank, General Gatacre received orders to proceed at once with his brigade to Berber. The orders reached him after the troops had been out all day exercising in the desert. Nevertheless, tents were at once struck, and the same evening the advance began. As far as "rail head,"

now at Sheriek, the men were transported by train, after which they proceeded on foot, and marching partly by night and partly by day, on the 2nd March they reached Berber, where, in the absence of the Sirdar at Wady Halfa, General Hunter had his head-quarters with two Egyptian brigades.

[Ill.u.s.tration: MAP OF THE NILE and ATBARA]

On the British soldiers reaching Berber, the Soudanese battalions turned out in force, and gave Gatacre's men an enthusiastic reception. The next day the Egyptian ma.s.sed bands played the new arrivals well on their way to their camp at Debeker, ten miles south of Berber.

The only things which gave out during the march were the regulation boots. Whether from inferior workmans.h.i.+p, or the effect of climate, the st.i.tching failed, and the soles came off in great numbers. Two hundred of the men fell out from footsores, and many of the remainder had to tramp along to their destination barefooted.

On the 10th March the Sirdar arrived at Debeker, and inspected the troops, which, two days later, moved camp into a healthier spot at Darmali.

On the 13th news was received that Mahmoud, leaving a garrison at Ben Naga in charge of his stores, had quitted Shendy the day before, and, after engaging Keppel's gunboats en route, had descended the Nile as far as Aliab, midway between Shendy and Berber.

All doubts as to his intentions being now at rest, a general advance of the Sirdar's army was ordered to be made to Kenur, a deserted village about ten miles north of the Atbara. One Egyptian battalion was left to guard the store depot at Berber, and a half battalion was placed in charge of the railway, by this time advanced to Geneinetti, twenty miles north of Berber.

The British troops at Darmali, on getting orders, at once set out, and marching amid intense heat and over trying ground, reached Kenur on the night of the 15th. On the following day they were joined by the Seaforths, which had been sent forward from Wady Halfa to Geneinetti by rail and thence by steamer. The Egyptian troops had been advancing meanwhile, and, with the exception of Lewis's brigade, the entire Anglo-Egyptian force was concentrated at Kenur on the 16th.

On the 19th March, Mahmoud with his whole army quitted Aliab, and started across the desert in an easterly direction towards the river Atbara. His intention was known to be to ford the river near a place called Hudi and then, after turning the Sirdar's left, to operate against Berber from the desert.

On the intelligence being received, it was determined to intercept, if possible, the Dervish forces, and the 20th saw the Anglo-Egyptian army on the march to Hudi, where, on its arrival, it was joined by the 3rd (Lewis's) Brigade, which had just come from Fort Atbara, a strongly fortified post at the confluence of the Nile and Atbara rivers.

The total force with the Sirdar now amounted to about 13,000 men. It was composed of four infantry brigades, 800 cavalry, and four batteries of artillery with ten Maxims.

The British brigade, under Major-General Gatacre, consisted of the 1st Battalions of the following regiments: The Warwicks.h.i.+re (Colonel Quayle-Jones), Lincolns.h.i.+re (Colonel Verner), Camerons (Colonel Money), and the Seaforth Highlanders (Colonel Murray). The Egyptian brigades were the 1st, under Lieutenant-Colonel Maxwell, formed by the 8th, 12th, 13th, and 14th Battalions; the 2nd, under Lieutenant-Colonel Macdonald, consisting of the 2nd, 9th, 10th, and 11th Battalions; and the 3rd, under Lieutenant-Colonel Lewis, composed of the 3rd, 4th, 7th, and 15th Battalions. To each of the four brigades an Egyptian battery of artillery was attached. The mounted troops consisted of eight squadrons of Egyptian cavalry, with Horse Artillery, under Lieutenant-Colonel Broadwood.

The Atbara at Hudi was at this season a narrow stream of clear water flowing slowly down a sandy valley, about a quarter of a mile wide, with steep banks covered with bush and Halfa gra.s.s. From Hudi the cavalry, with some Maxims under Colonel Broadwood, went forward to search for the enemy, whilst the remainder of the troops, after forming a zeriba from the surrounding mimosa bushes, bivouacked for the night. Each man lay down on the bare ground fully dressed with his arms and equipments beside him. The night, pa.s.sed in the open air, was bitterly cold, and the dust permeated everything.

On the same day (the 20th) that the Sirdar's army encamped at Hudi, on the north side of the Atbara, Mahmoud and his followers crossed the river from the south side near Nakhila, some thirty miles further up.

Here he established himself, and commenced intrenching his position.

On the 21st, the Sirdar's troops marched further up the Atbara, eventually halting at a spot marked in the maps "Ras-el-Hudi," where they were destined to remain for several days. The Sirdar thus placed his force directly between the Dervish leader and Berber, effectually frustrating the intended move in that direction. There were no houses, huts, or habitations at Ras-el-Hudi, which derives its name from its geographical position, the Arabic word "Ras" meaning "head." It was a pretty spot, green and fertile at this time of the year.

The Atbara here no longer flowed, but was represented only by a series of isolated pools of water, in which fish and an occasional crocodile were to be seen. A zeriba was at once made, and the camp generally put in a state of defence.[163]

Whilst the main body of the Sirdar's force was advancing, the Egyptian cavalry under Colonel Broadwood, with the Horse Artillery and Maxims, pushed on as far as Abadar on the 22nd, and here the enemy were found in force. They consisted princ.i.p.ally of Baggara hors.e.m.e.n, who charged with great gallantry a squadron of cavalry, under Captain the Hon. C. Baring, who had to fall back upon his supports.

Mahmoud's position having been by this time pretty well ascertained, a force consisting of a squadron of cavalry, with a battalion of infantry and Maxims in support, was sent on the following day, under the command of Major Collinson, to tempt the Dervish leader to come out. When the party had advanced about six miles in the direction of the enemy's camp, the cavalry met and opened fire upon a force of 300 or 400 Baggara hors.e.m.e.n who attempted to surround them. The cavalry, however, managed to get away, and fell back upon the infantry now formed up in square, which, with rifle and Maxim fire, eventually forced the Baggara to withdraw. The party then returned to the camp.

As already stated, Mahmoud had left a garrison close to Shendy, to enable him to keep up his communications with Omdurman, and as a guard for his depot. On the 25th March, the Sirdar detached one of his battalions, and sent it by Commander Keppel's steamers to take the position, capture the stores, and destroy Shendy. The expedition steamed past the last-named place to the depot at Horh Ben Naga, and, on the following morning, disembarked the soldiers, who, encountering little resistance, drove out the Baggara garrison of 700 men, with a loss of 150 killed, seized the stores, and captured a large number of prisoners, including 650 women and children. Shendy was found to be in ruins. Such men as it contained gave themselves up. The forts were destroyed, and the place set fire to. The gunboats pursued the fugitives up to the foot of the Sixth Cataract, and then returned and re-embarked the soldiers, together with the booty, consisting of great quant.i.ties of grain, camels, donkeys, arms, and ammunition.

A reconnaissance made on the 30th March showed that Mahmoud occupied a strongly intrenched position, surrounded by brushwood, at Nakheila, on the north bank of the river, now quite dry, with his front towards the desert, and protected by a thorn zeriba running from his left, at right angles to the river, away to his extreme right. Deserters, who now came in daily, reported that Mahmoud was in great straits for food, his men existing princ.i.p.ally on the nuts of the dom palm, on cooked cabbage palms, and such other vegetables as could be found in the bush. Most of his warriors were disaffected, and were only prevented by strong measures from deserting _en ma.s.se_.