The Egyptian campaigns, 1882 to 1885 Part 57

After the repulse of the Dervish attack on Khor Mussa (in August, 1888), the southern frontier of Egypt was left for some time comparatively undisturbed, but, early in 1889, persistent rumours reached Cairo that the long-threatened invasion was at last to come off. This time it was to take place down the left bank of the river, the idea being to avoid Wady Halfa and the other fortified posts, and, by starting from a post opposite Sarras, to strike across the desert to Bimban, a place on the Nile, about twenty-five miles north of a.s.souan. The military authorities in Cairo, from the first, considered the project impracticable, seeing the difficulties which must arise in conducting an army of 5,000 men (the estimated number of Wad-en-Nejumi's force), with an equal number of camp-followers and without either adequate provisions or means of transport, across a waterless desert, only to fight a battle at the end.

Nevertheless, it was deemed advisable to be prepared, and steps were taken to provide for the defence of the villages on the west bank in the neighbourhood of Wady Halfa, where block-houses were constructed at the various points most liable to attack.

The first indication of the forward movement of the Dervishes was in April, 1889, when the Emir Abd-el-Halim reached Sarras with 1,000 men.

Wad-en-Nejumi at this period was at Hafir, thirty miles north of Dongola, with about 5,000 more, and with this force he calculated upon taking Egypt with a rush.

On the 5th May, a party of the Dervishes at Sarras, where by reinforcements the enemy's force had been increased to 2,500 men, crossed over to the west bank and set out for the village of Serra (north of Wady Halfa). Here, on the 9th May, they appeared to the number of 600 and commenced pillaging the houses, but, after a stubborn fight with a detachment of the 13th Soudanese, were driven off into the desert, taking with them some of the loot. In the fight, the marauders lost some thirty men, the Egyptian loss being only six wounded.

On the 22nd June, Wad-en-Nejumi reached Sarras, and, crossing the Nile, united his followers with those of Abd-el-Halim, who had already transferred his camp to the western bank. The combined forces, estimated at over 4,000 men, then marched to Matuka,[146] which they reached on the 28th.

To oppose the invaders, a flying column was organized at Wady Halfa. It consisted of two squadrons of cavalry, eight Krupp guns, two companies of the Camel Corps, and the 9th, 10th, and 13th Soudanese Battalions, in all 1,940 men. Colonel Wodehouse, in command, hearing from his scouts that the enemy might march at any moment on Argin, three miles distant, took his measures accordingly. To protect the village of Argin, there was at the south end, standing a little back from the river, a block-house held by a company of the Camel Corps and an infantry detachment. At the extreme north end, three and a half miles distant, was a large building, the house of the "Omdeh," or head man of the village, garrisoned by 250 more infantry. In the centre, between the two points, the 13th Soudanese, under Captain Kempster, took up a position in some detached houses, which they placed in a state of defence. All three positions were practically in a line, and, with the exception of the block-houses, on the river. On the east bank, facing the north end of the village, stood the fortified post of Ishkait, with one gun. Such were the dispositions made for the defence of Argin by Colonel Wodehouse, who had at his disposal four stern wheel gunboats, and a number of native craft for transport purposes. With these, his intention was to reinforce with the remainder of his flying column any point of the straggling line of defence which might be threatened.

On the 1st July, after sunset, Wad-en-Nejumi's force left Matuka in a vast crowd in a north-western direction, and making a detour into the desert, were seen at dawn on the 2nd at a distance of two miles from the forts of Wady Halfa. Colonel Wodehouse, sending the cavalry along the west bank, proceeded to Argin by steamer with half the 9th Soudanese and the 10th Battalion. Learning that the mounted troops were in touch with the enemy, he disembarked his men and guns on the east bank, opposite the centre of the village, and, after sending the gunboats to cruise in front, awaited events. Meanwhile, at 8 a.m., a portion of the cavalry had cut off a few stragglers in the enemy's rear, who were making for the Nile, until, faced by superior numbers, the Egyptians were forced to fall back.

The enemy, continuing the advance, occupied the hills west of Argin, about 5,000 yards from the village, driving in the 2nd Camel Corps, which had been reconnoitring from the southern post.

From a commanding position on the east bank, where Colonel Wodehouse had established his head-quarters with two companies of the 9th Battalion and the artillery, the enemy were now perceived planting their banners on the hill-tops to mark their positions, and descending in numbers towards the north end of the village. The artillery immediately opened on them, and the 10th Battalion, under Major Hunter, was sent across in a gunboat to reinforce the central and northern posts. The enemy continued their forward movement in a north-easterly direction, though exposed to a flanking fire from the cavalry and Camel Corps, and at 8.30 a.m. three large parties of them approached within 1,000 yards of the 13th Soudanese in the central post, when the volleys they received from Captain Kempster's battalion forced them to sheer off and take cover behind a long ridge to the left of the position. From this point, they kept up a hara.s.sing rifle-fire until, the reinforcements having disembarked near the northern post, the rifles of the 10th Battalion, added to those of the 13th, compelled them to retreat.

Though this first attempt to seize the village failed, small parties of Dervishes continued to come down to the river between Kempster's position and the southern post, and occupying a portion of the houses, opened fire on the cavalry and Camel Corps, inflicting some loss.

Up to this time no serious attempt had been made to push home the attack, and the fighting had been of a somewhat desultory character. The Dervishes occupying the captured houses, continually receiving reinforcements from the main body, about noon placed a gun in position and opened fire on the artillery on the east bank, only to be silenced, however, by the latter after firing a few rounds.

[Ill.u.s.tration]

One of the gunboats was then sent to drive the Dervish force out. In this she signally failed, and after a cannonade on both sides lasting for an hour, she had to return with the commander and two men wounded.

In the meantime there was, it seems, a disagreement between the two Emirs, Abd-el-Halim wis.h.i.+ng to capture the village, and Wad-en-Nejumi refusing to consent. The dispute ended in Abd-el-Halim collecting his own men, and as many others as he could prevail upon to follow him. Then he advanced rapidly down a khor leading to the centre of the village, his left being protected by riflemen posted on the ridge behind, to which they had been driven in the morning, and his right being covered by the fire from the captured houses.

The movement being perceived from the eastern bank, Colonel Wodehouse again opened fire with his artillery, but the Dervishes nevertheless still came on, and divided into three groups, one of which was directed towards Captain Kempster's position, the second taking the centre of the village, and the third advancing to the southern post.

Seeing the nature of this new attack, Wodehouse promptly ordered the 10th Battalion, then stationed near the northern post, to embark and reinforce the troops to the southern end of the village. Two of the first companies to land from the steamer had hardly advanced any distance before they were charged by the enemy's cavalry and spearmen, and forced back to the water's edge. There, aided by the fire from the gunboat, they maintained their position against heavy odds, until help came in the form of two companies of the 9th Soudanese and some of the Camel Corps.

Major Hunter, the rest of whose battalion had by this time landed, now a.s.sumed command of these detachments, and, advancing steadily, drove back the a.s.sailants, who frequently charged him, only, however, to be shot down to a man. Seeing a number of horse and spearmen rallying on the left, Hunter now halted his men in a position which, with the adjacent houses right and rear, formed a square, and remained on the defensive.

In the meantime, Captain Kempster, observing the enemy streaming down into the village, kept up a steady fire from his loopholed houses, to which the Dervish riflemen on the ridge replied. Hearing that a gun had been brought into position on the river bank to his left, he went with a party of men to seize it, but, finding that the post was too strongly held, he retired after some fighting, in which he lost seven of his men.

The gun was shortly after captured by a party of the 13th Soudanese, though not without a severe hand-to-hand encounter. Wodehouse had now arrived on the west bank, and sent Major Hunter with some companies of the 9th to clear the ground to his left front. Though three times charged by the Dervish spearmen, he succeeded, and drove the enemy back through the khor by which they had advanced. Some fifty of the Arabs who remained in the captured houses were surrounded, and the houses being set fire to, the unfortunate inmates had no alternative but to come out and be killed.

This completed the work of the day, and at 6 p.m. Argin was completely cleared of the Dervish force, which left some 900 men killed in and around the village, besides 500 prisoners, men, women, and children.

The Egyptians engaged amounted to less than 2,000 men, and their loss was eleven killed and fifty-nine wounded.

The enemy's camp was found the next day still in its original position, and although Wodehouse, with the object of drawing the Dervishes, placed the 10th Soudanese opposite the entrance to the khor, there was no response.

There was now another difference of opinion between Abd-el-Halim and his commander-in-chief, Wad-en-Nejumi, as to the further steps to be taken.

The former, wounded in the engagement, and depressed by his recent defeat, wished to retreat to Matuka. To this Nejumi positively refused to consent, and, a.s.sembling his entire force, declared that he would never desist from what he regarded as a holy undertaking, and that the weak hearts who wished to retire to their homes might do so. The result was that over 500 of his followers seceded and made their way back to Matuka, whence they subsequently went further south. By this proceeding, Wad-en-Nejumi's force was diminished altogether by nearly 2,000 men.

At midnight on the 4th, the Dervish leader burnt his camp and moved still further north towards Serra.

Wodehouse, not feeling strong enough to attack now, contented himself with keeping in touch with the enemy, and heading them off the river.

With the bulk of his flying squadron on the west bank, and his four gunboats in mid-stream, he was able to do this without running unnecessary risk.

The Dervish army continued its onward march, Wodehouse's force descending the river and keeping abreast of Wad-en-Nejumi all the time.

Conflicts frequently occurred, and the enemy lost several men from the fire of the steamers, and by desertion.

This state of things continued till the 8th, when the Dervish force was discovered encamped behind the village of Faras. From this point they were sh.e.l.led out by the artillery on the east bank, and on the 10th they took up a position on the hills two miles above Belanga, and 3,000 yards from the river.

Wodehouse concentrated his column at Belanga village, sending on the Camel Corps to Toski.

After the fight at Argin, it dawned upon the military authorities that if any stop had to be made to the advance of the Dervishes on the Nile, Kitchener's force would have to be supplemented by further troops.

Accordingly the 1st and 2nd Egyptian battalions, a mule battery, and two squadrons of cavalry were despatched in hot haste to the front.

On 5th July, the Sirdar, Sir Francis Grenfell, left Cairo, and a British brigade, under Brigadier-General the Hon. R. H. Montmorency, was moved up the river. It was composed of the 2nd Battalion Royal Irish Rifles, the 1st Battalion of the Welsh Regiment, with a squadron of the 10th Hussars, a detachment of Mounted Infantry, and a mule battery.

These forces were to be concentrated, in the first instance, at a.s.souan, and thence either to take up a strong position at Bimban, and there await the Dervish attack, or, in case Wad-en-Nejumi's advance should prove less rapid than was expected, to form a second column to join Wodehouse's force, and bring on a decisive action further up the river.

The British cavalry, artillery, and Royal Irish Rifles reached a.s.souan on 25th July, and the Egyptian troops having also come up, a column of the latter, composed of the 1st and 2nd Battalions of Egyptian Infantry, the 11th Battalion of Soudanese Infantry, with artillery and cavalry, was organized and placed under the command of Colonel Kitchener.

No time was lost in pus.h.i.+ng them forward; and on the 19th two of the infantry battalions reached Toski, which they proceeded to put in a state of defence.

[Ill.u.s.tration]

In the meantime, Wad-en-Nejumi's force at Belanga had been strengthened by the arrival of 500 men, with 100 camels, under the command of another emir, called Makin-en-Nur. This brought the number of Wad-en-Nejumi's troops up to a total of 3,300 fighting men and 4,000 camp-followers.

With these, on the 28th July, he resumed his march to the north.

Pausing for one night at a distance of ten miles from the celebrated temple of Abu Simbel, they continued on their way till the 1st August, when they took up a position in the hills four miles to the south of Toski. On the same day Wodehouse's force, which step by step had followed Wad-en-Nejumi's movements down the Nile, also reached Toski, where the whole of the Egyptian troops from a.s.souan, together with General Sir Francis Grenfell and the British cavalry, had concentrated the previous day.

With the exception of the British brigade, the entire Nile field force was now a.s.sembled, and General Grenfell took over the command.

On the 3rd the General, receiving information that Wad-en-Nejumi intended to resume his march northward, ordered all the mounted troops to make a reconnaissance in force, the object being to check the Dervish advance and keep Wad-en-Nejumi in his present position until the arrival of the British brigade.

Nejumi's camp was placed on the inner extremity of a range of granite hills, extending from the river inland in a westerly direction and situated about four miles south of Toski. The village consisted of scattered houses covering the land for about three miles from end to end and dotted in places with palm groves; 1,200 yards in the rear the cultivated ground disappeared in the desert which stretched away till closed in by a range of hills at a distance of six miles from the Nile.

Behind these hills lay Nejumi's camp.

The desert was intercepted here and there by rocks and boulders of a height and size sufficient to afford cover to considerable numbers of men. Across this desert ground the British and Egyptian mounted troops advanced. They consisted of four squadrons of cavalry and a camel corps.

Grenfell himself accompanied the force.

On nearing the enemy's position, it was seen that camels were being loaded up, and everything prepared for an immediate move. It was evident that if this was to be prevented no time was to be lost. The cavalry pushed on, and the enemy's riflemen, advancing in skirmis.h.i.+ng order, at once opened fire. This was answered by the dismounted Camel Corps, which, taking up a position on a commanding ridge, poured volleys on the Dervishes, now coming on in considerable numbers. The fire of the latter, however, became too hot, and the Camel Corps, as well as the mounted troops generally, retired to a second position, which they were equally unable to hold. A third position, 900 yards off, was now occupied, and it being on a hill with clear ground intervening, the mounted troops were able for some time to hold their own and keep up a steady fire.

The situation at this moment was such that orders were sent back to bring up the 1st Brigade from Toski. At 8.30, before there was time for the reinforcements to arrive, the Arab spearmen in force emerged from two ravines and steadily advanced on the position. A further retirement then became necessary, and the troops took up a position at the foot of a conical hill two miles from Toski, where they were joined by two guns of the Horse Battery. At 9 a.m. the guns opened fire on the advancing column, which now, followed by a ma.s.s of camp-followers and baggage animals, turned to its left and marched steadily across the Egyptian front.

It then became evident that Wad-en-Nejumi did not mean fighting, and that his object was simply to get away, and continue his advance northward. To prevent this, which would have frustrated the whole object of the reconnaissance, Grenfell immediately sent off for the 2nd Brigade, and whilst the two guns continued their fire Colonel Kitchener, with the mounted troops, made a detour to the north and checked Nejumi's further advance. Finding that his march was opposed, the Emir determined to accept battle, and placed his followers upon some semi-detached hills to the west of the ground occupied by the mounted troops.

The tops of these hills were by this time planted with standards and lined with riflemen, the spearmen being kept out of sight. The camp-followers and transport animals were placed in a temporary camp behind the hills in front.

In the meantime, the 1st Brigade, under Major Hunter, together with the artillery, had come up unseen under the cover of some rising ground, and stationed themselves on an eminence 800 yards distant from and exactly opposite to the enemy's position. The 2nd Brigade, arriving shortly after, was kept as a support on the left rear of the 1st.

The 1st Brigade then opened fire all along its front. This was kept up and replied to for half an hour. Colonel Wodehouse, who was in command of the infantry division, then proceeded to extend his line by moving the 9th Soudanese to the right with a view to enfilading the enemy's left flank. After the battalion had moved only 500 yards it was halted on a number of men on the first hill being observed preparing to charge.

At this moment, emerging from their cover, on they came with wild cries, and charged down towards the battalion. The Egyptians never wavered, and maintaining their formation, by a steady fire drove the enemy back with a loss of some 150 of their men. The battalion, supported by a company of the 2nd Egyptian Regiment, then advanced and took possession of the hill, in spite of frequent isolated charges made by its defenders.

Under cover of a heavy cannonade kept up by the artillery, the whole line of troops then advanced towards the various points held by the enemy. On arriving in front of Wad-en-Nejumi's central position, another attempt was made to charge. It was directed this time against the 10th Soudanese, which, in combination with the 9th, had seized a ridge connecting two of the hills. The charge, however, collapsed under the well-directed volleys of the 10th.