The Egyptian campaigns, 1882 to 1885 Part 43

_Husseinyeh_ is still aground; the _Ismailia_ is at anchor. What a six hours' anxiety for me when I saw the sh.e.l.ls strike the water near the steamers from the Arabs; imagine my feelings!

Noon.--The firing has ceased, I am glad to say. I have lived years in these last hours! Had I lost the _Ismailia_ I should have lost the _Husseinyeh_ (aground), and then Omdurman and the North Fort, and then the town. One p.m.--The Arabs are firing on the steamers with their two guns. The _Husseinyeh_ still aground; that is the reason of it. 1.30 p.m.--Now has ceased.

The _Ismailia_, struck by three sh.e.l.ls, had one man killed, fifteen wounded on board of her; she did really very well. This is our first encounter with the Mahdi's personal troops. 2.45 p.m.--The _Ismailia_ tried to take _Husseinyeh_ off and got struck twice, in addition to the three times before mentioned, with sh.e.l.ls, so she desisted from the attempt. The Arabs are firing on the _Husseinyeh_. I have ordered the Krupp of (Fort) Mogrim to play on the Arab guns, and shall wait till night to take off the _Husseinyeh_. She is nearer to the left bank than to the right bank. It is not clear if she is aground or half sunk (equally a trouble). 3.30 p.m.--The Arabs are bringing their guns nearer to the aground or half-sunken _Husseinyeh_.

The _Ismailia_ reports that the two last sh.e.l.ls have done her no material damage. 4.30 p.m.--The Arabs have now three guns bearing on the _Husseinyeh_. Six p.m.--The firing has ceased. I hope to get the _Husseinyeh_ off to-night. Seven p.m.--The Arabs keep up a dropping fire on the _Husseinyeh_, who, I hear, has two sh.e.l.l holes in her, and has six men, including the captain, wounded.

"22nd November.--I am terribly anxious for the fort at Omdurman, and am trying to devise some means of occupying the Arabs and diverting their attention elsewhere.... The Arab camps are about five miles from the city.

"5th December.--I have almost given up an idea of saving the town; it is a last resource we make to open the route to the Omdurman Fort.

"6th December.--I have given up all idea of landing at Omdurman; we have not the force to do it. The Arabs fired forty-five rounds at (Fort) Mogrim and the steamers. We had two men wounded at Mogrim and one killed. This is most distressing, to have these poor fellows wounded and killed.

"13th December.--The steamers went up and attacked Arabs at Buri. Certainly this day after day delay has a most disheartening effect on every one. To-day is the two hundred and seventy-sixth day of our anxiety. The Arabs appear to have suffered to-day heavily at Buri.... We are going to send down the _Bordein_ the day after to-morrow, and with her I shall send this journal. If some effort is not made before ten days'

time, the town will fall. It is inexplicable this delay. If the expeditionary forces have reached the river, and met my steamers, one hundred men are all that we require just to show themselves."

The latest entry in the Diaries is on 14th December, and is as follows:--

"Arabs fired two sh.e.l.ls at the Palace this morning: 546 ardebs dhoora in store; also 83,525 okes of biscuits. 10.30 a.m.--The steamers are down at Omdurman engaging the Arabs. Consequently I am on 'tenterhooks.' 11.30 a.m.--Steamers returned. The _Bordein_ was struck by a sh.e.l.l in her battery. We had only one man wounded. We are going to send down the _Bordein_ to-morrow with this journal. If I was in command of the two hundred men of the expeditionary force, which are all that is necessary for the movement, I should stop just below Halfiyeh and attack the Arabs at that place before I came on here to Khartoum. I should then communicate with the North Fort, and act according to circ.u.mstances. Now, mark this, if the expeditionary force--and I ask for no more than two hundred men--does not come in ten days the town may fall, and I have done my best for the honour of our country. Good-bye.

"C. G. GORDON."

It would be impossible to find words more simple and at the same time more pathetic than those contained in the concluding sentences of the man who so long held the attention of the world riveted upon him, and who, unaided and alone, maintained the highest traditions of British courage and fort.i.tude.

CHAPTER XLIII.

WILSON'S VOYAGE TO KHARTOUM.

"Khartoum all right, can hold on for years.--C. G. Gordon, 29: 12: '84,"

was the cheering message, written on a tiny slip of paper, which reached Sir Charles Wilson by Gordon's steamers.

With this writing came Gordon's journals, containing a narrative of events from the 10th September to the 14th December, some private letters and also some despatches addressed by him to "the Officer Commanding H.M.'s troops," to Sir Evelyn Baring, and others.

In one of the despatches, dated 20th October, 1884, Gordon informs the officer in command of the British troops of the sending to him of the steamers, and advises the removal from them of all Egyptians, whether pashas, beys, or privates, all of whom Gordon terms "hens." The letter concludes:--

"If you do not use the steamers, at least take out the hens and send them back empty. If you choose to put black troops on board, they will be welcome, but not those heroes of Tel-el-Kebir."

In another letter, dated 21st October, addressed to "the Chief of the Staff, Soudan Expeditionary Force," Gordon wrote that he had tendered the resignation of his commission in the British Army, and requested that the General commanding Her Majesty's troops advancing for the relief of the garrison might be informed of this fact.

The letter addressed to Sir Evelyn Baring was dated the 12th December.

In it Gordon stated that, having been sent to Khartoum to draw up a report on the state of the Soudan, and for this purpose having been placed under the orders of Her Majesty's Minister in Egypt, he now informed him that Colonel Stewart took down this report, and that consequently Gordon's connection with the Foreign Office and Baring had ceased.

The latest letter was dated the 14th December, and was addressed to the Chief of the Staff. Its contents were as follows:--

"I send down the steamer _Bordein_ to-morrow with Vol. 6 of my private journal containing account of the events in Khartoum from 5th November to 14th December. The state of affairs is such that one cannot foresee further than five to seven days, after which the town may at any time fall. I have done all in my power to hold out, but I own I consider the position is extremely critical, almost desperate; and I say this without any feeling of bitterness with respect to Her Majesty's Government, but merely as a matter of fact. Should the town fall, it will be questionable whether it will be worth the while of Her Majesty's Government to continue its expedition, for it is certain that the fall of Khartoum will insure that of Ka.s.sala and Sennar."

The writing dated 29th December, 1884, containing the expression, "Khartoum all right, can hold on for years," was probably intended, like Gordon's previous message to the like effect, merely to convey the information that he was still holding out.

The wording of the doc.u.ment was simply a _ruse_ in the event of the capture of the person who brought the message, on foot, to the steamer after she left Khartoum. This is apparent from the letter of the 14th December, as well as from the statements of the Egyptian officers who accompanied the steamers. They reported that they had been for some weeks stationed a short distance above Metammeh waiting for the arrival of the British column. They had a.s.sisted in getting messages into and out of Khartoum, where the situation was altogether most gloomy. Gordon himself was well, they said, but his soldiers were despairing of relief, and it was necessary that some Europeans should proceed with the utmost alacrity to Khartoum, in order to rea.s.sure the population and the troops.

Abdul Hamid Bey, who commanded one of the steamers, the _Bordein_, informed Sir Charles Wilson that he left Khartoum on the 14th in that vessel, and Gordon then told him that if he (Abdul Hamid) did not return with English troops within ten days it would be too late; and that in that case he had better not attempt to return at all.

The other three steamers had quitted Khartoum in September, and had been down to Shendy and other places looking for the expeditionary force.

On the 22nd January, 1885, it was decided to construct two forts--a village fort to be held by the Guards, and a river fort, containing the hospital, to be held by the remainder of the force. The three small guns of the column, together with some from the steamers, were put in position.

The same day, the steamers were utilized by Sir Charles Wilson for the purposes of another reconnaissance, this time towards Shendy, a town opposite to Metammeh on the right bank of the Nile. Only a small force, consisting for the most part of a detachment of the Mounted Infantry, was embarked. Shendy was found to be in the possession of the enemy, though they were not in overwhelming force. One Krupp gun was mounted there. The steamers contented themselves with throwing a few sh.e.l.ls into the place and then retired.

It was found that a portion of the enemy had occupied a small island in the Nile just opposite the British camp. The guns of the steamers were speedily brought to bear on them, and the infantry opening a steady fire drove the intruders out of the island and across the river.

The whole of the 23rd was occupied in changing the crews and soldiers on board the steamers, fitting them up and loading them with supplies for Khartoum, and preparing for a start. Owing to the absence of coal, wood had to be subst.i.tuted, and the latter commodity was scarce. It was only obtained by landing parties from the steamers carrying off the timber of which the sakheas or waterwheels were constructed. A convoy of camels under Colonel Talbot was sent back to Gakdul after dark with despatches for Lord Wolseley, and instructions to bring up provisions. The escort of 400 men accompanying the convoy reduced the little garrison at Gubat to a total of 922 all told.

The original plan was for Lord Charles Beresford to man two of the steamers with his naval brigade and, after putting fifty of the Suss.e.x Regiment on board, to take them with Sir Charles Wilson to Khartoum.

Unfortunately it was impossible to carry out this programme. All the naval officers were killed or wounded except Beresford, who was so ill as to be unable to walk, and many of the best petty officers and seamen were also gone. Beresford indeed offered to accompany the expedition, but, as he was clearly not in a fit condition, Wilson felt bound to decline the offer. After consultation with him Khasm-el-Mus was placed in command of the steamer _Bordein_, and Abdul Hamid Bey in command of the _Tala Hawiyeh_. It was Lord Wolseley's idea that the military escort should enter Khartoum in red coats. There was some difficulty in finding a sufficient number of coats for the purpose, but at the last moment they were obtained from the Guards, and the Suss.e.x men were enabled to appear in tunics which were sadly wanting in point of fit, though correct in colour.

At 8 a.m. on the 24th Sir C. Wilson left for Khartoum in the _Bordein_, with Captain Gascoigne, Yorks.h.i.+re Hussars, ten non-commissioned officers and men of the Suss.e.x Regiment, and one petty officer, artificer, Royal Navy; the _Tala Hawiyeh_ followed with Captain Trafford and ten non-commissioned officers and men of the Suss.e.x, Lieutenant Stuart-Wortley, King's Rifles, and one petty officer, artificer, Royal Navy. Captain Trafford commanded the escort, and Captain Gascoigne and Lieutenant Stuart-Wortley accompanied Wilson for service with Gordon, at Khartoum.

No information has been given why only two of the four vessels were despatched, nor why only twenty British soldiers were embarked. Of course little more than a "demonstration" could have been made with any force such as the steamers could have carried, even if all of them had been employed. Still the singular reduction from 14,000, the total of the British Army in Egypt, to 7,000, the force told off for the expedition, then to 1,800, the number of Sir Herbert Stewart's column, and finally to twenty, the number of Sir Charles Wilson's forlorn hope, cannot fail to strike the reader.

Colonel Boscawen was left in command of the force which remained at Gubat.

When near Sheikeih, on the left bank, a portion of the force under Fiki-Mustapha, which, it had been reported, was marching on Metammeh, was seen in the distance. It was ascertained afterwards that this force, about 3,000 men, had halted on receiving news of the fight at Metammeh, and then retired to Wad-Habes.h.i.+.

On the 26th two Shukriyehs came on board and reported that for the last fifteen days there had been fighting at Khartoum, and on the 27th a man shouted out from the left bank, that a camel-man had just pa.s.sed with the news that Khartoum had fallen, and that Gordon had been killed.

On the 28th, a Shukriyeh on the right bank stated that Khartoum had fallen two days previously, and that Gordon had been killed. The news was generally discredited, and the vessels prepared to force their way past the enemy's batteries into Khartoum, the _Bordein_ leading and the _Tala Hawiyeh_ following close astern. The orders to the detachment of the Royal Suss.e.x were to fire volleys at the embrasures of the batteries, whilst the Soudanese troops kept up an independent fire and the four guns on the steamers replied to the fire of the batteries.

On approaching Halfiyeh it was noticed that the palm-grove there had been burned, and that three or four large nuggers were lying alongside the bank. On the attention of Khasm-el-Mus being called to this, he at once replied, "Gordon's troops must be there, as the Mahdi has no boats." Directly afterwards a heavy fire was opened upon the steamers from four guns, and from rifles at from 600 to 900 yards range. One gun was in a sakhea pit at the water's edge, two in an earthwork a little above the sakhea, and one in the village. After pa.s.sing Shamba, two guns on the right bank opened on the steamers while a heavy rifle-fire came from both banks, and this was sustained until they came within range of the guns of Omdurman. When abreast of Tuti Island, which it was expected to find in Gordon's possession, the vessels were received by a sharp musketry fire at from 75 to 200 yards range; three or four guns, of which one was a Krupp, opened fire from the upper end of Tuti, or from Khartoum, two guns from the fort at Omdurman, and a well-sustained rifle-fire from the left bank. The steamers returned the fire both with guns and rifles.

On reaching a point beyond Tuti, Wilson came to the conclusion that Khartoum was in the hands of the enemy, and that it would be a useless sacrifice of life to attempt to land or try to force a pa.s.sage to the town itself; he therefore ordered the _Bordein_ to turn and run down the river at full speed. The _Tala Hawiyeh_, which had grounded for a few minutes, near the upper end of Tuti Island, followed, and the steamers drew up for the night near Tamaniat.

Here Wilson sent out two messengers, one to go to Khartoum to ascertain the fate of Gordon, the other to collect information. The latter, on his return, stated he had met a Jaalin Arab, who told him that Khartoum had fallen on the night of the 26th, and that Gordon was dead. He also said that on the 27th the Mahdi had entered Khartoum, prayed in the princ.i.p.al mosque, and then retired to Omdurman, leaving the town to three days'

pillage.

The reasons which led Wilson to the conclusion that Khartoum had fallen were:--The heavy fire brought to bear from Tuti Island; the absence of any fire from Khartoum in his support; the fact that no Egyptian flag was flying from any place in or near the town, though Government and other houses were plainly visible; the presence of a large number of dervishes with their banners on a sandspit; and the fact that a number of Gordon's troop boats and nuggers were lying along the left bank of the White Nile under Omdurman Fort.

On the 29th the _Tala Hawiyeh_ ran at full speed on a sunken rock in open water opposite Jeb-el-Royan and rapidly filled. The _Bordein_ was brought up at a small island below the wreck, and before sunset Captain Trafford and Lieutenant Stuart-Wortley came down with a large nugger, in which they placed every one on board the steamer, the two guns, and such of the ammunition as had not been damaged.

Fiki-Abd-Er-Rahman, who had come down to the river with a flag of truce at Omdurman, and followed down to the scene of the wreck, came on board with a letter from the Mahdi, which was addressed to the party. The letter stated that Khartoum had been taken and Gordon killed, and offered a safe-conduct to any one sent to verify the facts. The Mahdi enjoined the English to become Moslems if they wished for peace, and promised protection to Khasm-el-Mus and his followers if they submitted.

The messenger, on the other hand, stated that Gordon was with the Mahdi at Omdurman, and that the garrison of Tuti having refused to submit had been put to the sword.

Wilson made no reply to the Mahdi's letter, but, to secure a safe pa.s.sage through the cataracts, where the slightest opposition would have been fatal to every one on board the steamers, Khasm-el-Mus, with Wilson's cognizance, answered that he would never give himself up unless the Mahdi sent him a special safe-conduct and promise of safety. If this were sent he would surrender to Fiki-Mustapha at Wad-Habes.h.i.+, where guns had been mounted to oppose the pa.s.sage of the steamers.

On the 30th they pa.s.sed the most difficult portion of the cataract without opposition (the result of Khasm-el-Mus' answer, for during several hours the soldiers and men on the steamer and nugger were at the mercy of a few sharpshooters).

The same day two Shukriyehs came on board with information that Gordon was shut up in the mission church at Khartoum with some faithful followers.

On the 31st, after the _Bordein_ had been lowered down a difficult fall with great care, she was run on a sunken rock off the island of Mernat between two and three miles above the enemy's position at Wad-Habes.h.i.+.