The Egyptian campaigns, 1882 to 1885 Part 32

He then undertook a mission to the Congo River for the King of the Belgians, and only relinquished his post on the British Government requiring his services in the Soudan.

Opinions in Egypt were much divided on the subject of Gordon's mission and his chances of success. His courage, energy, and disinterestedness were beyond all doubt. There were, however, uncertainties, not to say eccentricities, in his character, which led many persons to question whether he was a fit person for the task to which he was called. That he had formerly an immense influence over the tribes of the Soudan was unquestionable. But people remembered that years had pa.s.sed away since that period, and argued that Gordon, returning to the Soudan with half-a-dozen followers, would not be the Gordon of Ismail's time, backed by his prestige and at the head of a powerful armed force. The difficulty, however, was to find any one else. It was Gordon or n.o.body, and the critics were compelled to shake their heads and hope all would be for the best.

Gordon's original instructions were dated the 18th January, 1884. He was to proceed at once to Egypt, to report on the military situation in the Soudan, and on the measures which it might be advisable to take for the security of the Egyptian garrisons and for the safety of the European population in Khartoum. He was to consider and report upon the best mode of effecting the evacuation of the interior of the Soudan, and upon the manner in which the safety and the good administration by the Egyptian Government of the ports on the sea-coast could best be secured. He was also to give especial consideration to the question of the steps that might usefully be taken to counteract the stimulus which it was feared might be given to the slave trade by the insurrectionary movement and by the withdrawal of Egyptian authority from the interior. He was to perform such other duties as the Egyptian Government might desire to intrust to him. He was to be accompanied by Colonel Stewart.

Gordon received new and more extended instructions from Sir Evelyn Baring, at Cairo, on January 25th. The following are their salient pa.s.sages:--

"It is believed that the number of Europeans at Khartoum is very small, but it has been estimated by the local authorities that some 10,000 to 15,000 people will wish to go northward from Khartoum only, when the Egyptian garrison is withdrawn. These people are native Christians, Egyptian employes, their wives and children, &c. The Government of His Highness the Khedive is earnestly solicitous that no effort should be spared to insure the retreat both of these people and of the Egyptian garrison without loss of life. As regards the most opportune time, and the best method for effecting the retreat, whether of the garrison or of the civil populations, it is neither necessary nor desirable that you should receive detailed instructions.

"You will bear in mind that the main end to be pursued is the evacuation of the Soudan. This policy was adopted, after very full discussion, by the Egyptian Government, on the advice of Her Majesty's Government. It meets with the full approval of His Highness the Khedive and of the present Egyptian Ministry.

"You are of opinion that the 'restoration of the country should be made to the different petty Sultans who existed at the time of Mehemet Ali's conquest, and whose families still exist;' and that an endeavour should be made to form a confederation of those Sultans. In this view the Egyptian Government entirely concurs.

"A credit of 100,000 has been opened for you at the Finance Department, and further sums will be supplied to you on your requisition when this sum is exhausted."

Gordon's final instructions were given him by the Egyptian Government in a firman appointing him Governor-General. By this firman he was empowered to carry into execution the evacuation of the respective territories and the withdrawal of the troops, civil officials, and such of the inhabitants as wished to leave for Egypt. He was, if possible, after completing the evacuation, to take steps for establis.h.i.+ng an organized government in the different provinces.

The significance of the alteration in Gordon's instructions will be perceived from Lord Granville's remark at the close of his summary of Gordon's new duties, in a despatch of March 28th, that "Her Majesty's Government, bearing in mind the exigencies of the occasion, concurred in these instructions," which virtually altered General Gordon's mission from one of advising and reporting to that of directing the evacuation not only of Khartoum, but of the whole Soudan, and also of establis.h.i.+ng an organized government.

Gordon left Cairo on January 26th, 1884, and arrived at Khartoum on the 18th February. He held a levee at the Mudirieh, the entire population being admitted. On his way between the Mudirieh and the Palace about 1,000 persons pressed forward, kissing his hands and feet, and calling him "Sultan," "Father," and "Saviour of Kordofan." General Gordon and Colonel Stewart at once opened offices in the Palace, granting admittance to every one with a grievance and giving all a careful hearing. The Government books, recording from time immemorial the outstanding debts of the overtaxed people, were publicly burned in front of the Palace. The courbashes, whips, and implements for administering the bastinado, were all placed on the blazing pile. Gordon created a native council of the local notables. Then he visited the hospital and a.r.s.enal. With Colonels Stewart and De Coetlogon and the English Consul he visited the prison, and found it to be a perfect den of misery. Two hundred beings loaded with chains lay there. They were of all ages, boys and old men, some having never been tried, some having been proved innocent, but left in prison, some arrested on suspicion and detained there more than three years, others merely prisoners of war. Gordon at once commenced to demolish this Bastille. Before it was dark scores of prisoners had had their chains struck off. In the evening the town was in a blaze of illumination, the bazaar being hung with cloth and coloured lamps and the private houses decorated. There was also a display of fireworks by the population, who indulged in rejoicings till after midnight.

Gordon's next act was to issue a proclamation repealing the existing laws against slavery. As a good deal of indignation has been expressed at this step, it is only fair to give his explanation.

Gordon in his "Diary" says, "Was it not announced that the Soudan was going to be abandoned, and consequently that the Soudanese were going to be allowed to follow their own devices (which are decidedly slave-huntingly inclined)? What possible influence could my saying that that feeble Treaty of 1877 was not going to be enforced have on people who were going to be abandoned?"

CHAPTER x.x.xIII.

SOUAKIM EXPEDITION, 1884.

The defeat of Baker's force, following, as it did, the annihilation of Hicks' army, created a most painful impression in England.

The situation was this--two armies led by English commanders and officered in great measure by Englishmen had been successively destroyed. Of the garrisons of Sinkat and of Tokar, one was known to have been sacrificed, and the other might share its fate any day.

Besides this, Souakim itself was seriously threatened.

With regard both to Hicks' and Baker's expeditions the Government was severely attacked both in and out of Parliament.

Of the character of the force which Baker had a.s.sembled at Trinkitat, the British Ministers had full information. Before it started there was a consensus of opinion that it was foredoomed. The special correspondent of the "Daily News" telegraphed on February 1st, 1884, that "Baker Pasha's force is unequal to the task of the relief of Sinkat, and if the troops whose chiefs have visited our camp prove faithless, Sinkat will be lost." The "Standard's" correspondent sent telegrams to the same effect. On February 1st the "St. James's Gazette" said "there was a very bad chance for Baker Pasha;" while the "Spectator" declared that "the chances against the success of the expedition were as three to one." The "Times" did not think Baker Pasha's enterprise a too hopeful one, considering the cla.s.s of men of which his force was composed, and added "that it would be a calamity if the fate of Hicks' expedition were to be risked again after a warning so recent and solemn." Opinion amongst military men, both in Egypt and at home, was to the same effect.

And yet Baker, like Hicks, was allowed to lead his rabble on to destruction. England, it was true, had declared that it took no responsibility as regards the despatch of Hicks' army; but England at the time of both disasters was omnipotent in Egypt. The country, bound hand and foot, was in the hands of the British Government. Under these circ.u.mstances, to permit was to do. The existence of power involved responsibility. The Government of the Khedive after the events of 1882 was little more than a shadow. England had only to advise, and Egypt to obey. Nevertheless, the Egyptian Government was permitted to send forth two wretchedly equipped expeditions, one to Kordofan and another to Souakim, both almost inevitably doomed to destruction.

The matter was not rendered more pleasant by the reflection that whilst Baker was sent with an impossible army to perform what, with his force, was a hopeless task, a British army capable of accomplis.h.i.+ng with ease all that was wanted remained idle in its barracks at Cairo. The shortsightedness of British policy was shown by the fact that this very force had after all to be despatched to accomplish what Baker had failed in. Unfortunately, however, it was destined, like many other operations recorded in this work, to be too late.

Public opinion had been especially moved by the news of the fall of Sinkat and the ma.s.sacre of its brave defenders, and it was felt that an effort should be made to save, if possible, the garrison of Tokar from a similar fate. For this purpose it was decided that a British force should be sent to Souakim.

The force to be employed was to be chiefly drawn from the Army of Occupation in Egypt, and General Stephenson was instructed by telegraph to make the necessary preparations. He was informed that the object of the expedition was to relieve the Tokar garrison if it could hold out, and, if not, to take any measures necessary for the safety of the Red Sea ports. He was to select the three best battalions under his command, and these, with the Royal Irish Fusiliers (then on their way from India), the York and Lancaster Regiment from Aden, and a battalion of Marines, were to form an infantry brigade. The garrison of Alexandria was to be removed to Cairo while the expedition lasted, and orders were sent to the fleet to hold Alexandria temporarily. The 10th and 19th Hussars, the Mounted Infantry, and any trustworthy native hors.e.m.e.n at Souakim, were to const.i.tute the mounted force. The 19th Hussars were to be mounted with native horses taken from the Egyptian cavalry under Sir Evelyn Wood. The baggage was to be on the lowest possible scale, as the troops were to be back in Cairo in three weeks. Tents were to accompany the force to Souakim or Trinkitat, as the case might be. The greatest publicity was to be given to the determination to relieve Tokar by British soldiers.

Messages were despatched to the garrison at Tokar, urging them to hold out, as relief was on the way, and the expedition was hurrying forward with all possible speed.

The command of the expedition was given to Major-General Sir Gerald Graham, who had led the Second Brigade at Tel-el-Kebir. Generals Davis and Redvers Buller were to accompany him.

Every effort was made to send off the expedition as early as possible.

The troops from Egypt embarked at Suez and proceeded to Souakim and Trinkitat. Between the 16th and 18th February the 10th and 19th Hussars, two batteries of Royal Artillery, the 3rd Battalion of the 60th King's Royal Rifles, the 42nd Royal Highlanders (Black Watch), the 75th Gordon Highlanders, the 65th York and Lancaster Regiment, the 89th Royal Irish Fusiliers, the 26th Company of the Royal Engineers, and 100 Mounted Infantry left for the scene of operations. Detachments of Marines from the vessels of the Mediterranean Squadron were also told off to accompany Graham's force.

The reorganized Egyptian Army under Sir Evelyn Wood was anxious to take part in the expedition, but the British Government had declined to sanction this, on the ground that the Egyptian army was expressly raised for the defence of Egypt proper, excluding the Soudan.

General Graham left Suez with his head-quarters on the 18th February and proceeded to Souakim.

Meanwhile Admiral Hewett had communicated with Osman Digna and warned him that a British force was going to relieve Tokar, and at the same time informed him that the English Government wished to avoid useless bloodshed, and would not interfere with the tribes if they did not oppose the expedition. Osman Digna replied that he felt himself obliged to take Tokar, and must, therefore, fight the English, and the responsibility for any bloodshed, he added, would rest with the latter.

On the 22nd of February an Egyptian soldier, who escaped from Tokar, stated that the garrison was then going over to the rebels, and that the commandant was treating for capitulation on the following day. Spies who arrived subsequently said that they could not approach Tokar owing to the presence of rebels in the vicinity, and on the 24th, whilst the British forces were disembarking at Trinkitat, news was received that Tokar had already fallen.

As to the precise manner in which this was brought about some little mystery exists, but so far as can be ascertained the circ.u.mstances attending the fall of Tokar appear to have been as follows. The garrison had for some time been hara.s.sed by a continual fire kept up by the Krupp guns and rifles in the hands of the rebels. The soldiers were despairing of relief, and the officers more or less disaffected. The bulk of the inhabitants were in favour of a surrender. According to some accounts, the Governor for some while resisted their importunities; according to others, he was only too willing to hand over the town to the besiegers.

In any case, negotiations were on the 19th opened with them through a merchant in Tokar, who had been imprisoned by the authorities as a sympathiser with the Mahdi, and who was now despatched as an emissary to the rebel camp. The surrender was fixed for the next day. The emissary returned to Tokar the same evening accompanied by 100 rebels, who were admitted to the town. One officer and a few soldiers still wanted to fight, but they were over-ruled by the others, who preferred ceding the town to Mussulmans rather than to Christians. During the night such soldiers as remained loyal escaped from the town, and several of them, journeying by night, made their way to Souakim. The next day the town was finally surrendered.

There seems to have been no valid reason for giving up Tokar, there being an abundance of provisions, and 45,000 rounds of ball cartridge left. Although the town had been sh.e.l.led and exposed to a heavy rifle fire for five days, the total loss suffered during the bombardment was only two men killed and twelve wounded out of a garrison of 300 men. The rebel force numbered less than 1,000.

Some doubt was at first felt as to the correctness of the news of the surrender of Tokar. In any case the expedition was now at Trinkitat, and it was resolved not to countermand it.

On the 26th Graham was instructed that, in the event of Tokar having fallen, the main object would be to protect Souakim. The next day Mr.

Gladstone stated in Parliament that the Cabinet saw no reason to doubt the accuracy of the report of the fall of Tokar. Notwithstanding this, it was decided to continue to push on with Graham's expedition.

The real reason for this decision is not altogether clear. Probably the truth is that the British Government was unwilling that the preparations which had been made should be in vain. Possibly, also, it was desired that the army, being on the spot, should strike a blow at Osman Digna before coming away. From a despatch sent to Graham on the 24th February it would seem that the objects to be attained by persevering with the expedition were to march on El-Teb, to protect any fugitives, and to bury the English dead, after which it was to return by land to Souakim.

These objects it was still in General Graham's power to attain.

On the 26th, after a preliminary reconnaissance by the Hussars and Mounted Infantry, the Gordon Highlanders and Royal Irish Fusiliers moved across the lagoon and took possession of Fort Baker. From early morning the enemy had shown in considerable numbers in the vicinity of the fort, but as the troops advanced the former fell back. A number also showed in force on the ridge nearly two miles distant. Upon the cavalry advancing, they still held their ground and opened fire at long range; but it being evident that a yet larger force was still behind the ridge, it was not considered advisable to charge.

The two succeeding days were occupied in transporting a supply of water and three days' provisions for the whole army.

On the 27th the enemy ma.s.sed some two miles off, and numbering about 2,000 strong, kept up continuous firing on the English sentries and outposts. A last effort was now made to treat with the rebels. Major Harvey, accompanied by Colonel Burnaby, rode with an escort to the rising ground two miles distant. Here he planted a white flag with a letter attached to the staff, enjoining the troops to disperse and to send delegates to Khartoum to consult with General Gordon as to the settlement of the Soudan provinces. The enemy maintained continuous firing at the party, but, after it had withdrawn, took the flag and letter, but left no reply.

On the afternoon of the 28th Graham and the remainder of the force proceeded to the fort and bivouacked for the night. Each man carried seventy rounds. No transport was taken.

The two infantry brigades were disposed as follows:--1st Brigade under General Redvers Buller--2nd Brigade under General Davis. For transport there were 600 camels, with 350 mules, and 100 camels for ambulance work. There was also a camel battery of 80 animals and 100 men.

CHAPTER x.x.xIV.

GRAHAM'S VICTORY AT EL-TEB.

On the morning of the 28th February the bugles sounded the reveille about five, and instantly all were on the alert. The camp fires were relighted, breakfast was got ready, and although the men had been drenched by the rain which fell during the night, every one was in excellent spirits. At 8 o'clock the order was given to advance, the men having fallen in some time previously.

The force, though nominally in square, was formed in a long rectangle, having an interior s.p.a.ce of about 500 yards by 150 yards. The Gordon Highlanders, in line, were in front; in the rear the Royal Highlanders (Black Watch); on the right the Royal Irish Fusiliers, with four companies of the King's Royal Rifles; and on the left the York and Lancaster Regiment and the Royal Marines. Intervals were left at the angles for the guns and Gatlings, the Naval Brigade occupying the front and the Royal Artillery the rear angles. In the centre were the staffs of Generals Graham and Buller, the officers of the Royal Engineers, and the medical department. The front and left of the square were covered by a squadron of the 10th Hussars, the right by a troop of the 19th Hussars, and the rest of the cavalry were in the rear, under the command of General Stewart. The total force, including the officers and men of the Naval Brigade, was a little under 4,000 in number. The accompanying diagram shows the formation:--