History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902 Part 41

[Sidenote: The arrival of fresh ammunition being delayed, the gun teams are withdrawn to the donga.]

Meanwhile, the personnel of the field batteries in the open, 400 yards in front of Ogilvy's guns, was beginning to suffer from the accurate shrapnel and rifle fire concentrated on them. The escort of "A." and "B." companies of the Royal Scots Fusiliers, under command of Captain D. H. A. d.i.c.k, extended on the immediate left of Long's guns up to the railway line; four companies of the Royal Irish Fusiliers, under Major C. R. Rogers, were sent in extended order by General Barton, two companies in advance and two in support, to aid this escort. Of these, one company halted in rear of the Royal Scots Fusiliers companies; one company remained in the donga near Ogilvy's guns, and the other two lay down about 300 yards to the right rear of the field guns. The Royal Scots Fusiliers companies[233] endeavoured to subdue the enemy's riflemen, but unsuccessfully. After a few minutes Colonel Long was very severely wounded. A little later Lieut.-Colonel Hunt was also wounded, and the command devolved on Major A. C. Bailward. Casualties amongst the men, especially in the centre gun detachments, were frequent. Nevertheless, the batteries continued to be served with great efficiency, the guns being worked steadily by sections with accurate elevation and fuse. Notwithstanding the heavy fire of the enemy, the second line ammunition wagons were brought up to the guns, and the empty wagons removed in strict conformity with regulations.

The requisition, however, for further supplies for the batteries from the ammunition column three miles in rear was delayed by the death of Captain A. H. Goldie, 14th battery, and by the wounding of Captain F.

A. Elton, 66th Battery. Officers and men the while, soldiers and sailors alike, fought their guns with the utmost determination, and with great effect. Fort Wylie became a ma.s.s of bursting sh.e.l.l and red dust, and for a time the Boer guns on the kopjes some 500 yards in rear of that work were silenced. The infantry fire of the enemy had been also greatly reduced,[234] but after being in action for an hour the ammunition of the British batteries began to run short, each gun having now fired from 80 to 100 rounds. Major Bailward therefore, after first obtaining Colonel Long's approval, decided to withdraw the gun detachments temporarily into the donga, and keep them under cover, pending the arrival of reinforcements of men and ammunition.

[Footnote 233: The two companies of the Royal Scots Fusiliers subsequently ran short of ammunition, but a further supply was brought up to them under a heavy fire by Sergeant-Major J. Shannon, 2nd Royal Irish Fusiliers.]

[Footnote 234: Three burghers of the Krugersdorp commando, who were manning the trenches near the river, stated subsequently that it would have been impossible for them to have maintained "any sort of fire" on the infantry, if these had advanced while the guns were in action.]

[Sidenote: Two messengers sent to Sir Redvers.]

The effective strength of the detachments was by this time reduced to an average of about four men per gun.[235] The remaining men were accordingly formed up and marched quietly to the donga at about 7.15 a.m. All the wounded were placed under cover in small dongas, close to the outer flanks of the batteries, but no attempt was made to disable the guns, as the officer in command only awaited fresh supplies of men and ammunition to open fire again. Captain G. F. Herbert, R.A., Colonel Long's staff officer, and an Australian officer attached to his staff, were instructed to ride at once to Sir Redvers Buller and report the situation and the needs of the batteries.

[Footnote 235: Exclusive of prisoners, the 66th battery's losses throughout the day were 1 officer and 10 men killed, and 2 officers and 30 men wounded; these casualties include those incurred in the attempts to carry away the guns.]

[Sidenote: Sir Redvers receives various reports and leaves Naval Gun Hill.]

Sir Redvers had already felt some anxiety as to Long's guns, as Colonel Stopford had already pointed out to him that they were not in the intended position. An aide-de-camp had been despatched to ascertain their exact situation, and, having observed the guns in action from a distance through field-gla.s.ses, that officer had reported that they were "all right and comfortable," but under a certain amount of fire. Sir Redvers' anxiety as to the guns was not relieved, and a little later he left Naval Gun Hill with the intention of seeing himself what was going on. On his way he met the Australian officer, who stated that the batteries, including the Naval guns, were all out of action, their ammunition exhausted, and every officer and man of the gun detachments killed or wounded. Shortly afterwards Captain Herbert rode up, and was understood by General Buller to confirm the previous report, with the exception that he estimated that six rounds per gun were still left. It was not until the following day that the General Commanding knew that men had been all along available to fight the guns. He had already ordered the retirement of Hart's brigade, but, until hearing of this fresh mishap, had still hoped to succeed with his main attack. The operation orders had contemplated that the fire of the whole of the Naval guns and of both brigade divisions of Royal artillery (amounting in all to 44 guns) should be concentrated on the Colenso kopjes, so as to pave the way for an attack upon them. The 2nd brigade division had been diverted to a.s.sist Hart's brigade and, conceiving from the reports now made that the 1st brigade division and six of the Naval guns were permanently out of action for the day, Sir Redvers immediately decided that the artillery left to him was insufficient and that "without guns it would be impossible to force the pa.s.sage of the river."[236] He determined, before falling back, to make an effort to save Long's guns from what seemed to him their desperate position.

[Footnote 236: See despatch to Secretary of State, dated 17th December, 1899.]

[Sidenote: He decides to withdraw from the attack. 8 a.m.]

[Sidenote: The distribution of the troops at 8 a.m.]

He came to this decision, which marks the crucial point of the action, a little before 8 a.m.[237] Hart's brigade was at that moment slowly beginning to carry out the order to retire from the western loop of the river. Barton's brigade, save the two companies Royal Scots Fusiliers and the half-battalion Irish Fusiliers, which had been pushed forward to support Long's guns, had not been engaged, although, to meet any advance of the enemy from the bush near the river on the right front, the Brigadier had moved the Royal Welsh Fusiliers some 1,000 yards beyond the point where they had first halted. Neither the 2nd nor the 4th brigade had yet fired a shot. The former had been halted by Major-General Hildyard a little in front of Naval Gun Hill, with its right on the railway and its left near some kraals, awaiting the completion of the artillery preparation. Two battalions of the 4th brigade, the 2nd Scottish Rifles and the 3rd King's Royal Rifles, were lying close beside Hildyard's brigade, in rear of Captain Jones' Naval artillery. Two other battalions, 1st Rifle Brigade and 1st Durham Light Infantry, were moving in accordance with Sir R. Buller's orders to the left flank to cover the withdrawal of the 5th brigade; one company, however, of the latter battalion had been left with the Naval guns. The mounted brigade, whose proceedings will be narrated later, was advancing against Hlangwhane Hill, but no report of their progress had yet reached Sir Redvers Buller.

[Footnote 237: The positions of the troops at this period of the action are given in detail on map No. 15.]

[Sidenote: Hildyard moves 2nd brigade forward.]

[Sidenote: He occupies Colenso, and joins hands with Barton.]

He himself now considered it advisable to go in person to the critical point, and ascertain by his own inspection the true facts about the guns. On his way to the front, he informed Major-General Hildyard that the attack, as originally planned, was to be given up, and instructed him to advance two of his battalions to cover the extrication of the guns, taking care not to get involved in any engagement with the enemy that could be avoided. The G.O.C., 2nd brigade, had already extended his two leading battalions, the 2nd Queen's and 2nd Devon, for the attack on the bridge, as first ordered. Both these battalions being to the west of the railway, Hildyard directed the 2nd Devon to pa.s.s through the Queen's and cross over to the east side of the line. The two battalions then advanced, the 2nd Queen's on Colenso and the Devon on Long's guns, the formation adopted being columns of half companies at from fifty to eighty paces distance, the half companies being deployed in single rank, with six to eight paces interval. The 2nd East Surrey formed a second line in rear; the 2nd West Yorks.h.i.+re was in third line. In this formation, the 2nd brigade moved forward across the open plain under a heavy fire, experiencing but slight loss. By 9.30 a.m. five companies of the Queen's, under the command of Major W.

S. Burrell, had occupied the village of Colenso. About two sections of "C." and "G." companies of the Devon, accompanied by their battalion commander, Lieut.-Colonel G. M. Bullock, had reached the donga immediately in rear of Long's guns, the rest of that battalion being echeloned in the open, further back as a support. A little later "E."

and "F." companies crossed the railway, and seized some farm buildings, close to the road near the village. Part of these were already occupied by the 2nd Queen's. Between Bullock's two foremost Devon sections and Burrell's five companies lay the companies of the Royal Scots Fusiliers, which formed the original escort to the guns, and behind them, in support, were those two other companies of R. S.

Fusiliers which had been despatched by General Barton, when he observed that an attempt was being made to withdraw the field guns. To the right, and on the left rear of Bullock, four companies of Irish Fusiliers were still extended. At this time, therefore, nearly ten companies of infantry were in the firing line. Three companies of the Queen's, about seven of the Devon, two of the Irish, and two of the Scotch Fusiliers were in immediate support, and the remainder of the 2nd and 6th brigades and a battalion of the 4th brigade (the King's Royal Rifles) were near at hand in rear. During this period of the fight, Lieutenant R. E. Meyricke, Royal Engineers, of his own initiative, worked down the spruit above the Bulwer bridge to the river, and thence along its bank to the bridge, which he tested under heavy fire, and found not to be mined.

[Sidenote: Sir Redvers, in zone of fire, orders Naval guns to retire.]

After giving his orders to General Hildyard's brigade, Sir Redvers rode forward with Lieut.-General Clery and his staff into the zone of fire, Captain M. E. Hughes, R.A.M.C., being killed, and Sir Redvers himself hit by a shrapnel bullet. On reaching that donga, where Lieutenant Ogilvy's Naval guns were still in action, General Buller ordered their retirement. Two of these guns, whose oxen had been kept at hand, went off to join the main Naval battery under Captain Jones.

The remaining four were withdrawn out of range one by one with the help of artillery horses, and were eventually brought back to camp by fresh spans of oxen. This withdrawal was covered by "C." squadron of the 13th Hussars. The casualties among Ogilvy's party during the day only amounted to three men wounded, and twenty-eight oxen killed, wounded or lost.

[Sidenote: He stops despatch of ammunition to Long's guns.]

The field guns were still in the open, beyond the further donga, under cover of which the surviving officers and men of the brigade division were lying, hoping for ammunition to enable them to resume the action.

Major W. Babtie, R.A.M.C., who had volunteered to go forward to the gun line, was attending to the wounded. Captain Herbert, on his return, after his interview with the General Commanding-in-Chief, had again been despatched to the rear by Colonel Long to seek for ammunition. At his request Major W. Apsley Smith, commanding No. 1 ammunition column, ordered forward nine wagons, and to cover their advance Captain Jones, R.N., concentrated the fire of his Naval guns on Fort Wylie, but the wagons were stopped on their way by General Buller.

[Sidenote: Gallant attempts to rescue guns.]

Sir Redvers, by the time he arrived at the Naval donga, had decided that it was impracticable to re-man the guns of the field batteries.

Since the batteries ceased fire, Fort Wylie had been re-occupied by the enemy, and the fire therefrom, and from the neighbouring trenches, was so heavy that he considered that it was impossible that troops could live in the open by the guns. He sanctioned a series of gallant attempts being made by volunteers to withdraw them. Limber teams were collected for this purpose, in the rear donga. The first of these attempts was made by Captains Schofield and Congreve, both serving on Sir Redvers' staff, Lieut. the Hon. F. H. S. Roberts (who was acting as an extra A.D.C. to General Clery, until he could join Sir George White's staff), Corporal Nurse and others, gathered from the drivers of the 66th battery. Two guns were limbered up and brought back to the rear donga under a very severe fire, but Lieutenant Roberts fell mortally wounded, and was carried into some shelter on the left flank by Major Babtie, R.A.M.C., Major W. G. Forster, R.F.A., and Captain Congreve. One of the limbers which had been brought for the guns had been reduced to a standstill by the enemy's fire. Lieutenants C. B.

Schreiber and J. B. Grylls, both of the 66th battery, accompanied by Bombardier Knight and two gunners, thereupon made a valiant endeavour to a.s.sist the endangered drivers. Schreiber was shot dead, and Grylls severely wounded, but the bombardier and gunners succeeded in bringing back two wounded men.

[Sidenote: The last effort.]

Later in the morning a final effort was made by Captain H. L. Reed, of the 7th Field battery, who, with three wagon-teams, came across from the eastern flank, but before the teams could reach the guns, Captain Reed was wounded and his horse killed. Of his thirteen men, one was killed and five wounded, while twelve of their horses were shot. After this failure Sir Redvers refused to allow any more volunteering to withdraw the guns.[238] Captain Reed, by General Buller's direction, and with the a.s.sistance of Major F. C. Cooper, A.D.C., withdrew from the rear donga the unwounded drivers and horses of No. 1 brigade division, and took them back to the wagons of the 7th Field battery.

No order to retire appears to have been sent to the artillery officers and men in the front donga. A written message--"I am ordered to retire; fear that you cannot get away"--was sent by Lieut.-Col. E. O.

F. Hamilton, commanding 2nd Queen's, to the donga, addressed to "O.C.R.A., or any other officer," but it did not reach an officer's hands.

[Footnote 238: For conspicuous gallantry displayed in the attempt to carry away the guns, the following were awarded the Victoria Cross: Captain W. N. Congreve, Rifle Brigade; Captain H. L. Reed, 7th battery R.F.A.; Captain H. N.

Schofield, R.F.A.; Lieutenant the Hon. F. H. S. Roberts, King's Royal Rifle Corps (posthumous); Corporal G. E. Nurse, 66th battery R.F.A.; and Private C. Ravenhill, Royal Scots Fusiliers. For devotion to the wounded under very heavy fire, Major W. Babtie, C.M.G., Royal Army Medical Corps, also received the Victoria Cross.]

[Sidenote: The mounted brigade.]

Whilst the fortunes of the day had thus been proving unfavourable to the main attack, the mounted brigade had been endeavouring to carry out its part in the programme. The 7th battery R.F.A., according to orders, reported before daylight to Lord Dundonald. Lord Dundonald detached the Royal Dragoons to watch the left flank of the general advance, detailed Bethune's M.I. to act as baggage guard, and moved off from his rendezvous on the west side of the railway at 4 a.m.

Crossing the line at the platelayer's cottage about 4.30 a.m., he advanced on Hlangwhane, employing the Composite regiment[239] to reconnoitre to the front and flanks.

[Footnote 239: This regiment was made up of one squadron Natal Carbineers, a detachment of Natal Police, one squadron Imperial Light Horse, and one mounted company formed from 2nd King's Royal Rifles and Dublin Fusiliers; Major R. L. Walter, 7th Hussars, was on that day in command.]

[Sidenote: The mission of the mounted brigade.]

The Commanding Officers were informed by the Brigadier that their mission was "to prevent the enemy working round on the right, to occupy Hlangwhane Mountain if possible, and to a.s.sist the main attack on Colenso by a flank fire." A little before 7 a.m., when the main body of the brigade was still about two miles from Hlangwhane, the scouts reported that the hill was held by the enemy. The 7th battery, commanded by Major C. G. Henshaw, had already come into action, at about 6 a.m., close to the right battalion of the 6th brigade, the Royal Fusiliers, on an underfeature to the north of Advance Hill, about 3,000 yards from Hlangwhane. The targets selected for the battery were at first Fort Wylie and the other Colenso kopjes, the range of the former being about 3,100 yards; but when Hlangwhane was found to be occupied by the enemy, the fire of the right section, and later on of another section, was directed on its south-western slopes at a range of from 2,400 to 2,600 yards.

[Sidenote: It tries to capture Hlangwhane but finds Boers in full possession.]

Meanwhile, the Brigadier had despatched the South African Light Horse, under Lt.-Colonel the Hon. Julian Byng, to demonstrate against the southern slope of the hill, and had directed Thorneycroft's and the Composite regiment to work round by the Gomba Spruit, and to endeavour to push through the dense thorn-bush up the eastern face. The 13th Hussars were held in reserve close to Advance Hill. Deducting the horse-holders, the force thus launched for the attack of Hlangwhane was somewhat less in strength than the commando defending it; the Boers were holding entrenched and well-concealed positions on the lower southern slopes of the hill, with their left flank prolonged for a considerable distance to the eastward. Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft's men gained ground to the north-east for about a mile, under cover of the spruit, and then moved through the bush northwards until they came in contact with the enemy at a distance of about 300 yards from the base of the hill. The two leading companies of Thorneycroft's corps still tried to push on, but they were stopped by finding that they were outflanked by Boers occupying the ridge to the eastward. The advance of the South African Light Horse against the southern spur of the hill was also checked. It was now about 7.40 a.m.

[Sidenote: Dundonald asks for infantry support, but does not get it.]

On receiving Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft's report that he could make no further progress, and that the enemy was outflanking him, Lord Dundonald sent "A." squadron of the 13th Hussars towards Green Hill to strengthen his right flank, and asked Major-General Barton to support his attack on Hlangwhane with some infantry. General Barton was unable to comply with this request. The Royal Fusiliers were at this moment his last reserve, and having regard to his instructions, the G.O.C., 6th brigade, did not feel justified, without the specific sanction of General Buller, in committing this battalion to what appeared to him a doubtful enterprise on intricate ground.

[Sidenote: Sir Redvers decides that Hlangwhane would be useless without Colenso.]

[Sidenote: The decision 11 a.m. to abandon the guns and return to camp.]

On receipt of this reply, Lord Dundonald directed his troops to hold on to the positions they were occupying, and reported the situation to the General Commanding-in-Chief, who now (about 10 a.m.) had left the donga and ridden over to the mission station at the cross roads between Advance Hill and Hussar Hill. There he received Lord Dundonald's and General Barton's reports; the former was of the opinion that, with the help of one or two battalions, he could carry Hlangwhane, while the latter considered that his whole brigade, including the eight companies now in the firing line by Long's guns, would be needed if the hill was to be taken. Sir Redvers decided that the occupation of Hlangwhane would be useless unless he had first forced the pa.s.sage of the Tugela at Colenso, and of this he had already relinquished all hope. He therefore ordered the Commander of the mounted brigade to keep his men well in hand, and not to allow them to become too closely engaged in the bush. As regards the 6th brigade, General Buller considered the Royal Fusiliers already too far forward on the right flank, and ordered that the battalion should be drawn in. Five companies of the battalion were accordingly moved to the south; the other three companies remained with the commanding officer, Lt.-Colonel C. G. Donald, in support of Thorneycroft, and were advanced to a point half a mile in front of the position of the 7th battery. General Buller now went back to the donga, and thence watched Captain Reed's effort to save Long's guns. After its failure, Sir Redvers, sending away his staff and escort, rode personally through part of the extended battalions of the 2nd brigade, and formed the opinion that the men were too exhausted with the extreme heat to be kept out all day, with the probability at nightfall of a severe fight at close quarters for the guns. He therefore decided to abandon the guns, and to withdraw the whole of his force forthwith to camp.

The decision was given about 11 a.m.

[Sidenote: Parsons and Lyttelton successfully cover the retreat of Hart's brigade.]

The retirement of the 5th brigade, which had been ordered more than three hours earlier, was now approaching completion. Lieut.-Colonel Parsons[240] had succeeded in moving the 64th and 73rd Field batteries across the Doornkop Spruit, somewhat higher up than the place of his first attempt; to afford the infantry better support, he advanced to a low ridge near a kraal, as close in rear of the left of the brigade as would permit of sufficient command to fire over them. Thence, at a range of 2,800 yards, the batteries searched with sh.e.l.l the kopjes on the north bank of the Tugela, and, a.s.sisted by the fire of Captain Jones' Naval guns, silenced the two Boer guns near the Ladysmith road, using for this purpose shrapnel with percussion fuse. Parsons'

batteries were at this time only 1,200 yards from the river, and came under the rifle fire of the enemy. Their casualties were but slight.

The 1st Rifle Brigade and the 1st Durham Light Infantry, which, under the personal command of Major-General Lyttelton, had gone to a.s.sist in covering Hart's retreat, had reached the Doornkop Spruit. The 1st Rifle Brigade and four companies of the Durham Light Infantry crossed it and opened out to six or eight paces interval on the far side, four companies of the Rifle Brigade and two of the Durham forming a firing line at a distance of about 500 yards from the river. The three remaining companies of the Durham Light Infantry lined the spruit.

[Footnote 240: See p. 357.]

[Sidenote: The retreat down the loop.]