The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government Volume II Part 46

After the full conversation with General Beauregard above noticed, General Hardee was called in and asked to give his opinion on the plan, which I regarded as ent.i.tled to great consideration, not only because of his high capacity as a soldier, but also because of his long connection with the Army of Tennessee, and minute knowledge of the country in which it was proposed to operate. He had previously been made fully aware of the plans and purposes discussed between General Hood and myself, and stated to General Beauregard substantially that, while he could not say the plan would succeed, he was confident it was the best which we could adopt, and that, if it failed, none other with our means would succeed. General Beauregard left for General Hood's headquarters, as I supposed, to aid in the execution of the proposed plan, to the success of which the larger command with which he was invested, it was hoped, would contribute.

General Hood moved as was expected upon the enemy's line of communication, and his successes at Big Shanty and Acworth, in capturing those stations and thoroughly destroying the railroad between them, and his partial success at Allatoona, caused Sherman, leaving one corps to garrison Atlanta, to move out with his main body to restore his communications. Hood further succeeded in destroying the railroad from Resaca to Tunnel Hill, capturing the enemy's posts at Tilton, Dalton, and Mill-Creek Gap; but, not deeming his army in condition to risk a general engagement, withdrew his forces in a southwesterly direction toward Gadsden, which place he reached October 20th, finding there supplies adequate for the wants of his troops. Sherman had turned back toward Atlanta, and Hood, instead of hanging on his rear, not allowing him to repair the damage to the railroad, and otherwise hara.s.sing him in his march as much as possible, after conference with General Beauregard, decided to continue his march into Tennessee.[111] His reasons for this change of plan are elaborately and forcibly presented in his book, "Advance and Retreat," published since the war, and in which he emphatically contradicts the attempt which has been made to represent that campaign into Tennessee as one projected by me. The correspondence of General Sherman, published in the same work, shows that Hood was not far wrong in the supposition that Sherman would follow the movement made on his line of communication; the only error being that he could thus draw him beyond the limits of Georgia. After my return to Richmond, a telegram from General Beauregard informed me of the change of programme. My objection to that movement remained, and, though it was too late to regain the s.p.a.ce and time which had been lost, I replied promptly on November 30, 1864, as follows:

"General BEAUREGARD, care of Colonel W. M. Browne, _Augusta, Georgia._

"Yours of 24th received. It is probable that the enemy, if short of supplies, may move directly for the coast. When that is made manifest, you will be able to concentrate your forces upon the one object, and I hope, if you can not defeat his attempt, that you may reduce his army to such condition as to be inefficient for further operations.

"Until Hood reaches the country proper of the enemy, he can scarcely change the plans for Sherman's or Grant's campaigns. They would, I think, regard the occupation of Tennessee and Kentucky as of minor importance.

"JEFFERSON DAVIS."

To the arguments offered to show that our army could not, after it had reached the Tennessee River, have effectually pursued Sherman in his march through southern Georgia, it is only needful to reply that the physical difficulties set forth would not have existed, had our army commenced the pursuit from Gadsden.

To make the movement into Tennessee a success, even so far as to recover that country, it was necessary that it should be executed so promptly as to antic.i.p.ate the concentration of the enemy's forces, but unforeseen and unavoidable delays occurred, which gave full time for preparation. After having overcome many vexatious detentions, Hood on the 20th of November completed his crossing of the Tennessee River at Gunter's Landing, and moved forward into Tennessee on the route to Nashville, whither Sherman had sent General Thomas for the protection of his depots and communications against an apprehended attack by cavalry under General Forrest.

Most unwilling to criticise the conduct of that very gallant and faithful soldier who, battle-scarred and mutilated, survived the war, and whose recent death our country has so much deplored, I must say after the event, as I did before it, that I consider this movement into Tennessee ill-advised.

Thomas having been sufficiently reenforced in Tennessee to enable him to hold Hood in check, and Sherman relieved from the necessity of defending himself against an active army, and of protecting a long line of railroad communication with a fortified base in his rear, resolved upon his march to the sea, abandoning Atlanta, after having first utterly destroyed that city by fire. Not a single house was spared, not even a church. Similar acts of vandalism marked the progress of the Federal army at Rome, Kingston, Acworth, Marietta, and every town or village along its route, thus carrying out General Sherman's order "to enforce a devastation more or less relentless"

along the line of his march, where he only encountered helpless women and children. The arson of the dwelling-houses of non-combatants and the robbery of their property, extending even to the trinkets worn by women, made the devastation as relentless as savage instincts could suggest.

On November 16th Sherman left his intrenchments around Atlanta, and, dividing his army into two bodies, each from twenty-five to thirty thousand strong, the one followed the Georgia Railroad in the direction of Augusta, and the other took the line of the Macon and Western Railroad to Jonesboro. Avoiding Macon and Augusta, they pa.s.sed through central Georgia, taking Milledgeville on the way, marching in compact column, and advancing with extreme caution, although only opposed by detachments of Wheeler's cavalry and a few hastily formed regiments of raw militia. Partial efforts were made to obstruct and destroy the roads in the front and on the flanks of the invading army, and patriotic appeals by prominent citizens were made to the people, to remove all provisions from its path, but no formidable opposition was made, except at the railroad-bridge over the Oconee, where Wheeler, with a portion of his command and a few militia, held the enemy in check for two or three days. With his small force, General Wheeler daringly and persistently hara.s.sed, and, when practicable, delayed the enemy's advance, attacking and defeating exposed detachments, deterring his foragers from venturing far from the main body, defending all cities and towns along the railroad lines, and affording protection to depots of supplies, a.r.s.enals, and other important Government works. The report of his operations from November 14th to December 20th displays a dash, activity, vigilance, and consummate skill, which justly ent.i.tle him to a prominent place on the roll of great cavalry leaders. By his indomitable energy, operating on all sides of Sherman's columns, he was enabled to keep the Government and commanders of our troops advised of the enemy's movements, and, by preventing foraging parties from leaving the main body, he saved from spoliation all but a narrow tract of country, and from the torch millions worth of property which would otherwise have been certainly consumed.

It soon became manifest that Savannah was General Sherman's objective point. That city was occupied by General W. J. Hardee with about eighteen thousand men, a considerable portion of which was composed of militia, local troops, reserves, and hastily organized regiments and battalions made up of convalescents from the hospitals and artisans from the Government shops. On the 10th of December the enemy's columns reached the immediate vicinity of Savannah, and on the 12th they occupied a semicircular line extending from the Savannah River to the Savannah and Gulf Railroad. The defenses of the city were strong, the earthworks and other fortifications were flanked by inundated rice-swamps extending across the peninsula formed by the Savannah and Ogeechee Rivers, and the causeways leading through them were well fortified by works mounting heavy guns. With a sufficient force to occupy his long lines of defense, General Hardee could have sustained a protracted siege. The city was amply supplied, and its lines of communication were still open. Although Sherman had reached Savannah, he had not yet opened communication with the Federal fleet. Fort McAllister, situated on the right bank of the Ogeechee, about six miles from Ossabaw Sound, was a serious obstacle in his way, as it was a work of considerable strength, mounting twenty-one heavy guns, a deep and wide ditch extending along its front, with every avenue of approach swept by the guns mounted upon its bastions. The fort was held by a garrison of two hundred and fifty men under the command of experienced officers. The work was attacked on the evening of the 13th, and carried by a.s.sault after a short and feeble resistance. In consequence of the loss of this fort, Sherman speedily opened communication with the fleet, and became perfectly secure against any future want of supplies. This also enabled him to obtain heavy ordnance for use against the city. He proceeded immediately to take measures to invest Savannah, and in a few days had succeeded in doing so on every side of the city except that fronting the river. While Hardee's troops had not yielded a single position or lost a foot of ground, with the exception of Fort McAllister, when, on December 20th, he discovered that Sherman had put heavy siege-guns in position near enough to bombard the city, and that the enemy was threatening Union Causeway, which extends across the large swamps that lie between Savannah and Charleston, and offered the only practicable line of retreat, he determined to evacuate the place rather than expose the city and its inhabitants to bombardment. He also thought holding it had ceased to be of any special importance, and that his troops could do more valuable service in the field. Accordingly, on the night of December 20th, having destroyed the navy-yard, the ironclads, and other Government property, and razed the fortifications below the city, he withdrew his army and reached Hardeeville on the evening of the 22d, without hindrance or molestation on the part of the enemy.

[Ill.u.s.tration: General John B. Hood]

Having heretofore stated my objections to the plan of sending Hood's army into Tennessee after the fall of Atlanta, I will now follow it in that campaign, relying for the facts on the official report of General Hood of the 15th of February, 1865. The fidelity and gallantry of that officer and the well-known magnanimity of his character are a sufficient guarantee of the impartiality of his narration.

He reported the arrival of his army at Gadsden on the 20th of October, 1864, where he was joined by General P. G. T. Beauregard, commanding the military department. He writes that, after withdrawing from Atlanta, his hope had been that Sherman in following might offer an opportunity to strike him in detail, but in this he was disappointed. Hood reported that the morale of his army, though improved, was not such as, in the opinion of his corps commanders, would justify a general engagement while the enemy remained united.

At Gadsden he found a thorough supply of shoes and other stores, but, after a full and free conference with General Beauregard at Tusc.u.mbia, he decided to cross the Tennessee and move against Thomas, who with his corps had been detached by Sherman and sent into Middle Tennessee. General Beauregard had sent orders to General Forrest to move with his cavalry into Tennessee; the main body of Hood's cavalry had been sent to follow Sherman. As the orders to Forrest were accidentally delayed, and Hood had not cavalry enough to protect his trains, he was compelled to wait for the coming of Forrest, and, to hasten the meeting, moved down the river as far as Florence, where he arrived on the 31st of October. This unfortunate delay gave the enemy time to repair the railroad to Chattanooga, and acc.u.mulate supplies at Atlanta for a march thence toward the Atlantic coast. Forrest's cavalry joined on the 21st of November, and the movement began. The enemy's forces at that time were concentrated at Pulaski and at Lawrenceburg. Hood endeavored to place his army between these forces and Nashville, but our cavalry, having driven off the enemy at Lawrenceburg, gave notice of our advance, and on the 23d he evacuated Pulaski and moved rapidly by the turnpike and railroad to Columbia.

On the evening of the 27th of November our army took position in front of the works at that place. During the night the town was evacuated, and a strong position was taken on the opposite side of the river, about a mile and a half distant. On the evening of the 28th General Forrest crossed Duck River a few miles above Columbia, and in the morning of the 29th Stewart's and Cheatham's corps followed the cavalry, leaving Lieutenant-General Stephen D. Lee's corps confronting the enemy at Columbia. The cavalry and the two infantry corps moved in light marching order, the object being, by advancing rapidly on roads parallel to the Columbia and Franklin turnpike at or near Spring Hill, to cut off that portion of the foe at Columbia. The movement having been discovered after Hood's forces had got well on the flank of the enemy, he began to retreat along the turnpike toward Spring Hill. About noon of that day the cavalry attacked his trains, but found them too strongly guarded to be captured. The retreat was rapidly conducted along the turnpike, with flankers thrown out to protect the main column. Near Spring Hill Major-General Cheatham, being in the advance, commenced to come in contact with the retreating column about two miles from Spring Hill.

He was ordered to attack vigorously, and get possession of the turnpike. This was so feebly executed that he failed to attain the object, and the enemy pa.s.sed on toward Spring Hill. Though the golden opportunity had pa.s.sed with daylight, Hood did not abandon the hope of effecting by a night movement the end he sought. Accordingly, Lieutenant-General Stewart was furnished with a guide, and ordered to move his corps beyond Cheatham's, and place it across the road beyond Spring Hill. In the dark and confusion, he did not succeed in getting the position desired. About midnight, ascertaining that the enemy was moving in disorder, with artillery, wagons, and troops intermixed, Hood sent instructions to General Cheatham to advance a heavy line of skirmishers, still further to impede the retreat. This was not accomplished. The enemy continued to move along the road in hurry and confusion nearly all the night. Thus was lost a great opportunity for striking him for which we had labored so long--the greatest this campaign had offered, and one of the greatest during the war.

Lieutenant-General S. D. Lee, left in front of the enemy at Columbia, was instructed to press him the moment he abandoned his position at that point. He did not abandon his works until dark, showing that his trains obstructed the road for fifteen miles during the day and a great part of the night. At daylight Hood pursued the enemy so rapidly as to compel him to burn a number of his wagons. On the hills about four miles south of Franklin, he made demonstration as if to give battle, but, when our forces deployed for the attack, he retired to Franklin.

From dispatches captured at Spring Hill, Hood learned that Schofield was instructed by Thomas to hold that position until Franklin could be made secure, and thus knew that it was important to attack Schofield promptly, and concluded that, if he should escape at Franklin, he would gain the fortifications about Nashville. Hood reports that "the nature of the position was such as to render it inexpedient to attempt any other flank movement, and I therefore determined to attack him in front and without delay."

As this was one of the bloodiest battles of the war, and its results materially affected the future, before entering on an account of it, I pause for some general reflections. It is not quite easy to determine what my gallant friend Hood meant by the expression, "the nature of the position." It may have referred to the probability that the enemy, if he attempted a flank movement, would retreat rapidly, as he had done from Columbia, and it is now known that a part of his troops and a large part of his train had already been sent across the Harpeth River. Thomas's dispatch indicated a purpose to hold Franklin; and its relation to Murfreesboro, where a garrison was maintained, would seem to render this a probable part of a plan to maintain communication with Chattanooga. Franklin had to us, as a mere _military_ question, no other value than that the road to Nashville led through it. Whether it would have been possible to turn the position so promptly as to strike the enemy's line of retreat is a question which no doubt General Hood considered and decided in the negative, otherwise he would surely have preferred to attack the enemy on the march rather than in his intrenchments, especially as these were so near to the town that Hood was restrained from using his artillery on account of the women and children resident in it.

The position itself was favorable for defense; the Harpeth River by a short bend flows on two sides of the town, and the works in front had the center so boldly salient, their flanks resting on the river, as to inclose the town in something like a square, two sides being river and two sides intrenchment. The exterior line of defense had been recently and hastily constructed; the interior line was much stronger. Behind the town there were two bridges, one on the main road leading through it, and the other a pontoon-bridge a short distance above it. Hood had served with distinction under Lee and Jackson, and his tactics were of that school. If he had, by an impetuous attack, crushed Schofield's army, without too great a loss to his own, and Forrest could have executed his orders to capture the trains when Schofield's army was crushed, we should never have heard complaint because Hood attacked at Franklin, and these were the hopes with which he made his a.s.sault.

On the 30th of November he formed his line of battle. At 4 P.M. he gave the order to advance; his troops moved gallantly forward, carried the first line, and advanced against the interior works; here the engagement was close and fierce; the combatants occupied the opposite sides of the intrenchments, our men carrying them in some places, many being killed entirely inside the enemy's works. Some of the Tennesseeans, after years of absence, saw again their homes, and strove with desperation to expel the invader from them; the contest continued till near midnight, when the enemy abandoned his works and crossed the river, leaving his dead and wounded behind him, We had won a victory, but it was purchased at fearful cost. General Hood, in his letter of December 11, 1864, written near Nashville, reported his entire loss at about four thousand five hundred, and among them was Major-General Cleburne, Brigadier-Generals Gist, John Adams, Strahl, and Granberry, all well known to fame, and whose loss we could ill afford to bear. Around Cleburne thickly lay the gallant men who, in his desperate a.s.sault, followed him with the implicit confidence that in another army was given to Stonewall Jackson; and in the one case, as in the other, a vacancy was created which could never be filled.

Hood reported that the number of dead left on the field by the enemy indicated that his loss was equal to or near our own; that those of our men who were captured were inside the enemy's works.

The next morning at daylight, the wounded being cared for and the dead buried, Hood moved forward toward Nashville, about eighteen miles distant, and Forrest with his cavalry closely pursued the enemy. On the 2d of December our army took position in front of Nashville about two miles from the city, Lieutenant-General Lee's corps in the center resting on the Franklin turnpike, Cheatham's on the right, Stewart's on the left, and the cavalry on each flank. Hood then commenced to construct detached works to cover the flanks, should offensive movements be attempted against our flank and rear.

The enemy still held Murfreesboro with a garrison of about six thousand, strongly fortified; he also had small forces at Chattanooga and Knoxville. It was supposed that he would soon have to take the offensive to relieve his garrisons at those points, or cause them to be evacuated, in which latter case Hood hoped to capture the forces at Murfreesboro, and thus open communication with Georgia and Virginia; and he thought, if attacked in position, that he could defeat Thomas, gain possession of Nashville with its abundant supplies, and thus get the control of Tennessee. The people of the country, in the mean time, were able and willing to furnish our army with supplies, and we had captured rolling-stock to put the railroad to Pulaski in successful operation.

Hood sent Major-General Forrest with the greater part of his cavalry and a division of infantry against Murfreesboro. The infantry did not fulfill expectation, and it was withdrawn. Mercer's and Palmer's brigades of infantry were sent to replace the division. Nothing of importance occurred until the morning of the 15th, and the enemy, having been reenforced by about fifteen thousand men from the trans-Mississippi, attacked simultaneously both flanks of our line.

On our right he was repulsed with heavy loss; but on our left, toward evening, he earned some of the partially completed redoubts. During the night of the 15th our line was shortened and strengthened, the left being thrown back and dispositions made to meet any renewed attack. The corps of Major-General Cheatham was transferred from our right to the left. Early on the 16th of December the enemy made a general attack on our lines, accompanied by a heavy fire of artillery. All his a.s.saults were repulsed with heavy loss until 3.30 P.M., when a portion of our line to the left of the center suddenly gave way. Up to this time no battle ever progressed more favorably-- the troops in excellent spirits, waving their colors and bidding defiance to the enemy; but the position he then gained being such as to enfilade us, caused our entire line to give way in a few moments and our troops to retreat in the direction of Franklin, most of them in great confusion. Confidence in the ability to hold the line had caused the artillery-horses to be sent to the rear for safety, and the abandonment of the position was so unexpected and sudden that it was not possible to bring forward the horses to remove the guns which had been placed in position, and fifty-four of them were consequently lost. Our loss in killed and wounded was small. At Brentwood, about four miles from the field of battle, the troops were partially rallied, and Lieutenant-General S. D, Lee took command of the rear-guard and encamped for the night. On leaving the field, Hood sent one of his staff-officers to inform General Forrest of our defeat, and to direct him to rejoin the army with as little delay as possible, but heavy rains had so swollen the creeks that he was unable to effect the junction with his main force until it reached Columbia. During the 17th the enemy's cavalry pressed boldly on the retreating column, the open character of the country being favorable to cavalry operations. Lieutenant-General Lee, commanding the covering force, was severely wounded, but not until after he and the corps he commanded had rendered such service as to receive the special commendation of the General commanding the army.

Hood reports that when he left the field before Nashville he had hoped to be able to remain in Tennessee, on the line of Duck River; but, after arriving at Colombia, he became convinced that the condition of the army made it necessary to recross the Tennessee without delay. On the 21st he resumed his march for Pulaski, leaving Major-General Walthall, with five infantry brigades, and General Forrest, with the main body of his cavalry, at Columbia, to cover the movements of the army. The retreat continued, and on the 25th, 26th, and 27th, the army, including the rear-guard, crossed the Tennessee River at Bainbridge. The enemy had followed the rear-guard with all his cavalry and three corps of infantry to Pulaski, and thence the cavalry continued the pursuit to the Tennessee River. After crossing the river, the army moved by easy marches to Tupelo, Mississippi.

General Hood reported his losses in the Tennessee campaign to have been about ten thousand men, including prisoners, and that when he arrived at Tupelo he had 18,500 infantry and artillery, and 2,306 cavalry. I again quote from General Hood's report:

"Here, finding so much dissatisfaction throughout the country, as, in my judgment, greatly to impair, if not destroy, my usefulness, and counteract my exertions, and with no desire but to serve my country, I asked to be relieved, with the hope that another might be a.s.signed to the command who might do more than I could hope to accomplish.

Accordingly, I was so relieved on the 23d of January, by authority of the President."

Though, as General Hood states in his book, page 273, I was "averse to his going into Tennessee," he might well a.s.sume that I "was not, as General Beauregard and himself, acquainted with the true condition of the army" when they decided on the Tennessee campaign. Of the manner in which he conducted it, Isham G. Harris, the Governor of Tennessee, a man of whose judgment, integrity, and manhood I had the highest opinion, wrote to me, on the 25th of December, 1864:

"... I have been with General Hood from the beginning of this campaign, and beg to say, disastrous as it has ended, I am not able to see anything that General Hood has done that he should not, or neglected any thing that he should, have done, ... and regret to say that, if all had performed their parts as well as he, the results would have been very different."

To this I will only add that General Hood was relieved at his reiterated request, made from such creditable motives as are expressed in the extract above, taken from his official report, and that it was in no wise due to a want of confidence in him on my part.

[Footnote 105: It was during this time, i. e.. in March and April, 1864, that Forrest made his extraordinary expedition from north Mississippi across Tennessee to Paducah, Kentucky, and continued his operations against depots of supplies, lines of communication, and troops moving to reenforce Sherman--having, on June 11th, a severe action in Tishemingo with a force estimated at eight or nine thousand, supposed to be on their way to join Sherman. The energy, strategy, and high purposes of Forrest, during all this period, certainly ent.i.tle him to higher military rank than that of a partisan, and enroll him in the list of great cavalry commanders. Some of his other expeditions are elsewhere mentioned in these pages.]

[Footnote 106: "Narrative," p. 302.]

[Footnote 107: "Advance and Retreat," by J. B. Hood, pp. 98-116.]

[Footnote 108: Johnston's "Narrative," p. 346.]

[Footnote 109: Mr. Seddon, ex-Secretary of War, in a letter written to me on the 10th of February, 1879, states, in regard to his interview with General Lee, that it was held after the determination had been made "to remove General Johnston from his command at Atlanta," and says of the purpose of the interview with General Lee: "It was designed merely to secure General Lee's estimate of qualifications in the selection of a successor for the command."]

[Footnote 110: Mayor Calhoun's Pet.i.tion to General Sherman, September 11, 1864.]

[Footnote 111: "Advance and Retreat," by General J. B. Hood; letter of General Beauregard to President Davis, p. 278, _et seq_.]

CHAPTER XLIX.

Exchange of Prisoners.--Signification of the Word "loyal."--Who is the Sovereign?--Words of President Lincoln.--The Issue for which we fought.--Position of the United States Government.--Letters of Marque granted by us.--Officers and Crew First Prisoners of the Enemy.--Convicted as "Pirates."--My Letter to President Lincoln.-- How received.--Act of Congress relating to Prisoners.--Exchanges, how made.-Answer of General Grant.--Request of United States Congress.--Result.--Commissioners sent.--Agreement.--Disputed Points.--Exchange arranged.--Order to pillage issued.--General Pope's Order.--Proceedings.--Letter of General Lee relative to Barbarities.--Answer of General Halleck.--Case of Mumford.--Effect of Threatened Retaliation.--Mission of Vice-President Stephens.--A Failure.--Excess of Prisoners.--Paroled Men.--Proposition made by us.--No Answer.--Another Arrangement.--Stopped by General Grant.-- His words, "Put the Matter offensively."--Exchange of Slaves.-- Proposition of Lee to Grant.--Reply of Grant.--Further Reply.--His Dispatch to General Butler.--Another Proposition made by us.--No Answer.--Proposition relative to Sick and Wounded.--Some exchanged.--The Worst Cases asked for to be photographed.-- Proposition as to Medicines.--No Answer.--A Final Effort.-- Deputation of Prisoners sent to Was.h.i.+ngton.--A Failure.-- Correspondence between Ould and Butler.--Order of Grant.--Report of Butler.--Responsibility of Grant for Andersonville.--Barbarities of the United States Government.--Treatment of our Men in Northern Prisons.--Deaths on Each Side.

Perhaps there was no question in the treatment of which the true character and intentions of the Government of the United States was so clearly exposed as in the exchange of prisoners. That we should dare to resort to arms for the preservation of our rights, and "to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity," was regarded by our enemies as most improbable. Their aspirations for dominion and sovereignty, through the Government of the Union, had become so deep-seated and apparently real as to cause that Government, at its first step, to a.s.sume the haughtiness and imperiousness of an absolute sovereign. "I appeal to all loyal citizens to favor, facilitate, and aid this effort," said President Lincoln, in the first proclamation, calling for seventy-five thousand men. The term "loyal" has no signification except as applied to the sovereign of an empire or kingdom. In a republic the people are the sovereign, and the term "loyal" or its opposite can have no signification except in relation to the true sovereign. To say, therefore, that the agent of the sovereign people, the representative of the system they have organized to conduct their common affairs, composed the real sovereign, and that loyalty or disloyalty is of signification in relation to this sovereign alone, is not only a perversion of language, but an error, that leads straight to the subversion of all popular government and the establishment of the monarchical or consolidated form. The Government of the United States is now the sovereign here, says President Lincoln in this proclamation, and loyalty consists in the maintenance of that sovereignty against all its foes. The sovereignty of the people and of the several and distinct States, in his mind, was only a weakness and enthusiasm of the fathers. The States and the people thereof had become consolidated into a national Union. "I appeal," says President Lincoln, "to all loyal citizens to favor, facilitate, and aid this effort to maintain the honor, the integrity, and the existence of our national Union."

The Confederate States refused thus "to favor, facilitate, and aid this effort to maintain the honor, the integrity, and the existence of a national Union." They not only refused to aid, but they took up arms to defeat the consummation of such a monstrous usurpation of popular rights and popular sovereignty. It was evident that, if no efforts for a rescue were made, the time would soon come when the rights of all the States might be denied, and the hope of mankind in const.i.tutional freedom be for ever lost. This was the usurpation.

This lay at the foundation of the war. Every subsequent act of the Government was another step in the same direction, all tending palpably to supremacy for the Government of the United States, the subjugation of the States, and the submission of the people.

This was the adversary with whom we had to struggle, and this was the issue for which we fought. That we dared to draw our swords to vindicate the rights and the sovereignty of the people, that we dared to resist and deny all sovereignty as inherently existing in the Government of the United States, was adjudged an infamous crime, and we were denounced as "rebels." It was a.s.serted that those of us "who were captured should be hung as rebels taken in the act." Crus.h.i.+ng the corner-stone of the Union, the independence of the States, the Federal Government a.s.sumed toward us a position of haughty arrogance, refused to recognize us otherwise than as insurrectionists and "rebels," who resisted and denied its usurped sovereignty, and who were ent.i.tled to no amelioration from the punishment of death, except such as might proceed only from the promptings of mercy.

On April 17, 1861, I issued a proclamation in which I offered to grant letters of marque and reprisal to seamen. On April 19th President Lincoln issued a counter-proclamation, declaring that, "if any person, under the pretended authority of said States, or under any other pretense, shall molest a vessel of the United States, or the persons or cargo on board of her, such person shall be held amenable to the laws of the United States for the prevention and punishment of piracy," which was death.

Some small vessels obtained these letters of marque and were captured. Their officers and crew const.i.tuted the first prisoners that fell into the hands of the enemy. They were immediately imprisoned, and held for trial as pirates. The trial came on later in the year. A report of it states that "the views of all the judges seemed to center upon the one point, that these men were taken in arms against the Government of the United States, and that, inasmuch as the laws of that Government did not recognize the authority under which the men acted, there was no course but to condemn them."

As soon as the treatment of these prisoners was known in Richmond, before their trial and as early as July 6, 1861, I sent by a special messenger a communication to President Lincoln, in substance as follows:

"Haying learned that the schooner Savannah, a private armed vessel in the service and sailing under a commission issued by the authority of the Confederate States of America, had been captured by one of the vessels forming the blockading squadron off Charleston Harbor, I directed a proposition to be made to the commanding officer of the squadron for an exchange of officers and crew of the Savannah for prisoners of war held by this Government, 'according to number and rank.' To this proposition, made on the 19th ultimo, Captain Mercer, the officer in command of the blockading squadron, made answer, on the same day, that 'the prisoners' (referred to) 'are not on board any of the vessels under my command.'