Grace, Actual and Habitual Part 14

If the rational creature were compelled to perform a sinful act, as act, resistance would be impossible. And if it were true that the malice of an act practically cannot be separated from its physical ent.i.ty, then in the Thomistic hypothesis G.o.d would be the author not only of the _ent.i.tas_ but likewise of the _malitia peccati_. The devil tempts us only by moral means, _i.e._ by suggestion; are we to a.s.sume that G.o.d tempts us physically by inducing sin as an act and simultaneously withholding the _praemotio ad bonum_, thus making sin an inevitable fatality? This consideration may be supplemented by another. So-called "sins of malice"

are comparatively rare. Most sins are committed for the sake of some pleasure or imaginary advantage. It is for this reason that moral theology in forbidding sin forbids its physical ent.i.ty. How gladly would not those who are addicted to impurity, for instance, separate the malice from the ent.i.ty of their sinful acts, in order to be enabled to indulge their pa.s.sion without offending G.o.d!

) Against the logic of this argument some Thomist theologians defend themselves by a simile. The soul of a lame man, they say, enables him indeed to move his disabled limb; however, the cause of limping is not the soul but a crooked s.h.i.+nbone. Father Pesch wittily disposes of such reasoning as follows: "The will of Adam before the fall was not a crooked s.h.i.+nbone, but it was absolutely straight, and became crooked through physical premotion."(742)

Another and more plausible contention of the Thomist school is that Molinism, too, is compelled to ascribe sin somehow to G.o.d. "It is impossible for a man to sin unless G.o.d lends His cooperation. Do not, therefore, the Molinists also make G.o.d the author of sin?" Those who argue in this wise overlook the fact that there is a very large distinction between the _concursus simultaneus_ of the Molinists and the _praemotio physica_ of the Thomists. The _praemotio physica_ predetermines the sinful act without regard to the circ.u.mstance whether or not the will is able to offer resistance. The _concursus simultaneus_, on the other hand, begins as a mere _concursus oblatus_, which is in itself indifferent and awaits as it were the free consent of the will before it cooperates with the sinner as _concursus collatus_ in the performance of the sinful act.(743) For this reason the distinction between _actus_ and _malitia_ has a well-defined place in the Molinistic system, whereas it is meaningless in that of the Thomists.(744)

2. AUGUSTINIANISM.-This system, so called because its defenders pretend to base it on the authority of St. Augustine, has some points of similarity with Thomism but differs from the latter in more than one respect, especially in this that the Augustinians,(745) though they speak with great deference of the _gratia per se efficax_, hold that the will is not physically but only morally predetermined in its free acts. Hence Augustinianism may fitly be described as the system of the _praedeterminatio moralis_. Its most eminent defender is Lawrence Berti, O. S. A. (1696-1766), who in a voluminous work _De Theologicis Disciplinis_(746) so vigorously championed the Augustinian theory that Archbishop Jean d'Yse de Saleon, of Vienne,(747) and other contemporary theologians combated his teaching as a revival of Jansenism. Pope Benedict XIV inst.i.tuted an official investigation, which resulted in a decree permitting Augustinianism to be freely held and taught.

a) Whereas Thomism begins with the concept of _causa prima_ and _motor primus_, Augustinianism is based on the notion of _delectatio coelestis_ or _caritas_. Berti holds three principles in common with Jansenius: (1) Actual grace consists essentially in the infusion of celestial delectation. (2) This heavenly delectation (_i.e._ grace) causally precedes free-will in such wise that its relative intensity in every instance const.i.tutes the law and standard of the will's disposition to do good.

(3) Simultaneously with this celestial delectation, concupiscence (_delectatio carnalis, concupiscentia_) is doing its work in fallen man, and the two powers constantly contend for the mastery. So long as celestial delectation (_i.e._ grace) is weaker than, or equipollent with, concupiscence, the will inevitably fails to perform the salutary act to which it is invited by the former. It is only when the _delectatio coelestis_ overcomes concupiscence (_delectatio coelestis victrix_) that free-will can perform the act inspired by grace. There is a fourth principle, and one, too, of fundamental importance, which brings out the essential difference between Augustinianism and Jansenism, _viz._: the _delectatio coelestis_ never overpowers the will but leaves it free to choose between good and evil.(748)

b) The relation between merely sufficient and efficacious grace in the Augustinian system, therefore, may be described as follows: Merely sufficient grace imparts to the will the _posse_ but not the _velle_, or at best only such a weak _velle_ that it requires the _delectatio victrix_ (_gratia efficax_) to become effective. Efficacious grace (_delectatio coelestis victrix_), on the other hand, impels the will actually to perform the good deed. Hence there is between the two an essential and specific difference, and the efficacy of that grace which leads to the performance of salutary acts does not lie with free-will but depends on the _delectatio coelestis_, which must consequently be conceived as _gratia efficax ab intrinseco sive per se_.(749)

c) Nevertheless, the necessity of the _gratia efficax ab __ intrinseco_, according to the Augustinian theory, is not due to the subordination of the _causa secunda_ to the _causa prima_, as the Thomists contend, but to a const.i.tutional weakness of human nature, consisting in this that its evil impulses can be overcome solely by the _delectatio coelestis victrix_ (_gratia efficax, adiutorium quo_. The case was different before the Fall, when the _gratia versatilis_ (_gratia sufficiens, adiutorium sine quo non_) sufficed for the performance of salutary acts.(750)

d) However, the Augustinians insist against the Jansenists, that the delectatio _coelestis_ (_i.e._ efficacious grace) does not intrinsically compel the will, but acts merely as a _praemotio moralis_, and that while the will obeys the inspiration of grace infallibly (_infallibiliter_) it does not do so necessarily (_non necessario_). With equal certainty, though not necessarily, the will, when equipped solely with sufficient grace, succ.u.mbs to concupiscence. The ultimate reason for the freedom of the will is to be found in the _indifferentia iudicii_.(751) By way of exemplification the Augustinians cite the case of a well-bred man who, though physically free and able to do so, would never turn summersaults on a public thoroughfare or gouge out his own eyes.

CRITICAL ESTIMATE OF AUGUSTINIANISM.-On account of its uncritical methods Augustinianism has found but few defenders and deserves notice only in so far as it claims to base its teaching on St. Augustine.

Like the Bible, the writings of that holy Doctor have been quoted in support of many contradictory systems.(752) If the use of Augustinian terms guaranteed the possession of Augustinian ideas, Jansenius would have a strong claim to be considered a faithful disciple of St. Augustine. Yet how widely does not the "Augustinus Iprensis," as he has been called, differ from the "Augustinus Hipponensis"! Augustinianism, too, utterly misconceives the terms which it employs. s.p.a.ce permits us to call attention to one or two points only.

a) In the first place Augustinianism labors under an absolutely false conception of sufficient grace.

How can that grace be sufficient for justification which is first described in glowing colors as _parva et invalida_ and then in the same breath is declared to be insufficient except when reinforced by a _gratia magna_ in the shape of _delectatio victrix_? What kind of "grace" can that be which in its very nature is so const.i.tuted that the will, under the prevailing influence of concupiscence, infallibly does the opposite of that to which it is supernaturally impelled? It is quite true that the distinction between _gratia parva_ and _gratia magna_(753) is found in St.

Augustine. However, he understands by _gratia parva_ not sufficient grace, but the grace of prayer (_gratia remote sufficiens_), and by _gratia magna_, not efficacious grace as such, but grace sufficient to perform a good act (_gratia proxime sufficiens_).(754)

b) Augustinianism is unable to reconcile its theory of a _praemotio moralis_ with the dogma of free-will.

Under the Augustinian system the influence of efficacious grace can be conceived in but two ways. Either it is so strong that the will is physically unable to withhold its consent; or it is only strong enough that the consent of the will can be inferred with purely moral certainty.

In the former alternative we have a prevenient necessity which determines the will _ad unum_ and consequently destroys its freedom. In the latter, there can be no infallible foreknowledge of the future free acts of rational creatures on the part of G.o.d, because the Augustinians reject the _scientia media_ of the Molinists and expressly admit that the same grace which proves effective in one man remains ineffective in another because of the condition of his heart.(755)

c) Finally, the three fundamental principles of the Augustinian system are false and have no warrant in the writings of St. Augustine.

It is not true that pleasure (_delectatio_) is the font and well-spring of all supernaturally good deeds. Such deeds may also be inspired by hatred, fear, sorrow, etc.(756) With many men the fear of G.o.d or a sense of duty is as strong an incentive to do good as the sweet consciousness of treading the right path. St. Augustine did not regard "celestial delectation" as the essential mark of efficacious grace, nor concupiscence as the characteristic note of sin.(757)

The second and third principles of the Augustinian system are likewise false. If delectation is only one motive among many, its varying intensity cannot be the standard of our conduct; and still less can it be said that the will is morally compelled in each instance to obey the relatively stronger as against the weaker delectation; for any necessitation that does not depend on the free will excludes the _libertas a coactione_, but not that _libertas a necessitate_ which const.i.tutes the notion of liberty.

There can be no freedom of the will unless the will is able to resist delectation at all times. Consequently, the fourth principle of the Augustinians, by which they pretend to uphold free-will, is also false.(758)

READINGS:-The literature on the different systems of grace is enormous. We can mention only a few of the leading works.

On the Thomist side: *Banez, O. P., _Comment. in S. Theol. S.

Thom._, Salamanca 1584 sqq.-*Alvarez, O. P., _De Auxiliis Gratiae et Humani Arbitrii Viribus_, Rome 1610.-IDEM, _Responsionum Libri Quatuor_, Louvain 1622.-Ledesma, O. P., _De Divinae Gratiae Auxiliis_, Salamanca 1611.-*Gonet, O. P., _Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae_, 16 vols., Bordeaux 1659-69.-Contenson, O. P., _Theologia Mentis et Cordis_, Lyons 1673.-De Lemos, O. P., _Panoplia Divinae Gratiae_, 4 vols., Liege 1676.-Goudin, O. P., _De Scientia et Voluntate Dei_, new ed., Louvain 1874.-*Gotti, O.

P., _Theologia Scholastico-Dogmatica iuxta Mentem __ Divi Thomae_, Venice 1750.-Gazzaniga, O. P., _Theologia Dogmatica in Systema Redacta_, 2 vols., Vienne 1776.-*Billuart, _De Gratia_, diss. 5 (ed. Lequette, t. III, pp. 123 sqq.).-IDEM, _Le Thomisme Triomphant_, Paris 1725.-*Fr. G. Feldner, O. P., _Die Lehre des hl. Thomas uber die Willensfreiheit_, Prague 1890.-IDEM, in Commer's _Jahrbuch fur Philosophie und spekulative Theologie_, 1894 sqq.-*Dummermuth, O. P., _S. Thomas et Doctrina Praemotionis Physicae_, Paris 1886.-I. A. Manser, _Possibilitas Praemotionis Physicae Thomisticae_, Fribourg (Switzerland) 1895.-Joh. Ude, _Doctrina Capreoli de Influxu Dei in Actus Voluntatis Humanae_, Graz 1905.-Del Prado, _De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio_, 3 vols., Fribourg (Switzerland) 1907.-P. Garrigou-Lagrange, _S. Thomas et le Neomolinisme_, Paris 1917.

On the Augustinian side: Card. Norisius, _Vindiciae Augustinianae,_ Padua 1677.-*Berti, _De Theologicis Disciplinis_, 8 vols., Rome 1739 sqq.-Bellelli, _Mens Augustini de Modo Reparationis Humanae Naturae_, 2 vols., Rome 1773.-L. de Thoma.s.sin, _Memoires sur la Grace, etc._, Louvain 1668.

For a list of Molinistic and Congruistic authors see pp. 269 sq.

Article 2. Molinism And Congruism

The point in which these two systems meet, and in regard to which they differ from Thomism and Augustinianism, is the definition of efficacious grace as _efficax ab extrinseco sive per accidens_.

This conception was violently attacked by the Spanish Dominican Banez and other divines. About 1594, the controversy between the followers of Banez and the Molinists waxed so hot that Pope Clement VIII appointed a special commission to settle it. This was the famous _Congregatio de Auxiliis_, consisting of picked theologians from both the Dominican and the Jesuit orders. It debated the matter for nine full years without arriving at a decision. Finally Pope Paul V, at the suggestion of St. Francis de Sales, declared both systems to be orthodox and defensible, and strictly forbade the contending parties to denounce each other as heretical.(759)

While Thomism devoted its efforts mainly to the defense of grace, Molinism made it its chief business to champion the dogma of free-will.

1. MOLINISM.-Molinism takes its name from the Jesuit Luis de Molina, who published a famous treatise under the t.i.tle _Concordia Liberi Arbitrii c.u.m Gratiae Donis_ at Lisbon, in 1588. His teaching may be outlined as follows:

a) In _actu primo_ there is no intrinsic and ontological but merely an extrinsic and accidental distinction between efficacious and sufficient grace, based upon their respective effects. Sufficient grace becomes efficacious by the consent of the will; if the will resists, grace remains inefficacious (_inefficax_) and _merely_ sufficient (_gratia mere sufficiens_). Consequently, one and the same grace may be efficacious in one case and inefficacious in another. It all depends on the will.(760)

b) This theory involves no denial of the priority and superior dignity of grace in the work of salvation. The will, considered as a mere faculty, and _in actu primo_, is raised to the supernatural order by prevenient grace (_gratia praeveniens_), which imparts to it all the moral and physical power necessary to perform free salutary acts. Neither can the _actus secundus_ be regarded as a product of the unaided will; it is the result of grace cooperating with free-will.(761) Consequently, the will by giving its consent does not increase the power of grace, but it is grace which makes possible, prepares, and aids the will in performing free acts.

To say that the influence of grace goes farther than this would be to a.s.sert that it acts independently of the will, and would thereby deny the freedom of the latter.(762)

c) The infallibility with which efficacious grace works its effects is to be explained not by G.o.d's absolute will, but by His infallible foreknowledge through the _scientia media_,-a Molinistic postulate which was first defined and scientifically demonstrated by Father Fonseca, S.

J., the teacher of Suarez.(763) G.o.d foreknows not only the absolutely free acts (_futura_) of His rational creatures by the _scientia visionis_, but likewise their hypothetically free acts (_futuribilia_) by means of the _scientia media_, and hence He infallibly knows from all eternity what att.i.tude the free-will of man would a.s.sume in each case if grace were given him. Consequently, when G.o.d, in the light of this eternal foreknowledge, actually bestows a grace, this grace will prove efficacious or inefficacious according as He has foreknown whether the will will give or withhold its consent. Thus can the infallibility of efficacious grace be reconciled with the dogma of free-will without prejudice to such other dogmas as final perseverance and the predestination of the elect, because G.o.d by virtue of the _scientia media_ has it absolutely in His power to give or withhold His graces in each individual case.(764)

CRITICAL ESTIMATE OF MOLINISM.-Even the most determined opponents of Molinism admit that this system possesses three important advantages.

a) First, it gives a satisfactory account of the sufficiency of "merely sufficient grace," which in its physical nature does not differ essentially from efficacious grace.

Second, Molinism safeguards free-will by denying that efficacious grace either physically or morally predetermines the will to one course of action.

Third, Molinism explains in a fairly satisfactory manner why efficacious grace is infallibly efficacious. G.o.d in virtue of the _scientia media_ knows with metaphysical certainty from all eternity which graces in each individual case will prove efficacious through the free consent of the will and which will remain inefficacious, and is thereby enabled to bestow or withhold grace according to His absolute decrees.

b) The question may justly be raised, however, whether, in endeavoring to safeguard freewill, the Molinists do not undervalue grace, which is after all the primary and decisive factor in the work of salvation.

There is something incongruous in the notion that the efficacy or inefficacy of divine grace should depend on the arbitrary pleasure of a created will. If sufficient grace does not become efficacious except by the consent of the will, how can the resultant salutary act be said to be an effect of grace? St. Paul, St. Augustine, and the councils of the Church do not say: "_Deus facit, si volumus_," but they declare: "_Deus facit, ut faciamus_," "_Deus ipse dat ipsum velle et facere et perficere_," and so forth. What can this mean if not: Divine grace need not concern itself with external circ.u.mstances, occasions, humors, etc., but it takes hold of the sinner and actually converts him, without regard to anything except the decree of the Divine Will. On account of this and similar difficulties Cardinal Bellarmine, who was a champion and protector of P. Molina, seems to have rejected Molinism(765) in favor of Congruism.(766)

c) The same reasons that induced Bellarmine to embrace Congruism probably led the Jesuit General Claudius Aquaviva, in 1613, to order all teachers of theology in the Society to lay greater emphasis on the Congruistic element in the notion of efficacious grace. This measure was quite in harmony with the principles defended by the Jesuit members of the _Congregatio de Auxiliis_ before Clement VIII and Paul V. Aquaviva's order is of sufficient importance to deserve a place in the text of this volume: "_Nostri in posterum omnino doceant, inter eam gratiam quae effectum re ipsa habet atque efficax dicitur, et eam quam sufficientem nominant, non tantum discrimen esse in actu secundo, quia ex usu liberi arbitrii etiam cooperantem gratiam habentis effectum sortiatur, altera non item; sed in ipso actu primo, quod posita scientia conditionalium [scientia media] ex efficaci Dei proposito atque intentione efficiendi certissime in n.o.bis boni, de industria ipse ea media seligit atque eo modo et tempore confert, quo videt effectum, infallibiliter habitura, aliis usurus, si haec inefficacia praevidisset. Quare semper moraliter et in ratione beneficii plus aliquid in efficaci, quam in sufficienti gratia est, in actu primo contineri: atque hac ratione efficere Deum, ut re ipsa faciamus, non tantum quia dat gratiam qua facere possimus. Quod idem dicendum est de perseverantia, quae procul dubio donum est._" This modified, or perhaps we had better say, more sharply determined form of Molinism is called Congruism.(767)

2. CONGRUISM.-The system thus recommended by Aquaviva in its fundamental principles really originated with Molina himself. It was developed by the great Jesuit theologians Suarez, Vasquez, and Lessius, and became the official system of the Society of Jesus under Muzio Vitelleschi (d. 1645) and Piccolomini (d. 1651).

a) The distinction between _gratia congrua_ and _gratia incongrua_ is founded on the writings of St. Augustine, who speaks of the elect as "_congruenter vocati_."(768) The Congruists maintain against the extreme Molinists that the efficacy of grace is not attributable solely to a free determination of the will, but, at least in part, to the fact that grace is bestowed under circ.u.mstances favorable to its operation, _i.e._ "congruous" in that sense. When the circ.u.mstances are comparatively adverse (_incongrua_), grace remains merely sufficient. A prudent father who knows how to govern his children without physical force will speak the right word to each at the proper time. Similarly G.o.d adapts His grace, if it is to prove efficacious, to the circ.u.mstances of each individual case, thereby attaining His purpose without fail. Thus the reckless youth on the city streets needs more powerful graces than the pious nun in her secluded convent cell, because he is exposed to stronger temptations and his environment is unfavorable to religious influences. Since grace is conferred with a wise regard to temperament, character, inclinations, prejudices, time and place, there exists between it and free-will a sort of intrinsic affinity, which in the hands of G.o.d becomes an infallible means of executing His decrees.(769)

b) The actual bestowal of congruous grace, considered _in actu primo_, is undoubtedly a special gift of G.o.d, and hence the _gratia congrua_ possesses a higher value than the _gratia incongrua sive inefficax_. An ent.i.tatively weaker impulse of grace, if conferred under comparatively favorable conditions, is more precious than a stronger impulse which fails in its purpose by reason of unfavorable circ.u.mstances created by inclination, training, or environment. Little David accomplished more with a handful of pebbles in his scrip than had he been heavily armed.(770)

c) Congruism a.s.signs a far more important role to grace than extreme Molinism. It makes the will depend on efficacious grace, not the efficacy of grace upon the will. Bellarmine ill.u.s.trates this difference by the example of a sermon which, under an entirely equal distribution of internal grace, converts one sinner while it leaves another untouched.(771)

CRITICAL ESTIMATE OF CONGRUISM.-Among the different systems devised for the purpose of harmonizing the dogmas of grace and free-will, Congruism probably comes nearest the truth. It strikes a golden mean between the two extremes of Pelagianism and Semipelagianism on the one hand, and Calvinism and Jansenism on the other, and its princ.i.p.al theses can be supported by clear and unmistakable pa.s.sages from the writings of St. Augustine.

a) Other points in its favor are the following: "Sufficient grace," in the Congruist hypothesis, is truly sufficient so far as G.o.d is concerned, because its inefficaciousness is attributable solely to the human will.

That free-will is properly safeguarded under the influence of efficacious grace (_gratia congrua_) is admitted even by theologians of the opposing schools. True, Congruism does not regard the will as an abstract notion, but as a factor closely interwoven with the concrete circ.u.mstances of daily life. As favorable circ.u.mstances (education, a.s.sociation, temperament) merely influence the will but do not compel it, so supernatural grace (_gratia congrua s. efficax_) may soften the will and occasionally even break down its resistance, but (rare cases excepted)(772) will never compel it to do good. Congruism marks a distinct advance over extreme Molinism also in this, that it bases the difference between _gratia efficax_ (_congrua_) and _gratia inefficax_ not entirely on the will of man, but likewise on the will of G.o.d, whereby it is able to explain such formulas as "_Deus facit, ut faciamus_," "_Deus est, qui discernit_," _etc._, in a manner entirely compatible with the dogmatic teaching of the Church.(773)

The _modus operandi_ of the _gratia congrua_ (efficacious grace) is explained by Congruism, in common with Molinism, as follows: There is a threefold efficacy: the efficacy of power (_efficacia virtutis_), the efficacy of union (_efficacia connexionis_), and the efficacy of infallible success (_efficacia infallibilitatis_). Grace (both efficacious and sufficient) does not derive its _efficacia virtutis_ from the free-will of man, nor from the knowledge of G.o.d (_scientia media_), but from itself. The _efficacia connexionis_ (of union between act and grace) on the other hand, depends entirely on the free-will, since, according to the Council of Trent as well as that of the Vatican, efficacious grace does not operate irresistibly but can be "cast off." The _efficacia infallibilitatis_ springs from G.o.d's certain foreknowledge (_scientia media_), which cannot be deceived.(774)