Great Britain and the American Civil War Part 50

Lindsay wrote Mason that he retained members.h.i.+p only to prevent a break up of the a.s.sociation and had at last succeeded in securing a meeting of the Executive Committee when his proposed parliamentary resolution would be considered. The Manchester a.s.sociation was much more alert and ready to support him. "The question is quite ripe _for fresh agitation_ and from experience I find that that agitation _must_ be started by a debate in Parliament. No notice is taken of lectures or speeches in the provinces[1175]."

Before any move was made in Parliament letters to the newspapers began anew to urge that the Ministry should be pressed to offer mediation in America. They met with little favourable response. The _Times_, at the very end of Lindsay's effort, explained its indifference, and recited the situation of October-November, 1862, stating that the question had then been decided once for all. It declared that Great Britain had "no moral right to interfere" and added that to attempt to do so would result in filling "the North with the same spirit of patriotism and defiance as animated the invaded Confederates[1176]." Thus support to Lindsay was lacking in a hoped-for quarter, but his conferences with a.s.sociation members had brought a plan of modified action the essential feature of which was that the parliamentary motion must not be made a _party_ one and that the only hope of the South lay in the existing Government. This was decidedly Lindsay's own view though it was clearly understood that the opportuneness of the motion lay in ministerial desire for and need of support in its Danish policy. Lindsay expected to find Palmerston more complaisant than formerly as regards American policy and was not disappointed. He wrote to Mason on May 27:

"I received in due course your note of the 23rd. In a matter of so much importance I shall make no move in the House in regard to American affairs without grave consideration. I am therefore privately consulting the friends of the South. On this subject we had a meeting of our lifeless a.s.sociation on Monday last and on the same subject we are to have another meeting next Monday; but differences of opinion exist there as well as elsewhere, as to the advisability of moving at present. Some say 'move'--others, 'postpone'--but the news by the _Scotia_ to-morrow will regulate to a considerable extent our course of action. One thing is now clear to me that the motion must _not_ be a party one, and that the main point will be to get the Government to go with _whoever_ brings forward the motion, for as you are aware I would rather see the motion in other hands than mine, as my views on the American question are so well known. As no competent member however seems disposed to move or rather to incur the responsibility, I sent to inquire if it would be agreeable to Lord Palmerston to see me on American affairs and on the subject of a motion to be brought forward in the House. He sent word that he would be very glad to see me, and I had, therefore, a long meeting with him alone last night, the result of which was that if I brought forward a motion somewhat as follows, on the third of June, he would likely be prepared _to accept it_, though he asked if I would see him again after the _Scotia_ arrived. The motion we talked about was to this _effect_--'That the House of Commons deeply regretting the great loss of life and the sufferings of the people of the United States and the Confederate States of North America by the continuance of the war which has been so long waged between them, trust that Her Majesty's Government will avail itself of the earliest opportunity of mediating in conjunction with the other powers of Europe to bring about a cessation of hostilities.'"

Lindsay had suggested to Palmerston that it was desirable for Mason to return to England and have a conference with the Premier. To this Palmerston gave a ready consent but, of course, no invitation. Lindsay strongly urged Mason to come over:

_I think much good will follow your meeting Lord Palmerston.

It will lead to other meetings_; and besides in other matters I think if you came here, you might _at present_ prove of much service to the South[1177]."

Meanwhile the difference within the Southern Independence a.s.sociation permitted the coming forward of a minor London organization called _The Society for Promoting the Cessation of Hostilities in America_. A letter was addressed by it to Members of Parliament urging that the time had come for action:

"215 _Regent Street, London, W.

May 28th_, 1864.

"SIR,

"The Society which has the honour to present to you the accompanying pamphlet, begs to state that there now exists in Great Britain and Ireland a strong desire to see steps taken by the Government of this country in concert with other Powers, to bring about peace on a durable basis between the belligerents in North America.

"I am directed by the Committee to express a hope that you will, before the Session closes, support a motion in Parliament to this effect; and should you desire to see evidence of the feeling of a large portion of the country in this matter, I shall be most happy to lay it before you[1178]."

Whether Lindsay, vexed with the delays of the a.s.sociation, had stirred the Society to action, is not clear, but the date of this letter, following on the day after the interview with Palmerston, is suggestive.

The pressure put on Mason to come to London was not at first successful.

Mason had become fixed in the opinion, arrived at in the previous fall, that there was no favour to be expected from Palmerston or Russell and that the only hope rested in their overthrow. Against this idea Lindsay had now taken definite ground. Moreover, Mason had been instructed to shake the dust of England from off his shoes with no official authority to return. Carefully explaining this last point to Lindsay he declined to hold an interview with Palmerston, except on the latter's invitation, or at least suggestion:

"Had the suggestion you make of an interview and conversation with Lord Palmerston originated with his Lords.h.i.+p I might not have felt myself prohibited by my instructions from at once acceding to it, but as it has the form only of his a.s.sent to a proposition from you I must with all respect decline it.

"Although no longer accredited by my Government as Special Commissioner to Great Britain, I am yet in Europe with full powers, and therefore, had Lord Palmerston expressed a desire to see me as his own act (of course unofficially, and even without any reason a.s.signed for the interview) I should have had great pleasure in complying with his request[1179]."

The explanation of disinclination to come was lengthy, but the last paragraph indicated an itching to be active in London again. Lindsay renewed his urgings and was not only hopeful but elated over the seeming success of his overtures to the Government. He had again seen Palmerston and had now pushed his proposal beyond the timid suggestion of overtures when the opportune moment should arrive to a definite suggestion of recognition of the Confederacy:

"I reasoned on the _moral_ effect of recognition, considering that the restoration of the Union, which was utterly hopeless, was the object which the North had in view, etc., etc. This reasoning appeared to produce a considerable effect, for he appears now to be very open to conviction. He again said that in his opinion the subjugation of the South could not be effected by the North, and he added that he thought the people of the North were becoming more and more alive to the fact every day."

Lindsay's next step was to be the securing of an interview with Russell and if he was found to be equally acquiescent all would be plain sailing:

"Now, if by strong reasoning in a quiet way, and by stern facts we can get Lord R. to my views, I think I may say that all difficulty so far as our Cabinet is concerned, _is at an end_. I hope to be able to see Lord Russell alone to-morrow.

He used to pay some little attention to any opinions I ventured to express to him, and I am _not_ without hope. I may add that I was as frank with Lord Palmerston as he has been pleased to be with me, and I told him at parting to-day, that my present intention was not to proceed with the Motion at least for 10 days or a fortnight, unless he was prepared to support me. He highly commended this course, and seemed much gratified with what I said. The fact is, _sub rosa_, it is clear to me that _no_ motion will be carried unless it is supported by the Government for it is clear that Lord Derby is resolved to leave the responsibility with the Executive, and therefore, _in the present state of matters_, it would seriously injure the cause of the South to bring forward any motion which would not be carried."

Lindsay then urges Mason to come at once to London.

"Now apart altogether from you seeing Lord Palmerston, I must earnestly entreat you to come here. Unless you are much wanted in Paris, your visit here, as a private gentleman, can do no harm, and _may, at the present moment, be of great service to your country_[1180]."

Palmerston's willingness to listen to suggestions of what would have amounted to a complete face-about of British policy on America, his "gratification" that Lindsay intended to postpone the parliamentary motion, his friendly courtesy to a man whom he had but recently rebuked for a meddlesome "amateur diplomacy," can be interpreted in no other light than an evidence of a desire to prevent Southern friends from joining in the attack, daily becoming more dangerous, on the Government's Danish policy. How much of this Lindsay understood is not clear; on the face of his letters to Mason he would seem to have been hoodwinked, but the more reasonable supposition is, perhaps, that much was hoped from the governmental necessity of not alienating supporters.

The Danish situation was to be used, but without an open threat. In addition the tone of the public press, for some time gloomy over Southern prospects, was now restored to the point of confidence and in this the _Times_ was again leading[1181]. The Society for Promoting the Cessation of Hostilities in America quickly issued another circular letter inviting Members of Parliament to join in a deputation to call on Palmerston to urge action on the lines of Lindsay's first overture.

Such a deputation would represent "more than 5,000 members and the feeling of probably more than twenty millions of people." It should not be a deputation "of parties" but representative of all groups in Parliament:

"The Society has reason to believe that the Premier is disposed to look favourably upon the attempt here contemplated and that the weight of an influential deputation would strengthen his hands[1182]."

This proposal from the Society was now lagging behind Lindsay's later objective--namely, direct recognition. That this was felt to be unfortunate is shown by a letter from Tremlett, Honorary Secretary of the Society, to Mason. He wrote that the _Southern Independence a.s.sociation_, finally stirred by Lindsay's insistence, had agreed to join the Society in a representation to Palmerston but had favoured some specific statement on recognition. Palmerston had sent word that he favoured the Society's resolution but not that of the a.s.sociation, and as a result the joint letter of the two organizations would be on the mild lines of Lindsay's original motion:

"Although this quite expresses the object of our Society, still I do not think the 'Independence a.s.sociation' ought to have 'ratted' from its principles. It ought not to have consented to ignore the question which it was inst.i.tuted to bring before Parliament--that of the Independence of the Confederacy--and more than that, the ambiguous ending of the resolution to be submitted is not such as I think ought to be allowed. You know the resolution and therefore I need only quote the obnoxious words 'That Her Majesty's Government will avail itself of the earliest opportunity of mediating, etc.'

"This is just leaving the Government where they have been all along. They have always professed to take 'the earliest opportunity' but of which they are to be the judges[1183]!"

Evidently there was confusion in the ranks and disagreement among the leaders of Southern friends. Adams, always cool in judgment of where lay the wind, wrote to Seward on this same day that Lindsay was delaying his motion until the receipt of favourable news upon which to spring it.

Even such news, Adams believed, would not alter British policy unless it should depict the "complete defeat and dispersion" of Northern forces[1184]. The day following the _Times_ reported Grant to be meeting fearful reverses in Virginia and professed to regard Sherman's easy advance toward Atlanta as but a trap set for the Northern army in the West[1185]. But in reality the gage of battle for Southern advantage in England was fixed upon a European, not an American, field. Mason understood this perfectly. He had yielded to Lindsay's insistence and had come to London. There he listened to Lindsay's account of the interview (now held) with Russell, and June 8 reported it to Slidell:

"Of his intercourse with Lord Russell he reports in substance that his Lords.h.i.+p was unusually gracious and seemed well disposed to go into conversation. Lord Russell agreed that the war on the part of the United States was hopeless and that neither could union be restored nor the South brought under the yoke.... In regard to Lindsay's motion Lord Russell said, that he could not _accept_ it, but if brought up for discussion his side would _speak_ favourably of it. That is to say they would commend it if they could not vote for it."

This referred to Lindsay's original motion of using the "earliest opportunity of mediation," and the pleasant reception given by Russell scarcely justified any great hope of decided benefit for the South. It must now have been fairly apparent to Lindsay, as it certainly was to Mason, that all this complaisance by Palmerston and Russell was but political manipulation to retain or to secure support in the coming contest with the Tories. The two old statesmen, wise in parliamentary management, were angling for every doubtful vote. Discussing with Lindsay the prospects for governmental action Mason now ventured to suggest that perhaps the best chances of success lay with the Tories, and found him unexpectedly in agreement:

"I told Lindsay (but for his ear only) that Mr. Hunter, editor of the _Herald_, had written to Hotze about his connection with Disraeli, and he said at once, that if the latter took it up in earnest, it could not be in better hands and would carry at the expense of the Ministry and that he would most cheerfully and eagerly yield him the _pas_.

Disraeli's accession, as you remember, was contingent upon our success in Virginia--and agreeing entirely with Lindsay that the movement could not be in better hands and as there were but 10 days before his motion could again come, I thought the better policy would be for the present that he should be silent and to await events[1186]."

Slidell was less sceptical than was Mason but agreed that it might best advantage the South to be rid of Russell:

"If Russell can be trusted, which to me is very doubtful, Lindsay's motion must succeed. Query, how would its being brought forward by Disraeli affect Russell's action--if he can be beaten on a fair issue it would be better for us perhaps than if it appeared to be carried with his qualified a.s.sent[1187]."

But Mason understood that Southern expectation of a change in British policy toward America must rest (and even then but doubtfully) on a change of Government. By June 29 his personal belief was that the Tory attack on the Danish question would be defeated and that this would "of course postpone Lindsay's projected motion[1188]." On June 25, the Danish Conference had ended and the Prussian war with Denmark was renewed. There was a general feeling of shame over Palmerston's bl.u.s.ter followed by a meek British inaction. The debate came on a vote of censure, July 8, in the course of which Derby characterized governmental policy as one of "meddle and muddle." The censure was carried in the Lords by nine votes, but was defeated in the Commons by a ministerial majority of eighteen. It was the sharpest political crisis of Palmerston's Ministry during the Civil War. Every supporting vote was needed[1189].

Not only had Lindsay's motion been postponed but the interview with Palmerston for which Mason had come to London had also been deferred in view of the parliamentary crisis. When finally held on July 14, it resolved itself into a proud and emphatic a.s.sertion by Mason that the South could not be conquered, that the North was nearly ready to acknowledge it and that the certainty of Lincoln's defeat in the coming Presidential election was proof of this. Palmerston appears to have said little.

"At the conclusion I said to him in reply to his remark, that he was gratified in making my acquaintance, that I felt obliged by his invitation to the interview, but that the obligation would be increased if I could take with me any expectation that the Government of Her Majesty was prepared to unite with France, in some act expressive of their sense that the war should come to an end. He said, that perhaps, as I was of opinion that the crisis was at hand, it might be better to wait until it had arrived. I told him that my opinion was that the crisis had pa.s.sed, at least so far as that the war of invasion would end with the campaign[1190]."

Reporting the interview to Slidell in much the same language, Mason wrote:

"My own impressions derived from the whole interview are, that [while] P. is as well satisfied as I am, that the separation of the States is final and the independence of the South an accomplished fact, the Ministry fears to move under the menaces of the North[1191]."

Slidell's comment was bitter:

"I am very much obliged for your account of your interview with Lord Palmerston. It resulted very much as I had antic.i.p.ated excepting that his Lords.h.i.+p appears to have said even less than I had supposed he would. However, the time has now arrived when it is comparatively of very little importance what Queen or Emperor may say or think about us. A plague, I say, on both your Houses[1192]."

Slidell's opinion from this time on was, indeed, that the South had nothing to expect from Europe until the North itself should acknowledge the independence of the Confederacy. July 21, _The Index_ expressed much the same view and was equally bitter. It quoted an item in the _Morning Herald_ of July 16, to the effect that Mason had secured an interview with Palmerston and that "the meeting was satisfactory to all parties":

"The withdrawal of Mr. Lindsay's motion was, it is said, the result of that interview, the Premier having given a sort of implied promise to support it at a more opportune moment; that is to say, when Grant and Sherman have been defeated, and the Confederacy stand in no need of recognition."

In the same issue _The Index_ described a deputation of clergymen, n.o.blemen, Members of Parliament "and other distinguished and influential gentlemen" who had waited upon Palmerston to urge mediation toward a cessation of hostilities in America. Thus at last the joint project of the Southern Independence a.s.sociation and of the Society for Promoting the Cessation of Hostilities in America had been put in execution _after_ the political storm had pa.s.sed and not before--when the deputation might have had some influence. But the fact was that no deputation, unless a purely party one, could have been collected before the conclusion of the Danish crisis. When finally a.s.sembled it "had no party complexion," and the smiling readiness with which it received Palmerston's jocular reply indicating that Britain's safest policy was to keep strictly to neutrality is evidence that even the deputation itself though hara.s.sed by Lindsay and others into making this demonstration, was quite content to let well enough alone. Not so _The Index_ which sneered at the childishness of Palmerston:

"... He proved incontestably to his visitors that, though he has been charged with forgetting the vigour of his prime, he can in old age remember the lessons of his childhood, by telling them that

They who in quarrels interpose Will often wipe a b.l.o.o.d.y nose (laughter)--

a quotation which, in the mouth of the Prime Minister of the British Empire, and on such an occasion, must be admitted as not altogether unworthy of Abraham Lincoln himself[1193]."

Spence took consolation in the fact that Mason had at last come into personal contact with Palmerston, "even now at his great age a charming contrast to that piece of small human pipe-clay, Lord Russell[1194]."

But the whole incident of Lindsay's excited efforts, Mason's journey to London and interview with Palmerston, and the deputation, left a bad taste in the mouth of the more determined friends of the South--of those who were Confederates rather than Englishmen. They felt that they had been deceived and toyed with by the Government. Mason's return to London was formally approved at Richmond but Benjamin wrote that the argument for recognition advanced to Palmerston had laid too much stress on the break-down of the North. All that was wanted was recognition which was due the South from the mere facts of the existing situation, and recognition, if accorded, would have at once ended the war without intervention in any form[1195]. Similarly _The Index_ stated that mediation was an English notion, not a Southern one. The South merely desired justice, that is, recognition[1196]. This was a bold front yet one not unwarranted by the military situation in midsummer of 1864, as reported in the press. Sherman's western campaign toward Atlanta had but just started and little was known of the strength of his army or of the powers of Southern resistance. This campaign was therefore regarded as of minor importance. It was on Grant's advance toward Richmond that British attention was fixed; Lee's stiff resistance, the great losses of the North in battle after battle and finally the settling down by Grant to besiege the Southern lines at Petersburg, in late June, 1864, seemed to indicate that once again an offensive in Virginia to "end the war"

was doomed to that failure which had marked the similar efforts of each of the three preceding years.

Southern efforts in England to alter British neutrality practically ended with Lindsay's proposed but undebated motion of June, 1864, but British confidence in Southern ability to defend herself indefinitely, a confidence somewhat shattered at the beginning of 1864--had renewed its strength by July. For the next six months this was to be the note harped upon in society, by organizations, and in the friendly press.