Spencer's Philosophy of Science Part 3

James, _Memories and Studies_, p. 134.

[53] I retain in this connexion the current term physico-chemical. It seems that the basal type of relatedness here is electrical. It may be said that when we come down to the atom the _things in_ relation are electrical, are electrons, are positive and negative charges. So be it.

But is it not the _electrical relatedness_ that is const.i.tutive of the atom as such?

[54] 'A large number of physical properties', says Nernst, 'have been shown to be clearly additive; that is, the value of the property in question can be calculated as though the compound were such a mixture of its elements that they experience no change in their properties.' But other properties are not additive. 'The kind of influence of the atom in a compound is primarily dependent on the mode of its union, that is, upon the const.i.tution and configuration of the compound. Such non-additive properties may be called const.i.tutive.' Quoted by E. G.

Spaulding in _The New Realism_, p. 238.

[55] _System of Logic_, vol. i, Bk. III, ch. vi.

[56] _Problems of Life and Mind_, Series II, p. 212.

[57] Of course if a particular physico-chemical change (_a_) is correlated with a particular physiological or vital change (_b_), then (_b_) implies (_a_) as (_a_) implies (_b_). The statement in the text refers to the implications of cla.s.ses of change. There may be physico-chemical relatedness without any correlated vital relatedness; but there does not appear to be any vital relatedness which is not correlated with physico-chemical relatedness.

[58] _Essays_, vol. iii, pp. 31, 55.

[59] Ps., vol. ii, p. 484.

[60] F. P., p. 178.

[61] An ordinal correlation is one that couples every term of a series (_a_) with a specific term of another series (_b_) and _vice versa_ in the same order in each. Cf. Spaulding in _The New Realism_, p. 175. I shall sometimes speak of such correlation as serial.

[62] _Principles of Biology_, Edition of 1898, pp. 117, 120.

[63] _Op. cit._, p. 122.

[64] Ps., vol. i, p. 208.

[65] F. P., p. 61. Cf. Ps., vol. i, p. 134.

[66] Ps., vol. i, p. 132. James well says 'Spencer broke new ground here in insisting that, since mind and its environment have evolved together, they must be studied together. He gave to the study of mind in isolation a definite quietus, and that certainly is a great thing to have achieved'. _Memories and Studies_, p. 140.

[67] Ps., vol. i, p. 206.

[68] Ps., vol. i, p. 124.

[69] F. P., p. 120. Ps., vol. ii, p. 472. Cf. Ps., vol. i, p. 98.

[70] The word underlying is used in the sense of occupying a lower position in the logical hierarchy above indicated. If any one likes to speak of the physico-chemical and the vital as two aspects of one process, he is free to do so. And if he likes to say that the vital is caused by the physico-chemical, let him do so; but he must define the exact sense in which he uses the ambiguous word cause. The word inner in the text means within the organism.

[71] See S. Alexander, 'On Relations: and in particular the Cognitive Relation.' _Mind._, vol. xxi, N. S., No. 83, p. 318.

[72] I have avoided the use of the word determine. It would be well to distinguish between that which is _determined_ from without, that is, conditioned, and that which is _determinate_, that is, grounded in the const.i.tution. I am here, I think, in line with Bosanquet. (See _Principle of Individuality and Value_, e. g. pp. 341, 352.) I have also avoided all reference to teleology. Without committing myself to the acceptance of all that Mr. Bosanquet says in the fourth lecture of the series to which reference has just been made, his treatment, there, appears to be on right lines. There is no opposition in teleology, so treated, to what is determinate. Indeed, such teleology is the expression of the logical structure of the world, or, as Spencer would say, the universality of law. For just as higher types of relatedness imply a substratum of physico-chemical processes, so do all events imply the underlying logic of events. Cf. W. T. Marvin, _A First Book of Metaphysics_, ch. xiii, 'On the logical strata of reality.'

[73] Cf. Ps., vol. i, pp. 99 and 140.

[74] _Problems of Philosophy_, ch. v; cf. _Proc. Aristotelian Soc._, 1910-11, p. 108.

[75] It should be distinctly understood that I here speak of one order of being in reference to the phenomena dealt with by science, including the cognitive phenomena discussed in the text. Whether we should speak of the Source of phenomena as const.i.tuting a separate order of being is a question I cannot discuss in a note. Does the logic of events imply a Logos? That is the question in brief. But, since the implication in question is not of the scientific kind, I may leave it on one side in considering a philosophy of science.

[76] Ps., vol. i, p. 140.

[77] F. P., p. 178.

[78] I have confined my attention to the cognitive type of relatedness.

Other higher modes supervene when the course of evolution is traced further upwards. Indeed, cognition is only part of the underlying basis implied by the richer forms of distinctively human relational life.

Spencer has much to say of them in his _Sociology_ and his _Ethics_, though he fails to realize that the phenomena he is dealing with involve essentially new const.i.tutive features in man and in society. Can music or any form of art be discussed in terms of cognition only? I merely add this note to show that I am not unaware of the patent fact that when we have reached the cognitive type of relatedness, we are nowhere near the top of the evolutional tree.

[79] The part which is the centre of awareness, may be spoken of as experienc_ing_, in contradistinction to what is experienc_ed_. It is clear that such experiencing is always correlative to what is experienced actually or ideally (Spencer's vividly or faintly). The centre of awareness is either the cortex, or some specific part of the cortex, or (more generally) the organism as owning the cortex, in each case in accordance with the universe of discourse.

[80] Few physicists would, I think, be prepared to deny that, within a field of effective relatedness, there may be, and very often is, guidance without work done or any change in the 'amount of energy'. What physicists are concerned to insist on is their cardinal principle that every physical change involves physical terms in physical relatedness.

This can be fully and freely accepted in accordance with the doctrine of implication sketched in the text. It is when Life or Consciousness is invoked to play the part of a non-physical term, or thing, which acts and reacts as if it were a physical term or thing, that physicists enter an emphatic protest. Cognitive relatedness among physical things may well be effective in guidance. To claim its presence must not, however, be regarded as in any sense equivalent to a denial of underlying physico-chemical relatedness.

[81] Until those who seek to furnish evidence of the existence of discarnate spirits can make some plausible suggestions as to the nature of a comprehensible scheme of correlation which shall serve to link the discarnate with the incarnate, one is forced to enter their results in a suspense account. It is of little use to proclaim the existence of 'facts scorned by orthodox science'. The so-called facts must be incorporated within a consistent scheme, before they can claim a place in the fabric of scientific truth.

[82] As the word ent.i.ty is now often used, for example by Mr. G. E.

Moore, cognitive relatedness may be termed an ent.i.ty. 'When I speak of an ent.i.ty I shall mean to imply absolutely nothing more with regard to that which I so call, than that it _is_ or _was_--that it is or was contained in the Universe; and of anything whatever which _is_ or _was_, I shall take the liberty to say that it is an ent.i.ty.' G. E. Moore, _Proc. Aristotelian Soc._, 1909-10, p. 36.

[83] I have no s.p.a.ce to discuss the physiological differentiation which is implied by the effectiveness of the cognitive relation. It involves, I believe, the differentiation of a superior cortical system from an inferior system of nervous arcs. I have dealt with it in some detail elsewhere. See _Instinct and Experience_.

[84] F. P., pp. 91-2.