From Isolation to Leadership, Revised Part 4

In view of the opposition which the whole scheme encountered in Congress, the instructions to the American delegates were very carefully drawn and their powers were strictly limited. They were cautioned against committing their government in any way to the establishment of "an amphictyonic council, invested with power fully to decide controversies between the American states or to regulate in any respect their conduct." They were also to oppose the formation of an offensive and defensive alliance between the American powers, for, as Mr. Clay pointed out, the Holy Alliance had abandoned all idea of a.s.sisting Spain in the reconquest of her late colonies. After referring to "the avoidance of foreign alliances as a leading maxim" of our foreign policy, Mr. Clay continued: "Without, therefore, a.s.serting that an exigency may not occur in which an alliance of the most intimate kind between the United States and the other American republics would be highly proper and expedient, it may be safely said that the occasion which would warrant a departure from that established maxim ought to be one of great urgency, and that none such is believed now to exist."

The British Government sent a special envoy to reside near the Congress and to place himself in frank and friendly communication with the delegates. Canning's private instructions to this envoy declared that, "Any project for putting the U. S. of North America at the head of an American Confederacy, as against Europe, would be highly displeasing to your Government. It would be felt as an ill return for the service which has been rendered to those States, and the dangers which have been averted from them, by the countenance and friends.h.i.+p, and public declarations of Great Britain; and it would probably, at no distant period, endanger the peace both of America and of Europe."

The Panama Congress was without practical results and it was more than half a century before the scheme for international cooperation on the part of American states was again taken up. In 1881 Secretary Blaine issued an invitation to the American republics to hold a conference at Was.h.i.+ngton, but the continuance of the war between Chile and Peru caused an indefinite postponement of the proposed conference. Toward the close of President Cleveland's first administration the invitation was renewed and the First International Conference of American States convened at Was.h.i.+ngton in 1890. It happened that when the Conference met Mr. Blaine was again Secretary of State and presided over its opening sessions. The most notable achievement of this Conference was the establishment of the Bureau of American Republics, now known as the Pan-American Union. The Second International Conference of American States, held in the City of Mexico in 1901, arranged for all American states to become parties to the Hague Convention of 1899 for the pacific settlement of international disputes and drafted a treaty for the compulsory arbitration, as between American states, of pecuniary claims. The Third Conference, held at Rio Janeiro in 1906, extended the above treaty for another period of five years and proposed that the subject of pecuniary claims be considered at the second Hague Conference. Added significance was given to the Rio Conference by the presence of Secretary Root who, although not a delegate, made it the occasion of a special mission to South America. The series of notable addresses which he delivered on this mission gave a new impetus to the Pan-American movement. The Fourth Conference, held at Buenos Ayres in 1910, was occupied largely with routine matters. It extended the pecuniary claims convention for an indefinite period.

The conferences above referred to were political or diplomatic in character. There have been held two Pan-American Scientific Congresses in which the United States partic.i.p.ated, one at Chile in 1908 and one at Was.h.i.+ngton, December, 1915, to January, 1916. A very important Pan-American Financial Congress was held at Was.h.i.+ngton in May, 1915.

These congresses have accomplished a great deal in the way of promoting friendly feeling as well as the advancement of science and commerce among the republics of the Western Hemisphere.

The American Inst.i.tute of International Law, organized at Was.h.i.+ngton in October, 1912, is a body which is likely to have great influence in promoting the peace and welfare of this hemisphere. The Inst.i.tute is composed of five representatives from the national society of international law in each of the twenty-one American republics. At a session held in the city of Was.h.i.+ngton, January 6, 1916, the Inst.i.tute adopted a Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Nations. This declaration, designed to give a solid legal basis to the new Pan-Americanism, was as follows:

I. Every nation has the right to exist and to protect and to conserve its existence; but this right neither implies the right nor justifies the act of the state to protect itself or to conserve its existence by the commission of unlawful acts against innocent and unoffending states.

II. Every nation has the right to independence in the sense that it has a right to the pursuit of happiness and is free to develop itself without interference or control from other states, provided that in so doing it does not interfere with or violate the rights of other states.

III. Every nation is in law and before law the equal of every other nation belonging to the society of nations, and all nations have the right to claim and, according to the Declaration of Independence of the United States, "to a.s.sume, among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and of Nature's G.o.d ent.i.tle them."

IV. Every nation has the right to territory within defined boundaries, and to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over its territory, and all persons whether native or foreign found therein.

V. Every nation ent.i.tled to a right by the law of nations is ent.i.tled to have that right respected and protected by all other nations, for right and duty are correlative, and the right of one is the duty of all to observe.

VI. International law is at one and the same time both national and international; national in the sense that it is the law of the land and applicable as such to the decision of all questions involving its principles; international in the sense that it is the law of the society of nations and applicable as such to all questions between and among the members of the society of nations involving its principles.

This Declaration has been criticised as being too altruistic for a world in which diplomacy has been occupied with selfish aims, yet Mr.

Root, in presenting it at the annual meeting of the American Society of International Law, claimed that every statement in it was "based upon the decisions of American courts and the authority of American publicists."

The Mexican situation put the principles of the new Pan-Americanism to a severe test. On February 18, 1913, Francisco Madero was seized and imprisoned as the result of a conspiracy formed by one of his generals, Victoriano Huerta, who forthwith proclaimed himself dictator. Four days later Madero was murdered while in the custody of Huerta's troops.

Henry Lane Wilson, the American amba.s.sador, promptly urged his government to recognize Huerta, but President Taft, whose term was rapidly drawing to a close, took no action and left the question to his successor.

President Wilson thus had a very disagreeable situation to face when he a.s.sumed control of affairs at Was.h.i.+ngton. He refused to recognize Huerta, whose authority was contested by insurrectionary chiefs in various parts of the country. It was claimed by the critics of the administration that the refusal to recognize Huerta was a direct violation of the well-known American policy of recognizing de facto governments without undertaking to pa.s.s upon the rights involved. It is perfectly true that the United States has consistently followed the policy of recognizing de facto governments as soon as it is evident in each case that the new government rests on popular approval and is likely to be permanent. This doctrine of recognition is distinctively an American doctrine. It was first laid down by Thomas Jefferson when he was Secretary of State as an offset to the European doctrine of divine right, and it was the natural outgrowth of that other Jeffersonian doctrine that all governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. Huerta could lay no claim to authority derived from a majority or anything like a majority of the Mexican people. He was a self-const.i.tuted dictator, whose authority rested solely on military force. President Wilson and Secretary Bryan were fully justified in refusing to recognize his usurpation of power, though they probably made a mistake in announcing that they would never recognize him and in demanding his elimination from the presidential contest. This announcement made him deaf to advice from Was.h.i.+ngton and utterly indifferent to the destruction of American life and property.

The next step in the President's course with reference to Mexico was the occupation of Vera Cruz. On April 20, 1914, the President asked Congress for authority to employ the armed forces of the United States in demanding redress for the arbitrary arrest of American marines at Vera Cruz, and the next day Admiral Fletcher was ordered to seize the custom house at that port. This he did after a sharp fight with Huerta's troops in which nineteen Americans were killed and seventy wounded. The American charge d'affaires, Nelson O'Shaughnessy, was at once handed his pa.s.sports, and all diplomatic relations between the United States and Mexico were severed.

A few days later the representatives of the so-called ABC Alliance, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, tendered their good offices for a peaceful settlement of the conflict and President Wilson promptly accepted their mediation. The resulting conference at Niagara, May 20, was not successful in its immediate object, but it resulted in the elimination of Huerta who resigned July 15, 1914. On August 20, General Venustiano Carranza, head of one of the revolutionary factions, a.s.sumed control of affairs at the capital, but his authority was disputed by General Francisco Villa, another insurrectionary chief. On Carranza's promise to respect the lives and property of American citizens the United States forces were withdrawn from Vera Cruz in November, 1914.

In August, 1915, at the request of President Wilson, the six ranking representatives of Latin America at Was.h.i.+ngton made an unsuccessful effort to reconcile the contending factions of Mexico. On their advice, however, President Wilson decided in October to recognize the government of Carranza, who now controlled three fourths of the territory of Mexico. As a result of this action Villa began a series of attacks on American citizens and raids across the border, which in March, 1916, compelled the President to send a punitive expedition into Mexico and later to dispatch most of the regular army and large bodies of militia to the border.

The raids of Villa created a very awkward situation. Carranza not only made no real effort to suppress Villa, but he vigorously opposed the steps taken by the United States to protect its own citizens along the border, and even a.s.sumed a threatening att.i.tude. There was a loud and persistent demand in the United States for war against Mexico.

American investments in land, mines, rubber plantations, and other enterprises were very large, and these financial interests were particularly outraged at the President's policy of "watchful waiting."

The President remained deaf to this clamor. No country had been so shamelessly exploited by foreign capital as Mexico. Furthermore, it was suspected and very generally believed that the recent revolutions had been financed by American capital. President Wilson was determined to give the Mexican people an opportunity to reorganize their national life on a better basis and to lend them every a.s.sistance in the task.

War with Mexico would have been a very serious undertaking and even a successful war would have meant the military occupation of Mexico for an indefinite period. After our entrance into the World War many of those Americans who dissented radically from Wilson's Mexican policy became convinced that his refusal to become involved in war with Mexico was a most fortunate thing for us.

It has been charged that there was a lack of consistency between the President's Mexican policy and his Haitian policy. The difference between the two cases, however, was that order could be restored in Haiti with a relatively small force of marines, while any attempt to apply force to Mexico would have led to a long and b.l.o.o.d.y conflict.

The most novel feature of the President's Mexican policy was his acceptance of the mediation of the ABC Alliance and his subsequent consultation with the leading representatives of Latin America. This action brought the Pan-American ideal almost to the point of realization. It was received with enthusiasm and it placed our relations with Latin America on a better footing than they had been for years.

It was suggested by more than one critic of American foreign policy that if we were to undertake to set the world right, we must come before the bar of public opinion with clean hands, that before we denounced the imperialistic policies of Europe, we should have abandoned imperialistic policies at home. The main features of President Wilson's Latin-American policy, if we may draw a general conclusion, were to pledge American republics not to do anything which would invite European intervention, and to secure by treaty the right of the United States to intervene for the protection of life, liberty, and property, and for the establishment of self-government. Such a policy, unselfishly carried out, was not inconsistent with the general war aims defined by President Wilson.

IX

THE FAILURE OF NEUTRALITY AND ISOLATION

In Was.h.i.+ngton's day the United States was an experiment in democracy.

The vital question was not our duty to the rest of the world, but whether the rest of the world would let us live. The policy of wisdom was to keep aloof from world politics and give as little cause for offense as possible to the great powers of Europe. Was.h.i.+ngton pointed out that "our detached and distant situation" rendered such a course possible. This policy was justified by events. We were enabled to follow unhindered the bent of our own political genius, to extend our inst.i.tutions over a vast continent and to attain a position of great prosperity and power in the economic world. While we are still a young country, our government is, with the possible exception of that of Great Britain, the oldest and most stable in the world, and since we declared ourselves a nation and adopted our present const.i.tution the British Government has undergone radical changes of a democratic character. By age and stability we have long been ent.i.tled to a voice and influence in the world, and yet we have been singularly indifferent to our responsibilities as a member of the society of nations. We have been in the world, but not of it.

Our policy of isolation corresponded with the situation as it existed a hundred years ago, but not with the situation as it exists to-day and as it has existed for some years past. We no longer occupy a "detached and distant situation." Steam and electricity, the cable and wireless telegraphy have overcome the intervening s.p.a.ce and made us the close neighbors of Europe. The whole world has been drawn together in a way that our forefathers never dreamed of, and our commercial, financial, and social relations with the rest of the world are intimate. Under such circ.u.mstances political isolation is an impossibility. It has for years been nothing more than a tradition, but a tradition which has tied the hands of American diplomats and caused the American public to ignore what was actually going on in the world. The Spanish War and the acquisition of the Philippines brought us into the full current of world politics, and yet we refused to recognize the changes that inevitably followed.

The emergence of j.a.pan as a first-cla.s.s power, conscious of achievement and eager to enter on a great career, introduced a new and disturbing element into world politics. Our diplomacy, which had hitherto been comparatively simple, now became exceedingly complex. Formerly the United States was the only great power outside the European balance.

The existence of a second detached power greatly complicated the international situation and presented opportunities for new combinations. We have already seen how Germany undertook to use the opportunity presented by Russia's war with j.a.pan to humiliate France and that the United States took a prominent part in the Algeciras Conference for the purpose of preventing the threatened overthrow of the European balance of power. Thus, even before the World War began, it had become evident to close observers of international affairs that the European balance would soon be superseded by a world balance in which the United States would be forced to take its place.

It took a world war, however, to dispel the popular illusion of isolation and to arouse us to a temporary sense of our international responsibilities. When the war began the President, following the traditions of a hundred years, issued, as a matter of course, a proclamation of neutrality, and he thought that the more scrupulously it was observed the greater would be the opportunity for the United States to act as impartial mediator in the final adjustment of peace terms. As the fierceness of the conflict grew it became evident that the role of neutral would not be an easy one to play and that the vital interests of the United States would be involved to a far greater extent than anyone had foreseen.

Neutrality in the modern sense is essentially an American doctrine and the result of our policy of isolation. If we were to keep out of European conflicts, it was necessary for us to pursue a course of rigid impartiality in wars between European powers. In the Napoleonic wars we insisted that neutrals had certain rights which belligerents were bound to respect and we fought the War of 1812 with England in order to establish that principle. Half a century later, in the American Civil War, we insisted that neutrals had certain duties which every belligerent had a right to expect them to perform, and we forced Great Britain in the settlement of the _Alabama_ Claims to pay us damages to the extent of $15,500,000 for having failed to perform her neutral obligations. We have thus been the leading champion of the rights and duties of neutrals, and the principles for which we have contended have been written into the modern law of nations. When two or three nations are engaged in war and the rest of the world is neutral, there is usually very little difficulty in enforcing neutral rights, but when a majority of the great powers are at war, it is impossible for the remaining great powers, much less for the smaller neutrals, to maintain their rights. This was true in the Napoleonic wars, but at that time the law of neutrality was in its infancy and had never been fully recognized by the powers at war. The failure of neutrality in the Great War was far more serious, for the rights of neutrals had been clearly defined and universally recognized.

Notwithstanding the large German population in this country and the propaganda which we now know that the German Government had systematically carried on for years in our very midst, the invasion of Belgium and the atrocities committed by the Germans soon arrayed opinion on the side of the Allies. This was not a departure from neutrality, for it should be remembered that neutrality is not an att.i.tude of mind, but a legal status. As long as our Government fulfilled its obligations as defined by the law of nations, no charge of a violation of neutrality could be justly made. To deny to the citizens of a neutral country the right to express their moral judgments would be to deny that the world can ever be governed by public opinion. The effort of the German propagandists to draw a distinction between so-called ethical and legal neutrality was plausible, but without real force. While neutrality is based on the general principle of impartiality, this principle has been embodied in a fairly well-defined set of rules which may, and frequently do, in any given war, work to the advantage of one belligerent and to the disadvantage of the other. In the Great War this result was brought about by the naval superiority of Great Britain. So far as our legal obligations to Germany were concerned she had no cause for complaint.

If, on the other hand, our conduct had been determined solely by ethical considerations, we would have joined the Allies long before we did.

The naval superiority of Great Britain made it comparatively easy for her to stop all direct trade with the enemy in articles contraband of war, but this was of little avail so long as Germany could import these articles through the neutral ports of Italy, Holland, and the Scandinavian countries. Under these circ.u.mstances an ordinary blockade of the German coast would have had little effect. Therefore, no such blockade was proclaimed by Great Britain. She adopted other methods of cutting off overseas supplies from Germany. She enlarged the lists of both absolute and conditional contraband and under the doctrine of continuous voyage seized articles on both lists bound for Germany through neutral countries.

As to the right of a belligerent to enlarge the contraband lists there can be no doubt. Even the Declaration of London, which undertook for the first time to establish an international cla.s.sification of contraband, provided in Article 23 that "articles and materials which are exclusively used for war may be added to the list of absolute contraband by means of a notified declaration," and Article 25 provided that the list of conditional contraband might be enlarged in the same manner. Under modern conditions of warfare it would seem impossible to determine in advance what articles are to be treated as contraband.

During the Great War many articles regarded in previous wars as innocent became indispensable to the carrying on of the war.

Great Britain's application of the doctrine of continuous voyage was more open to dispute. She a.s.sumed that contraband articles s.h.i.+pped to neutral countries adjacent to Germany and Austria were intended for them unless proof to the contrary was forthcoming, and she failed to draw any distinction between absolute and conditional contraband. The United States protested vigorously against this policy, but the force of its protest was weakened by the fact that during the Civil War the American Government had pursued substantially the same policy in regard to goods s.h.i.+pped by neutrals to Na.s.sau, Havana, Matamoros, and other ports adjacent to the Confederacy. Prior to the American Civil War goods could not be seized on any grounds unless bound directly for a belligerent port. Under the English doctrine of continuous voyage as advanced during the Napoleonic wars, goods brought from the French West Indies to the United States and res.h.i.+pped to continental Europe were condemned by the British Admiralty Court on the ground that notwithstanding the unloading and reloading at an American port the voyage from the West Indies to Europe was in effect a continuous voyage, and under the Rule of 1756 Great Britain refused to admit the right of neutral s.h.i.+ps to engage in commerce between France and her colonies. Great Britain, however, seized s.h.i.+ps only on the second leg of the voyage, that is, when bound directly for a belligerent port.

During the American Civil War the United States seized goods under an extension of the English doctrine on the first leg of the voyage, that is, while they were in transit from one neutral port to another neutral port, on the ground that they were to be subsequently s.h.i.+pped in another vessel to a Confederate port. Great Britain adopted and applied the American doctrine during the Boer War. The doctrine of continuous voyage, as applied by the United States and England, was strongly condemned by most of the continental writers on international law. The Declaration of London adopted a compromise by providing that absolute contraband might be seized when bound through third countries, but that conditional contraband was not liable to capture under such circ.u.mstances. As the Declaration of London was not ratified by the British Government this distinction was ignored, and conditional as well as absolute contraband was seized when bound for Germany through neutral countries.

While Great Britain may be charged with having unwarrantably extended the application of certain rules of international law and may have rendered herself liable to pecuniary damages, she displayed in all her measures a scrupulous regard for human life. Her declaration that "The whole of the North Sea must be considered a military area," was explained as an act of retaliation against Germany for having scattered floating mines on the high seas in the path of British commerce. She did not undertake to exclude neutral vessels from the North Sea, but merely notified them that certain areas had been mined and warned them not to enter without receiving sailing directions from the British squadron.

The German decree of February 4, 1915, establis.h.i.+ng a submarine blockade or "war zone" around the British Isles, on the other hand, was absolutely without legal justification. It did not fulfill the requirements of a valid blockade, because it cut off only a very small percentage of British commerce, and the first requirement of a blockade is that it must be effective. The decree was aimed directly at enemy merchant vessels and indirectly at the s.h.i.+ps of neutrals. It utterly ignored the well-recognized right of neutral pa.s.sengers to travel on merchant vessels of belligerents. The second decree announcing unrestricted submarine warfare after February 1, 1917, was directed against neutral as well as enemy s.h.i.+ps. It undertook to exclude all neutral s.h.i.+ps from a wide zone extending far out on the high seas, irrespective of their mission or the character of their cargo. It was an utter defiance of all law.

The citizens of neutral countries have always had the right to travel on the merchant vessels of belligerents, subject, of course, to the risk of capture and detention. The act of the German amba.s.sador in inserting an advertis.e.m.e.nt in a New York paper warning Americans not to take pa.s.sage on the _Lusitania_, when the President had publicly a.s.serted that they had a perfect right to travel on belligerent s.h.i.+ps, was an insolent and unparalleled violation of diplomatic usage and would have justified his instant dismissal. Some action would probably have been taken by the State Department had not the incident been overshadowed by the carrying out of the threat and the actual destruction of the _Lusitania_.

The destruction of enemy prizes at sea is recognized by international law under exceptional circ.u.mstances and subject to certain definite restrictions, but an unlimited right of destruction even of enemy merchant vessels had never been claimed by any authority on international law or by any government prior to the German decree. The destruction of neutral prizes, though practised by some governments, has not been so generally acquiesced in, and when resorted to has been attended by an even more rigid observance of the rules designed to safeguard human life. Article 48 of the Declaration of London provided that, "A captured neutral vessel is not to be destroyed by the captor, but must be taken into such port as is proper in order to determine there the rights as regards the validity of the capture."

Unfortunately Article 49 largely negatived this statement by leaving the whole matter to the discretion of the captor. It is as follows: "As an exception, a neutral vessel captured by a belligerent s.h.i.+p, and which would be liable to condemnation, may be destroyed if the observance of Article 48 would involve danger to the s.h.i.+p of war or to the success of the operations in which she is at the time engaged."

The next article provided the following safeguards: "Before the destruction the persons on board must be placed in safety, and all the s.h.i.+p's papers and other doc.u.ments which those interested consider relevant for the decision as to the validity of the capture must be taken on board the s.h.i.+p of war."

The Declaration of London was freely criticised for recognizing an unlimited discretionary right on the part of a captor to destroy a neutral prize. Under all the circ.u.mstances the main grievance against Germany was not that she destroyed prizes at sea, but that she utterly ignored the restrictions imposed upon this right and the rules designed to safeguard human life.

Germany sought to justify her submarine policy on the ground (1) that the American manufacture and sale of munitions of war was one-sided and therefore unneutral, and (2) that the United States had practically acquiesced in what she considered the unlawful efforts of Great Britain to cut off the food supply of Germany. The subject of the munitions trade was brought to the attention of the United States by Germany in a note of April 4, 1915. While not denying the legality of the trade in munitions under ordinary circ.u.mstances the contentions of the German Government were that the situation in the present war differed from that of any previous war; that the recognition of the trade in the past had sprung from the necessity of protecting existing industries, while in the present war an entirely new industry had been created in the United States; and it concluded with the following statement which was the real point of the note: "This industry is actually delivering goods to the enemies of Germany. The theoretical willingness to supply Germany also, if s.h.i.+pments were possible, does not alter the case. If it is the will of the American people that there should be a true neutrality, the United States will find means of preventing this one-sided supply of arms or at least of utilizing it to protect legitimate trade with Germany, especially that in food stuffs." To this note Secretary Bryan replied that "Any change in its own laws of neutrality during the progress of the war which would affect unequally the relations of the United States with the nations at war would be an unjustifiable departure from the principle of strict neutrality."

Two months later the discussion was renewed by the Austro-Hungarian Government. The Austrian note did not question the intention of the United States to conform to the letter of the law, but complained that we were not carrying out its spirit, and suggested that a threat to withhold food stuffs and raw materials from the Allies would be sufficient to protect legitimate commerce between the United States and the Central Powers. To this note Secretary Lansing replied at length.

He held: (1) that the United States was under no obligation to change or modify the rules of international usage on account of special conditions. (2) He rejected what he construed to be the contention of the Austrian Government that "the advantages gained to a belligerent by its superiority on the sea should be equalized by the neutral powers by the establishment of a system of non-intercourse with the victor." (3) He called attention to the fact that Austria-Hungary and Germany had during the years preceding the present European war produced "a great surplus of arms and ammunition which they sold throughout the world and especially to belligerents. Never during that period did either of them suggest or apply the principle now advocated by the Imperial and Royal Government." (4) "But, in addition to the question of principle, there is a practical and substantial reason why the Government of the United States has from the foundation of the Republic to the present time advocated and practised unrestricted trade in arms and military supplies. It has never been the policy of this country to maintain in time of peace a large military establishment or stores of arms and ammunition sufficient to repel invasion by a well-equipped and powerful enemy. It has desired to remain at peace with all nations and to avoid any appearance of menacing such peace by the threat of its armies and navies. In consequence of this standing policy the United States would, in the event of attack by a foreign power, be at the outset of the war seriously, if not fatally, embarra.s.sed by the lack of arms and ammunition and by the means to produce them in sufficient quant.i.ties to supply the requirements of national defense. The United States has always depended upon the right and power to purchase arms and ammunition from neutral nations in case of foreign attack. This right, which it claims for itself, it cannot deny to others."

The German and Austrian authorities were fully aware that their arguments had no basis in international law or practice. Indeed, their notes were probably designed to influence public opinion and help the German propagandists in this country who were making a desperate effort to get Congress to place an embargo on the export of munitions. Having failed in this attempt, an extensive conspiracy was formed to break up the trade in munitions by a resort to criminal methods. Numerous explosions occurred in munition plants destroying many lives and millions of dollars' worth of property, and bombs were placed in a number of s.h.i.+ps engaged in carrying supplies to the Allies. The Austrian amba.s.sador and the German military and naval attaches at Was.h.i.+ngton were involved in these activities and their recall was promptly demanded by Secretary Lansing.

The violations of international law by Germany were so flagrant, her methods of waging war so barbarous, the activities of her diplomats so devoid of honor, and her solemn pledges were so ruthlessly broken that the technical discussion of the rules of maritime law was completely overshadowed by the higher moral issues involved in the contest. All further efforts to maintain neutrality finally became intolerable even to President Wilson, who had exercised patience until patience ceased to be a virtue. Having failed in his efforts to persuade Congress to authorize the arming of merchantmen, the President finally concluded, in view of Germany's threat to treat armed guards as pirates, that armed neutrality was impracticable. He accepted the only alternative and on April 2, 1917, went before Congress to ask for a formal declaration of war against Germany.

Had Germany observed the rules of international law, the United States would probably have remained neutral notwithstanding the imminent danger of the overthrow of France and the possible invasion of England.

The upsetting of the European balance would eventually have led to a conflict between Germany and the United States. The violation of American rights forced us to go to war, but having once entered the war, we fought not merely for the vindication of American rights, but for the establishment of human freedom and the recognition of human rights throughout the world. In his war address President Wilson said: "Neutrality is no longer feasible or desirable where the peace of the world is involved and the freedom of its peoples, and the menace to that peace and freedom lies in the existence of autocratic Governments backed by organized force which is controlled wholly by their will, not by the will of their people. We have seen the last of neutrality in such circ.u.mstances." Having once abandoned neutrality and isolation we are not likely to remain neutral again in any war which involves the balance of power in the world or the destinies of the major portion of mankind. Neutrality and isolation were correlative. They were both based on the view that we were a remote and distant people and had no intimate concern with what was going on in the great world across the seas.