From Isolation to Leadership, Revised Part 2

The refusal of England to ratify the Declaration of London sealed its fate. The United States Senate formally ratified it, but this ratification was, of course, conditional on the ratification of other powers. At the beginning of the Great War the United States made a formal proposal to the belligerent powers that they should agree to adopt the Declaration for the period of the war in order that there might be a definite body of law for all parties concerned. This proposal was accepted by Germany and Austria, but England, France, and Russia were not willing to accept the Declaration of London without modifications. The United States, therefore, promptly withdrew its proposal and stated that where its rights as a neutral were concerned it would expect the belligerent powers to observe the recognized rules of international law and existing treaties.

The Hague Conferences were concerned with questions of general international interest, and had no bearing upon the internal affairs of states. Such, however, was not the character of the conference which convened at Algeciras, Spain, in December, 1905, for the purpose of adjusting the very serious dispute that had arisen between France and Germany over the status of Morocco. France had been engaged for some years in the peaceful penetration of Morocco. By the terms of the Entente of 1904 England recognized Morocco as being within the French sphere of influence and France agreed to recognize England's position in Egypt. The German Kaiser had no idea of permitting any part of the world to be divided up without his consent. In March, 1905, while on a cruise in the Mediterranean, he disembarked at Tangier and paid a visit to the Sultan "in his character of independent sovereign." As the Russian armies had just suffered disastrous defeats at the hands of the j.a.panese, France could not count on aid from her ally and the Kaiser did not believe that the recently formed Entente was strong enough to enable her to count on English support. His object in landing at Tangier was, therefore, to check and humiliate France while she was isolated and to break up the Entente before it should develop into an alliance. Delca.s.se, the French foreign minister, wanted to stand firm, but Germany demanded his retirement and the prime minister accepted his resignation. In recognition of this triumph, the German chancellor Count von Bulow was given the t.i.tle of Prince. Not satisfied with this achievement, the Kaiser demanded a general European conference on the Moroccan question, and, in order to avoid war, President Roosevelt persuaded France to submit the whole dispute to the powers interested.

The Algeciras conference turned out to be a bitter disappointment to Germany. Not only did France receive the loyal support of England, but she was also backed by the United States and even by Italy--a warning to Germany that the Triple Alliance was in danger. As the conference was called nominally for the purpose of inst.i.tuting certain administrative reforms in Morocco, President Roosevelt decided, in view of our rights under a commercial treaty of 1880, to take part in the proceedings. The American delegates were Henry White, at that time amba.s.sador to Italy, and Samuel R. Gummere, minister to Morocco. As the United States professed to have no political interests at stake, its delegates were instrumental in composing many of the difficulties that arose during the conference and their influence was exerted to preserve the European balance of power. The facts in regard to America's part in this conference were carefully concealed from the public. There was nothing in any published American doc.u.ment to indicate that the partic.i.p.ation of our representatives was anything more than casual. Andre Tardieu, the well-known French publicist, who reported the conference and later published his impressions in book form, first indicated that President Roosevelt was a positive factor in the proceedings. But it was not until the publication of Bishop's "Theodore Roosevelt and His Time" that the full extent of Roosevelt's activities in this connection became known.

There can be no doubt that our partic.i.p.ation in the Moroccan conference was the most radical departure ever made from our traditional policy of isolation. Roosevelt's influence was exerted for preserving the balance of power in Europe. As we look back upon the events of that year we feel, in view of what has since happened, that he was fully justified in the course he pursued. Had his motives for partic.i.p.ating in the conference been known at the time, they would not have been upheld either by the Senate or by public opinion. There are many serious objections to secret diplomacy, but it cannot be entirely done away with even under a republican form of government until the people are educated to a fuller understanding of international politics. The German Kaiser was relentless in his attempt to score a diplomatic triumph while France was isolated. He was thwarted, however, by the moral support which England, Italy, and the United States gave to France.

During the proceedings of the conference the American delegates declared in open session that the United States had no political interest in Morocco and that they would sign the treaty only with the understanding that the United States would thereby a.s.sume no "obligation or responsibility for the enforcement thereof." This declaration did not satisfy the United States Senate, which no doubt suspected the part that was actually played by America in the conference. At any rate, when the treaty was finally ratified the Senate attached to its resolution of ratification the following declaration:

"Resolved further. That the Senate, as a part of this act of ratification, understands that the partic.i.p.ation of the United States in the Algeciras conference and in the formation and adoption of the general act and protocol which resulted therefrom, was with the sole purpose of preserving and increasing its commerce in Morocco, the protection as to life, liberty, and property of its citizens residing or traveling therein, and of aiding by its friendly offices and efforts, in removing friction and controversy which seemed to menace the peace between powers signatory with the United States to the treaty of 1880, all of which are on terms of amity with this Government; and without purpose to depart from the traditional American foreign policy which forbids partic.i.p.ation by the United States in the settlement of political questions which are entirely European in their scope."

The determination of the United States not to interfere in the internal politics of European States has not prevented occasional protests in the name of humanity against the harsh treatment accorded the Jews in certain European countries. On July 17, 1902, Secretary Hay protested in a note to the Rumanian government against a policy which was forcing thousands of Jews to emigrate from that country. The United States, he claimed, had more than a philanthropic interest in this matter, for the enforced emigration of the Jews from Rumania in a condition of utter dest.i.tution was "the mere transplantation of an artificially produced diseased growth to a new place"; and, as the United States was practically their only place of refuge, we had a clearly established right of remonstrance. In the case of Russia information has repeatedly been sought through diplomatic channels as to the extent of dest.i.tution among the Jewish population, and permission has been requested for the distribution of relief funds raised in the United States. Such inquiries have been so framed as to amount to diplomatic protests. In his annual message of 1904 President Roosevelt went further and openly expressed the horror of the nation at the ma.s.sacre of the Jews at Kishenef. These protests, however, were purely diplomatic in character. There was not the slightest hint at intervention. During the early stages of the Great War in Europe the Government of the United States endeavored to adhere strictly to its historic policy. The German invasion of Belgium with its attendant horrors made a deep impression upon the American people and aroused their fighting spirit even more perhaps than the German policy of submarine warfare, but it was on the latter issue, in which the interests and rights of the United States were directly involved, that we finally entered the war.

V

THE OPEN-DOOR POLICY

In the Orient American diplomacy has had a somewhat freer hand than in Europe. Commodore Perry's expedition to j.a.pan in 1852-1854 was quite a radical departure from the general policy of attending strictly to our own business. It would hardly have been undertaken against a country lying within the European sphere of influence. There were, it is true, certain definite grievances to redress, but the main reason for the expedition was that j.a.pan refused to recognize her obligations as a member of the family of nations and closed her ports to all intercourse with the outside world. American sailors who had been s.h.i.+pwrecked on the coast of j.a.pan had failed to receive the treatment usually accorded by civilized nations. Finally the United States decided to send a naval force to j.a.pan and to force that country to abandon her policy of exclusion and to open her ports to intercourse with other countries.

j.a.pan yielded only under the threat of superior force. The conduct of the expedition, as well as our subsequent diplomatic negotiations with j.a.pan, was highly creditable to the United States, and the j.a.panese people later erected a monument to the memory of Perry on the spot where he first landed.

The acquisition of the Philippine Islands tended to bring us more fully into the current of world politics, but it did not necessarily disturb the balancing of European and American spheres as set up by President Monroe. Various explanations have been given of President McKinley's decision to retain the Philippine group, but the whole truth has in all probability not yet been fully revealed. The part.i.tion of China through the establishment of European spheres of influence was well under way when the Philippine Islands came within our grasp. American commerce with China was at this time second to that of England alone, and the concessions which were being wrung from China by the European powers in such rapid succession presented a bad outlook for us. The United States could not follow the example of the powers of Europe, for the seizure of a sphere of influence in China would not have been supported by the Senate or upheld by public opinion. It is probable that President McKinley thought that the Philippine Islands would not only provide a market for American goods, which owing to the Dingley tariff were beginning to face retaliatory legislation abroad, but that they would provide a naval base which would be of great a.s.sistance in upholding our interests in China.

Talcott Williams made public some years later another explanation of President McKinley's decision which is interesting and appears to be well vouched for. He was informed by a member of McKinley's cabinet that while the President's mind was not yet made up on the question, a personal communication was received from Lord Salisbury who warned the President that Germany was preparing to take over the Philippine Islands in case the United States should withdraw; that such a step would probably precipitate a world war and that in the interests of peace and harmony it would be best for the United States to retain the entire group.

The famous open-door policy was outlined by Secretary Hay in notes dated September 6, 1899, addressed to Great Britain, Germany, and Russia. Each of these powers was requested to give a.s.surance and to make a declaration to the following effect: (1) that it would not interfere with any treaty port or vested interests in its so-called sphere of influence; (2) that it would permit the Chinese tariff to continue in force in such sphere and to be collected by Chinese officials; (3) that it would not discriminate against other foreigners in the matter of port dues or railroad rates. Similar notes were later addressed to France, Italy, and j.a.pan. England alone expressed her willingness to sign such a declaration. The other powers, while professing thorough accord with the principles set forth by Mr. Hay, avoided committing themselves to a formal declaration and no such declaration was ever made. Mr. Hay made a skillful move, however, to clinch matters by informing each of the powers to whom the note had been addressed that in view of the favorable replies from the other powers, its acceptance of the proposals of the United States was considered "as final and definitive."

Americans generally are under the impression that John Hay originated the open-door policy and that it was successfully upheld by the United States. Neither of these impressions is correct. A few months before John Hay formulated his famous note Lord Charles Beresford came through America on his return from China and addressed the leading chambers of commerce from San Francisco to New York, telling Americans what was actually taking place in China and urging this country to unite with England and j.a.pan in an effort to maintain the open door. Like the Monroe Doctrine, the open-door policy was thus Anglo-American in origin. There is little doubt that England and j.a.pan were willing to form an alliance with the United States for the purpose of maintaining the open door in China, but our traditional policy of isolation prevented our committing ourselves to the employment of force.

President McKinley, following the example of President Monroe, preferred announcing our policy independently and requesting the other powers to consent to it. Had John Hay been able to carry out the plan which he favored of an alliance with England and j.a.pan, the mere announcement of the fact would have been sufficient to check the aggressions of the powers in China. Instead of such an alliance, however, we let it be known that while we favored the open door we would not fight for it under any conditions.

The utter worthlessness of the replies that were made in response to Hay's note of September 6, 1899, became fully apparent in the discussions that soon arose as to the status of consuls in the various spheres of influence. j.a.pan claimed that sovereignty did not pa.s.s with a lease and that even if China should surrender jurisdiction over her own people, the lessee governments could not acquire jurisdiction over foreigners in leased territory. This position was undoubtedly correct if the territorial integrity of China was really to be preserved, but after negotiations with Russia and the other powers concerned Mr. Hay wrote to Minister Conger on February 3, 1900, that "The United States consuls in districts adjacent to the foreign leased territories are to be instructed that they have no authority to exercise extra-territorial consular jurisdiction or to perform ordinary non-judicial consular acts within the leased territory under their present Chinese exequaturs."

Application was then made to the European powers for the admission of American consuls in the leased territories for the performance of the ordinary consular functions, but in no case were they to exercise extra-territorial jurisdiction within a leased territory.

The exploitation of China which continued at a rapid rate naturally aroused an intense anti-foreign sentiment and led to the Boxer uprising. Events moved with startling rapidity and United States troops took a prominent part with those of England, France, Russia, and j.a.pan in the march to Peking for the relief of the legations. In a note to the powers July 3, 1900, Secretary Hay, in defining the att.i.tude of the United States on the Chinese question, said: "The policy of the government of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative ent.i.ty, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese empire." Mr. Hay's notes were skillfully worded and had some influence in helping to formulate public opinion on the Chinese question both in this country and abroad, but we know now from his private letters which have recently been made public that he realized only too fully the utter futility of his efforts to stay the course of events. During the exciting days of June, 1900, when the foreign legations at Peking were in a state of siege, Mr. Hay wrote to John W. Foster as follows:

"What can be done in the present diseased state of the public mind?

There is such a mad-dog hatred of England prevalent among newspapers and politicians that anything we should now do in China to take care of our imperiled interests would be set down to 'subservience to Great Britain'. . . . Every Senator I see says, 'For G.o.d's sake, don't let it appear we have any understanding with England.' How can I make bricks without straw? That we should be compelled to refuse the a.s.sistance of the greatest power in the world, in carrying out our own policy, because all Irishmen are Democrats and some Germans are fools--is enough to drive a man mad. Yet we shall do what we can."

A little later (September 20, 1900) in confidential letters to Henry Adams, he exclaimed:

"About China, it is the devil's own mess. We cannot possibly publish all the facts without breaking off relations with several Powers. We shall have to do the best we can, and take the consequences, which will be pretty serious, I do not doubt. 'Give and take'--the axiom of diplomacy to the rest of the world--is positively forbidden to us, by both the Senate and public opinion. We must take what we can and give nothing--which greatly narrows our possibilities.

"I take it, you agree with us that we are to limit as far as possible our military operations in China, to withdraw our troops at the earliest day consistent with our obligations, and in the final adjustment to do everything we can for the integrity and reform of China, and to hold on like grim death to the Open Door. . . ."

Again, November 21, 1900:

"What a business this has been in China! So far we have got on by being honest and naf. . . . At least we are spared the infamy of an alliance with Germany. I would rather, I think, be the dupe of China, than the chum of the Kaiser. Have you noticed how the world will take anything nowadays from a German? Bulow said yesterday in substance--'We have demanded of China everything we can think of. If we think of anything else we will demand that, and be d--d to you'--and not a man in the world kicks."

During the long negotiations that followed the occupation of Peking by the powers, the United States threw the weight of its influence on the side of moderation, urging the powers not to impose too many burdens on China and declaring that the only hope for the future lay in a strong, independent, responsible Chinese government. Contrary to the terms of the final protocol, however, Russia retained in Manchuria the troops concentrated there during the Boxer movement with a view to exacting further concessions from China. The open-door policy was again ignored. The seriousness of the situation led England and j.a.pan to sign a defensive agreement January 30, 1902, recognizing England's interest in China and j.a.pan's interest in Korea, and providing that if either party should be attacked in defense of its interest, the other party would remain neutral, unless a third power joined in, in which event the second party would come to the a.s.sistance of the first. A formal protest made by the United States, February 1, against some of the demands Russia was making on China led Russia to conclude that the American government had an understanding with England and j.a.pan, but Mr. Hay gave the a.s.surance that he had known nothing about the Anglo-j.a.panese agreement until it was made public. He succeeded in securing from Russia, however, a definite promise to evacuate Manchuria, but as the time for the withdrawal of her troops drew near, Russia again imposed new conditions on China, and deliberately misrepresented to the United States the character of the new proposals.

After the suppression of the Boxer uprising, China had agreed to extend the scope of her commercial treaties with the powers. When the negotiation of a new treaty with the United States was begun, our representative demanded that at least two new ports in Manchuria be opened to foreign trade and residence. The Chinese commissioners declined to discuss the subject on the alleged ground that they had no instructions to do so. It was evident that there was secret opposition somewhere, and after considerable difficulty Mr. Hay finally secured evidence that it came from Russia. When confronted with the evidence the Russian Government finally admitted the facts. We were told that we could not be admitted to one of the ports that we had designated because it was situated within the Russian railway zone, and therefore not under the complete jurisdiction of China, but that another port would be subst.i.tuted for it. Secretary Hay and President Roosevelt were helpless. They accepted what they could get and kept quiet. "The administrative ent.i.ty" of China was again utterly ignored. The difficulty was that we did not have a strong enough navy in the Pacific to fight Russia alone, and President Roosevelt and Secretary Hay realized that neither the Senate nor public opinion would consent to an alliance with England and j.a.pan. Had these three powers made a joint declaration in support of the open-door policy, the exploitation of China would have ceased, there would have been no Russo-j.a.panese war, and the course of world history during the period that has since intervened might have been very different.

When we backed down and abandoned Manchuria to Russian exploitation j.a.pan stepped into the breach. After long negotiations the j.a.panese Government finally delivered an ultimatum to Russia which resulted in the rupture of diplomatic relations and war. After a series of notable victories on land and sea j.a.pan was fast approaching the end of her resources, and it is now an open secret that the Emperor wrote a personal letter to President Roosevelt requesting him to intervene diplomatically and pave the way for peace. The President was quick to act on the suggestion and the commissioners of Russia and j.a.pan met at Portsmouth, New Hamps.h.i.+re. Here President Roosevelt's intervention should have ceased. The terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth were a bitter disappointment to the j.a.panese people and the j.a.panese commissioners undertook to s.h.i.+ft the burden from their shoulders by stating that President Roosevelt had urged them to surrender their claim to the Island of Saghalien and to give up all idea of an indemnity. j.a.panese military triumph had again, as at the close of the Chino-j.a.panese War, been followed by diplomatic defeat, and for this defeat j.a.panese public opinion held President Roosevelt responsible.

From the days of Commodore Perry and Townsend Harris to the Treaty of Portsmouth, relations between the United States and j.a.pan had been almost ideal. Since the negotiations at Portsmouth there has been a considerable amount of bad feeling, and at times diplomatic relations have been subjected to a severe strain.

Having fought a costly war in order to check the Russian advance in Manchuria, the j.a.panese naturally felt that they had a paramount interest in China. They consequently sharply resented the attempts which the United States subsequently made, particularly Secretary Knox's proposal for the neutralization of the railways of Manchuria, to formulate policies for China. They took the position that we had had our day and that we must henceforth remain hands off so far as China was concerned. This att.i.tude of mind was not unnatural and during the World War the United States, in order to bind the j.a.panese government more closely to the Allied Cause, agreed to recognize, in the Lansing-Is.h.i.+ agreement, the "special interests" of j.a.pan in China.

VI

ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

A few years ago George L. Beer, one of our leading students of British colonial policy, said "It is easily conceivable, and not at all improbable, that the political evolution of the next centuries may take such a course that the American Revolution will lose the great significance that is now attached to it, and will appear merely as the temporary separation of two kindred peoples whose inherent similarity was obscured by superficial differences resulting from dissimilar economic and social conditions." This statement does not appear as extravagant to-day as it did ten years ago. As early as 1894, Captain Mahan, the great authority on naval history, published an essay ent.i.tled "Possibilities of an Anglo-American Reunion," in which he pointed out that these two countries were the only great powers which were by geographical position exempt from the burden of large armies and dependent upon the sea for intercourse with the other great nations.

In a volume dealing with questions of American foreign policy, published in 1907, the present writer concluded the last paragraph with this statement: "By no means the least significant of recent changes is the development of cordial relations with England; and it seems now that the course of world politics is destined to lead to the further reknitting together of the two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon race in bonds of peace and international sympathy, in a union not cemented by any formal alliance, but based on community of interests and of aims, a union that will const.i.tute the highest guarantee of the political stability and moral progress of the world."

The United States has very naturally had closer contact with England than with any other European power. This has been due to the fact that England was the mother country, that after independence was established a large part of our trade continued to be with the British Isles, that our northern boundary touches British territory for nearly four thousand miles, and that the British navy and mercantile marine have dominated the Atlantic Ocean which has been our chief highway of intercourse with other nations. Having had more points of contact we have had more disputes with England than with any other nation. Some writers have half jocularly attributed this latter fact to our common language. The Englishman reads our books, papers, and magazines, and knows what we think of him, while we read what he writes about us, and in neither case is the resulting impression flattering to the national pride.

Any one who takes the trouble to read what was written in England about America and the Americans between 1820 and 1850 will wonder how war was avoided. A large number of English travellers came to the United States during this period and published books about us when they got home. The books were bad enough in themselves, but the great English periodicals, the _Edinburgh Review_, _Blackwood's_, the _British Review_, and the _Quarterly_, quoted at length the most objectionable pa.s.sages from these writers and made malicious attacks on Americans and American inst.i.tutions. American men were described as "turbulent citizens, abandoned Christians, inconstant husbands, unnatural fathers, and treacherous friends." Our soldiers and sailors were charged with cowardice in the War of 1812. It was stated that "in the southern parts of the Union the rites of our holy faith are almost never practised. . . . Three and a half millions enjoy no means of religious instruction. The religious principle is gaining ground in the northern parts of the Union; it is becoming fas.h.i.+onable among the better orders of society to go to church . . . The greater number of states declare it to be unconst.i.tutional to refer to the providence of G.o.d in any of their public acts." The _Quarterly Review_ informed its readers that "the supreme felicity of a true-born American is inaction of body and inanity of mind." d.i.c.kens's _American Notes_ was an ungrateful return for the kindness and enthusiasm with which he had been received in this country. De Tocqueville's _Democracy in America_ was widely read in England and doubtless had its influence in revising opinion concerning America. Richard Cobden was, however, the first Englishman to interpret correctly the significance of America as an economic force.

His essay on America, published in 1835, pointed out that British policy should be more concerned with economic relations with America than with European politics. As Professor Dunning says, "Cobden made the United States the text of his earliest sermon against militarism and protectionism."

Notwithstanding innumerable disputes over boundaries, fisheries, and fur seals, trade with the British West Indies and Canada, and questions of neutral rights and obligations, we have had unbroken peace for more than a hundred years. Upon several occasions, notably during the Canadian insurrection of 1837 and during our own Civil War, disturbances along the Canadian border created strained relations, but absence of frontier guards and forts has prevented hasty action on the part of either government. The agreement of 1817, effecting disarmament on the Great Lakes, has not only saved both countries the enormous cost of maintaining navies on these inland waters, but it has prevented hostile demonstrations in times of crisis.

During the Canadian rebellion of 1837 Americans along the border expressed openly their sympathy for the insurgents who secured arms and munitions from the American side. In December a British force crossed the Niagara River, boarded and took possession of the _Caroline_, a vessel which had been hired by the insurgents to convey their cannon and other supplies. The s.h.i.+p was fired and sent over the Falls. When the _Caroline_ was boarded one American, Amos Durfee, was killed and several others wounded. The United States at once demanded redress, but the British Government took the position that the seizure of the _Caroline_ was a justifiable act of self-defense against people whom their own government either could not or would not control.

The demands of the United States were still unredressed when in 1840 a Canadian named Alexander McLeod made the boast in a tavern on the American side that he had slain Durfee. He was taken at his word, examined before a magistrate, and committed to jail in Lockport.

McLeod's arrest created great excitement on both sides of the border.

The British minister at Was.h.i.+ngton called upon the Government of the United States "to take prompt and effectual steps for the liberation of Mr. McLeod." Secretary of State Forsyth replied that the offense with which McLeod was charged had been committed within the State of New York; that the jurisdiction of each State of the United States was, within its proper sphere, perfectly independent of the Federal Government; that the latter could not interfere. The date set for the trial of McLeod was the fourth Monday in March, 1841. Van Buren's term ended and Harrison's began on the 4th of March, and Webster became Secretary of State. The British minister was given instructions by his government to demand the immediate release of McLeod. This demand was made, he said, because the attack on the _Caroline_ was an act of a public character; because it was a justifiable use of force for the defense of British territory against unprovoked attack by "British rebels and American pirates"; because it was contrary to the principles of civilized nations to hold individuals responsible for acts done by order of the const.i.tuted authorities of the State; and because Her Majesty's government could not admit the doctrine that the Federal Government had no power to interfere and that the decision must rest with the State of New York. The relations of foreign powers were with the Federal Government. To admit that the Federal Government had no control over a State would lead to the dissolution of the Union so far as foreign powers were concerned, and to the accrediting of foreign diplomatic agents, not to the Federal Government, but to each separate State. Webster received the note quietly and sent the attorney-general to Lockport to see that McLeod had competent counsel. After considerable delay, during which Webster replied to the main arguments of the British note, McLeod was acquitted and released.

In the midst of the dispute over the case of the _Caroline_ serious trouble arose between the authorities of Maine and New Brunswick over the undetermined boundary between the St. Croix River and the Highlands, and there ensued the so-called "Aroostook War." During the summer of 1838 British and American lumbermen began operating along the Aroostook River in large numbers. The governor of Maine sent a body of militia to enforce the authority of that State, and the New Brunswick authorities procured a detachment of British regulars to back up their position. Bloodshed was averted by the arrival of General Winfield Scott, who managed to restrain the Maine authorities. The administration found it necessary to take up seriously the settlement of the boundary question, and for the next three years the matter was under consideration, while each side had surveyors employed in a vain attempt to locate a line which would correspond to the line of the treaty. As soon as the McLeod affair was settled, Webster devoted himself earnestly to the boundary question. He decided to drop the ma.s.s of data acc.u.mulated by the surveyors and historians, and to reach an agreement by direct negotiation.

In April, 1842, Alexander Baring, Lord Ashburton, arrived in Was.h.i.+ngton and the following August the Webster-Ashburton treaty was signed. The boundary fixed by the treaty gave Maine a little more than half the area which she claimed and the United States appropriated $150,000 to compensate Maine for the territory which she had lost.

The settlement of these matters did not, however, insure peace with England. Settlers were crowding into Oregon and it was evident that the joint occupation, established by the convention of 1818, would soon have to be terminated and a divisional line agreed upon. Great Britain insisted that her southern boundary should extend at least as far as the Columbia River, while Americans finally claimed the whole of the disputed area, and one of the slogans of the presidential campaign of 1844 was "Fifty-Four-Forty or Fight." At the same time Great Britain actively opposed the annexation of Texas by the United States. Her main reason for this course was that she wished to encourage the development of Texas as a cotton-growing country from which she could draw a large enough supply to make her independent of the United States. If Texas should thus devote herself to the production of cotton as her chief export crop, she would, of course, adopt a free-trade policy and thus create a considerable market for British goods.

As soon as it became evident that Tyler contemplated taking definite steps toward annexation, Lord Aberdeen secured the cooperation of the government of Louis Philippe in opposing the absorption of Texas by the American republic. While the treaty for the annexation of Texas was before the Senate, Lord Aberdeen came forward with a proposition that England and France should unite with Texas and Mexico in a diplomatic act or perpetual treaty, securing to Texas recognition as an independent republic, but preventing her from ever acquiring territory beyond the Rio Grande or joining the American union. While the United States would be invited to join in this act, it was not expected that the government of that country would agree to it. Mexico obstinately refused to recognize the independence of Texas. Lord Aberdeen was so anxious to prevent the annexation of Texas that he was ready, if supported by France, to coerce Mexico and fight the United States, but the French Government was not willing to go this far, so the scheme was abandoned.

The two foremost issues in the campaign of 1844 were the annexation of Texas and the occupation of Oregon. Texas was annexed by joint resolution a few days before the inauguration of Polk. This act, it was foreseen, would probably provoke a war with Mexico, so Polk's first task was to adjust the Oregon dispute in order to avoid complications with England. The fate of California was also involved. That province was not likely to remain long in the hands of a weak power like Mexico.

In fact, British consular agents and naval officers had for several years been urging upon their government the great value of Upper California. Aberdeen refused to countenance any insurrectionary movement in California, but he directed his agents to keep vigilant watch on the proceedings of citizens of the United States in that province. Had England and Mexico arrived at an understanding and joined in a war against the United States, the probabilities are that England would have acquired not only the whole of Oregon, but California besides. In fact, in May, 1846, just as we were on the point of going to war with Mexico, the president of Mexico officially proposed to transfer California to England as security for a loan.

Fortunately, the Oregon question had been adjusted and England had no reason for wis.h.i.+ng to go to war with the United States. Mexico's offer was therefore rejected. Polk managed the diplomatic situation with admirable promptness and firmness. Notwithstanding the fact that the democratic platform had demanded "Fifty-Four-Forty or Fight," as soon as Polk became President he offered to compromise with England on the 49th parallel. When this offer was declined he asked permission of Congress to give England the necessary notice for the termination of the joint occupation agreement, to provide for the military defense of the territory in dispute, and to extend over it the laws of the United States. A few months later notice was given to England, but at the same time the hope was expressed that the matter might be adjusted diplomatically. As soon as it was evident that the United States was in earnest, England gracefully yielded and accepted the terms which had been first proposed.

As war with Mexico was imminent the public generally approved of the Oregon compromise, though the criticism was made by some in the North that the South, having secured in Texas a large addition to slave territory, was indifferent about the expansion of free territory. In fact, Henry Cabot Lodge, in his recent little book, "One Hundred Years of Peace," says: "The loss of the region between the forty-ninth parallel and the line of 54-40 was one of the most severe which ever befell the United States. Whether it could have been obtained without a war is probably doubtful, but it never ought to have been said, officially or otherwise, that we would fight for 54-40 unless we were fully prepared to do so. If we had stood firm for the line of 54-40 without threats, it is quite possible that we might have succeeded in the end; but the hypotheses of history are of little practical value, and the fact remains that by the treaty of 1846 we lost a complete control of the Pacific coast."

That the United States lived through what Professor Dunning calls "the roaring forties" without a war with England seems now little less than a miracle. During the next fifteen years relations were much more amicable, though by no means free from disputes. The most important diplomatic act was the signature in 1850 of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty which conceded to England a joint interest in any ca.n.a.l that might be built through the isthmus connecting North and South America. One of the interesting episodes of this period was the dismissal of Crampton, the British minister, who insisted on enlisting men in the United States for service in the Crimean War, an act which pales into insignificance in comparison with some of the things which Bernstorff did during the early stages of the Great War.