The Sarva-Darsana-Samgraha Part 12

But devotion (or faith) is a kind of cognition which admits no other motive than the illimitable beat.i.tude, and is free from all other desires; and the attainment of this devotion is by discrimination and other means. As is said by the author of the Vakya: Attainment thereof results from discrimination (_viveka_), exemption (_vimoka_), practice (_abhyasa_), observance (_kriya_), excellence (_kalya?a_), freedom from despondency (_anavasada_), satisfaction (_anuddharsha_), according to the equivalence (of the definition), and the explication (of these terms). Of these means, discrimination is purity of nature, resultant from eating undefiled food, and the explication (of discrimination) is From purity of diet, purity of understanding, and by purity of understanding the unintermittent reminiscence. Exemption is non-attachment to sensuous desires; the explication being, Let the quietist meditate. Practice is reiteration; and of this a traditionary explication is quoted (from the Bhagavad-gita) by (Ramanuja) the author of the commentary: For ever modified by the modes thereof.

Observance is the performance of rites enjoined in revelation and tradition according to one's ability; the explication being (the Vedic text), He who has performed rites is the best of those that know the supreme. The excellences are veracity, integrity, clemency, charity (alms-giving), and the like; the explication being, It is attained by veracity. Freedom from despondency is the contrary of dejection; the explication being, This soul is not attained by the faint-hearted.

Satisfaction is the contentment which arises from the contrary of dejection; the explication being, Quiescent, self-subdued. It has thus been shown that by the devotion of one in whom the darkness has been dispelled by the grace of the Supreme Spirit, propitiated by certain rites and observances, which devotion is meditation transformed into a presentative manifestation of soul, without ulterior motive, as incessantly and illimitably desired, the sphere of the Supreme Spirit (Vaiku??ha) is attained. Thus Yamuna says: Attainable by the final and absolute devotion of faith in one internally purified by both (works and knowledge); that is, in one whose internal organ is rectified by the devotion of works and knowledge.

In antic.i.p.ation of the inquiry, But what absolute is to be desired to be known? the definition is given (in the second aphorism). From which the genesis, and so forth, of this. The genesis, and so forth, the creation (emanation), sustentation, and retractation (of the universe). The purport of the aphorism is that the emanation, sustentation, and retractation of this universe, inconceivably multiform in its structure, and interspersed with souls, from Brahma to a tuft of gra.s.s, of determinate place, time, and fruition, is from this same universal Lord, whose essence is contrary to all qualities which should be escaped from, of illimitable excellences, such as indefeasible volition, and of innumerable auspicious attributes, omniscient, and omnipotent.

In antic.i.p.ation of the further inquiry, What proof is there of an absolute of this nature? It is stated that the system of inst.i.tutes itself is the evidence (in the third aphorism): Because it has its source from the system. To have its source from the system is to be that whereof the cause or evidence is the system. The system, then, is the source (or evidence) of the absolute, as being the cause of knowing the self, which is the cause of knowing the absolute. Nor is the suspicion possible that the absolute may be reached by some other form of evidence. For perception can have no conversancy about the absolute since it is supersensible. Nor can inference, for the illation, the ocean, and the rest, must have a maker, because it is an effect like a water-pot, is worth about as much as a rotten pumpkin.

It is evinced that it is such texts as, Whence also these elements, that prove the existence of the absolute thus described.

Though the absolute (it may be objected) be unsusceptible of any other kind of proof, the system, did it not refer to activity and cessation of activity, could not posit the absolute aforesaid. To avoid by antic.i.p.ation any queries on this point, it is stated (in the fourth aphorism): But that is from the construction. This is intended to exclude the doubt antic.i.p.ated. The evidence, then, of the system is the only evidence that can be given of the absolute. Why? Because of the construction, that is because the absolute, that is, the highest end for man, is construed as the subject (of the first aphorism, viz., Then thence the absolute is to be desired to be known). Moreover, a sentence which has nothing to do either with activity or with cessation of activity is not therefore void of purpose, for we observe that sentences merely declaratory of the nature of things, such as, A son is born to you, This is not a snake, convey a purpose, viz., the cessation of joy or of fear. Thus there is nothing unaccounted for. We have here given only a general indication. The details may be learnt from the original (viz., Ramanuja's Bhashya on the Vedanta aphorisms); we therefore decline a further treatment, apprehensive of prolixity; and thus all is clear.[110]

A. E. G.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 107: Cf. "The argument in defence of the Maxim of Contradiction is that it is a postulate employed in all the particular statements as to matters of daily experience that a man understands and acts upon when heard from his neighbours; a postulate such that, if you deny it, no speech is either significant or trustworthy to inform and guide those who hear it. You may cite innumerable examples both of speech and action in the detail of life, which the Herakleitean must go through like other persons, and when, if he proceeded upon his own theory, he could neither give nor receive information by speech, nor ground any action upon the beliefs which he declares to co-exist in his own mind. Accordingly the Herakleitean Kratylus (so Aristotle says) renounced the use of affirmative speech, and simply pointed with his finger."--Grote's Aristotle, vol. ii. pp.

297, 298.]

[Footnote 108: Cf. the dictum of Herakleitus: Making worlds is Zeus's pastime; and that of Plato (Laws, Book vii. p. 803): Man is made to be the plaything of G.o.d.]

[Footnote 109: "Whose body nature is, and G.o.d the soul."--_Pope._]

[Footnote 110: For further details respecting Ramanuja and his system, see Wilson's Works, vol. i. pp. 34-46; and Banerjea's Dialogues, ix.

The _Tattva-muktavali_ was printed in the _Pandit_ for September 1871; but the lines quoted in p. 73 are not found there.]

CHAPTER V.

THE SYSTEM OF PURNA-PRAJNA.

ananda-tirtha (Pur?a-prajna, or Madhva) rejected this same Ramanuja system, because, though like his own views, it teaches the atomic size of the soul, the servitude of the soul, the existence of the Veda without any personal author, the authenticity of the Veda, the self-evidence of the instruments of knowledge, the triad of evidences, dependency upon the Pancha-ratra, the reality of plurality in the universe, and so forth,--yet, in accepting three hypotheses as to reciprocally contradictory divisions, &c., it coincides with the tenets of the Jainas. Showing that He is soul, That art thou, and a number of other texts of the Upanishads bear a different import under a different explanation, he set up a new system under the guise of a new explication of the Brahma-Mima?sa (or Vedanta).

For in his doctrine ultimate principles are dichotomised into independent and dependent; as it is stated in the Tattva-viveka:--

"Independent and dependent, two principles are received;

"The independent is Vish?u the Lord, exempt from imperfections, and of inexhaustible excellences."

Here it will be urged (by the Advaita-vadins): Why predicate of the absolute these inexhaustible excellences in the teeth of the Upanishads, which lay down that the absolute principle is void of h.o.m.ogeneity and heterogeneity, and of all plurality in itself? To this be it replied: Not so, for these texts of the Upanishads, as contradictory of many proofs positive of duality, cannot afford proof of universal unity; perception, for example, in the consciousness, This is different from that, p.r.o.nounces a difference between things, blue and yellow, and so forth. The opponent will rejoin: Do you hold that perception is cognisant of a perceptional difference, or of a difference const.i.tuted by the thing and its opposite?

The former alternative will not hold: for without a cognition of the thing and its opposite, the recognition of the difference, which presupposes such a cognition, will be impossible. On the latter alternative it must be asked, Is the apprehension of the difference preceded by an apprehension of the thing and its contrary, or are all the three (the thing, its contrary, and the contrariety) simultaneously apprehended? It cannot be thus preceded, for the operation of the intellect is without delay (or without successive steps), and there would also result a logical seesaw (apprehension of the difference presupposing apprehension of the thing and its contrary, and apprehension of the thing and its contrary presupposing apprehension of the difference). Nor can there be a simultaneous apprehension (of the thing, its contrary, and the difference); for cognitions related as cause and effect cannot be simultaneous, and the cognition of the thing is the cause of the recognition of the difference; the causal relation between the two being recognised by a concomitance and non-concomitance (mutual exclusion), the difference not being cognised even when the thing is present, without a cognition of its absent contrary. The perception of difference, therefore (the opponent concludes), is not easily admissible. To this let the reply be as follows:--Are these objections proclaimed against one who maintains a difference identical with the things themselves, or against one who maintains a difference between things as the subjects of attributes? In the former case, you will be, as the saying runs, punis.h.i.+ng a respectable Brahman for the offence of a thief, the objections you adduce being irrelevant. If it be urged that if it is the essence of the thing that is the difference, then it will no longer require a contrary counterpart; but if difference presuppose a contrary counterpart, it will exist everywhere; this statement must be disallowed, for while the essence of a thing is first known as different from everything else, the determinate usage (name and notion) may be shown to depend upon a contrary counterpart; for example, the essence of a thing so far as const.i.tuted by its dimensions is first cognised, and afterwards it becomes the object of some determinate judgment, as long or short in relation to some particular counterpart (or contrasted object). Accordingly, it is said in the Vish?u-tattva-nir?aya: "Difference is not proved to exist by the relation of determinant and determinate; for this relation of determinant and determinate (or predicate and subject) presupposes difference; and if difference were proved to depend upon the thing and its counterpart, and the thing and its counterpart to presuppose difference, difference as involving a logical circle could not be accounted for; but difference is itself a real predicament (or ultimate ent.i.ty). For this reason (viz., because difference is a _thing_) it is that men in quest of a cow do not act (as if they had found her) when they see a gayal, and do not recall the word _cow_. Nor let it be objected that (if difference be a real ent.i.ty and as such perceived) on seeing a mixture of milk and water, there would be a presentation of difference; for the absence of any manifestation of, and judgment about, the difference, may be accounted for by the force of (the same) obstructives (as hinder the perception of other things), viz., aggregation of similars and the rest." Thus it has been said (in the Sa?khya-karika, v. vii.)--

"From too great remoteness, from too great nearness, from defect in the organs, from instability of the common sensory,

"From subtilty, from interposition, from being overpowered, and from aggregation of similars."

There is no perception respectively of a tree and the like on the peak of a mountain, because of its too great remoteness; of collyrium applied to the eyes, and so forth, because of too great proximity; of lightning and the like, because of a defect in the organs; of a jar or the like in broad daylight, by one whose common sensory is bewildered by l.u.s.t and other pa.s.sions, because of instability of the common sensory; of an atom and the like, because of their subtility; of things behind a wall, and so forth, because of interposition; of the light of a lamp and the like, in the day-time, because of its being overpowered; of milk and water, because of the aggregation of similars.

Or let the hypothesis of difference in qualities be granted, and no harm is done; for given the apprehension of a subject of attributes and of its contrary, the presentation of difference in their modes is possible. Nor let it be supposed that on the hypothesis of difference in the modes of things, as each difference must be different from some ulterior difference, there will result an embarra.s.sing progression to infinity, there being no occasion for the occurrence of the said ulterior difference, inasmuch as we do not observe that men think and say that two things are different as differenced from the different.

Nor can an ulterior difference be inferred from the first difference, for there being no difference to serve as the example in such inference, there cannot but be a non-occurrence of inference. And thus it must be allowed that in raising the objection you have begged for a little oil-cake, and have had to give us gallons of oil. If there be no difference for the example the inference cannot emerge. The bride is not married for the destruction of the bridegroom. There being, then, no fundamental difficulty, this infinite progression presents no trouble.

Difference (duality) is also ascertained by inference. Thus the Supreme Lord differs from the individual soul as the object of its obedience; and he who is to be obeyed by any person differs from that person, a king, for instance, from his attendant. For men, desiring as they do the end of man, Let me have pleasure, let me not have the slightest pain, if they covet the position of their lord, do not become objects of his favour, nay, rather, they become recipients of all kinds of evil. He who a.s.serts his own inferiority and the excellence of his superior, he it is who is to be commended; and the gratified superior grants his eulogist his desire. Therefore it has been said:--

"Kings destroy those who a.s.sert themselves to be kings,

"And grant to those who proclaim their kingly pre-eminence all that they desire."

Thus the statement of those (Advaita-vadins) in their thirst to be one with the Supreme Lord, that the supreme excellence of Vish?u is like a mirage, is as if they were to cut off their tongues in trying to get a fine plantain, since it results that through offending this supreme Vish?u they must enter into the h.e.l.l of blind darkness (_andha-tamasa_). The same thing is laid down by Madhya-mandira in the Mahabharata-tatparya-nir?aya:--

"O Daityas, enemies of the eternal, Vish?u's anger is waxed great;

"He hurls the Daityas into the blind darkness, because they decide blindly."

This service (or obedience of which we have spoken) is trichotomised into (1.) stigmatisation, (2.) imposition of names, (3.) wors.h.i.+p.

Of these, (1.) stigmatisation is (the branding upon oneself) of the weapons of Naraya?a (or Vish?u) as a memorial of him, and as a means of attaining the end which is needful (emanc.i.p.ation). Thus the sequel of the Sakalya-samhita:--

"The man who bears branded in him the discus of the immortal Vish?u, which is the might of the G.o.ds,

"He, shaking off his guilt, goes to the heaven (Vaiku??ha) which ascetics, whose desires are pa.s.sed away, enter into:

"The discus Sudarsana by which, uplifted in his arm, the G.o.ds entered that heaven;

"Marked wherewith the Ma.n.u.s projected the emanation of the world, that weapon Brahmans wear (stamped upon them);

"Stigmatised wherewith they go to the supreme sphere of Vish?u;

"Marked with the stigmas of the wide-striding (Vish?u), let us become beatified."

Again, the Taittiriyaka Upanishad says: "He whose body is not branded, is raw, and tastes it not: votaries bearing it attain thereto." The particular parts to be branded are specified in the agneya-pura?a:--

"On his right hand let the Brahman wear Sudarsana,

"On his left the conch-sh.e.l.l: thus have those who know the Veda declared."

In another pa.s.sage is given the invocation to be recited on being branded with the discus:--

"Sudarsana, brightly blazing, effulgent as ten million suns,

"Show unto me, blind with ignorance, the everlasting way of Vish?u.

"Thou aforetime sprangest from the sea, brandished in the hand of Vish?u,

"Adored by all the G.o.ds; O Pa?chajanya, to thee be adoration."

(2.) Imposition of names is the appellation of sons and others by such names as Kesava, as a continual memorial of the name of the Supreme Lord.

(3.) Wors.h.i.+p is of ten kinds, viz., with the voice, (1.) veracity, (2.) usefulness, (3.) kindliness, (4.) sacred study; with the body, (5.) alms-giving, (6.) defence, (7.) protection; with the common sensory, (8.) mercy, (9.) longing, and (10.) faith. Wors.h.i.+p is the dedication to Naraya?a of each of these as it is realised. Thus it has been said:--