Lessons of the War Part 4

SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS

_January 25th_, 1900

The decisive operation is proceeding slowly but surely. On Wednesday, the 10th, Lord Dundonald reached the south bank of the Tugela at Potgieter's Drift, and on Thursday a brigade of infantry was up with him. A week later, on Wednesday, the 17th, Lyttelton's brigade crossed by the drift, and Warren's wing of the Army began the pa.s.sage by a pontoon bridge at Trichardt's or Wagon Drift. On Thursday, the 18th, Dundonald was on the high road west of Acton Homes, and drove away a party of Boers.

North of the Tugela there is a great crescent-shaped plateau three or four miles across at the widest part. The crescent has its convex side to the south-west. One of its horns touches the Acton Homes--Ladysmith road; its broadest part bulges south towards the river bank between Wagon Drift and the loop near Potgieter's Drift; its other limb is broken into irregular heights, Brakfontein kopje apparently marking its south-eastern apex. On the concave north-eastern side Spion Kop is about at the centre, and is four miles north of Wagon Drift. The plateau is three or four hundred feet above the river and Spion Kop about the same height above the plateau. Near the northern apex rises the Blaauwbank River, which flows eastward towards Ladysmith along the foot of an east and west range, a spur from the Drakensberg mountains jutting out so as to separate the Van Reenen's road and valley from the valley followed by the Acton Homes--Ladysmith road.

When Warren crossed the river he found the western half of the crescent held by the enemy.

Whatever his original design, which may have been to take his whole force to Acton Homes, and then march eastward along the road, he had to drive the Boers from the plateau. His action was deliberate, without hurry, but without waste of time. The troops had been prepared for tactics better suited to their weapons, the bullet and the sh.e.l.l, to the enemy's weapons, and to the ground, than the rapid advance and charge, which was the plan of earlier actions in this war. The view that the bullet should do its work before the appeal to the bayonet is made had at length a.s.serted itself. Moreover, the need for method in attack had been recognised; first reconnaissance, then sh.e.l.ling; during the sh.e.l.ling the deployment of the infantry in extended and flexible order, then the musketry duel supported by the artillery; and then, as the infantry fire proves stronger than the enemy's, an advance from point to point in order to bring it to closer and more deadly range; last of all, if and where it may be needed, the charge. These sound tactics--the only tactics appropriate to modern firearms--cannot be hurried, for to charge men armed with the magazine rifle and not yet shaken is to sacrifice your troops to their own bravery.

Warren's attack then was rightly deliberate. On Friday, the 19th, he was reconnoitring and feeling for the enemy. On Sat.u.r.day the shooting match began. It was continued throughout Sunday, and was not over on Tuesday.

During these days the British were making way, gradually and not without loss, but steadily. There were, no doubt, pauses for renewing order, for reinforcing, and for securing the ground won. On Tuesday evening Spion Kop was still held by the Boers, who seem even then not to have been driven off the plateau, but to have been clinging to its eastern edge.

On Tuesday night Spion Kop was taken. It was a.s.saulted, probably in the dark, by surprise, and the Boers driven off. Even on Wednesday the Boers were tenaciously resisting the advance, making heavy attacks on Spion Kop and using their artillery with effect. At midnight between Wednesday and Thursday Sir Redvers Duller telegraphed home Sir Charles Warren's opinion that the enemy's position had been rendered untenable, and added his own judgment of the behaviour of the British troops in the words, "the men are splendid."

All through the week Lyttelton's brigade has been facing a force of the enemy on the eastern limb of the plateau in front of Potgieter's Drift.

He has not pressed an attack but has kept his infantry back, not pus.h.i.+ng them forward to close range, but contenting himself with sh.e.l.ling the Boer positions.

Sir Redvers Buller before the troops left the camps beside the railway had six infantry brigades. There are indications in the telegrams of a reorganisation and redistribution of battalions among the brigades, so that it is hardly safe to speak with certainty as to the present composition and distribution of the commands. Apparently the left wing under Warren consists of three or four infantry brigades, the cavalry brigade, and most of the mounted infantry, and five or six batteries.

Sir Charles Warren himself appears to keep the general direction of this wing in his own hands. Sir F. Clery either commands a division (two brigades), the third brigade being led by its brigadier, under Sir Charles Warren's direction, or Sir F. Clery is supervising the whole of the infantry advance. Lyttelton has his own brigade, and Barton's brigade covers the railhead at Chieveley. That accounts for five of the six brigades. The sixth is c.o.ke's, of Warren's division. We do not at present know whether this is with Warren on the left wing or with Duller as a general reserve to be put in to the fight at the decisive moment.

The great difficulties of day-after-day fighting, which has been regarded for some years as the normal character of future battles, is to secure for the men the food and rest without which they must soon collapse, and to ensure the continuous supply of ammunition. If these difficulties can be overcome Sir Redvers Bullers has a good chance of success in his endeavour to relieve Ladysmith. Once driven from the plateau by Warren, the Boers must retire several miles before they can reach a second defensive position, and their retirement may be hastened by pressure on their flanks, which is to be expected from Dundonald's mounted infantry and cavalry, probably now on the right or northern flank of the Boer line, as well as from Lyttelton on their left. A small reinforcement would give a fresh impetus to the British advance. If c.o.ke's brigade has not yet been engaged Sir Redvers Buller will know when and where to use it--either to reinforce Lyttelton for a blow against the Boer line of retreat or to reinforce Warren's left. The arrival of the _Kildonan Castle_ at Durban this morning, as far as we know, with drafts for some of the battalions, is better than nothing, for the drafts will give fresh vigour to the bodies that receive them.

They cannot reach the fighting line before Sat.u.r.day, but their arrival then may be most opportune. Still better would it be if a fresh brigade should arrive while the struggle continues. There was at least a brigade available at Cape Town a few days ago, and it could not have been better employed than in strengthening Buller at any point where he can feed it, at Chieveley if not as a reinforcement to Warren or Lyttelton, for a fresh brigade at Chieveley would enable Barton to put pressure on the Boers in his front.

Supposing that Warren has by this time compelled the retreat of the Boers from the plateau for which he has been fighting, what can the Boers do to resist Buller's further advance? They must try to hold a second position. Two such positions appear to be open to them, if we may judge by the not very full maps available. The line of hills from Bulbarrow Hill on the north to the hill near Arnot Hill Farm on the south might give good opportunities for defence; it blocks the road to Ladysmith, for the Boers occupying the line would be right across these roads. Another plan would be for the Boers to retreat to the north-east on to the east and west ridge, which commands from the north the Acton Homes--Dewdrop road. If the Boers took this position the roads to Ladysmith, or to the rear of the investing lines, would be open. But Sir Redvers Buller could not advance along them with the Boer forces menacing his flank, and he would be obliged either to attack them or to contain them by extending a force along their front to hold its ground against them while he pushed the rest of his force towards Ladysmith.

Whether this would be a prudent plan for the Boers depends upon their numbers, and if they are strong enough they might combine both plans.

It is, however, by no means certain that Lord Dundonald is unable to prevent the Boers from crossing the Blaauwbank Spruit. He has not been heard of for a week, and has had plenty of time to have his force in position to the north of Clydesdale Farm, unless, indeed, he has been kept in hand behind Warren's left flank ready for pursuit after the capture of the great plateau.

The situation continues to be critical, and must be so until the fate of Ladysmith is decided. Our own men are justifying to the full the confidence reposed in them; what men can do they will accomplish. But the Boers are fighting stubbornly, and may be able to wear out Sir Redvers Buller's force before their own resistance collapses. We at home must wait patiently, hoping for the best but prepared for fresh efforts.

At least we ought all now to realise that the splendid behaviour of our soldiers in the field lays upon us as citizens the duty of securing for the future the best possible treatment of those who are so generous of their lives.

THE ELEVENTH HOUR

_February 1st_, 1900

If on Tuesday the Bank of England had announced that it could not meet its obligations I imagine that there would have been a certain amount of uneasiness in the City and elsewhere, and that some at least of the rich men to be found in London would have put their heads together to see what could be done to meet a grave emergency.

On Tuesday a failure was indeed announced--a failure which must involve the Bank of England and most of the great banking and trading corporations of this country. But no one seems to have taken action upon it, and I see no visible sign of general alarm. The Prime Minister, speaking in his place in the House of Lords and on behalf of the National Government, said: "I do not believe in the perfection of the British Const.i.tution as an instrument of war ...it is evident there is something in your machinery that is wrong." That was Lord Salisbury's explanation and defence of the failure of his Government in the diplomacy which preceded the war, in the preparations for the war, and in the conduct of the war. It was a declaration of bankruptcy--a plain statement by the Government that it cannot govern. The announcement was not made to Parliament with closed doors and the reporters excluded. It was made to the whole world, to the British Nation, and to all the rivals of Great Britain. Parliament did not take any action upon the declaration. No committee of both Houses was formed to consider how without delay to make a Government that can govern. The ordinary normal routine of public and private life goes on. Thus in the crisis of the Nation's fate we are ungoverned and unled, and to all appearance we are content to be so, and the leader-writers trained in the tradition of respectable formalism interpret the Nation's apathy as fort.i.tude.

Lord Salisbury's confession of impotence was true. From the beginning to the end of this business the Government has lacked the manliness to do its plain duty. In the first half of July, before the official reports of the Bloemfontein conference were published, everyone but the disciples of Mr. Morley knew that the only honourable course, after the Government's declaration prior to the conference and after what there took place, was to insist on the acceptance by the South African Republic of the Bloemfontein proposals and to back up that insistence by adequate military preparations. It is admitted that this was not done, and what is the excuse now made? Mr. Balfour told the House of Commons on Tuesday, January 30th, that if in August a vote of credit had been demanded "we should not have been able to persuade the House that the necessity for the vote was pressing and urgent." The Government charged with the defence of the Empire excuses itself for not having made preparations for that task on the ground that perhaps the House of Commons would not have given its approval. Yet the Government had a great majority at its back, and there is no instance in recent times of a vote of credit having been rejected by the House of Commons. This shameful cowardice was exhibited although, as we now know but could not then have imagined, the Government had in its possession the protest of the Government of Natal against the intention of the Imperial Government to abandon the northern portion of that colony. The Natal Ministers on July 25th confidentially communicated their extreme surprise at learning that in case of sudden hostilities it would not be possible with the garrison and colonial forces available to defend the northern portion of the colony.

After s.h.i.+lly-shallying from May to September the Government began its preparations, and the Boers as soon as they were ready began the war. Of the conduct of the war the readers of _The London Letter_ have had an account week by week, as to the truth of which they can judge for themselves, for the facts are there by which it can be tested. The attempt has been made to refrain from any criticism which could hurt the feelings of the generals, who are doing their duty to the best of their power in most trying circ.u.mstances. But is it not plain that the British Army has been hampered by a lack of sound strategy and of sound tactics such as indicate prolonged previous neglect of these branches of study and training? Who is responsible to the Nation for the training of the Army? The Government and the Government alone. If any military officer has not done his work effectively--if, for example, the Commander-in-Chief has not taught his generals rightly or not selected them properly--who is responsible to Parliament for that?

Not the officer, even if he be the Commander-in-Chief, for the Commander-in-Chief is the servant of the Cabinet and responsible to the Cabinet, which if it were dissatisfied with him ought to have dismissed him. Authority over the Army is in the hands of the Secretary of State for War as the delegate of the Cabinet. Lord Lansdowne has held his post only since 1895, and cannot be held responsible for the training of the older generals; but before him came Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman who for some years had charge of the preparation of the Army for war as the delegate of the late Cabinet. For the state of the Army, for the strategical and tactical training which has resulted in so many failures, the politicians of both front benches, who in turn have neglected these vital matters, are responsible.

Here we are, then, in the middle of the war, without a Government, but with a body of men who fill the place of a Government while admitting themselves incompetent to do the work entrusted to them and for which they are paid. The war so far has consisted of a succession of repulses, which at any moment may culminate in disaster. Sir Redvers Buller has twice led his Army to defeat and is about to lead it a third time--to what? Possibly to victory; we all hope that it may be to victory. But possibly to a third defeat which would mean not merely the loss of the force at Ladysmith; it would mean that Sir Redvers Buller's Army in its turn would need succour, and that the plan, so much favoured by the strategists of the Army, of a march through the Free State would be hampered. For the final and decisive defeat of Sir Redvers Buller would be followed by the long-deferred general rising of the Cape Dutch, and probably enough by the action of one or more of the European Powers.

_The Times_ of to-day announces that a foreign Government has ordered a large supply of steam coal from the Welsh collieries. That can mean but one thing, that some foreign Power is getting its Navy ready for action.

What, then, is the situation to-day? That any day may bring the gravest news from South Africa, to be followed possibly by an ultimatum from a foreign coalition. In that event the Nation will have to choose between abandoning its Empire in obedience to foreign dictation, an abandonment which would mean National ruin, and a war for existence, a war for which no preparation has been made, which the Government is incompetent to conduct, and which would begin by a naval conflict during which it would be impossible to a.s.sist the Army in South Africa. That is the situation.

It may take a turn for better; you cannot be quite sure that a storm which you see brewing may not pa.s.s off, but the probabilities are that the struggle for existence is at hand. What then is our duty, the duty of every one of us? To support the Government which cannot govern? Not for a moment, but to get rid of it as soon as possible and to make at once a Government that will try. Lord Rosebery at least sees the situation and understands the position. There is no other public man who commands such general confidence, and it is practically certain that if the Cabinet were compelled to resign by an adverse vote of the House of Commons Lord Rosebery would be the first statesman to be consulted by the Queen. Lord Rosebery could make a Government to-morrow if he would ignore parties and pick out the competent men wherever they are to be found. Any new Cabinet, except one containing Mr. Morley or Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, would be given a chance. The House of Commons would wait a few weeks to see how it bore itself. If there were prompt evidences of knowledge and will in the measures adopted, even though half the Ministers or all of them except Lord Rosebery were new men, there would soon be a feeling of confidence, and the Nation, knowing that it was led, would respond with enthusiasm. In that case Great Britain might make a good fight, though no one who knows the state of our preparations and those of the rest of the world will make a sanguine prediction as to the result.

TRY, TRY, TRY AGAIN

_February 8th_, 1900

Sir Redvers Buller on Monday set out on his third attempt to relieve Ladysmith. He appears to have made a feint against the Boer position north of Potgieter's Drift, and, while there attracting the attention of the Boers by the concentrated fire of many guns, to have pushed a force of infantry and artillery across the river to the right of Potgieter's Drift. This force, of which the infantry belongs to Lyttelton's brigade, carried and defended against counter attack a hill called Vaal Krantz, at the eastern end of the Brakfontein ridge. To the east of Vaal Krantz runs a good road to Ladysmith, along which the distance from the Tugela to Sir George's White's outposts is about ten miles. To the east again of the road is a hill called Dorn Kop. Here the Boers have an artillery position which seems to command Vaal Krantz, and they probably have the usual infantry trenches. The Boer position then faces the Tugela and runs from Spion Kop on the west, the Boer left, to Dorn Kop on the east, the Boer right. Sir Redvers Buller's attack is an attempt to pierce the centre of this position.

To break the centre of an enemy's line, to pour your forces into and through the gap, and then roll up the more important of his divided wings, is an operation which if it can be successfully executed makes a decisive victory; if followed up it ruins the enemy's army. But it is in modern conditions the most difficult form of attack. The long range of modern weapons, of guns that kill at two miles and of rifles that kill at a mile--to take a moderate estimate of their power--enables the defender to concentrate upon any attack against his centre the fire of all the rifles in his front line for a couple of miles, and of all the guns standing on a length of four miles. A similar concentration of fire is only occasionally and temporary possible for the a.s.sailant, though if it should happen that the ground exposes a point of the defender's line to such concentric fire, while it protects some points held by the a.s.sailant, the attack would have a prospect of success. But the moment the point of attack is recognised by the defender he will collect every available battery and rifleman from all parts of his line and place them on that portion of his front which commands the path of the a.s.sailant.

To prevent this the a.s.sailant must engage the defender along his whole line so that all the defending forces are fully occupied and there are none to spare for the critical point or region.

Sir Redvers Buller's task is rendered harder by the fact that his own troops before they can attack must cross the Tugela. He has two bridges at the point here supposed to have been selected for the main attack, but troops can hardly cross a bridge at a quicker rate than a brigade an hour, and as the Boers ride faster than the British infantry can walk, and as the British troops south of the river cannot effectually engage the Boers, it will not have been easy so to occupy the enemy along the whole front as to prevent his ma.s.sing guns and rifles--at any rate rifles--to defend his centre.

So much for the initial difficulties, which seem by a combination of feint and surprise to have been so far overcome on Monday that the advanced British troops effected a lodgment in the centre of the Boer position, from which a counter-attack failed to eject them. The next thing is, as the British force is brought across the river, to attack one of the Boer wings while containing or keeping back the other. Before this, can be done the enemy's centre must really be pierced, so that troops can be poured through the gap to turn the flank of one of the enemy's divided halves. This piercing is most difficult in the conditions of to-day, for the enemy by establis.h.i.+ng a new firing line behind the point carried by our troops may be able to enclose in a semicircle of fire the party that has made its way into the position.

Against such an enveloping fire it is a hard task to make headway.

All these aspects of his problem a General thinks out before he starts; he does not make his attempt unless and until he sees his way to meet the various difficulties, both those inherent in the nature of the operation and those that arise from the local conditions and from the character of the particular enemy. The difficulties are therefore not reasons why General Buller should not succeed, but their consideration may help to show why with the best previous deliberation and with the bravest of troops he may perhaps not be able to break the Boer resistance.

There is one feature of his task that is perhaps not fully appreciated by the public. In order to relieve Ladysmith he must thoroughly defeat and drive away the Boer army--must, so to speak break its back. For, supposing he could clear a road to Ladysmith and march there, leaving the Boer army in position on one or both sides of his road, his position on reaching the place would be that he would have to fight his way back again, and that unless he could then defeat the Boers his Army would be lost, for it would be cut off from its supplies. The relief of Ladysmith and the complete defeat of the Boer army are therefore synonymous terms.

There is, however, a sense in which a partial defeat of the Boers would be of use. If the Boer army, though not driven off, were yet fully absorbed in its struggle with Sir Redvers Bullet and had drawn to its a.s.sistance some portion of the force investing Ladysmith, it might be possible for Sir George White to make a sortie and to break through the investing lines. To that case, however, the term "the relief of Ladysmith" could hardly be correctly applied.

How far Sir George White can co-operate with Sir Redvers Buller depends partly upon the mobility of his force. His horses after three months in Ladysmith can hardly be in much condition, even supposing that they have not already begun to be used as food for the troops. Supposing there are horses enough for the field guns, and that the naval guns and mountain guns were destroyed at the last moment before the sortie. The men and the field artillery would then have to make a night attack, followed by a march of about seven miles in trying conditions, and by a second attack in which they would join hands with Sir Redvers Buller.

This does not imply exertions impossible to troops like Sir George White's, and such a move perhaps offers the best way out of the difficulties of the situation. If in that case Sir George White made for the north side of Dorn Kop a part of the Boer army would probably be destroyed, and the loss which the British force would have suffered would thus to some extent be made up for. It is presumed that Sir Redvers Buller and Sir George White, who are able to communicate with one another, have a cipher which enables them to inform each other without informing the enemy.

Any plan which will unite Sir George White's force, or the bulk of it, with that of Sir Redvers Buller on the Tugela will simplify the whole problem of the War. Lord Roberts is preparing for an advance in force from the Orange River, which will sooner or later transfer the centre of gravity to the western theatre of War, in which the British troops will not be confronted by the difficulties of an unknown or very imperfectly known mountainous region. The movements now taking place in the Cape Colony are the preliminaries to that advance. The method, the only right method, is to use the reinforcements that have arrived--the sixth and seventh divisions--to secure a preponderance first at one point and then at another, instead of distributing them evenly over the whole area and the various points of contact. The idea would seem to be, first, to strengthen General French until he has crushed the Boer force with which he is dealing, then to use his troops to secure the defeat of the Boers who are opposing Sir William Gatacre, and then to cross the Orange River with three divisions and deal a blow against the Boer army that is now between the Riet River and Kimberley. This plan of beating in detail the Boer forces in the western theatre of war, if carried out so as to lead in each case to a crus.h.i.+ng defeat of the Boers, would be the prelude to a collision between the main Boer army and a British force its superior in every respect. The first certain evidence that some such idea is at the foundation of the new operations may be hailed as the beginning of victory. For the present it is enough to know that the departure of Lord Roberts from Cape Town augurs the opening of an energetic campaign with that unity of direction in a strong hand which is the first element of success in war.

A COMMANDER

_February 15th_, 1900

In war, as in other great enterprises, the first element of success is unity of direction in a strong hand. The reason is that whenever the co-operation of large numbers is involved the needful concentration of purpose can be supplied only by the head man, the leader or director.

Concentration of purpose means in war the arrangement in due perspective of all the various objectives, the selection of the most important of them, the distribution of forces according to the importance of the blows to be delivered, of which some one is always decisive. To the decisive point, then, the bulk of the forces are directed, and at other points small forces are left to make s.h.i.+ft as well as they can, unless, indeed, there is a superabundance of force--not a common phenomenon.

The same principle of concentration prescribes that action when once begun should, at any rate at the decisive point, be sudden, rapid, and continuous. These fundamental ideas are ill.u.s.trated by the practice of all the great commanders, and there is perhaps no better definition of a great commander than one whose action ill.u.s.trates the simple principles of war. Lord Roberts is once more revealing to his countrymen the nature of these principles. The tangled ma.s.s of the war has suddenly become simplified, and there is clearness where there was confusion.

The Commander-in-Chief reached Cape Town on January 10th, and found large forces dispersed over a front of two or three hundred miles, the reinforcements at sea, and the transport still in a state very like confusion. By February 6th, two or three weeks earlier than was antic.i.p.ated by those at home who had the most perfect confidence in him, he was on his way to the front, enabling those at home to draw the certain inference that all was ready, the divisions a.s.sembled, and the transport in order. While he was travelling the six hundred miles from Cape Town to the Modder River various preliminary moves which he had ordered were in course of execution. There had been a large display of British infantry near Colesberg, covering the withdrawal of General French and the cavalry division. This had the effect of causing the Boers to reinforce Colesberg, probably by detachments from Magersfontein. The British infantry, however, was there only to lure the Boers; it was composed of parts of the sixth division on the way further north, and only a small infantry force was left to hold the reinforced Boers in check. The next move was a reconnaissance in force from Modder River to Koodoosberg Drifts, which drew Commandant Cronje's attention and some of his troops to his right flank. The reconnaissance had the further object of inspiriting the Highland Brigade which had been so badly damaged at Magersfontein, and of establis.h.i.+ng good relations between these troops and their new commander, General Mac Donald. On their return to camp a short address from Lord Roberts had the effect upon them that Napoleon's proclamations used to produce on the French troops. A day or two was spent in completing the organisation of the force at Modder River, where a new division, the ninth, had been formed probably of troops brought up from the communications. The mounted infantry were also brigaded, as had been those at Orange River Station.

Meantime various movements had been going on of which the details as yet are unreported. Two infantry divisions, the sixth and seventh, the last two from England, were moving towards the Riet River to the East of Jacobsdal. The point or points from which they started are not known, nor the direction of their march, which was screened by the cavalry division and perhaps also by a brigade of mounted infantry. At any rate on Sunday, the 11th inst., Hannay's brigade of mounted infantry from Orange River, on the march to Ramdam, had to cover its right flank against a party of Boers. Ramdam is not to be found, but if it is on the Riet above Jacobsdal the probability is that Hannay's brigade was covering the right flank of the infantry divisions.