Doctrine Of The Will Part 3

I. The first inquiry that presents itself is this: Do Necessitarians hold the doctrine of Necessity as defined in this chapter? Do they really hold, in respect to every act of will, that, in the circ.u.mstances of its occurrence, that one act only is possible, and that cannot but arise? Is this, for example, the doctrine of Edwards? Is it the doctrine really held by those who professedly agree with him? I argue that it is:

1. Because they unanimously repudiate the doctrine of Liberty as here defined. They must, therefore, hold that of Necessity; inasmuch as no third relation is even conceivable or possible. If they deny that the phenomena of the Will fall under either of these relations, and still call themselves Necessitarians, they most hold to an inconceivable something, which themselves even do not understand and cannot define, and which has and can have no real existence.

2. Edwards has confounded the phenomena of the Will with those of the Sensibility which are necessary in the sense here defined. He must, therefore, hold that the characteristics of the latter cla.s.s belong to those of the former.

3. Edwards represents the relation between motives and acts of Will, as being the same in _kind_ as that which exists between _causes_ and _effects_ among external material substances. The former relation he designates by the words _moral necessity_; the latter, by that of natural, or _philosophical_, or _physical necessity_. Yet he says himself, that the difference expressed by these words "does not lie so much in the nature of the _connection_ as in the two terms _connected_."

The qualifying terms used, then, designate merely the nature of the antecedents and consequents, while the nature of the connection between them is, in all instances, the same, that of naked necessity.

4. Edwards himself represents moral necessity as just as absolute as physical, or natural necessity. "Moral necessity may be," he says, "as absolute as natural necessity. That is, the effect may be as perfectly connected with its moral cause as a natural necessary effect is with its natural cause."

5. Necessitarians represent the relation between motives and acts of Will as that of _cause_ and _effect_; and for this reason necessary.

"If," says Edwards, "every act of Will is excited by some motive, then that motive is the _cause_ of that act of Will." "And if volitions are properly the effects of their motives, then they are _necessarily_ connected with their motives." Now as the relation of cause and effect is necessary, in the sense of the term Necessity as above defined, Edwards must hold, and design to teach, that all acts of Will are necessary in this sense.

6. Necessitarians represent the connection between motives and acts of Will as being, in all instances, the same in kind as that which exists between volitions and external actions. "As external actions," says President Day, "are directed by the Will, so the Will itself is directed by influence." Now all admit, that the connection between volitions and external actions is necessary in this sense, that when we will such action it cannot but take place. No other act is, in the circ.u.mstances, possible. In the same sense, according to Necessitarians, is every act of Will necessarily connected with influence, or motives. We do Necessitarians no wrong, therefore, when we impute to them the doctrine of Necessity as here defined. In all cases of sin, they hold, that an individual is in circ.u.mstances in which none but sinful acts of Will are possible, and these he cannot but put forth; and that in these identical circ.u.mstances the sinner is under obligation infinite to put forth different and opposite acts.

THE TERM, CERTAINTY, AS USED BY NECESSITARIANS.

II. We are prepared for another important inquiry, to wit: whether the words, _certainty_, _moral certainty_, &c., as used by Necessitarians, are identical in their meaning with that of Necessity as above defined?

The doctrine of Necessity would never be received by the public at all, but for the language in which it is clothed, language which prevents the public seeing it as it is. At one time it is called Moral, in distinction from Natural Necessity. At another, it is said to be nothing but Certainty, or moral Certainty, &c. Now the question arises, what is this Certainty? Is it or is it not, real Necessity, and nothing else?

That it is, I argue,

1. From the fact, as shown above, that there can possibly be no Certainty, which does not fall either under the relation of Liberty or Necessity as above defined. The Certainty of Necessitarians does not, according to their own showing, fall under the former relation: it must, therefore, fall under the latter. It must be naked Necessity, and nothing else.

2. While they have defined the term Necessity, and have not that of Certainty, they use the latter term as avowedly synonymous with the former. The latter, therefore, must be explained by the former, and not the former by the latter.

3. The Certainty which they hold is a certainty which avowedly excludes the possibility of different and opposite acts of Will under the influences, or motives, under which particular acts are put forth. The Certainty under consideration, therefore, is not necessity of a particular kind, a necessity consistent with liberty and moral obligation. It is the Necessity above defined, in all its naked deformity.

III. We are now prepared for a distinct statement of the doctrine of Ability, according to the Necessitarian scheme. Even the Necessitarians, with very few exceptions, admit, that in the absence of all power to do right or wrong, we can be under no obligation to do the one or avoid the other. "A man," says Pres. Day, "is not responsible for remaining in his place if he has no power to move. He is not culpable for omitting to walk, if he has no strength to walk. He is not under obligation to do anything for which he has not what Edwards calls _natural_ power." It is very important for us to understand the _nature_ of this ability, which lies at the foundation of moral obligation; to understand, I repeat, what this Ability is, according to the theory under consideration. This Ability, according to the doctrine of Liberty, has been well stated by Cousin, to wit: "The moment we take the resolution to do an action, we take it with a consciousness of being able to take a contrary resolution;" and by Dr. Dwight, who says of a man's sin, that it is "chosen by him unnecessarily, _while possessed of a power to choose otherwise_." The nature of this Ability, according to the Necessitarian scheme, has been stated with equal distinctness in the Christian Spectator. "If we take this term [Ability or Power] in the absolute sense, as including _all_ the antecedents to a given volition, there is plainly no such thing as power to the contrary; for in this sense of the term," as President Day states, "a man never has power to do anything but what he actually performs." "In this comprehensive, though rather unusual sense of the word," says President Day, "a man has not power to do anything which he does not do." The meaning of the above extracts cannot be mistaken. Nor can any one deny that they contain a true exposition of the doctrine of Necessity, to wit: that under the influences under which men do will, and consequently act, it is absolutely impossible for them to will and act differently from what they do. In what sense, then, have they power to will and act differently according to this doctrine? To this question President Day has given a correct and definite answer. "The man who wills in a particular way, under the influence of particular feelings, might will differently under a different influence."

Now, what is the doctrine of Ability, according to this scheme? A man, for example, commits an act of sin. He ought, in the stead of that act, to have put forth an act of obedience. Without the power to render this obedience, as President Day admits, there can be no obligation to do it.

When the Necessitarian says, that the creature, when he sins, has power to obey, he means, not that under the influence under which the act of sin is committed, the creature has power to obey; but that _under a different influence he might obey_. But mark, it is under the identical influence under which a man does sin, and under which, according to the doctrine of Necessity, he cannot but sin, that he is required not to sin. Now how can a man's ability, and obligation not to sin under a given influence, grow out of the fact, that, under a different influence, an influence under which he cannot but do right, he might not sin? This is all the ability and ground of obligation as far as Ability, Natural Ability as it is called, is concerned, which the doctrine of Necessity admits. A man is, by a power absolutely irresistible, placed in circ.u.mstances in which he cannot possibly but sin. In these circ.u.mstances, it is said, that he has _natural ability_ not to sin, and consequently ought not to do it. Why? Because, to his acting differently, no change in his nature or powers is required. These are "perfect and entire, wanting nothing." All that is required is, that his _circ.u.mstances_ be changed, and then he might not sin. "In what sense,"

asks President Day, "is it true, that a man has power to will the contrary of what he actually wills? He has such power that, with a _sufficient inducement_, he will make an opposite choice." Is not this the strangest idea of Natural Ability as const.i.tuting the foundation of obligation, of which the human mind ever tried to conceive? In ill.u.s.tration, let us suppose that a man, placed in the city of New York, cannot but sin; placed in that of Boston, he cannot but be holy, and that the fact whether he is in the one or the other city depends upon the irresistible providence of G.o.d. He is placed in New York where he cannot but sin. He is told that he ought not to do it, and that he is highly guilty for not being perfectly holy. It is also a.s.serted that he has all the powers of moral agency, all the ability requisite to lay the foundation for the highest conceivable obligation to be holy. What is the evidence? he asks. Is it possible for me, in my present circ.u.mstances, to avoid sin? and in my present circ.u.mstances, you know, I cannot but be. I acknowledge, the Necessitarian says, that under present influences, you cannot but sin, and that you cannot but be subject to these influences. Still, I affirm, that you have all the powers of moral agency, all the natural ability requisite to obedience, and to the highest conceivable obligation to obedience. Because, in the first place, even in New York, you could obey if you chose. You have, therefore, _natural_, though not _moral_, power to obey. But stop, friend, right here. When you say that I might obey, if I chose, I would ask, if choosing, as in the command, "choose life," is not the very thing required of me? When, therefore, you affirm that I might obey, if I chose, does it not mean, in reality, that I might choose, if I should choose? Is not your Natural Ability this, that I might obey if I did obey?[2] I cannot deny, the Necessitarian replies, that you have correctly stated this doctrine. Permit me to proceed in argument, however. In the next place, all that you need in order to be holy as required, is a change, not of your _powers_, but of the _influences_ which control the _action_ of those powers. With no change in your const.i.tution or powers, you need only to be placed in Boston instead of New York, and there you cannot but be holy. Is it not as clear as light, therefore, that you have now all the powers of moral agency, all the ability requisite to the highest conceivable obligation to be holy instead of sinful?

I fully understand you, the sinner replies. But remember, that it is not in Boston, where, as you acknowledge, I cannot be, that I am required not to sin; but here, in New York, where I cannot but be, and cannot possibly but sin. It is here, and not somewhere else, that I am required not to sin. How can the fact, that if I were in Boston, where I could not but be holy, I might not sin, prove, that here, in New York, I have any ability, either natural or moral--am under any obligation whatever--not to sin? These are the difficulties which press upon me.

How do you remove them according to your theory?

I can give no other answer, the Necessitarian replies, than that already given. If that does not silence for ever every excuse for sin in your mind, it is wholly owing to the perverseness of your heart, to its bitter hostility to the truth. I may safely appeal to the Necessitarian himself, whether I have not here given an uncaricatured expose of his theory.

SINFUL INCLINATIONS.

IV. When pressed with such appalling difficulties as these, the Necessitarian falls back, in self-justification, upon the _reason why_ the sinner cannot be holy. The only reason, it is said, why the sinner does not do as he ought is, not the want of power, but the strength of his sinful inclinations. Shall he plead these in excuse for sin? By no means. They const.i.tute the very essence of the sinner's guilt. Let it be borne in mind, that, according to the doctrine of Necessity, such is the connection between the nature, or const.i.tution of the sinner's mind--a nature which G.o.d has given him, and the influences under which he is placed by Divine Providence--that none but these very inclinations are possible to him, and these cannot but exist. From these inclinations, sinful acts of Will cannot but arise. How is the matter helped, as far as ability and obligation, on the part of the sinner, are concerned, by throwing the guilt back from acts of Will upon inclinations equally necessary?

NECESSARIAN DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY.

The real liberty of the Will, according to the Necessitarian scheme, next demands our attention. All admit that Liberty is an essential condition of moral obligation. In what sense, then, is or is not, man free, according to the doctrine of Necessity?

"The plain and obvious meaning of the words Freedom and Liberty," says President Edwards, "is power, opportunity, or advantage, that any one has to do as he pleases. Or, in other words, his being free from hinderance or impediment in the way of doing or conducting in any respect as he wills. And the contrary to Liberty, whatever name we please to call that by, is a person's being hindered, or unable to conduct as he will, or being necessitated to do otherwise." "The only idea, indeed, that we can form of free-agency, or of freedom of Will,"

says Abercrombie, "is, that it consists in a man's being able to do what he wills, or to abstain from doing what he will not. Necessary agency, on the other hand, would consist in a man's being compelled, by a force from without, to do what he will not, or prevented from doing what he wills."

With these definitions all Necessitarians agree. This is all the Liberty known, or conceivable, according to their theory. Liberty does not consist in the power to choose in one or the other of two or more different and opposite directions, under the same influence. It is found wholly and exclusively in the connection between the act of Will, considered as the antecedent, and the effort, external or internal, considered as the consequent. On this definition I remark,

1. That it presents the idea of Liberty as distinguished from _Servitude_, rather than Liberty as distinguished from Necessity. A man is free, in the first sense of the term, when no external restraints hinder the carrying out of the choice within. This, however, has nothing to do with Liberty, as distinguished from Necessity.

2. If this is the only sense in which a man is free, then, in the language of a very distinguished philosopher, "if you cut off a man's little finger, you thereby annihilate so much of his free agency;"

because, in that case, you abridge so much his power to do as he chooses. Is this Liberty, the only liberty of man, a liberty which may be destroyed by chains, bolts, and bars? Is this Liberty as distinguished from Necessity the liberty which lays the foundation of moral obligation?

3. If this is the only sense in which man is free, then dire Necessity reigns throughout the entire domain of human agency. If all acts of Will are the necessary consequents of the influences to which the mind is at the time subjected, much more must a like necessity exist between all acts of Will and their consequents, external and internal. This has been already shown. The mind, then, with all its acts and states, exists in a chain of antecedents and consequents, causes and effects, linked together in every part and department by a dire necessity. This is all the Liberty that this doctrine knows or allows us; a Liberty to choose as influences necessitate us to choose, and to have such acts of Will followed by certain necessary consequents, external and internal. In this scheme, the idea of Liberty, which all admit must have a location somewhere, or obligation, is a chimera; this idea, I say, after "wandering through dry places, seeking rest and finding none," at length is driven to a location where it finds its grave, and not a living habitation.

4. It is to me a very strange thing, that Liberty, as the foundation of moral obligation, should be located here. Because that acts of Will are followed by certain corresponding necessary consequents external and internal, therefore we are bound to put forth given acts of Will, whatever the influences acting upon us may be, and however impossible it may be to put forth those acts under those influences! Did ever a greater absurdity dance in the brain of a philosopher or theologian?

5. The public are entirely deceived by this definition, and because they are deceived as to the theory intended by it, do they admit it as true?

Suppose any man in the common walks of life were asked what he means, when he says, he can do as he pleases, act as he chooses, &c. Does this express your meaning? When you will to walk, rather than sit, for example, no other volition is at the time possible, and this you must put forth, and that when you have put forth this volition, you cannot but walk. Is this your idea, when you say, you can do as you please? No, he would say. That is not my idea at all. If that is true, man is not a free agent at all. What men in general really mean when they say, they can do as they please, and are therefore free, is, that when they put forth a given act of Will, and for this reason conduct in a given manner, they may in the same circ.u.mstances put forth different and opposite determinations, and consequently act in a different and opposite manner from what they do.

VI. The argument of Necessitarians in respect to the _practical tendencies_ of their doctrine demands a pa.s.sing notice. All acts of the Will, they say, are indeed necessary under the circ.u.mstances in which they occur; but then we should learn the practical lesson not to place ourselves in the circ.u.mstances where we shall be liable to act wrong. To this I reply:

1. That on the hypothesis before us, our being in the circ.u.mstances which originate a given choice, is as necessary as the choice itself.

For I am in those circ.u.mstances either by an overruling Providence over which I have no control, or by previous acts of the Will rendered necessary by such Providence. Hence the difficulty remains in all its force.

2. The solution a.s.sumes the very principle denied, that is, that our being in circ.u.mstances which originate particular acts of choice is not necessary. Else why tell an individual he is to blame for being in such circ.u.mstances, and not to place himself there again?

GROUND WHICH NECESSITARIANS ARE BOUND TO TAKE IN RESPECT TO THE DOCTRINE OF ABILITY.

VII. We are now fully prepared to state the ground which Necessitarians of every school are bound to take in respect to the doctrine of Ability.

It is to deny that doctrine wholly, to take the open and broad ground, that, according to any appropriate signification of the words, it is absolutely impossible for men to will, and consequently to act, differently from what they do; that when they do wrong, they always do it, with the absolute impossibility of doing right; and that when they do right, there is always an equal impossibility of their doing wrong.

If men have not power to _will_ differently from what they do, it is undeniably evident that they have no power whatever to act differently: because there is an absolutely necessary connection between volitions and their consequents, external actions. The doctrine of Necessity takes away wholly all ability from the creature to will differently from what he does. It therefore totally annihilates his ability to _act_ differently. What, then, according to the theory of Necessity, becomes of the doctrine of Ability? It is annihilated. It is impossible for us to find for it a "local habitation or a name." As honest men, Necessitarians are bound to proclaim the fact. They are bound to proclaim the doctrine, that, in requiring men to be holy, under influences under which they do sin, and cannot but sin (as it is true of all sinful acts according to their theory), G.o.d requires of them absolute impossibilities, and then dooms them to perdition for not performing such impossibilities.

The subterfuge to which Necessitarians resort here, will not avail them at all, to wit: that men are to blame for not doing right, because, they might do it if they chose. To will right is the thing, and the only thing really required of them. The above maxim therefore amounts, as we have already seen, to this: Men are bound to do, that is, to will, what is right, because if they should will what is right, they would will what is right.

DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY, AS REGARDED BY NECESSITARIANS OF DIFFERENT SCHOOLS.

VIII. Two schools divide the advocates of Necessity. According to one cla.s.s, G.o.d produces in men all their volitions and acts, both sinful and holy, by the direct exertion of his own omnipotence. Without the Divine agency, men, they hold, are wholly incapable of all volitions and actions of every kind. With it, none but those which G.o.d produces can arise, and these cannot but arise. This is the scheme of Divine efficiency, as advocated by Dr. Emmons and others.

According to the other school, G.o.d does not, in all instances, produce volitions and actions by his own direct agency, but by creating in creatures a certain nature or const.i.tution, and then subjecting them to influences from which none but particular volitions and acts which they do put forth can result, and these must result. According to a large portion of this school, G.o.d, either by his own direct agency, or by sustaining their laws of natural generation, produces in men the peculiar nature which they do possess, and then imputes to them infinite guilt, not only for this nature, but for its necessary results, sinful feelings, volitions, and actions.

Such are these two schemes. In the two following particulars, they perfectly harmonize. 1. All acts of Will, together with their effects, external and internal, in the circ.u.mstances of their occurrence, cannot but be what they are. 2. The ground of this necessity is the agency of G.o.d, in the one instance producing these effects directly and immediately, and in the other producing the same results, mediately, by giving existence to a const.i.tution and influences from which such results cannot but arise. They differ only in respect to the _immediate_ ground of this necessity, the power of G.o.d, according to the former, producing the effects directly, and according to the latter, indirectly.

According to both, all our actions sustain the same essential relation to the Divine Will, that of Necessity.

Now while these two theories so perfectly harmonize, in all essential particulars, strange to tell, the advocates of one regard the other as involving the most monstrous absurdities conceivable. For G.o.d to produce, through the energies of his own omnipotence, human volitions, and then to impute infinite guilt to men for what he himself has produced in them, what a horrid sentiment that is, exclaims the advocate of const.i.tutional depravity. For G.o.d to create in men a sinful nature, and then impute to them infinite guilt for what he has himself created, together with its unavoidable results, what horrid tyranny such a sentiment imputes to the Most High, exclaims the advocate of Divine efficiency, in his turn.

The impartial, uncommitted spectator, on the other hand, perceives most distinctly the same identical absurdities in both these theories. He knows perfectly, that it can make no essential difference, whether G.o.d produces a result directly, or by giving existence to a const.i.tution and influences from which it cannot but arise. If one theory involves injustice and tyranny, the other must involve the same. Let me here add, that the reprobation with which each of the cla.s.ses above named regards the sentiments of the other, is a sentence of reprobation pa.s.sed (unconsciously to be sure) upon the doctrine of Necessity itself which is common to both. For if this one element is taken out of either theory, there is nothing left to render it abhorrent to any mind. It is thus that Necessitarians themselves, without exception, pa.s.s sentence of condemnation upon their own theory, by condemning it, in every system in which they meet with it except their own. There is not a man on earth, that has not in some form or other pa.s.sed sentence of reprobation upon this system. Let any man, whatever, contemplate any theory but the one he has himself adopted, any theory that involves this element, and he will instantly fasten upon this one feature as the characteristic which vitiates the whole theory, and renders it deserving of universal reprobation. It is thus that unsophisticated Nature expresses her universal horror at a system which

"Binding nature fast in fate, Enslaves the human Will."

Unsophisticated Nature abhors this doctrine infinitely more than she was ever conceived to abhor a vacuum. Can a theory which the universal Intelligence thus agrees in reprobating, as involving the most horrid absurdity and tyranny conceivable, be the only true one?