The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation Part 120

[591] 3 Dall. 321 (1796). Justice Wilson dissented from this holding and contended that the appellate jurisdiction, as being derived from the Const.i.tution, could be exercised without an act of Congress or until Congress made exceptions to it.

[592] Durousseau _v._ United States, 6 Cr. 307 (1810).

[593] 6 Wall. 318 (1868); 7 Wall. 506 (1869).

[594] 15 Stat. 44 (1868).

[595] 7 Wall. 506, 514. The Court also took occasion to reiterate the rule that an affirmation of appellate jurisdiction is a negative of all other and stated that as a result acts of Congress providing for the exercise of jurisdiction had "come to be spoken of as acts granting jurisdiction, and not as acts making exceptions to * * * it." It continued grandly: "* * * judicial duty is not less fitly performed by declining ungranted jurisdiction than in exercising firmly that which the Const.i.tution and the laws confer." Ibid. 513, 515.

[596] _See_ especially the parallel case of Ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall. 85 (1869). For cases following Ex parte McCardle, _see_ Railroad Co. _v._ Grant, 98 U.S. 398, 491 (1878); Kurtz _v._ Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487, 497 (1885); Cross _v._ Burke, 146 U.S. 82, 86 (1892); Missouri _v._ Missouri Pacific R. Co., 292 U.S. 13, 15 (1934); Stephan _v._ United States, 319 U.S. 423, 426 (1943). _See also_ United States _v._ Bitty, 208 U.S. 393, 399-400 (1908), where it was held that there is no right to appeal to the Supreme Court except as an act of Congress confers it.

[597] 105 U.S. 381 (1882).

[598] Ibid. 386. _See also_ Barry _v._ Mercein, 5 How. 103, 119 (1847); National Exchange Bank _v._ Peters, 144 U.S. 570 (1892); American Construction Co. _v._ Jacksonville T. & K.W.R. Co., 148 U.S. 372 (1893); Colorado Central Consol. Min. Co. _v._ Turck, 150 U.S. 138 (1893); St.

Louis, I.M. & S.R. Co. _v._ Taylor, 210 U.S. 281 (1908); Luckenbach S.S.

Co. _v._ United States, 272 U.S. 533 (1926).

[599] 1 Wheat. 304 (1816).

[600] Ibid. 374.

[601] Ibid. 331. This recognition, however, is followed by the statement that "the whole judicial power of the United States should be at all times, vested either in an original or appellate form, in some courts created under its authority."

[602] 2 Commentaries, ---- 1590-1595.

[603] 1 Stat. 73, ---- 9-11.

[604] Ibid.

[605] Ibid. ---- 14, 15, 17, 18.

[606] Ibid. -- 16.

[607] Dall. 8 (1799).

[608] Ibid. 9.

[609] Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cr. 75, 93 (1807). Two years later Chief Justice Marshall in Bank of United States _v._ Deveaux, 5 Cr. 61 (1809), held for the Court that the right to sue does not imply a right to sue in a federal court unless conferred expressly by an act of Congress.

[610] 7 Cr. 32 (1812).

[611] Ibid. 33.

[612] Ibid.

[613] 12 Pet. 657, 721-722 (1838).

[614] 3 How. 236 (1845).

[615] Ibid. 244-245. To these sweeping a.s.sertions of legislative supremacy Justices Story and McLean took vigorous exception. They denied the authority of Congress to deprive the courts of power and vest it in an executive official because "the right to construe the laws in all matters of controversy is of the very essence of judicial power." In their view the act as interpreted violated the principle of the separation of powers, impaired the independence of the judiciary, and merged the executive and judicial department. Dissent of Justice McLean, pp. 264 and following.

[616] 8 How. 441 (1850).

[617] Ibid. 449.

[618] Rice _v._ M. & N.W.R. Co., 1 Bl. 358, 374 (1862); Mayor of Nashville _v._ Cooper, 6 Wall. 247, 251-252 (1868); United States _v._ Eckford, 6 Wall. 484, 488 (1868); Ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall. 85, 104 (1868); case of the Sewing Machine Companies, 18 Wall. 553, 557-558 (1874); Morgan _v._ Gay, 19 Wall. 81, 83 (1874); Gaines _v._ Fuentes, 92 U.S. 10, 18 (1876); Jones _v._ United States, 137 U.S. 202, 211 (1890); Holmes _v._ Goldsmith, 147 U.S. 150, 158 (1893); Johnson Steel Street Rail Co. _v._ Wharton, 152 U.S. 252, 260 (1894); Plaquemines Tropical Fruit Co. _v._ Henderson, 170 U.S. 511, 513-521 (1898); Stevenson _v._ Fain, 195 U.S. 165, 167 (1904); Kentucky _v._ Powers, 201 U.S. 1, 24 (1906); Venner _v._ Great Northern R. Co., 209 U.S. 24, 35 (1908); Ladew _v._ Tennessee Copper Co., 218 U.S. 357, 358 (1910); Kline _v._ Burke Construction Co., 260 U.S. 226, 233, 234 (1922). _See also_ Lauf _v._ E.G. s.h.i.+nner & Co., 303 U.S. 323 (1938); Federal Power Commission _v._ Pacific Power & Light Co., 307 U.S. 156 (1939).

[619] Mayor of Nashville _v._ Cooper, 6 Wall. 247, 251-252 (1868). The rule of Cary _v._ Curtis and Sheldon _v._ Sill was restated with emphasis many years later in Kline _v._ Burke Construction Co., 260 U.S.

226, 233-234 (1922), where Justice Sutherland, speaking for the Court, proceeded to say to article III, ---- 1 and 2: "The effect of these provisions is not to vest jurisdiction in the inferior courts over the designated cases and controversies but to delimit those in respect of which Congress may confer jurisdiction upon such courts as it creates.

Only the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is derived directly from the Const.i.tution. Every other court created by the general government derives its jurisdiction wholly from the authority of Congress. That body may give, withhold or restrict such jurisdiction at its discretion, provided it be not extended beyond the boundaries fixed by the Const.i.tution. * * * The Const.i.tution simply gives to the inferior courts the capacity to take jurisdiction in the enumerated cases, but it requires an act of Congress to confer it. * * * And the jurisdiction having been conferred may, at the will of Congress, be taken away in whole or in part; and if withdrawn without a saving clause all pending cases though cognizable when commenced must fall."

[620] 56 Stat. 23 (1942).

[621] 319 U.S. 182 (1943).

[622] 321 U.S. 414 (1944).

[623] Ibid. 468.

[624] _See infra_, pp. 515-528.

[625] 26 U.S.C.A. 3653.

[626] _See_ for example Snyder _v._ Marks, 109 U.S. 189 (1883); Cheatham _v._ United States, 92 U.S. 85 (1875); Shelton _v._ Platt, 139 U.S. 591 (1891); Pacific Steam Whaling Co. _v._ United States, 187 U.S. 447 (1903); Dodge _v._ Osborn, 240 U.S. 118 (1916).

[627] Dodge _v._ Brady, 240 U.S. 122, 126 (1916).

[628] Hill _v._ Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922); Lipke _v._ Lederer, 259 U.S. 557 (1922); Miller _v._ Standard Nut Margarine Co., 284 U.S. 498, 509 (1932).

[629] Enjoining the a.s.sessment and Collection of Federal Taxes Despite Statutory Prohibition, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 109 (1935).

[630] Allen _v._ Regents of University System of Georgia, 304 U.S. 439, 445-449 (1938).

[631] 47 Stat. 70 (1932).

[632] Lauf _v._ E.G. s.h.i.+nner & Co., 303 U.S. 323 (1938); New Negro Alliance _v._ Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552. 562-563 (1838); Milk Wagon Drivers' Union _v._ Lake Valley Farm Products Co., 311 U.S. 91, 100-103 (1940).

[633] 330 U.S. 258 (1947). Virginian R. Co. _v._ System Federation No.

40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937), in some ways const.i.tutes an exception to section 9 of the statute by sustaining a mandatory injunction issued against an employer on the pet.i.tion of employees on the ground that the prohibition of section 9 does not include mandatory injunctions, but "blanket injunctions which are usually prohibitory in form." For other acts of Congress limiting the power of the federal courts to issue injunctions _see infra_, pp. 523-525.

[634] 1 Wheat. 304 (1816).

[635] 18 How. 272 (1856).

[636] 285 U.S. 22 (1932).

[637] Ibid 56-57. _Cf._, however, s.h.i.+elds _v._ Utah, Idaho R. Co., 305 U.S. 185 (1938).

[638] Mayor of Nashville _v._ Cooper, 6 Wall. 247, 252 (1868); Kline _v._ Burke Construction Co., 260 U.S. 226, 233, 234 (1922). _See also_ Hodgson _v._ Bowerbank, 5 Cr. 303, 304 (1809) where Chief Justice Marshall disposed of the effort of British subjects to docket a case in a circuit court, saying, "turn to the article of the Const.i.tution of the United States, for the statute cannot extend the jurisdiction beyond the limits of the Const.i.tution."