The Philosophy of the Plays of Shakspere Unfolded Part 12

That is the real original English doctrine of Art:--that is the doctrine of the age of Elizabeth, at least, as it stands in that queen's English, and though it may be very far from being orthodox at present, it is the doctrine which must determine the rule of any successful interpretation of works of art composed on that theory.

'And, therefore,' he proceeds to say, 'it was great injustice in Plato, though springing out of a just hatred of the rhetoricians of his time, to esteem of rhetoric but as a voluptuary art, resembling it to cookery that did mar wholesome meats, and help unwholesome, by variety of sauces _to the pleasure of the taste_.' 'And therefore, as Plato said eloquently, "That virtue, if she could be seen, would move great love and affection, so, seeing that she cannot be showed to the sense by corporal shape, the next degree is to show her to the imagination _in lively representation_": _for_ to show her to _reason only_, in _subtilty of argument_ was a thing ever derided in--_Chrysippus and many of the Stoics--who thought to thrust virtue upon men_ by _sharp disputations and conclusions, which have no sympathy with the will of man_.'

'Again, if the affections in themselves were pliant and obedient to reason, it were true there should be no great use of persuasions and injunctions to the will, more than of _naked propositions and proofs;_ but in regard of the continual mutinies and seditions of the affections,

Video meliora proboque Deteriora sequor;

'Reason would become captive and servile, if eloquence of persuasions did not practise and win the imagination from the affections part, and contract a confederacy between the reason and the imagination, against the affections; for _the affections themselves_ carry ever an appet.i.te to _good_, as reason doth. _The difference is_'--mark it--'the difference is, that the affection beholdeth merely _the present; reason_ beholdeth the future and _sum_ of time. And therefore the present _filling the imagination most_, reason is commonly vanquished; but after that force of eloquence and persuasion hath made things future and remote, _appear as present_, then, _upon the revolt of the imagination reason prevaileth_.' Not less important than that is this art in his scheme of learning. No wonder that the department of learning which he refers to the imagination should take that prime place in his grand division of it, and be preferred deliberately and on principle to the two others.

'Logic differeth from Rhetoric chiefly in this, that logic handleth reason exact and in truth, and rhetoric handleth it as it is planted in popular opinions and manners. And therefore _Aristotle_ doth _wisely_ place rhetoric as between logic on the one side, and moral or civil knowledge on the other, (and when we come to put together the works of this author, we shall find that _that_ and none other is the place it takes in _his_ system, that that is just the bridge it makes in his plan of operations.)' The proofs and demonstrations of logic _are towards all men indifferent and the same_: but the proofs and persuasions of rhetoric _ought to differ according to the auditors_.

Orpheus in sylvis inter delphinas Arion.

Which application, in perfection of idea, ought to extend so far, that if a man should speak of _the same thing to several persons_, he should speak to them _all respectively, and several ways_; and there was a great folio written on this plan which came out in those days dedicated 'to the Great Variety of Readers. From the most able to him that can but spell'; (this is just the doctrine, too, which the Continental philosopher sets forth we see);--though this '_politic_ part of eloquence in private speech,' he goes on to say here, 'it is easy for the greatest orators _to want; whilst by observing their well graced forms of speech, they lose the volubility_ of APPLICATION; and _therefore_ it shall not be _amiss_ to recommend this _to better inquiry_, not being curious whether we place it here, or in that part which concerneth _policy._'

Certainly one would not be apt to infer from that decided preference which the author himself manifests here for those stately and well-graced forms of speech, judging _merely_ from the style of this performance at least, one would not be inclined to suspect that he himself had ever been concerned in any literary enterprises, or was like to be, in which that _volubility_ of application which he appears to think desirable, was successfully put in practice. But we must remember, that he was just the man who was capable of conceiving of a _variety_ of _styles adapted to different exigencies_, if we would have the key to this style in particular.

But we must look a little at these labours and studies themselves, which required such elaborate and splendid arts of delivery, if we would fully satisfy ourselves, as to whether this author really had any purpose after all in bringing them in here beyond that of mere ostentation, and for the sake of completing his muster-roll of the sciences. Above, we see an intimation, that the divisions of the subject are, after all, not so 'curious' but that the inquiry might possibly be resumed again in other connections, and in the particular connection specified, namely, in that part which concerneth _Policy_.

In that which follows, the new science of human nature and human life--which is the end and term of this treatise, we are told--is brought out under the two heads of Morality and Policy; and it is necessary to look into _both_ these departments in order to find what application he was proposing to make of this art and science of Tradition and Delivery, and in order to see what place--what vital place it occupied in his system.

CHAPTER II.

THE SCIENCE OF POLICY.

'Policy is the most immersed.'--_Advancement of Learning_.

Reversing the philosophic order, we glance first into that new department of science which the author is here boldly undertaking to const.i.tute under the above name, because in this his own practical designs, and rules of proceeding, are more clearly laid open, and the place which is a.s.signed in his system to that radical science, for which these arts of Delivery and Tradition are chiefly wanting, is distinctly pointed out.

And, moreover, in this department of Policy itself, in marking out one of the grand divisions of it, we find him particularly noticing, and openly insisting on, the form of delivery and inculcation which the new science must take here, that is, if it is going to be at all available as a science of practice.

In this so-called plan for the advancement of learning, the author proceeds, as we all know, by noticing _the deficiencies_ in human learning as he finds it; and everywhere it is that radical deficiency, which leaves human life and human conduct in the dark, while the philosophers are busied with their controversies and wordy speculations. And in that part of his inventory where he puts down as wanting a science of practice in those every-day affairs and incidents, in which the life of man is most conversant, embodying axioms of practice that shall save men the wretched mistakes and blunders of which the individual life is so largely made up; blunders which are inevitable, so long as men are left here, to natural human ignorance, to uncollected individual experience, or to the shrewdest empiricism;--in this so original and interesting part of the work, he takes pains to tell us at length, that that which he has before put down under the head of '_delivery_' as a point of form and method, becomes here essential as a point of substance also. It is not merely that he will have his axioms and precepts of direction digested from the facts, instead of being made out of the teacher's own brains, but he will have THE FACTS themselves, in all their stubbornness and opposition to the teacher's preconceptions, for the body of the discourse, and the precepts accommodated thereto, instead of having the precepts for the body of the discourse, and the facts brought in to wait upon them. That is the form of the practical doctrine.

He regrets that this part of a true learning has not been collected hitherto into writing, to the great derogation of learning, and the professors of learning; for from this proceeds the popular opinion which has pa.s.sed into an adage, that there is no great concurrence between wisdom and learning. The deficiency here is well nigh total he says: 'but for the wisdom of business, wherein man's life is most conversant, there be no books of it, except some few scattered advertis.e.m.e.nts, that have no proportion to the _magnitude of the subject_. For if books were written of this, as of the other, I doubt not but _learned men_ with _mean experience_ would far excel men of _long experience without learning_, and _outshoot them with their own bow_. Neither need it be thought that this knowledge is too variable to fall under precept,' he says; and he mentions the fact, that in old Rome, so renowned for practical ability, in its wisest and saddest times, there were professors of this learning, that were known for GENERAL WISE MEN, who used to walk at certain hours in the place, and give _advice_ to private citizens, who came to consult with them of the _marriage_ of _a daughter_, for instance, or the _employing_ of _a son_, or of _an accusation_, or of a _purchase or bargain_, and _every other occasion incident to man's life_. There is a pretty scheme laid out truly. Have _we_ any general wise man, or ghost of one, who walks up and down at certain hours and gives advice on such topics? However that may be, this philosopher does not despair of such a science.

'So,' he says, commenting on that Roman custom, 'there is a wisdom of council and advice, even in private cases, arising out of a universal _insight into the affairs_ of _the world_, which is _used_ indeed upon _particular cases propounded_, but is gathered by general _observation_ of _cases_ of _like nature_.' And fortifying himself with the example of Solomon, after collecting a string of texts from the Sacred Proverbs, he adds, 'though they are capable, of course, of a more divine interpretation, taking them as instructions for life, they might have received large discourse, if he would have _broken them_ and _ill.u.s.trated them_, by deducements and examples. Nor was this in use with the Hebrews only, but it is generally to be found in the wisdom of the more ancient times, that as men found out any observation that they thought was _good for life_, they would gather it, and express it in _parable_, or _aphorism_, or _fable_.'

But for _fables_, they were vicegerents and supplies, _where examples failed_. Now that the times abound with history, THE AIM IS BETTER WHEN THE MARK IS ALIVE. And, therefore, he recommends as the form of writing, 'which is of all others fittest for this variable argument, discourses upon histories and examples: for knowledge drawn freshly, _and in our view_, out of particulars, _knoweth the way best to particulars again_; and it hath much greater life _for practice_, when _the discourse attendeth upon the example_, than when the example attendeth upon the discourse. For this is no point of order as it seemeth at first' (indeed it is not, it is a point as substantial as the difference between the old learning of the world and the new)--'this is no point of order, but of substance. For when the example is the _ground_ being set down in a history at large, it is set down with all circ.u.mstances, which may _sometimes control_ the discourse thereupon made, and sometimes supply it as _a very pattern for action_; whereas the examples which are alleged _for the discourse's sake_, are cited succinctly and without _particularity_, and carry a _servile aspect_ towards the discourse which they are brought in to make good.'

The question of method is here, as we see, incidentally introduced; but it is to be noted, and it makes one of the rules for the interpretation of that particular kind of style which is under consideration, that in this casual and secondary introduction of a subject, we often get shrewder hints of the author's real intention than we do in those parts of the work where it is openly and distinctly treated; at least, these scattered and apparently accidental hints,--these dispersed directions, often contain the key for the 'second' reading, which he openly bespeaks for the more open and elaborate discussion.

And thus we are able to collect, from every part of this proposal for a practical and progressive human learning, based on the defects of the unpractical and stationary learning which the world has. .h.i.therto been contented with, the author's opinion as to the form of delivery and inculcation best adapted to effect the proposed object under the given conditions. This question of form runs naturally through the whole work, and comes out in specifications of a very particular and significant kind under some of its divisions, as we shall see. But everywhere we find the point insisted on, which we have just seen so clearly brought out, in the department which was to contain the axioms of success in private life. Whatever the particular form may be, everywhere we come upon this general rule. Whatever the particular form may be, everywhere it is to be one in which the facts shall have the precedence, and the conclusions shall follow; and not one in which the conclusions stand first, and the facts are brought in to make them good. And this very circ.u.mstance is enough of itself to show that the form of this new doctrine will be thus far new, as new as the doctrine itself; that the new learning will be found in some form very different, at least, from that which the philosophers and professed teachers were then making use of in their didactic discourses, in some form so much more lively than that, and so much less oracular, that it would, perhaps, appear at first, to those accustomed only to the other, not to be any kind of learning at all, but something very different from that.

But this is not the only point in the general doctrine of delivery which we find produced again in its specific applications. Through all the divisions of this discourse on Learning, and not in that part of it only in which the Art of its Tradition is openly treated, we find that the prescribed form of it is one which will adapt it to the popular preconceptions; and that it must be a form which will make it not only universally acceptable, but universally attractive; that it is not only a form which will throw open the gates of the new school to all comers, but one that will bring in mankind to its benches. Not under the head of Method only, or under the head of Delivery and Tradition, but in those parts of the work in which the substance of the new learning is treated, we find dispersed intimations and positive a.s.sertions, that the form of it is, at the same time, popular and enigmatical,--not openly philosophical, and not 'magisterial,'-- but insensibly didactic; and that it is, in its princ.i.p.al and higher departments--in those departments on which this plan for the human relief concentrates its forces--essentially POETICAL. That is what we find in the body of the work; and the author repeats in detail what he has before made a point of telling us, in general, under this head of Delivery and Tradition of knowledge, that he sees no reason why that same instrument, which is so powerful for delusion and error, should not be restored to its true uses as an instrument of the human advancement, and a vehicle, though a veiled _one_--a beautiful and universally-welcome vehicle--for bringing in on this Globe Theatre the knowledges that men are most in need of.

The doctrine which is to be conveyed in this so subtle and artistic manner is none other than the Doctrine of Human Nature and Human Life, or, as this author describes it here, the Scientific Doctrine of MORALITY and POLICY. It is that new doctrine of human nature and human life which the science of nature in general creates. It is the light which universal science, collected from the continent of nature, gives to that insular portion of it 'which is the end and term of natural philosophy in the intention of man.' Under these heads of _Morality_ and _Policy_, the whole subject is treated here. But to return to the latter.

The question of Civil Government is, in the light of this science, a very difficult one; and this philosopher, like the one we have already quoted on this subject, is disposed to look with much suspicion on propositions for violent and sudden renovations in the state, and immediate abolitions and cures of social evil. He too takes a naturalist's estimate of those larger wholes, and their virtues, and faculties of resistance.

'Civil knowledge is conversant about a subject,' he says, 'which is, of all others, _most immersed in matter_, and hardliest reduced to axiom. _Nevertheless_, as Cato, the censor, said, "that the Romans were like sheep, for that a man might better drive a flock of them than one of them, for, in a flock, if you could get SOME FEW to go right, the rest would follow;" _so_ in that respect, MORAL PHILOSOPHY _is more difficult than policy_. Again, moral philosophy propoundeth to itself the framing of _internal_ goodness, but civil knowledge requireth only an _external_ goodness, for that, as to society, sufficeth. Again, States, as great engines, move slowly, _and are not so soon put out of frame_;' (that is what our foreign statist thought also) 'for, as in Egypt the seven good years sustained the seven bad, so governments for a time, well grounded, do bear out errors following. But _the resolution of particular persons_ is _more suddenly subverted. These respects do somewhat qualify the extreme difficulty of civil knowledge_.'

This is the point of attack, then,--this is the point of scientific attack,--the resolution of particular persons. He has showed us where the extreme difficulty of this subject appears to lie in his mind, and he has quietly pointed, at the same time, to that place of resistance in the structure of the state, which is the key to the whole position.

He has marked the spot exactly where he intends to commence his political operations. For he has discovered a point there, which admits of being operated on, by such engines as a feeble man like him, or a few such together, perhaps, may command. It is the new science that they are going to converge on that point precisely, namely the resolution of particular persons. It is the _novum organum_ that this one is bringing up, in all its finish, for the a.s.sault of that particular quarter. Hard as that old wall is, great as the faculty of conservation is in these old structures that hold by time, there is one element running all through it, these chemists find, which _is_ within their power, namely, the resolution of particular persons. It is the science of the conformation of the parts, it is the const.i.tutional structure of the human nature, which, in its scientific development, makes men, naturally, members of communities, beautiful and felicitous parts of states,--it is that which the man of science will _begin_ with. If you will let him have that part of the field to work in undisturbed, he will agree not to meddle with the state. And beside those general reasons, already quoted, which tend to prevent him from urging the immediate application of his science to this 'larger whole,' for its wholesale relief and cure, he ventures upon some specifications and particulars, when he comes to treat distinctly of government itself, and a.s.sign to it its place in his new science of affairs. If one were to judge by the s.p.a.ce he has openly given it on his paper in this plan for the human advancement and relief, one would infer that it must be a very small matter in his estimate of agencies; but looking a little more closely, we find that it is not that at all in his esteem, that it is anything but a matter of little consequence.

It was enough for him, at such a time, to be allowed to put down the fact that the art of it was properly scientific, and included in his plan, and to indicate the kind of science that is wanting to it; for the rest, he gives us to understand that he has himself fallen on such felicitous times, and finds that affair in the hands of a person so extremely learned in it, that there is really nothing to be said. And being thrown into this state of speechless reverence and admiration, he considers that the most meritorious thing he can do, is to pa.s.s to the other parts of his discourse with as little delay as possible.

It is a very short paragraph indeed for so long a subject; but, short as it is, it is not less pithy, and it contains reasons why it should not be longer, and why that new torch of science which he is bringing in upon the human affairs generally, cannot be permitted to enter that department of them in his time. 'The first is, that it is a part of knowledge secret and retired in _both_ those respects in which things are deemed secret; for some things are secret because they are hard to know, and _some_ because they are not fit to utter. Again, the wisdom of _antiquity_, the _shadows whereof are in the Poets_, in the description of torments and pains, _next unto the crime of rebellion_, which was the _giants_ offence, doth detest _the crime of futility_, as in Sisyphus and Tantalus. But this was meant of _particulars_.

Nevertheless, _even unto the general rules and discourses_ of policy and government, [it extends; for even here] there is due a _reverent_ handling.' And after having briefly indicated the comprehension 'of this science,' and shown that it is the thing he is treating under other heads, he concludes, 'but considering that _I write to a king_ who is a _master_ of it, and is _so well a.s.sisted_, I think it decent to pa.s.s over _this part_ in silence, as willing to obtain the certificate which one of the ancient philosophers aspired unto; who being silent when others contended to make demonstration of their abilities by speech, desired it might be certified for _his part_ that there was one that knew how to hold his peace.'

And having thus distinctly cleared himself of any suspicion of a disposition to introduce scientific inquiry and innovation into departments not then open to a procedure of that sort, his proposal for an advancement of learning in other quarters was, of course, less liable to criticism. But even that part of the subject to which he limits himself involves, as we shall see, an incidental reference to this, from which he here so modestly retires, and affords no inconsiderable scope for that genius which was by nature so irresistibly impelled, in one way or another, to the criticism and reformation of the larger wholes. He retires from the open a.s.sault, but it is only to go deeper into his subject. He is const.i.tuting the science of that from which the state proceeds. He is a.n.a.lyzing the state, and searching out in the integral parts of it, that which makes true _states_ impossible. He has found the revolutionary forces in their simple forms, and is content to treat them in these. He is bestowing all his pains upon an art that will develop--on scientific principles, by simply attending to the natural laws, as they obtain in the human kind, royalties, and n.o.bilities, and liege-men of all degrees--an art that will make all kinds of pieces that the structure of the state requires.

CHAPTER III.

THE SCIENCE OF MORALITY.

Section I.--THE EXEMPLAR OF GOOD.

'Nature craves All dues to be rendered to their owners.'

But this great innovator is busying himself here with drawing up a report of THE DEFICIENCIES IN LEARNING; and though he is the first to propose a plan and method by which men shall build up, systematically and scientifically, a knowledge of _Nature in general_, instead of throwing themselves altogether upon their own preconceptions and abstract controversial theories, after all, the princ.i.p.al deficiency which he has to mark--that to which, even in this dry report, he finds himself constrained to affix some notes of admiration--this princ.i.p.al deficiency is THE SCIENCE OF MAN--THE SCIENCE of _human nature_ itself. And the reason of this deficiency is, that very deficiency before named; it is that very act of shutting himself up to his own theories which leaves the thinker without a _science_ of himself. 'For it is the greatest proof of want of skill, to investigate _the nature_ of any object in itself alone; and, in general, those very things which are considered as secret, are manifested and common in other objects, but will never be clearly seen if the contemplations and experiments of men be directed _to themselves alone_.' It is this science of NATURE IN GENERAL which makes the SCIENCE of _Human Nature_ for the first time possible; and that is the end and term of the new philosophy,--so the inventor of it tells us. And the moment that he comes in with that new torch, which he has been out into 'the continent of nature' to light,--the moment that he comes back with it, into this old debateable ground of the schools, and begins to apply it to that element in the human life in which the scientific innovation appears to be chiefly demanded, 'most of the controversies,' as he tells us very simply--'most of the controversies, wherein moral philosophy is conversant, are judged and determined by it.'

But here is the bold and startling criticism with which he commences his approach to this subject; here is the ground which he makes at the first step; this is the ground of his scientific innovation; not less important than this, is the field which he finds unoccupied. In the handling of this science he says, (the science of 'the Appet.i.te and Will of Man'), 'those which have written seem to me to have done as if a man that _professed to teach to write_ did only exhibit _fair copies_ of alphabets _and_ letters joined, without giving any precepts or directions for the carriage of the hand, or the framing of the letters; so have they made good and fair _exemplars_ and _copies_, carrying the _draughts_ and _portraitures_ of _good, virtue, duty, felicity_; propounding them, well described, as the true _objects_ and _scopes_ of man's will and designs; _but how to attain these excellent marks_, and _how_ to _frame_ and _subdue_ the _will_ of _man_ to become _true_ and _conformable_ to _these pursuits_, they _pa.s.s it over altogether_, or slightly and _unprofitably_; for it is not,' he says, 'certain scattered glances and touches that can excuse the _absence_ of this _part_ of--SCIENCE.

'The reason of this omission,' he supposes, 'to be that hidden rock, whereupon both this and many other barks of knowledge have been cast away, which is, that men have despised to be conversant in _ordinary and common matters_, the _judicious direction whereof, nevertheless_, is the wisest doctrine; for life consisteth not in novelties nor _subtleties_, but, _contrariwise_, they have compounded sciences _chiefly_ of _a certain_ resplendent or l.u.s.trous ma.s.s of matter, _chosen to give glory_ either to the _subtlety_ of _disputations_, or to the _eloquence_ of _discourses_.' But his theory of teaching is, that 'Doctrine should be such as should make men in love with the _lesson_, and not with the teacher; being directed to the auditor's benefit, and not to the author's commendation.' _Neither_ needed men of so excellent parts to have despaired of a fortune which the poet Virgil promised himself, and, indeed, obtained, who got as much glory of eloquence, wit, and learning, in the expressing of the observations of husbandry _as of the heroical acts of aeneas_.

'Nec sum animi dubius, verbis ea vincere magnum Quam sit, et angustis hunc addere rebus honorum.'

_Georg_. iii. 289.

So, then, there is room for a new Virgil, but his theme is _here_;--one who need not despair, if he be able to bring to his subject those excellent parts this author speaks of, of getting as much glory of eloquence, wit, and learning, in the expressing of the _observations of this husbandry_, as those have had who have sketched the ideal forms of the human life, the dream of what should be. The copies and exemplars of good,--that vision of heaven,--that idea of felicity, and beauty, and goodness that the human soul brings with it, like a memory,--those celestial shapes that the thought and heart of man, by a law in nature, project,--that garden of delights that all men remember, and yearn for, and aspire to, and will have, in one form or another, in delicate air patterns, or gross deceiving images,--that large, intense, ideal good which men desire--that perfection and felicity, so far above the rude mocking realities which experience brings them,--that, _that_ has had its poets. No lack of these exemplars the historian finds, when he comes to make out his report of the condition of his kind--where he comes to bring in his inventory of the human estate: when so much is wanting, that good he reports '_not_ deficient.' Edens in plenty,--G.o.ds, and demi-G.o.ds, and heroes, _not_ wanting; the purest abstract notions of virtue and felicity, the most poetic embodiments of them, are put down among the goods which the human estate, as it is, comprehends. This part of the subject appears, to the critical reviewer, to have been exhausted by the poets and artists that mankind has always employed to supply its wants in this field. No room for a poet here! The draught of the ideal Eden is finished;--the divine exemplar is finished; that which is wanting is,--_the husbandry thereunto_.

Till now, the philosophers and poetic teachers had always taken their stand at once, on the topmost peak of Olympus, pouring down volleys of scorn, and amazement, and reprehension, upon the vulgar nature they saw beneath, made out of the dust of the ground, and qualified with the essential attributes of that material,--kindled, indeed, with a breath of heaven, but made out of clay,--different kinds of clay,--with more or less of the Promethean spark in it; but always clay, of one kind or another, and always compelled to listen to the laws that are common to the kinds of that substance. And it was to this creature, thus bound by nature, thus _doubly_ bound,--'crawling between earth and heaven,' as the poet has it,--that these winged philosophers on the ideal cliffs, thought it enough to issue their mandates, commanding it to renounce its conditions, to ignore its laws, and come up thither at a word,--at a leap,--making no ado about it.

'I can call spirits from the vasty deep.'

'And so can I, and so can any man;'

Says the new philosopher--

'But will they _come?_ _Will they come_--when you do call for them?'

It was simply a command, that this dirty earth should convert itself straight into Elysian lilies, and bloom out, at a word, with roses of Paradise. Excellent patterns, celestial exemplars, of the things required were held up to it; and endless declamation and argument why it should be that, and not the other, were not wanting:--but as to any scientific inquiry into the nature of the thing on which this form was to be superinduced, as to any _scientific_ exhibition of the form itself which was to be superinduced, these so essential conditions of the proposed result, were in this case alike wanting. The position which these reformers occupy, is one so high, that the question of different kinds of soils, and chemical a.n.a.lyses and experiments, would not come within their range at all; and 'the resplendent or l.u.s.trous ma.s.s of matter,' of which their sciences are compounded, chosen to give glory either to the subtilty of disputations or to the eloquence of discourses, would not bear any such vulgar admixture. It would make a terrible jar in the rhythm, which those large generalizations naturally flow in, to undertake to introduce into them any such points of detail.

And the new teacher will have a mountain too; but it will be one that 'overlooks the vale,' and he will have a rock-cut-stair to its utmost summit. He is one who will undertake this despised unl.u.s.trous matter of which our ordinary human life consists, and make a science of it, building up its generalizations from its particulars, and observing the actual reality,--the thing as it is, freshly, for that purpose; and not omitting any detail,--the poorest. The poets who had undertaken this theme before had been so absorbed with the idea of what man should be, that they could only glance at him as he is: the idea of a science of him, was not of course, to be thought of. There was but one name for the creature, indeed, in their vocabulary and doctrine, and that was one which simply seized and embodied the general fact, the unquestionable historic fact, that he has not been able hitherto to attain to his ideal type in nature, or indeed to make any satisfactory approximation to it.

But when the Committee of Inquiry sits at last, and the business begins to a.s.sume a systematic form, even the science of that ideal good, that exemplar and pattern of good, which men have been busy on so long,--the _science_ of it,--is put down as 'wanting,' and the _science_ of the _husbandry thereunto_, '_wholly deficient_.'