Our Last Best Chance Part 11

Sharon seemed shy and somewhat reserved and kept looking down as he spoke. "I care about the security of Israel," he said, "but I also care about the safety and security of Jordan."

I knew that the true national interest of Jordan, and of Israel, would be served only by reaching peace between Israel and the Palestinians. I tried to convince him of this, but by the end of the meeting, after a lengthy discussion of Israeli actions in the Occupied Territories and the need to take effective steps to create an environment conducive to the resumption of serious peace negotiations, I was quite certain that Sharon did not share my view.

Our next encounter, on March 19, was a secret meeting at his ranch in the Negev Desert. By inviting me to his personal farm, where his wife was buried, Sharon was sending me the message that he was a friend to Jordan and hoped to put old hostilities behind us. Times were very tense. The construction by Israel of the wall dividing the West Bank had begun, and the belief in the region was that the Bush administration wanted to bring about "regime change" in the Palestinian Authority and had little interest in getting the parties back to the negotiating table. All the while, Israel was building more illegal settlements in the West Bank and consolidating its hold on the Occupied Territories. The settler population in the West Bank and East Jerusalem stood at around 265,000 at the time the Oslo Accords were signed in 1993. The number had risen to about 365,000 in 2000, and to over 400,000 in 2003. This growth was a reflection of the fact that Israel never stopped building new settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, a politically incendiary move. The building of new settlements was alarming not just because they were eating away at land that should belong to the future Palestinian state, but also because it was a clear indication that Israel was not committed to a two-state solution.

We had gone to Sharon's ranch to discuss his recent proposal to pull Israeli troops out of the Gaza Strip and some parts of the West Bank. I told him that any such move should be coordinated with the Palestinian leaders.h.i.+p and the Egyptians, and that it should be the beginning of a comprehensive Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab territory. It should not simply be a unilateral withdrawal by Israeli forces so as to transfer Israeli settlers from Gaza to other locations in the West Bank. I felt as though we were making some progress in building a working relations.h.i.+p that could ultimately help push the peace efforts forward. But in my neighborhood, appearances can be deceptive.

One of the problems with the Israeli government is that everything leaks. Although our meeting was supposed to be secret, a confidence-building measure that would allow us to discuss ways of moving toward a settlement with the Palestinians, news of the trip was leaked to the Israeli press. Shortly afterward the Israelis a.s.sa.s.sinated Sheikh Ahmed Ya.s.sin, the head of Hamas, with a Cobra guns.h.i.+p as he was leaving a mosque in Gaza. Nine innocent people were killed along with the blind, wheelchair-bound Ya.s.sin. The a.s.sa.s.sination of a quadriplegic in his seventies seemed heartless even by Israeli standards. I was infuriated by the murder of Ya.s.sin and knew it would open up another cycle of violence. But I was also furious because the operation had taken place so soon after my visit. The next month the Israelis a.s.sa.s.sinated Ya.s.sin's successor, Abdel Aziz Rantisi, sparking renewed violence in the West Bank and Gaza. The Americans did not condemn either a.s.sa.s.sination and vetoed a UN resolution doing so.

Israelis often, whether on purpose or not, seem to schedule important diplomatic meetings a few days before conducting controversial operations. One recent example was the meeting between Turkey's prime minister Recep Tayyep Erdogan and Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert in December 2008, a few days before the Gaza war started. Erdogan was furious. He felt the Israeli government was trying to create the impression that he had given his tacit consent to the Gaza attack.

The a.s.sa.s.sination of Sheikh Ya.s.sin was emblematic of the mora.s.s of Middle East conflict: one side acts rashly and the other overreacts in return. The path to peace is littered with roadside bombs. The only law that is followed is one whose logic leads to unintended consequences. After the Israelis a.s.sa.s.sinated Rantisi, Hamas had to find another leader. Who did they turn to? None other than Jordan's former guest, Khaled Meshaal.

In April 2004, I was again scheduled to meet with President Bush at the White House. I planned to push to restart the peace process and hoped that the president would take a broader view of the challenges facing our region. Before my arrival, Bush welcomed another visitor, Prime Minister Sharon. During that visit, on April 14, an exchange of letters between Bush and Sharon was made public. In the days leading up to the visit, Sharon had pressed the president to reveal America's positions on several issues and to support his unilateral disengagement in Gaza. Bush's secret a.s.surances amounted to a major s.h.i.+ft in American policy. In his formal letter to Sharon, Bush promised U.S. support for Israel's retention of some West Bank settlements and ruled out the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their former homes, saying that they should settle in a future Palestinian state. The U.S. administration was prejudging one of the most controversial topics in the whole peace process. Bush said: The United States is strongly committed to Israel's security and well-being as a Jewish state. It seems clear that an agreed, just, fair and realistic framework for a solution to the Palestinian refugee issue as part of any final status agreement will need to be found through the establishment of a Palestinian state, and the settling of Palestinian refugees there, rather than in Israel. The United States is strongly committed to Israel's security and well-being as a Jewish state. It seems clear that an agreed, just, fair and realistic framework for a solution to the Palestinian refugee issue as part of any final status agreement will need to be found through the establishment of a Palestinian state, and the settling of Palestinian refugees there, rather than in Israel.

The whole Arab world exploded in anger. It was clear to me that the Bush administration intended to back Israel right or wrong, so I told the White House that I was canceling my meeting. They were stunned. Few people ever turn down a meeting with the American president, and fewer still cancel meetings that have already been scheduled. But I had to make my point. I could not condone the s.h.i.+ft in U.S. policy implied by Bush's letter. The peace process was frozen, and despite the best efforts of the Arab states to make a new push for peace, all we were getting were one-sided p.r.o.nouncements and more violence.

One month later I went to Was.h.i.+ngton to try to reverse the change in American policy and was partially successful. In our joint press conference, which reiterated the substance of letters we had exchanged before my visit, Bush reaffirmed that he would not prejudge the final status talks. I restated Jordan's position that any Israeli withdrawal should follow the parameters of the road map and lead to the creation of a Palestinian state on the basis of the 1967 borders.

In October, Ya.s.ser Arafat was flown to Paris for medical treatment after his health speedily deteriorated. He slipped into a coma and died the following month. His body was flown to Cairo, where he was given a military funeral. An Egyptian plane then took his body to the Sinai, and Jordanian military helicopters carried it from there to Ramallah for burial. The helicopter landed as a distraught crowd of mourners surged forward, desperately trying to get one last glimpse of their beloved leader. Whatever the world may have thought of Arafat, he was a hero to the Palestinian people and his pa.s.sing marked the end of an era.

Mahmoud Abbas (known as Abu Mazen) was elected president of the Palestinian National Authority the following January. For decades, Israel had claimed that Arafat was a barrier to peace. Now, with his pa.s.sing, they would have one less excuse for failing to deliver on their promises. Abbas a.s.sumed the leaders.h.i.+p of the PNA at one of the lowest points in the peace process. The challenges before him were enormous. He had to fill the vacuum left by Arafat and rebuild Palestinian inst.i.tutions that had been systematically destroyed by Israel in the past few years. The new Palestinian leader also had to work to put the peace process back on track. From the day he a.s.sumed office, Abbas sought a political settlement with the Israelis on the basis of the two-state solution. But he would be sorely disappointed.

In August 2005, the Israelis unilaterally withdrew from Gaza three days earlier than announced-without adequate coordination with the Egyptians, who share a long border with Gaza, or with the Palestinian Authority. The Israeli cabinet had voted overwhelmingly in support of this move the previous February. Sharon, the former champion of the settlers, had given the order to bulldoze their buildings and remove the occupants, by force if necessary. Although the withdrawal was welcome, the manner in which it was conducted was not.

By blockading all of the Gaza Strip's entry and exit points, the Israelis had turned Gaza into a virtual prison. And when they withdrew in an uncoordinated manner, they created a security vacuum. This vacuum was soon filled by Hamas and the Islamic Jihad. It was a desolate scene, with heavily armed men moving through a landscape of barbed wire and ruined buildings. There was no management of the transition and no handing over of security and other responsibilities in a coordinated manner to Palestinian inst.i.tutions.

A few months later, in November, Sharon split from the Likud Party and founded a new party, which he called Kadima. His decision followed months of political infighting with members of Likud over what was known as the "disengagement plan," which involved the withdrawal from Gaza and the dismantlement of four settlements in the northern West Bank. Sharon was joined by key Likud members, including Tzipi Livni, who would later become foreign minister, and Ehud Olmert, the former mayor of Jerusalem, who was his deputy.

In early January 2006, Sharon suffered a stroke and fell into a coma. His duties were a.s.sumed by Olmert. It soon became clear that the old warrior would not recover, and Olmert officially became prime minister of Israel in April.

New leaders were taking over on both sides, and many in the region hoped this would lead to a fresh approach to an old conflict. Nowhere was that hope stronger than among those gearing up for the first Palestinian legislative election in a decade, which was slated for January 25, 2006. One of the parties on the ballot was Hamas, which had chosen not to take part in the 1996 legislative elections. Because of Hamas's partic.i.p.ation, the Israeli government considered not allowing Palestinians living in East Jerusalem to vote in the election (it considers East Jerusalem to be part of Israel). But in the end, they were allowed to vote.

Many Palestinians and others in the region argued that the conditions were not right for holding elections and urged that they be delayed. But the Bush administration disagreed with this suggestion. In a question-and-answer session with the State Department Correspondents a.s.sociation on January 5, Condoleezza Rice said: I don't really believe that we can favor postponing the elections because we fear an outcome.... [O]ur position on Hamas has not changed. It's listed as a terrorist organization. We recognize that there's a transition here going on in Palestinian politics. And so this is an internal matter for the Palestinians. We do believe that there should be the ability of everyone to partic.i.p.ate-the Palestinian people to partic.i.p.ate in the elections.

But what would the Bush administration do if Hamas won?

Many hoped and expected that Ya.s.ser Arafat's Fatah Party would win the elections. Fatah had promised the Palestinian people statehood and freedom through the Oslo process, but the long-agopromised state was still a distant mirage and charges of corruption against Palestinian National Authority officials were rampant. Many felt that Fatah had not delivered on its promises. So when the day came for Palestinians to go to the polls, they gave Hamas a decisive win. Hamas's victory created a major problem. The U.S. government considered Hamas a terrorist organization and would have nothing to do with it. Many European countries followed suit. This in turn allowed the Israelis to freeze tax payments to the Palestinian Authority and to claim that they did not have a "partner for peace."

Americans rightly extol the benefits of democracy, but democracy manifests itself in different forms in different cultures. If conditions are not right, it can cement divisions and fuel hatred. Part of the problem with the Bush administration was its cookie-cutter approach toward the concept of exporting democracy, which basically came down to holding elections. To my mind, developing an effective democracy is a journey. Voting in the absence of a widespread acceptance of democratic values and the existence of an independent judiciary can be a disaster. Democratic inst.i.tutions are strengthened by the presence of a strong, effective middle cla.s.s and reputable governing bodies. It is certainly a process that is more difficult to develop under an occupation that could, and would, destroy these inst.i.tutions at will.

I do not think the Bush administration fully understood conditions in the region and thus it pushed blindly for early elections wherever it could. It sometimes seemed as if the administration was just seeking a quick win to feed the never-ending twenty-four-hour news cycle. But the problems in the West Bank and Gaza were not going to be resolved through the ballot box before the end of the Israeli occupation. If the foundations for a stable society are not in place, extremist groups will capitalize on popular frustrations to seize power. And once the radicals take control, they do not easily relinquish it.

After winning a majority of seats in the parliamentary elections, Hamas took over the government, while Fatah still retained control of the presidency and the PLO. The new Hamas government was sworn in in March 2006. The United States and EU countries refused to recognize the government and suspended aid to it. The situation deteriorated quickly after that, especially after militants close to Hamas killed two Israeli soldiers and captured another, Gilad Shalit, during a raid into Israel from Gaza. Israel reacted by invading Gaza in June.

Almost three weeks before the invasion of Gaza, I expressed alarm at the deteriorating situation in the West Bank, Gaza, and Iraq, as well as the growing dispute between Iran and the United States. The likelihood of a new conflict appeared high to me. In a graduation speech at Mu'ta University on June 7, I warned of the risk posed by both state actors and nonstate groups seeking to ignite conflict and spoke about the devastating consequences of Iranian expansionist policies in our region. I normally address domestic issues in such speeches, but the enormity of the looming threats prompted me to emphasize these concerns instead.

On July 12, 2006, Hezbollah fighters crossed into Israel, killing eight Israeli soldiers and capturing two others. In response, Israel launched an all-out invasion of Lebanon and Hezbollah fired rockets at Israeli border towns. I watched on television as the Israeli army attacked cities and villages in South Lebanon and bombed power stations across the country as well as Beirut's airport, closing that city's lifeline to the outside world. Hezbollah fighters were in the south. They were not going to escape via the airport, nor were they going to fly in more men and military supplies. Closing the airport hurt the civilian population.

I condemned the war. I had seen enough suffering in our region to know that war brings nothing but destruction. Israel's security will be guaranteed only by coming to terms with its neighbors, not by more wars and military action.

The Israeli planes targeted not only power plants but also waterworks, roads, bridges, and other civilian infrastructure. Over the last few years Lebanese expatriates of all backgrounds had come back to the country and the economy was booming. And now the Israelis were systematically destroying Lebanon's economy and infrastructure. This was a terrible act of collective punishment, inflicting pain on the entire country in retaliation for the actions of one group.

Although throughout history there have been examples of states targeting civilians to break the will of the enemy, that is not a decision to be proud of. It is dangerously easy in wartime to demonize the enemy, which can lead to the killing of civilians, women, and children in large numbers. But any leader, whether a platoon commander, a general, or a head of state, has a moral obligation to distinguish between civilians and combatants. And Olmert chose not to do this.

Satellite stations across the Arab world filled their screens with pictures of civilian suffering in Beirut. Public opinion in Arab countries was strongly against the Israeli attack, and many in Jordan and across the region urged that something be done to help the hundreds of thousands of innocent Lebanese caught in the crossfire.

Our peace treaty with Israel allowed us to fly in humanitarian aid to Lebanon. A Jordanian C-130 transport plane was the first to land at Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport after Israel severely damaged its tarmac. Our military engineers helped to reopen the airport to supply planes. We then continued to send planes carrying relief supplies into Beirut airport, evacuating some Lebanese and third-country nationals stranded there.

An emergency Arab League meeting convened in Cairo on July 17 and unanimously condemned the Israeli military offensive in Lebanon. Several Arab states, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, also criticized Hezbollah for "unexpected, inappropriate, and irresponsible acts." Saudi foreign minister Prince Saud Al-Faisal said, "These acts will pull the whole region back to years ago and we simply cannot accept them." Since we suspected that Hezbollah was acting as an Iranian proxy, we believed that its rocket attacks were a direct intervention by Iran into Arab politics. We knew that no good would come out of this increased Iranian a.s.sertiveness, but we were widely criticized in the Arab world for our stance.

The war lasted for thirty-four days. More than 1,100 Lebanese and 160 Israelis were killed, and much of Lebanon was destroyed before the fighting stopped on August 14, two days after the Security Council adopted Resolution 1701 calling for the end of hostilities. Hezbollah, which put up a strong fight against the Israeli army and was able to fire rockets deep into Israel till the last minute of the war, declared victory. The majority of public opinion in the Arab world celebrated Hezbollah and took pride in its ability to stand up to the Israeli army. For a brief period, Hezbollah leader Ha.s.san Nasrallah became the hero of the Middle East. The celebration of Hezbollah's survival in the war against Israel as a victory was indicative of a major s.h.i.+ft in the Arab and Muslim world. Victory now means survival, rather than defeating the Israeli army. The implications of this new dynamic are dangerous in the sense that, if the conflict persists, people are willing to support armed confrontations no matter what the cost is as long as they can survive and inflict damage on Israel. This new reality gives more credence to the belief that only peace, and not the military superiority of Israel, will ensure the safety of Israelis and all other peoples of the region.

Meanwhile, the scene in the Palestinian territories was getting more problematic. Tensions between the Fatah-led PNA and the Hamas government were on the rise. The uncomfortable cohabitation between the two groups ended in violence on June 14, 2007, when Hamas took over the Gaza Strip after b.l.o.o.d.y confrontations with Fatah supporters and security forces.

A few months later, on November 27, the Bush administration made a final major push to reinvigorate the peace process by convening an international conference at the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis. The road map of 2003 had brought little progress. Though it clearly identified steps to be taken by the Palestinians and Israelis, the road map was not being implemented and the two sides kept accusing one another of not fulfilling their obligations.

The United States invited forty-nine countries and international organizations to the conference in Annapolis, with the purpose of setting in motion a continuous process that would result in the establishment of a Palestinian state. Among the attendees were Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas, as well as the secretary-general of the United Nations and foreign ministers of the Arab League's Arab Peace Initiative follow-up committee, which included Jordan. Also attending were representatives of the Quartet, a four-member group consisting of the United States, the European Union, Russia, and the United Nations, which had been set up in Madrid in 2002 to help overcome obstacles facing the peace process.

In an address to the conference Bush said, "We meet to lay the foundation for the establishment of a new nation-a democratic Palestinian state that will live side by side with Israel in peace and security. We meet to help bring an end to the violence that has been the true enemy of the aspirations of both the Israelis and Palestinians." He said that both Israelis and the Palestinians would have to make tough choices to achieve peace and that he believed leaders on both sides were ready to tackle the major issues and move toward peace.

The conference ended with the announcement of an agreement that raised hopes for a settlement. Abbas and Olmert agreed to immediately implement their respective obligations under the road map and to form a mechanism, led by the United States, to monitor its implementation. The two sides committed to engage in vigorous, ongoing, and continuous negotiations, and to make every effort to conclude an agreement before the end of 2008.

Direct negotiations between the Palestinians and the Israelis followed. They tackled the final status issues of borders, Jerusalem, refugees, and security, with a view to delivering a final settlement. The talks, which proceeded on the understanding that "nothing is agreed until all is agreed," appeared to be making some headway, especially on the essential issue of borders. The discussions were thorough and detailed, and the two sides exchanged maps and were negotiating the percentage of land to be swapped within the context of a final agreement. But the talks lost momentum in July when Olmert's authority was undermined by charges of corruption that forced him to announce his resignation.

Abbas's authority was also undermined by Hamas's electoral victory, which had opened another front. The 2006 elections had divided the Palestinian leaders.h.i.+p, leaving Gaza under the full control of Hamas and the West Bank under Fatah's control. Gaza was in continual confrontation with Israel until Egypt succeeded in brokering a truce in June 2008. Popular pressure was mounting for reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah. But that would prove an extremely difficult task.

In hindsight, a Palestinian election in which Hamas took part created more problems than it solved. And, as with the Iraqi elections the previous year, sometimes the democratic process throws up surprises.

Chapter 25.

The Mask Slips Iraq's first general elections were held one year before the Palestinian elections, on January 30, 2005. Parties were competing for seats in a Transitional National a.s.sembly, which would draft a new const.i.tution to be submitted to the Iraqi people. The likely victory of s.h.i.+a political parties backed by Iran had led to talk of a strengthening of s.h.i.+a power throughout the region. Iran was thought to be providing money and support to one or more of these parties, and many in the region feared that it was plotting to stage a behind-the-scenes takeover of Iraqi politics. The Sunni community in Iraq, unwilling to trust a process that they believed was being rigged to marginalize them, decided to boycott the elections. This proved to be a big mistake.

Just over a month before the election I was interviewed on Hardball with Chris Matthews Hardball with Chris Matthews on MSNBC. Matthews asked me my opinion of the upcoming Iraqi election, and in particular the implications of a radical s.h.i.+a victory. I said: on MSNBC. Matthews asked me my opinion of the upcoming Iraqi election, and in particular the implications of a radical s.h.i.+a victory. I said: The worst outcome is, you don't have a secular state. In other words, the new government is strongly represented by those who might have support from Iran. We hope that's not the case. As you are aware, there's an issue of the Sunnis; we want them to go to the elections, we want them to be part of the process. If they're not, then there could be more difficulties.

In those days I often expressed my concerns about the area covering the old Levant and the Fertile Crescent, an area stretching from Syria and Lebanon to Iraq and Iran. During that interview with Chris Matthews, the image of a crescent popped into my head as a good metaphor for the potential spread of Iranian influence. "If it was a s.h.i.+a-led Iraq that had a special relations.h.i.+p with Iran, and you look at that relations.h.i.+p with Syria and Hezbollah and Lebanon," I said, "then we have this new crescent that appears that will be very destabilizing for the Gulf countries and for the whole region."

After that interview, all h.e.l.l broke loose. I was criticized by many people for being anti-s.h.i.+a. The Iraqi politician Abdul Aziz Hakim, the head of the s.h.i.+a party SCIRI (the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq), who had spent many years in exile in Iran, called the idea of Iranian influence in Iraqi politics "ridiculous." But by then no one doubted that Iran was actively meddling in, if not guiding, Iraqi politics.

The controversy ill.u.s.trates some of the difficulties of speaking to the media. I was talking politics, not religion, but my comments were deliberately distorted. My concern was that some Iranians were trying to invoke sectarian sentiments to serve their own agendas, thus creating conditions that could lead to Sunni-s.h.i.+a confrontations across the Muslim world. I accept and respect the s.h.i.+a as one of the legitimate branches of Islam and strongly believe that it is not acceptable to judge people according to their faith. s.h.i.+as have made an enormous contribution to Arab and Muslim culture as well as to the defense of the Arab nationalist cause, and they have been loyal to their countries, whether in Lebanon or Iraq. I never meant to suggest that they would, by virtue of their faith, automatically align with Iran-only that the Iranian government would manipulate the situation to its advantage and foment divisions. In fact, Iraqi s.h.i.+a fought valiantly in defense of their country in its war with Iran in the 1980s.

Contemporary s.h.i.+a thought covers a broad spectrum of beliefs. At one end are some of the most conservative thinkers in the Muslim world, and at the other some of its most liberal. Iran is the home of some visionary clerics, who are leading the Middle East in addressing certain social issues. When we in Jordan were looking at different ways of tackling birth control, we turned to Iran to understand how religious authorities there support contraception, a sensitive subject in the Arab world. The late Lebanese s.h.i.+a cleric Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah believed that women should have equal rights and play a role equal to that of men in society. So clerics can be a force for positive change, but they can also be reactionary.

My fear was that some in the Iranian regime were setting in place the conditions for a devastating sectarian conflict that could speedily spread from Beirut to Bombay. Across the centuries, some of the most violent moments in human history have been preceded by politicians' decisions to use religion to justify a war or political interest. From the Crusades to the Spanish Inquisition, great cruelty and suffering have often been imposed by those with the divine conviction that they are in the right.

Speaking in the name of G.o.d can all too easily serve as a justification to suppress debate. Putting yourself on a moral and spiritual pedestal allows you to condemn any challenger as morally bankrupt. And this absolutist view becomes dangerous when it is combined with politics. Suddenly, your political opponents become not merely people with differing values and ideas about how to organize society, but enemies of G.o.d.

I wanted to point out the risk of this potential new sectarian conflict. Unfortunately, the controversy over my interview generated more than hostile words.

On Christmas Eve 2004, a tanker truck packed with explosives heading for the Jordanian emba.s.sy in Baghdad blew up, destroying a nearby house and killing nine people. Subsequent investigations revealed that the attack had been planned by a certain well-known s.h.i.+a political group with support from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. My hopes that my visit to Tehran the previous year would lead to improved relations between Jordan and Iran literally went up in smoke. This was the second attack on our emba.s.sy in Baghdad. The first, in August 2003, was a car bombing by Sunni extremists linked to Al Qaeda. Now we had also been attacked by s.h.i.+a extremists linked to the Iranian government. In the Middle East, moderates have no shortage of enemies.

As the New Year began, people across Iraq were getting ready for the elections. I asked my people to prepare an a.n.a.lysis, based on what we were hearing and seeing, of the Iraqi political situation for President Bush, who had just been reelected to a second term. To keep it simple, I asked them to use a traffic-light system. They put together a large chart with three colored columns, in which they placed pictures of thirty Iraqi politicians, organized by party and affiliation. In the green column were the Interim Government's prime minister, Ayad Allawi, and his supporters, as well as the Kurds-people who were moderate and with whom we shared the same values. The red column was made up of people who were allied with Iran and working to promote Iranian influence inside Iraq as well as Sunni extremists. And the yellow column comprised people who s.h.i.+fted in their allegiances but whom the international community could work with, like Nouri Al Maliki, of the s.h.i.+a Al-Da'wa party, technocrats and businessmen, and some of the more conservative Sunni tribal sheikhs.

We also gave the American president and his staff a detailed plan for reconstruction in western Iraq to help bring the Sunnis back into the political process. It was crucial that the tribal sheikhs not become hardened in opposition-Iraq could not survive without the Sunnis...o...b..ard. We were concerned that the traditional tribal instincts of the region would take over, and that all groups would begin to fight for political power and influence. Our goal was to make sure the Americans understood that if there was to be any hope of stability in Iraq, it would depend on having a government that was inclusive and representative of Iraqi society. To my shock, not all American officials agreed with this logic. A senior American general did not waste any time in brus.h.i.+ng aside our argument that the Sunnis' involvement in the political process was essential for the stability of Iraq. He was adamant that the Sunnis were America's enemies in this war and said that if they did not behave themselves, the United States would crush them militarily. Such an alarmingly simplistic view of the situation was very disconcerting.

Our plan outlined how to use social and economic a.s.sistance to provide political support to Iraqi tribal leaders in western Iraq. As we shared a common border, this was an area of Iraq we knew well. Some of the larger tribes had members in both eastern Jordan and western Iraq. In one area there was a run-down phosphate plant. We suggested that if the United States could help get that factory up and running again, this would create jobs, thereby providing a pocket of stability, which could in turn serve as a base for local tribesmen to fight back against Al Qaeda in Iraq.

U.S. defense secretary Rumsfeld took bits and pieces of our plan, focusing mainly on security and the creation of tribal militias. But the administration did not pay much attention to the economic and political recommendations, treating the occupation and administration of Iraq primarily as a military undertaking. They liked the idea of using the tribal militias to fight Al Qaeda, but they were far less interested in providing them with economic support so that they would become representatives of the central government in remote regions of Iraq.

By now, the Americans were not the only ones encountering problems in Iraq. In the south, the British were also struggling. The British Foreign Office has a deep knowledge of the Middle East, and its diplomats were known for their insight into the region and experience in dealing with its complicated and interconnected issues. But surprisingly, when the British went into the south, they seem to have been blind to the potential for problems from Iran. With Iranian surrogates fomenting unrest and Revolutionary Guard units being sent across the border, the whole place blew up in their faces. In some places you could hear Farsi spoken more often than Arabic. The British could have used fewer Whitehall bureaucrats and more people with deep cultural and historical knowledge of Iraq, especially as the Iranians began to make a stronger play for political influence in the south.

In the run-up to the elections, Iranian agents were determined to influence the result, supporting those s.h.i.+a parties affiliated with Iran with money and resources. A large influence in Iraq where U.S. troops are spread across the country could be extremely useful for the Iranians in any future confrontation with the United States.

In the January elections, the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), a coalition of s.h.i.+a parties, won a majority of the seats in the Transitional National a.s.sembly, and one of its leaders, Ibrahim Al Jaafari, replaced Ayad Allawi as prime minister. Ahmad Chalabi's party failed to win a single seat. The a.s.sembly fulfilled its main mandate of drafting a new Iraqi const.i.tution, and Iraqis, voted again in December to elect a new parliament for a four-year term. The UIA again won the majority of seats and Jaafari was again chosen as prime minister. But he was forced to step down amid criticisms of ineffectual leaders.h.i.+p. He was replaced by Nouri Al Maliki in April 2006.

The security situation in Iraq was gravely deteriorating when Maliki took over. Sectarian violence was on the rise. According to UN reports at the time, an average of one hundred civilians were killed a day in Sunni-s.h.i.+a confrontations that started to escalate after an attack at an important s.h.i.+a religious site, Al-Askari Mosque in the city of Samara, in February 2006. People began to speak about the possibility of a countrywide civil war.

In an attempt to restore security, Maliki announced a national reconciliation plan in June. The plan included steps to rein in militias and to open dialogue with rebels. But violence continued, raising concerns that the plan was not achieving its objectives. The Iraq Study Group, an American bipartisan panel established by Congress in March 2002 to a.s.sess the situation in Iraq, said in a report in December that the situation in Iraq was "grave and deteriorating."

In the beginning, I got a lot of positive reports about Maliki from the s.h.i.+a and Sunni tribal sheikhs, in part because he took on the Iranian-supported militias. But over time, the reports became more mixed, with some in Iraq and the region arguing that he started to become more sectarian, supporting s.h.i.+a over Sunni communities and refusing to spend government money in Sunni provinces. He took over at a terrible time, when Iraq was racked by sectarian strife and multifaceted violence. It is to Maliki's credit that the country started to stabilize during his premiers.h.i.+p.

As things slowly began to improve in Iraq, with levels of violence subsiding, many Iraqis began to ask why Arabs were not coming to talk to them and why no Arab leaders were visiting Baghdad. And the truth is, it was not all that easy to do. Though some other Arab leaders did want to reach out to Iraq, they did not want to appear in front of their people to be in cahoots with the Americans. Even now, when Iraqis are running the country, the government still bears the stigma of being seen as American-led. People use this to attack Arab leaders who are perceived to be too close to Iraq.

In December 2006, Saddam Hussein was executed. A widely circulated amateur video of the execution showed men crowding around the gallows chanting, "Muqtada! Muqtada! Muqtada!" as the noose was placed around Saddam's neck. They were referring to Muqtada al-Sadr, the firebrand s.h.i.+a cleric who leads the powerful Al Mahdi Army and who is believed to be an ally of Iran and Hezbollah. Arabs have, in the main, a common language and culture, so one image on satellite television can impact the whole region. In a flash, the mood in the Arab world changed. Saddam's execution was seen not just as an act inspired by the West against an Arab dictator. Many Sunnis around the region saw it as an act of revenge by Iran and s.h.i.+a groups allied with it. The implications of this perspective were serious. Following Saddam's death, violence in Iraq took a new course, degenerating into Sunni-s.h.i.+a t.i.t-for-tat a.s.sa.s.sinations. Militias roamed the streets. It was widely felt that a dangerous divide between s.h.i.+a and Sunni was threatening to spread across the region. The legitimacy of Hezbollah leader Nasrallah and others like him linked to Iran was diminished as a result. Many now saw them as proxies, working for Iran against the interests of the Arabs. The mask had slipped.

I tried to explain to the Bush administration, and in particular to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, that the mood of the region had changed and the moderates were back on top. Moderate Arab leaders could now band together and be more vocal-from the end of the Lebanon war in the summer until Saddam's execution, all of us had just been keeping our mouths shut and our heads down.

I said, now that we have regained momentum, empower us to push the peace process forward. But I do not think the message got through. The Bush administration's new priority was democracy promotion, and it had its hands full trying to stem the wave of violence in Iraq.

The Iranians lost some ground when Maliki took on the Iranian-backed militias in a series of confrontations and arrest campaigns, which eventually forced Muqtada al-Sadr to leave the country in February 2007. The security situation started to improve after that due to a combination of an increase in U.S. troops in Iraq and the efforts of the Awakening Councils, launched by Sunni tribes who took up the fight against Al Qaeda in their areas. Over time, however, Iranian-backed groups rebuilt their strength. I think Iraq's Arab neighbors bear some responsibility for this. The best way to guard against further Iranian interference in Iraq is for Arab countries to step in and support Iraq's new government as it gets onto its feet. If not, a vacuum will result and the Iranians will come back and restore the influence they briefly lost. Iran is offering sizable amounts of money to different sectarian groups inside Iraq, and is inviting children, both Sunni and s.h.i.+a, in need of medical attention or a better education to Iran. They have opened up all of their borders and are trying to put Iraq under their sphere of influence. The turbulent security situation inside Iraq made it difficult for Arab countries to set up diplomatic missions in Baghdad and strengthen their relations with Iraq. But the fact is that Arab engagement with Iraq is essential for consolidating it against Iranian government expansionism and ambitions for hegemony.

In 2008, I decided that it was important to show that Iraq was moving in the right direction and that the political situation was stabilizing. One practical step I could take was to visit Iraq. A very real problem was security, because neither the Iranians nor Al Qaeda in Iraq wanted me there. I would be the first Arab leader to visit Iraq since the invasion, and my visit would be a symbol that things in Iraq were beginning to return to normal.

News of my trip leaked out, and Al Qaeda in Iraq sent a hit squad to welcome me. We heard that they had smuggled in surface-to-air missiles and were planning to a.s.sa.s.sinate me. I postponed the trip and took action that showed the terrorists they were playing a dangerous game. Working with the Iraqis, we made sure we would have no more problems from that particular cell. Once the security problems had been resolved, I resumed plans for the visit.

On August 13, 2008, I flew with my brother Ali and a small Jordanian delegation east from Amman in a C-17 military transport aircraft, heading over the Jordanian desert and across the border into Iraq, a journey I had last made with my father. As we neared Baghdad, the crew began to strap on body armor and peered anxiously out of the windows to see if there was any missile signature. They did not offer us any armor, but luckily I was allowed to sit in the c.o.c.kpit. As we approached the airport, the plane dove sharply to avoid missiles. This was part of the standard operating procedure for landing at Baghdad's airport. Banking like a jet fighter, the bulky aircraft groaned as it hurtled toward the tarmac. As we landed, I thought back to my previous visits to Baghdad. Now I was returning-and Iraq was ruled by a very different government.

Once on the ground, we transferred to a helicopter and took off, flying low over the streets and buildings of Baghdad. I saw a puff of something white, which I then realized came from the helicopter next to us when it activated its flares and chaff systems designed to prevent missile lock-on. We swerved left, then continued on. Below, the sunlight glinted off what looked like lakes and ponds in the middle of the city. I did not remember these from previous trips and thought perhaps they were a new feature. As we flew closer I saw that they were cesspools festering in the streets. Baghdad once had been a jewel of the Middle East. It produced some of the finest scientists, engineers, and educators in our region. A grand nation of proud and capable people had been reduced to utter devastation. It was depressing to see the damage the city had suffered. All over the streets, every sixty yards were duck-and-dive shelters, bomb shelters that pedestrians could jump into to avoid mortar attacks.

When we arrived at the compound where I had been scheduled to meet Iraqi prime minister Nouri Al Maliki, things were quite confused, as we had not been able to publicize my arrival widely in advance, for security reasons. I was received by Maliki and he and I got along well. In a way, the substance of that meeting was less important than the fact that it took place in Baghdad.

As word of my arrival spread, more and more Iraqis began to arrive at the compound. We tried to meet with a number of other Iraqi officials, but the logistics proved problematic. They had not been told in advance that I was coming to Baghdad. They were therefore given late invitations to come to meet with a senior foreign visitor, but they had trouble reaching the location of this mystery guest because of long delays getting through checkpoints. We waited and waited for one senior parliamentarian, but he did not show up. The head of my security detail was uncomfortable with our party staying at one location too long. Finally he said, "Right, that's it," and we headed back to the airport. We were all subdued as we entered the aircraft. Our plane shot straight up, engines screaming, and we were slammed back into our seats. Once we were out of missile range, I glanced back out of the window.

Remembering the Baghdad I had seen twenty years ago, it was a shock to see it such a shattered mess. My brother Ali told me that the visit left him very depressed. "You too?" I said.

Over time, U.S. policy s.h.i.+fted and combat troops began to leave Iraq. A Status of Forces agreement was ratified by the Iraqi parliament in November 2009, providing for U.S. forces to leave Iraq by the end of 2011. This is a good objective, and I would be the first to say that all foreign troops should leave. But you do not want, as a result of too speedy a withdrawal, to create a political vacuum that a few years later somebody would have to come back and fix. If establis.h.i.+ng a strong Iraqi government means withdrawing a little more slowly, that may be the best course. When you talk to those Iraqis who are in government, many will admit privately that they do not want a vacuum, so the withdrawal must be well planned to ensure that the security of Iraq does not suffer.

U.S. combat troops completed their withdrawal from Iraq on August 31, 2010, and President Obama announced the end of U.S. combat operations in Iraq. The security situation deteriorated soon after, as the Iraqi security forces moved in to fill the vacuum. About fifty thousand U.S. troops will remain in Iraq until the end of 2011 to train the Iraqi army and help it a.s.sume its responsibilities in securing the country. The hope is that Iraq will stabilize by then and the Iraqi army will be fully equipped to maintain security.

Chapter 26.

A New Voice from America In March 2007, in a rare honor for a foreign head of state, I was invited to address a joint session of the U.S. Congress. After careful thought, I knew that there was only one topic I could speak about: the urgent need for peace in the Middle East.

I said that throughout the region, the people of the Middle East were searching for a new beginning, and hoping for a future of prosperity and peace. We have seen the danger and destruction of violence, hatred, and injustice, but we have also seen what people can achieve when they are empowered, when they break down walls, when they commit to the future. And we know that peace between the Israelis and Palestinians would offer new possibilities for our region and the entire world. No Palestinian father should be helpless to feed his family and build a future for his sons and daughters. No Israeli mother should feel fear when her child boards a bus. We cannot afford for one more generation to grow up thinking that violence and conflict are the norm.

After my speech, many American friends came and asked me what they could do to help. Others were more skeptical. Some said, "What does this conflict have to do with us? Why should we get involved in a local struggle halfway around the world?"

I would like to say very clearly now what I told them: resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict is in the national interest of the United States, Europe, and the rest of the international community. The Palestinian issue is of paramount importance to more than a billion and a half Muslims across the world; as such, it truly is a global issue. Many men of violence use the Israeli occupation of Arab lands, especially East Jerusalem, as a rallying cry. They portray the West-and America in particular-as a blind supporter of Israel, and therefore hold "Satanic America" and its allies responsible for the injustice of the Israeli occupation. Terrorist organizations exploit the legitimate frustration of Muslims over the failure to end the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories to serve their illegitimate agendas and to generate support for their anti-American rhetoric and actions. It is imperative that we resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in order to deprive these extremists of one of their most potent appeals.

Al Qaeda feeds on the continuation of this conflict. The creation of a Palestinian state would significantly diminish its global appeal and would limit its reach, turning Al Qaeda into a localized threat restricted to certain conflict zones. For more than ten years, the United States, Britain, and their allies have been involved in two wars in the Muslim world. We will witness more violent conflicts that Al Qaeda will exploit to further its reach unless the Palestinians and Israelis find peace. The link may not seem obvious to Americans, but any Muslim will tell you that the injustice suffered by the Palestinian people is a festering sore that radicalizes and mobilizes young men throughout the Muslim world. Al Qaeda won't disappear the moment a Palestinian state comes into being. But it will have a harder time finding new recruits and winning support for its criminal actions.

One of the most vital functions that the United States can play is to help its friends set aside their emotions to think in strategic terms. All too often in my region we are consumed with the latest injustice or act of violence and lose sight of the larger view. We sometimes need help to raise our eyes to the future, to consider where we want to be in ten, twenty, or thirty years, and to act in such a way as to make that vision a reality.

Unfortunately, when it comes to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, we do not have the luxury of time. All of the stalling and waiting, the deferred promises, have seriously compromised people's confidence that peace is even a possibility. This undermines moderates and plays directly into the hands of extremists. By failing to act now, we are dooming the Middle East to a future of wars that will reverberate way beyond its borders, a future dominated by terrorists and extremists as moderates lose all credibility.

The elements of a peace settlement are clear. A two-state solution has been endorsed by the entire international community. But we need some help getting there. In the past few years the peace process has stalled, producing little but empty rhetoric, disappointment, and violence.