The Works of George Berkeley Part 56

_Hyl._ Be that as it will, yet I still insist upon it, that _our_ not being able to conceive a thing is no argument against its existence.

_Phil._ That from a cause, effect, operation, sign, or other circ.u.mstance, there may reasonably be inferred the existence of a thing not immediately perceived; and that it were absurd for any man to argue against the existence of that thing, from his having no direct and positive notion of it, I freely own. But, where there is nothing of all this; where neither reason nor revelation induces us to believe the existence of a thing; where we have not even a relative notion of it; where an abstraction is made from perceiving and being perceived, from Spirit and idea: lastly, where there is not so much as the most inadequate or faint idea pretended to-I will not indeed thence conclude against the reality of any notion, or existence of anything; but my inference shall be, that you mean nothing at all; that you employ words to no manner of purpose, without any design or signification whatsoever. And I leave it to you to consider how mere jargon should be treated.

_Hyl._ To deal frankly with you, Philonous, your arguments seem in themselves unanswerable; but they have not so great an effect on me as to produce that entire conviction, that hearty acquiescence, which attends demonstration(845). I find myself still relapsing into an obscure surmise of I know not what, _matter_.

_Phil._ But, are you not sensible, Hylas, that two things must concur to take away all scruple, and work a plenary a.s.sent in the mind? Let a visible object be set in never so clear a light, yet, if there is any imperfection in the sight, or if the eye is not directed towards it, it will not be distinctly seen. And though a demonstration be never so well grounded and fairly proposed, yet, if there is withal a stain of prejudice, or a wrong bias on the understanding, can it be expected on a sudden to perceive clearly, and adhere firmly to the truth? No; there is need of time and pains: the attention must be awakened and detained by a frequent repet.i.tion of the same thing placed oft in the same, oft in different lights. I have said it already, and find I must still repeat and inculcate, that it is an unaccountable licence you take, in pretending to maintain you know not what, for you know not what reason, to you know not what purpose. Can this be paralleled in any art or science, any sect or profession of men? Or is there anything _so_ barefacedly groundless and unreasonable to be met with even in the lowest of common conversation?

But, perhaps you will still say, Matter may exist; though at the same time you neither know _what is meant_ by _Matter_, or by its _existence_. This indeed is surprising, and the more so because it is altogether voluntary [(846) and of your own head], you not being led to it by any one reason; for I challenge you to shew me that thing in nature which needs Matter to explain or account for it.

_Hyl._ The _reality_ of things cannot be maintained without supposing the existence of Matter. And is not this, think you, a good reason why I should be earnest in its defence?

_Phil._ The reality of things! What things? sensible or intelligible?

_Hyl._ Sensible things.

_Phil._ My glove for example?

_Hyl._ That, or any other thing perceived by the senses.

_Phil._ But to fix on some particular thing. Is it not a sufficient evidence to me of the existence of this _glove_, that I see it, and feel it, and wear it? Or, if this will not do, how is it possible I should be a.s.sured of the reality of this thing, which I actually see in this place, by supposing that some unknown thing, which I never did or can see, exists after an unknown manner, in an unknown place, or in no place at all? How can the supposed reality of that which is intangible be a proof that anything tangible really exists? Or, of that which is invisible, that any visible thing, or, in general of anything which is imperceptible, that a perceptible exists? Do but explain this and I shall think nothing too hard for you.

_Hyl._ Upon the whole, I am content to own the existence of Matter is highly improbable; but the direct and absolute impossibility of it does not appear to me.

_Phil._ But granting Matter to be possible, yet, upon that account merely, it can have no more claim to existence than a golden mountain, or a centaur.

_Hyl._ I acknowledge it; but still you do not deny it is possible; and that which is possible, for aught you know, may actually exist.

_Phil._ I deny it to be possible; and have, if I mistake not, evidently proved, from your own concessions, that it is not. In the common sense of the word _Matter_, is there any more implied than an extended, solid, figured, moveable substance, existing without the mind? And have not you acknowledged, over and over, that you have seen evident reason for denying the possibility of such a substance?

_Hyl._ True, but that is only one sense of the term _Matter_.

_Phil._ But is it not the only proper genuine received sense? And, if Matter, in such a sense, be proved impossible, may it not be thought with good grounds absolutely impossible? Else how could anything be proved impossible? Or, indeed, how could there be any proof at all one way or other, to a man who takes the liberty to unsettle and change the common signification of words?

_Hyl._ I thought philosophers might be allowed to speak more accurately than the vulgar, and were not always confined to the common acceptation of a term.

_Phil._ But this now mentioned is the common received sense among philosophers themselves. But, not to insist on that, have you not been allowed to take Matter in what sense you pleased? And have you not used this privilege in the utmost extent; sometimes entirely changing, at others leaving out, or putting into the definition of it whatever, for the present, best served your design, contrary to all the known rules of reason and logic? And hath not this s.h.i.+fting, unfair method of yours spun out our dispute to an unnecessary length; Matter having been particularly examined, and by your own confession refuted in each of those senses? And can any more be required to prove the absolute impossibility of a thing, than the proving it impossible in every particular sense that either you or any one else understands it in?

_Hyl._ But I am not so thoroughly satisfied that you have proved the impossibility of Matter, in the last most obscure abstracted and indefinite sense.

_Phil._ When is a thing shewn to be impossible?

_Hyl._ When a repugnancy is demonstrated between the ideas comprehended in its definition.

_Phil._ But where there are no ideas, there no repugnancy can be demonstrated between ideas?

_Hyl._ I agree with you.

_Phil._ Now, in that which you call the obscure indefinite sense of the word _Matter_, it is plain, by your own confession, there was included no idea at all, no sense except an unknown sense; which is the same thing as none. You are not, therefore, to expect I should prove a repugnancy between ideas, where there are no ideas; or the impossibility of Matter taken in an _unknown_ sense, that is, no sense at all. My business was only to shew you meant _nothing_; and this you were brought to own. So that, in all your various senses, you have been shewed either to mean nothing at all, or, if anything, an absurdity. And if this be not sufficient to prove the impossibility of a thing, I desire you will let me know what is.

_Hyl._ I acknowledge you have proved that Matter is impossible; nor do I see what more can be said in defence of it. But, at the same time that I give up this, I suspect all my other notions. For surely none could be more seemingly evident than this once was: and yet it now seems as false and absurd as ever it did true before. But I think we have discussed the point sufficiently for the present. The remaining part of the day I would willingly spend in running over in my thoughts the several heads of this morning's conversation, and to-morrow shall be glad to meet you here again about the same time.

_Phil._ I will not fail to attend you.

The Third Dialogue

_Philonous._ (847)Tell me, Hylas, what are the fruits of yesterday's meditation? Has it confirmed you in the same mind you were in at parting?

or have you since seen cause to change your opinion?

_Hylas._ Truly my opinion is that all our opinions are alike vain and uncertain. What we approve to-day, we condemn to-morrow. We keep a stir about knowledge, and spend our lives in the pursuit of it, when, alas! we know nothing all the while: nor do I think it possible for us ever to know anything in this life. Our faculties are too narrow and too few. Nature certainly never intended us for speculation.

_Phil._ What! Say you we can know nothing, Hylas?

_Hyl._ There is not that single thing in the world whereof we can know the real nature, or what it is in itself.

_Phil._ Will you tell me I do not really know what fire or water is?

_Hyl._ You may indeed know that fire appears hot, and water fluid; but this is no more than knowing what sensations are produced in your own mind, upon the application of fire and water to your organs of sense.

Their internal const.i.tution, their true and real nature, you are utterly in the dark as to _that_.

_Phil._ Do I not know this to be a real stone that I stand on, and that which I see before my eyes to be a real tree?

_Hyl._ _Know?_ No, it is impossible you or any man alive should know it.

All you know is, that you have such a certain idea or appearance in your own mind. But what is this to the real tree or stone? I tell you that colour, figure, and hardness, which you perceive, are not the real natures of those things, or in the least like them. The same may be said of all other real things, or corporeal substances, which compose the world. They have none of them anything of themselves, like those sensible qualities by us perceived. We should not therefore pretend to affirm or know anything of them, as they are in their own nature.

_Phil._ But surely, Hylas, I can distinguish gold, for example, from iron: and how could this be, if I knew not what either truly was?

_Hyl._ Believe me, Philonous, you can only distinguish between your own ideas. That yellowness, that weight, and other sensible qualities, think you they are really in the gold? They are only relative to the senses, and have no absolute existence in nature. And in pretending to distinguish the species of real things, by the appearances in your mind, you may perhaps act as wisely as he that should conclude two men were of a different species, because their clothes were not of the same colour.

_Phil._ It seems, then, we are altogether put off with the appearances of things, and those false ones too. The very meat I eat, and the cloth I wear, have nothing in them like what I see and feel.

_Hyl._ Even so.

_Phil._ But is it not strange the whole world should be thus imposed on, and so foolish as to believe their senses? And yet I know not how it is, but men eat, and drink, and sleep, and perform all the offices of life, as comfortably and conveniently as if they really knew the things they are conversant about.

_Hyl._ They do so: but you know ordinary practice does not require a nicety of speculative knowledge. Hence the vulgar retain their mistakes, and for all that make a s.h.i.+ft to bustle through the affairs of life. But philosophers know better things.

_Phil._ You mean, they _know_ that they _know nothing_.

_Hyl._ That is the very top and perfection of human knowledge.

_Phil._ But are you all this while in earnest, Hylas; and are you seriously persuaded that you know nothing real in the world? Suppose you are going to write, would you not call for pen, ink, and paper, like another man; and do you not know what it is you call for?

_Hyl._ How often must I tell you, that I know not the real nature of any one thing in the universe? I may indeed upon occasion make use of pen, ink, and paper. But what any one of them is in its own true nature, I declare positively I know not. And the same is true with regard to every other corporeal thing. And, what is more, we are not only ignorant of the true and real nature of things, but even of their existence. It cannot be denied that we perceive such certain appearances or ideas; but it cannot be concluded from thence that bodies really exist. Nay, now I think on it, I must, agreeably to my former concessions, farther declare that it is impossible any _real_ corporeal thing should exist in nature.

_Phil._ You amaze me. Was ever anything more wild and extravagant than the notions you now maintain: and is it not evident you are led into all these extravagances by the belief of _material substance_? This makes you dream of those unknown natures(848) in everything. It is this occasions your distinguis.h.i.+ng between the reality and sensible appearances of things. It is to this you are indebted for being ignorant of what everybody else knows perfectly well. Nor is this all: you are not only ignorant of the true nature of everything, but you know not whether anything really exists, or whether there are any true natures at all; forasmuch as you attribute to your material beings an absolute or external existence, wherein you suppose their reality consists. And, as you are forced in the end to acknowledge such an existence means either a direct repugnancy, or nothing at all, it follows that you are obliged to pull down your own hypothesis of material Substance, and positively to deny the real existence of any part of the universe. And so you are plunged into the deepest and most deplorable scepticism that ever man was(849). Tell me, Hylas, is it not as I say?