The Works of George Berkeley Part 54

_Phil._ You need not be much concerned at it; for after all, this way of explaining things, as you called it, could never have satisfied any reasonable man. What connexion is there between a motion in the nerves, and the sensations of sound or colour in the mind? Or how is it possible these should be the effect of that?

_Hyl._ But I could never think it had so little in it as now it seems to have.

_Phil._ Well then, are you at length satisfied that no sensible things have a real existence; and that you are in truth an arrant sceptic?

_Hyl._ It is too plain to be denied.

_Phil._ Look! are not the fields covered with a delightful verdure? Is there not something in the woods and groves, in the rivers and clear springs, that soothes, that delights, that transports the soul? At the prospect of the wide and deep ocean, or some huge mountain whose top is lost in the clouds, or of an old gloomy forest, are not our minds filled with a pleasing horror? Even in rocks and deserts is there not an agreeable wildness? How sincere a pleasure is it to behold the natural beauties of the earth! To preserve and renew our relish for them, is not the veil of night alternately drawn over her face, and doth she not change her dress with the seasons? How aptly are the elements disposed! What variety and use [(823)in the meanest productions of nature!] What delicacy, what beauty, what contrivance, in animal and vegetable bodies!

How exquisitely are all things suited, as well to their particular ends, as to const.i.tute opposite parts of the whole! And, while they mutually aid and support, do they not also set off and ill.u.s.trate each other? Raise now your thoughts from this ball of earth to all those glorious luminaries that adorn the high arch of heaven. The motion and situation of the planets, are they not admirable for use and order? Were those (miscalled _erratic_) globes once known to stray, in their repeated journeys through the pathless void? Do they not measure areas round the sun ever proportioned to the times? So fixed, so immutable are the laws by which the unseen Author of nature actuates the universe. How vivid and radiant is the l.u.s.tre of the fixed stars! How magnificent and rich that negligent profusion with which they appear to be scattered throughout the whole azure vault! Yet, if you take the telescope, it brings into your sight a new host of stars that escape the naked eye. Here they seem contiguous and minute, but to a nearer view immense orbs of light at various distances, far sunk in the abyss of s.p.a.ce. Now you must call imagination to your aid.

The feeble narrow sense cannot descry innumerable worlds revolving round the central fires; and in those worlds the energy of an all-perfect Mind displayed in endless forms. But, neither sense nor imagination are big enough to comprehend the boundless extent, with all its glittering furniture. Though the labouring mind exert and strain each power to its utmost reach, there still stands out ungrasped a surplusage immeasurable.

Yet all the vast bodies that compose this mighty frame, how distant and remote soever, are by some secret mechanism, some Divine art and force, linked in a mutual dependence and intercourse with each other; even with this earth, which was almost slipt from my thoughts and lost in the crowd of worlds. Is not the whole system immense, beautiful, glorious beyond expression and beyond thought! What treatment, then, do those philosophers deserve, who would, deprive these n.o.ble and delightful scenes of all _reality_? How should those Principles be entertained that lead us to think all the visible beauty of the creation a false imaginary glare? To be plain, can you expect this Scepticism of yours will not be thought extravagantly absurd by all men of sense?

_Hyl._ Other men may think as they please; but for your part you have nothing to reproach me with. My comfort is, you are as much a sceptic as I am.

_Phil._ There, Hylas, I must beg leave to differ from you.

_Hyl._ What! Have you all along agreed to the premises, and do you now deny the conclusion, and leave me to maintain those paradoxes by myself which you led me into? This surely is not fair.

_Phil._ I deny that I agreed with you in those notions that led to Scepticism. You indeed said the _reality_ of sensible things consisted in an _absolute existence out of the minds of spirits_, or distinct from their being perceived. And pursuant to this notion of reality, _you_ are obliged to deny sensible things any real existence: that is, according to your own definition, you profess yourself a sceptic. But I neither said nor thought the reality of sensible things was to be defined after that manner. To me it is evident, for the reasons you allow of, that sensible things cannot exist otherwise than in a mind or spirit. Whence I conclude, not that they have no real existence, but that, seeing they depend not on my thought, and have an existence distinct from being perceived by me(824), _there must be some other Mind wherein they exist_. As sure, therefore, as the sensible world really exists, so sure is there an infinite omnipresent Spirit who contains and supports it.

_Hyl._ What! This is no more than I and all Christians hold; nay, and all others too who believe there is a G.o.d, and that He knows and comprehends all things.

_Phil._ Aye, but here lies the difference. Men commonly believe that all things are known or perceived by G.o.d, because they believe the being of a G.o.d; whereas I, on the other side, immediately and necessarily conclude the being of a G.o.d, because all sensible things must be perceived by Him(825).

_Hyl._ But, so long as we all believe the same thing, what matter is it how we come by that belief?

_Phil._ But neither do we agree in the same opinion. For philosophers, though they acknowledge all corporeal beings to be perceived by G.o.d, yet they attribute to them an absolute subsistence distinct from their being perceived by any mind whatever; which I do not. Besides, is there no difference between saying, _There is a G.o.d, therefore He perceives all things_; and saying, _Sensible things do really exist; and, if they really exist, they are necessarily perceived by an infinite Mind: therefore there is an infinite Mind, or G.o.d_(826)_?_ This furnishes you with a direct and immediate demonstration, from a most evident principle, of the _being of a G.o.d_. Divines and philosophers had proved beyond all controversy, from the beauty and usefulness of the several parts of the creation, that it was the workmans.h.i.+p of G.o.d. But that-setting aside all help of astronomy and natural philosophy, all contemplation of the contrivance, order, and adjustment of things-an infinite Mind should be necessarily inferred from(827) the bare _existence of the sensible world_, is an advantage to them only who have made this easy reflexion: That the sensible world is that which we perceive by our several senses; and that nothing is perceived by the senses beside ideas; and that no idea or archetype of an idea can exist otherwise than in a mind. You may now, without any laborious search into the sciences, without any subtlety of reason, or tedious length of discourse, oppose and baffle the most strenuous advocate for Atheism. Those miserable refuges, whether in an eternal succession of unthinking causes and effects, or in a fortuitous concourse of atoms; those wild imaginations of Vanini, Hobbes, and Spinoza: in a word, the whole system of Atheism, is it not entirely overthrown, by this single reflexion on the repugnancy included in supposing the whole, or any part, even the most rude and shapeless, of the visible world, to exist without a Mind? Let any one of those abettors of impiety but look into his own thoughts, and there try if he can conceive how so much as a rock, a desert, a chaos, or confused jumble of atoms; how anything at all, either sensible or imaginable, can exist independent of a Mind, and he need go no farther to be convinced of his folly. Can anything be fairer than to put a dispute on such an issue, and leave it to a man himself to see if he can conceive, even in thought, what he holds to be true in fact, and from a notional to allow it a real existence(828)?

_Hyl._ It cannot be denied there is something highly serviceable to religion in what you advance. But do you not think it looks very like a notion entertained by some eminent moderns(829), of _seeing all things in G.o.d_?

_Phil._ I would gladly know that opinion: pray explain it to me.

_Hyl._ They conceive that the soul, being immaterial, is incapable of being united with material things, so as to perceive them in themselves; but that she perceives them by her union with the substance of G.o.d, which, being spiritual, is therefore purely intelligible, or capable of being the immediate object of a spirit's thought. Besides, the Divine essence contains in it perfections correspondent to each created being; and which are, for that reason, proper to exhibit or represent them to the mind.

_Phil._ I do not understand how our ideas, which are things altogether pa.s.sive and inert(830), can be the essence, or any part (or like any part) of the essence or substance of G.o.d, who is an impa.s.sive, indivisible, pure, active being. Many more difficulties and objections there are which occur at first view against this hypothesis; but I shall only add, that it is liable to all the absurdities of the common hypothesis, in making a created world exist otherwise than in the mind of a Spirit. Beside all which it hath this peculiar to itself; that it makes that material world serve to no purpose. And, if it pa.s.s for a good argument against other hypotheses in the sciences, that they suppose Nature, or the Divine wisdom, to make something in vain, or do that by tedious roundabout methods which might have been performed in a much more easy and compendious way, what shall we think of that hypothesis which supposes the whole world made in vain?

_Hyl._ But what say you? Are not you too of opinion that we see all things in G.o.d? If I mistake not, what you advance comes near it.

_Phil._ [(831)Few men think; yet all have opinions. Hence men's opinions are superficial and confused. It is nothing strange that tenets which in themselves are ever so different, should nevertheless be confounded with each other, by those who do not consider them attentively. I shall not therefore be surprised if some men imagine that I run into the enthusiasm of Malebranche; though in truth I am very remote from it. He builds on the most abstract general ideas, which I entirely disclaim. He a.s.serts an absolute external world, which I deny. He maintains that we are deceived by our senses, and know not the real natures or the true forms and figures of extended beings; of all which I hold the direct contrary. So that upon the whole there are no Principles more fundamentally opposite than his and mine. It must be owned that] I entirely agree with what the holy Scripture saith, 'That in G.o.d we live and move and have our being.' But that we see things in His essence, after the manner above set forth, I am far from believing. Take here in brief my meaning:-It is evident that the things I perceive are my own ideas, and that no idea can exist unless it be in a mind: nor is it less plain that these ideas or things by me perceived, either themselves or their archetypes, exist independently of _my_ mind, since I know myself not to be their author, it being out of my power to determine at pleasure what particular ideas I shall be affected with upon opening my eyes or ears(832): they must therefore exist in some other Mind, whose Will it is they should be exhibited to me. The things, I say, immediately perceived are ideas or sensations, call them which you will.

But how can any idea or sensation exist in, or be produced by, anything but a mind or spirit? This indeed is inconceivable(833). And to a.s.sert that which is inconceivable is to talk nonsense: is it not?

_Hyl._ Without doubt.

_Phil._ But, on the other hand, it is very conceivable that they should exist in and be produced by a Spirit; since this is no more than I daily experience in myself(834), inasmuch as I perceive numberless ideas; and, by an act of my will, can form a great variety of them, and raise them up in my imagination: though, it must be confessed, these creatures of the fancy are not altogether so distinct, so strong, vivid, and permanent, as those perceived by my senses-which latter are called _real things_. From all which I conclude, _there is a Mind which affects me every moment with all the sensible impressions I perceive_. And, from the variety, order, and manner of these, I conclude _the Author of them to be wise, powerful, and good, beyond comprehension_. Mark it well; I do not say I see things by perceiving that which represents them in the intelligible Substance of G.o.d. This I do not understand; but I say, the things by me perceived are known by the understanding, and produced by the will of an infinite Spirit. And is not all this most plain and evident? Is there any more in it than what a little observation in our own minds, and that which pa.s.seth in them, not only enables us to conceive, but also obliges us to acknowledge?

_Hyl._ I think I understand you very clearly; and own proof you give of a Deity seems no less evident than it is surprising. But, allowing that G.o.d is the supreme and universal Cause of all things, yet, may there not be still a Third Nature besides Spirits and Ideas? May we not admit a subordinate and limited cause of our ideas? In a word, may there not for all that be _Matter_?

_Phil._ How often must I inculcate the same thing? You allow the things immediately perceived by sense to exist nowhere without the mind; but there is nothing perceived by sense which is not perceived immediately; therefore there is nothing sensible that exists without the mind. The Matter, therefore, which you still insist on is something intelligible, I suppose; something that may be discovered by reason(835), and not by sense.

_Hyl._ You are in the right.

_Phil._ Pray let me know what reasoning your belief of Matter is grounded on; and what this Matter is, in your present sense of it.

_Hyl._ I find myself affected with various ideas whereof I know I am not the cause; neither are they the cause of themselves, or of one another, or capable of subsisting by themselves, as being altogether inactive, fleeting, dependent beings. They have therefore _some_ cause distinct from me and them: of which I pretend to know no more than that it is _the cause of my ideas_. And this thing whatever it be, I call Matter.

_Phil._ Tell me, Hylas, hath every one a liberty to change the current proper signification attached to a common name in any language? For example, suppose a traveller should tell you that in a certain country men pa.s.s unhurt through the fire; and, upon explaining himself, you found he meant by the word _fire_ that which others call _water_. Or, if he should a.s.sert that there are trees that walk upon two legs, meaning men by the term _trees_. Would you think this reasonable?

_Hyl._ No; I should think it very absurd. Common custom is the standard of propriety in language. And for any man to affect speaking improperly is to pervert the use of speech, and can never serve to a better purpose than to protract and multiply disputes where there is no difference in opinion.

_Phil._ And doth not _Matter_, in the common current acceptation of the word, signify an extended solid moveable, unthinking, inactive Substance?

_Hyl._ It doth.

_Phil._ And, hath it not been made evident that no _such_ substance can possibly exist(836)? And, though it should be allowed to exist, yet how can that which is _inactive_ be a _cause_; or that which is _unthinking_ be a _cause of thought_? You may, indeed, if you please, annex to the word _Matter_ a contrary meaning to what is vulgarly received; and tell me you understand by it, an unextended, thinking, active being, which is the cause of our ideas. But what else is this than to play with words, and run into that very fault you just now condemned with so much reason? I do by no means find fault with your reasoning, in that you collect _a_ cause from the _phenomena_: but I deny that _the_ cause deducible by reason can properly be termed Matter(837).

_Hyl._ There is indeed something in what you say. But I am afraid you do not thoroughly comprehend my meaning. I would by no means be thought to deny that G.o.d, or an infinite Spirit, is the Supreme Cause of all things.

All I contend for is, that, subordinate to the Supreme Agent, there is a cause of a limited and inferior nature, which _concurs_ in the production of our ideas, not by any act of will, or spiritual efficiency, but by that kind of action which belongs to Matter, viz. _motion_.

_Phil._ I find you are at every turn relapsing into your old exploded conceit, of a moveable, and consequently an extended, substance, existing without the mind. What! Have you already forgotten you were convinced; or are you willing I should repeat what has been said on that head? In truth this is not fair dealing in you, still to suppose the being of that which you have so often acknowledged to have no being. But, not to insist farther on what has been so largely handled, I ask whether all your ideas are not perfectly pa.s.sive and inert, including nothing of action in them(838).

_Hyl._ They are.

_Phil._ And are sensible qualities anything else but ideas?

_Hyl._ How often have I acknowledged that they are not.

_Phil._ But is not _motion_ a sensible quality?

_Hyl._ It is.

_Phil._ Consequently it is no action?

_Hyl._ I agree with you. And indeed it is very plain that when I stir my finger, it remains pa.s.sive; but my will which produced the motion is active.

_Phil._ Now, I desire to know, in the first place, whether, motion being allowed to be no action, you can conceive any action besides volition: and, in the second place, whether to say something and conceive nothing be not to talk nonsense(839): and, lastly, whether, having considered the premises, you do not perceive that to suppose any efficient or active Cause of our ideas, other than _Spirit_, is highly absurd and unreasonable?

_Hyl._ I give up the point entirely. But, though Matter may not be a cause, yet what hinders its being an _instrument_, subservient to the supreme Agent in the production of our ideas?

_Phil._ An instrument say you; pray what may be the figure, springs, wheels, and motions, of that instrument?

_Hyl._ Those I pretend to determine nothing of, both the substance and its qualities being entirely unknown to me.

_Phil._ What? You are then of opinion it is made up of unknown parts, that it hath unknown motions, and an unknown shape?

_Hyl._ I do not believe that it hath any figure or motion at all, being already convinced, that no sensible qualities can exist in an unperceiving substance.

_Phil._ But what notion is it possible to frame of an instrument void of all sensible qualities, even extension itself?