The Works of George Berkeley Part 24

A probable method propos'd whereby one may judge whether in near vision there is a greater distance between the crystalline & fund than usual, or whether the crystalline be onely render'd more convex. If the former, then the v. s. is enlarg'd, & the m. v. corresponds to less than 30 minutes, or wtever it us'd to correspond to.

Stated measures, inches, feet, &c., are tangible not visible extensions.

(M406) Locke, More, Raphson, &c. seem to make G.o.d extended. 'Tis nevertheless of great use to religion to take extension out of our idea of G.o.d, & put a power in its place. It seems dangerous to suppose extension, wch is manifestly inert, in G.o.d.

(M407) But, say you, The thought or perception I call extension is not itself in an unthinking thing or Matter-but it is like something wch is in Matter. Well, say I, Do you apprehend or conceive wt you say extension is like unto, or do you not? If the later, how know you they are alike? How can you compare any things besides your own ideas? If the former, it must be an idea, i.e. perception, thought, or sensation-wch to be in an unperceiving thing is a contradiction(241).

(M408) I abstain from all flourish & powers of words & figures, using a great plainness & simplicity of simile, having oft found it difficult to understand those that use the lofty & Platonic, or subtil & scholastique strain(242).

(M409) Whatsoever has any of our ideas in it must perceive; it being that very having, that pa.s.sive recognition of ideas, that denominates the mind perceiving-that being the very essence of perception, or that wherein perception consists.

The faintness wch alters the appearance of the horizontal moon, rather proceeds from the quant.i.ty or grossness of the intermediate atmosphere, than from any change of distance, wch is perhaps not considerable enough to be a total cause, but may be a partial of the phenomenon. N. B. The visual angle is less in cause the horizon.

We judge of the distance of bodies, as by other things, so also by the situation of their pictures in the eye, or (wch is the same thing) according as they appear higher or lower. Those wch seem higher are farther off.

Qu. why we see objects greater in ye dark? whether this can be solv'd by any but my Principles?

(M410) The reverse of ye Principle introduced scepticism.

(M411) N. B. On my Principles there is a reality: there are things: there is a _rerum natura_.

Mem. The surds, doubling the cube, &c.

We think that if just made to see we should judge of the distance & magnitude of things as we do now; but this is false. So also wt we think so positively of the situation of objects.

Hays's, Keill's(243), &c. method of proving the infinitesimals of the 3d order absurd, & perfectly contradictions.

Angles of contact, & verily all angles comprehended by a right line & a curve, cannot be measur'd, the arches intercepted not being similar.

The danger of expounding the H. Trinity by extension.

(M412) Qu. Why should the magnitude seen at a near distance be deem'd the true one rather than that seen at a farther distance? Why should the sun be thought many 1000 miles rather than one foot in diameter-both being equally apparent diameters? Certainly men judg'd of the sun not in himself, but wth relation to themselves.

(M413) 4 Principles whereby to answer objections, viz.

1. Bodies do really exist, tho' not perceiv'd by us.

2. There is a law or course of nature.

3. Language & knowledge are all about ideas; words stand for nothing else.

4. Nothing can be a proof against one side of a contradiction that bears equally hard upon the other(244).

What shall I say? Dare I p.r.o.nounce the admired ????e?a mathematica, that darling of the age, a trifle?

Most certainly no finite extension divisible _ad infinitum_.

(M414) Difficulties about concentric circles.

(M415) Mem. To examine & accurately discuss the scholium of the 8th definition of Mr. Newton's(245) Principia.

Ridiculous in the mathematicians to despise Sense.

Qu. Is it not impossible there should be abstract general ideas?

All ideas come from without. They are all particular. The mind, 'tis true, can consider one thing wthout another; but then, considered asunder, they make not 2 ideas. Both together can make but one, as for instance colour & visible extension(246).

The end of a mathematical line is nothing. Locke's argument that the end of his pen is black or white concludes nothing here.

Mem. Take care how you pretend to define extension, for fear of the geometers.

Qu. Why difficult to imagine a minimum? Ans. Because we are not used to take notice of 'em singly; they not being able singly to pleasure or hurt us, thereby to deserve our regard.

Mem. To prove against Keill yt the infinite divisibility of matter makes the half have an equal number of equal parts with the whole.

Mem. To examine how far the not comprehending infinites may be admitted as a plea.

Qu. Why may not the mathematicians reject all the extensions below the M.

as well as the dd, &c., wch are allowed to be something, & consequently may be magnify'd by gla.s.ses into inches, feet, &c., as well as the quant.i.ties next below the M.?

Big, little, and number are the works of the mind. How therefore can ye extension you suppose in Matter be big or little? How can it consist of any number of points?

(M416) Mem. Strictly to remark L[ocke], b. 2. c. 8. s. 8.

Schoolmen compar'd with the mathematicians.

Extension is blended wth tangible or visible ideas, & by the mind praescinded therefrom.

Mathematiques made easy-the scale does almost all. The scale can tell us the subtangent in ye parabola is double the abscisse.