The Basis of Early Christian Theism Part 2

[34] _Second Apology_, VI.

[35] _Dialogue with Trypho_, IV (end).

[36] _Stromata_, V, 14.

[37] _Against Marcion_, I, 10.

[38] _Resurrection of the Flesh_, III.

[39] _Apology_, XVII.

[40] _Against Celsus_, II, 40.

[41] _Treatise_ VI, -- 9. See, also, Tertullian: _Apology_, XVII; "And this is the crowning guilt of men that they will not recognize One of whom they cannot possibly be ignorant."

[42] _Against the Heathen_, I. 33.

[43] _Dialogue with Trypho_, IV, "Even Homer distinguishes simple seeing (?de??) from ??e??, which implies perception by the mind as consequent upon sight."

[44] _Hortatory Address to the Greeks_, V.

[45] _Exhortation to the Heathen_, XI.

[46] _Stromata_, IV, 25. In V, 12, he explains what he means by "demonstration": "Nor any more is He apprehended by the science of demonstration, for it depends on primary and better known principles.

But there is nothing antecedent to the Unbegotten."

[47] _Against Celsus_, VII, 20. See also VII, 44, and Clem. Alex.: _Stromata_, II, ii, 4, and often.

[48] E.g., Theophilus (I, 1, 2) replies to the demand: "Show me thy G.o.d," by the counter-demand: "Show me _yourself_, and I will show you my G.o.d."

[49] E.g., St. Justin: _Hortatory Address_, V.

[50] _Ibid._, x.x.xVIII. See also V, VIII, and Athenagoras: _Emba.s.sy_, VII; Clem. Alex.: _Exhortion to Heathen_, VI, XI; _Stromata_, I, 13; II, 2, 11; V, 14; Tertullian: _Apology_, XVIII; Methodius: _Miscellaneous Fragments_, 1.

[51] St. Clem. Alex.: _Stromata_, IV, 25. For a few among many references, see: St. Irenaeus: _Against Heresies_, V, i, 1; St. Clem.

Alex.: _Exhortation to Heathen_, XI; _Instructor_, I, 12; _Stromata_, I, 5, 19; II, 2; V, 1, 6, 11-13; VII, 1; VI, 5; Tertullian: _Against Marcion_, V, 16; _Against Praxeas_, XIV; Origen: _De Principiis_ I, iii, 1; _Against Celsus_, VII, 42, 44; Novatian: _De Trinitate_, VIII; Arn.o.bius: _Against the Heathen_, I, 38.

[52] _Stromata_, II, 4: "?? d? a?s??se?? ?a? t?? ??? ? t?? ?p?st???

s???stata? ??s?a ?????? d? ??? te ?a? a?s??se?? t? ??a????." The student of Kant's _Kritik der Reinen Vernunft_ will find a number of familiar pa.s.sages in St. Clement.

[53] _Ibid._, V, 12.

[54] _Ibid._, VIII, 3.

[55] _Ibid._, II, 4.

[56] _Ibid._, VIII, 3.

[57] _Stromata_, VIII, 3.

[58] E.g., Theophilus: _To Autolycus_, I, 3; St. Clem. Alex.: _Stromata_, V, 12.

[59] _Stromata_, V, 12: "If, then, abstracting all that belongs to bodies and things called incorporeal, we cast ourselves into the greatness of Christ, and then advance into immensity by holiness, we may reach somehow to the conception of the Almighty, _knowing not what He is, but what He is not_."

CHAPTER IV

PATRISTIC USE OF THE THEISTIC ARGUMENTS

From this account of the general att.i.tude of the ante-Nicene writers toward a possible knowledge of G.o.d, it will readily be antic.i.p.ated that the forms of the theistic argument used by Plato and by Aristotle will find no place in their system. St. Clement of Alexandria, in a pa.s.sage already referred to,[60] shows that any Ontological or Idealogical argument can only lead us to an "Unknown," which may be "understood" and given meaning "by the Word alone that proceeds from Him;" and he and others of the early Christian writers seem to hint at that distinction between Epistemology and Ontology which has always been the chief enemy of any purely rational theistic argument. The Aetiological argument, too, is not explicitly stated by them; and, though Lactantius does, in opposing atheistic atomism, ask the question, "Whence are those minute seeds?" yet the casual character of the inquiry shows the small emphasis he placed on it, and the silence of the other writers, even when there was every opportunity for calling attention to such an argument, gives evidence to their estimate of its usefulness.

It is the more "practical" and "common-sense" forms of the theistic argument--the Cosmological, the Teleological, the argument from common consent, and mixtures of these types--that the early Christian writers use most frequently, and in this they do but conform to the general tendency of their age, as well as to the practical spirit of Christianity. As we have seen, the more artificial and abstract arguments of Plato and Aristotle did not take much hold upon others than their originators or formulators, and the distinct tendency of the theology of the later Greek and Latin schools of philosophy was toward the more concrete forms of the theistic argument. And this inclination would be emphasized in the early Christian writers, so far as they make use of the argument at all, by the eminently simple and common-sense att.i.tude of Christianity toward all such problems, and also by the peculiar work which the primitive Church had to do in the conversion of the "common people," to whom an abstract argument would have been a waste of words.

But we should expect that to men, upon whom a close perusal and study of the Old Testament Scriptures had impressed the idea of G.o.d as the Creator, Law-Giver and Governor of the universe, the Cosmological argument would appeal strongly. Moreover, the strong Stoic influence which is seen in their works, particularly in their treatment of questions of morals, and in their ethical terminology, would naturally, one would think, pre-dispose them to regard with favor this argument, so in vogue among the philosophers of the Porch. It is, therefore, all the more remarkable that, among the important works of the Ante-Nicene Fathers, not more than a dozen instances, at most, of this argument can be found; and of these more than half are merely pa.s.sing references to the patent fact of order in the world. Thus Tertullian a.s.serts (quite incidentally, in the course of an argument on an ethical question), that "Nature herself is the teacher" of the fact "that G.o.d is the Maker of the universe,"[61] but even here it is doubtful whether he means to appeal to order or design in the world. In another place he makes the mere statement that the fact of G.o.d's existence is tested by His works; His character by the beneficence of them;[62] in another that the "Creator ought to be known even by nature;"[63] and in still another that nature teaches all men the existence and character of G.o.d.[64]

Origen in a pa.s.sage sometimes quoted, appeals to the order and harmony of the world,[65] but it is to prove the unity of G.o.d rather than His existence. Perhaps the best and most elaborate example of the use of the Cosmological argument by the Ante-Nicene authors, is that made of it by "Athenagoras the Athenian; Philosopher and Christian," as he styled himself.[66] He is concerned with making a distinction between G.o.d and matter, in opposition to the popular idolatry, and declares that Christians see the "Framer" behind the orderly world--whose relation one to the other he likens to that between the artist and the materials of his art. "But as clay cannot become vessels of itself without art, so neither did matter, which is capable of taking all forms, receive apart from G.o.d the Framer, distinction and shape and order."

And these few incidental and scattered instances represent practically the explicit use of the Cosmological argument in the writings with which we are occupied. When we consider how constantly they must have met with the statements of it which are prevalent in the writings of the Stoics, by whom they were, we know, profoundly influenced in both the form and the terminology of their thought, we must surely consider this omission a significant fact, for which it is worth while trying to account.

Nor does the "Socratic proof," the argument to design, meet with any more cordial reception at the hands of early Christian writers. Although the cases in which it is used are generally more explicit and fully developed, yet the appeals to design in nature are fewer even than those to order. The earliest, and one of the best examples of the use of this argument is that made by Theophilus, Bishop of Antioch, in his work addressed to the idolater Autolycus.[67] He seeks to prove that the invisible G.o.d is perceived through His works. As the soul is unseen, yet perceived through the motion of the body; as the pilot is inferred from the motion of the s.h.i.+p; as the king, though not present in person, is believed to exist from his "laws, ordinances and authorities;" so the unseen G.o.d is "beheld and perceived through his providence and works."

"Consider, O man, His works," he exclaims; and proceeds to enumerate the evidences of design in the universe--"the timely rotation of the seasons," "the regular march of the stars," the various beauty of seeds and plants and fruits, and many others. It is a pa.s.sage of considerable beauty, and evidences no mean rhetorical skill.

It is in this same connection--in the refutation of idolatry--that St.

Clement of Alexandria uses this argument, contrasting the living organism of man with the heathen idols.[68] "None of these (artists) ever made a breathing image, or out of earth moulded soft flesh. Who liquefied the marrow? or who solidified the bones? who stretched the nerves? who distended the veins? who poured the blood into them? or who spread the skin? who ever could have made eyes capable of seeing? who breathed spirit into the lifeless form? who bestowed righteousness? who promised immortality? The Maker of the universe alone; the great Artist and Father has formed us, such a living image as man is. But your Olympian Jove, the image of an image, greatly out of harmony with truth, is the senseless work of Attic hands." This, it will be readily seen, is more an attempt to show the insufficiency of idolatry to account for man's nature, than a deliberate attempt at theistic proof.

The other examples of the use of this form of the argument for the existence of G.o.d are found in Lactantius, "the Christian Cicero." In speaking of Socrates he introduces[69] with approval an epitome of the Athenian sage's argument, which we have already considered,[70] and, in combatting the atomistic theory of the origin of the world, he a.s.serts[71] that neither atoms nor the "Nature" of Lucretius can account for the adaptations in the actual world; and the phenomena of mind, especially, proclaim an intelligent Providence. His treatise "On the Workmans.h.i.+p of G.o.d, or the Formation of Man," is almost entirely an argument to design from the phenomena of man's physical and mental nature. From the standpoint of the physiology and psychology of his time, he discusses in detail the function and working of the different parts of man's nature, and from the adaptation of means to ends, of organs to their functions, which, even with the scanty data of the science of that day, is a striking consideration, he concludes that man's being can only be accounted for on the supposition of an Arranger or Planner, whose purposes are carried out in exercise of the various functions.

The argument _e Consensu Gentium_ has often been accredited with being peculiarly the patristic argument for the existence of G.o.d,[72] and for this conclusion the use of it in Epicurean theology, and the doctrine of the natural, innate idea of G.o.d already considered, would fully prepare us; but the fact is that, apart from frequent pa.s.sing references to the "natural opinion" mentioned in the preceding chapter, the instances in which the argument is explicitly made use of are not much more numerous than in the case of the other forms. They constantly appeal to the common consent, but it is generally against polytheism, as indicating a consciousness of _the unity_ of G.o.d. St. Justin Martyr, in the pa.s.sage to which we have already alluded, a.s.serts[73] this common consent, but only as preparatory to the certainty which he finds in revelation. St.

Clement of Alexandria, after a.s.serting that "the Father and Maker of all things is apprehended by all things, agreeably to all, by innate power, and without teaching," goes on to confirm his statement in this manner:[74] "But no race anywhere, of tillers of the soil, or nomads, and not even of dwellers in cities, can live without being imbued with the faith of a superior being. Wherefore, every eastern nation, and every nation touching the western sh.o.r.e; or the north, and each one toward the south--all have one and the same preconception respecting Him, who hath appointed government; since the most universal of His operations equally pervade all." It is with the principles and end of this argument in view that Tertullian appeals[75] to the witness of the soul, "not as when fas.h.i.+oned in schools, trained in libraries, fed in Attic academies and porticoes," but "rude, uncultured and untaught, such as they have thee who have thee only; that very thing of the road, the street, the workshop wholly;" and from his examination of this ordinary soul he concludes that "the knowledge of our G.o.d is possessed by all."[76] Minucius Felix appeals to this same common instinct and exclaims:[77] "What! is it not true that I have in this matter the consent of all men?" and Origen, in his reply to the attack of Celsus, points to "the ineradicable idea of Him."[78] Novatian a.s.serts[79] that "the whole mind of man is conscious" of Him, "even if does not express itself," and Lactantius thinks that for Cicero "it was no difficult task, indeed, to refute the falsehoods of a few men who entertained perverse sentiments by the testimony of communities and tribes, who on this one point had no disagreement."[80]

Besides these instances in which the different types of the theistic argument are used in an undeveloped, but yet in a pure form, there are several places where a mixed form appears, the different conventional processes being used in combination without being clearly differentiated. Thus the argument from common consent and the argument based on order or design are used in conjunction, the necessity of the universal knowledge of G.o.d's existence being seen from the witness to Him found in nature.[81] So, too, the arguments from order and from design in nature are often used in conjunction, and in many pa.s.sages it is difficult to decide to which one of these two the author intends to appeal primarily.[82] These undifferentiated or mixed arguments are quite frequently to be seen in the patristic writings, and serve to ill.u.s.trate the eclectic character of their thoughts, often presenting in one pa.s.sage the forms of the theistic arguments peculiar to two opposed schools in Greek philosophy; and they also indicate how incidentally and navely the Fathers used such weapons, not taking the trouble to differentiate one form from the other, though they could not have been ignorant of such distinctions.

The first thing that strikes one's attention in this examination of the use of the theistic argument in the early Christian writers is, as has been indicated, the paucity of examples. When we consider the emphasis laid upon this subject in the contemporaneous philosophical schools; the constant appeal to one form or another of the argument by Stoic and Epicurean alike; the various combinations and adaptations made by Eclectics and Syncretists; the use of such material in the exercises of the rhetorical instruction then so prominent in education; it would seem that a weapon so ready to their hand must have been seized upon by the Fathers, and made full use of for the advancement of the cause in which they were enlisted. And this silence on their part cannot be due to ignorance of what had been written on the subject, or of what was going on in the world about them. The patristic writings show the keenest interest in, and fullest knowledge of what men were thinking about in the outside world as well as within the Church. Many of the Fathers, as we have had occasion to notice, had been trained in the philosophical schools,[83] and show themselves fully conversant not only with such subjects, but with poetry and general literature as well.[84] In the course of their education, as well as in their reading, they must have become fully acquainted with all the forms of the theistic argument. And this knowledge they had every opportunity to use. Many of their works that have come down to us are either apologies or else answers to critics of Christianity, who attacked its doctrines from the stand-point of either polytheism or atheism. In maintaining the Christian doctrine of G.o.d against these opponents, the theistic argument would seem to be a most natural weapon for one who was confident of its validity. But the fact is, that in most of these apologies no such reasoning is employed, and even when it is to be found in their pages, is only incidental and by way of ill.u.s.tration, to explain the rational character of the Christian doctrine of G.o.d by a sort of _argumentum ad hominem_.

One reason for this neglect of the theistic argument may be readily found in the subject-matter of the treatises themselves. Almost exclusively with the earlier Fathers, as we have seen, and very largely with their successors, the emphasis was laid on life, rather than on thought, and the appeal was to authority rather than to reason. Men were asked to judge of Christianity by its fruits, and to receive the faith which it professed, not because of its rational demonstration, but because of the authority of Him who promulgated it. The persons to whom the arguments were addressed, too, explain much of the silence of the Fathers. To the Jew or religious Gentile it would be superfluous to address elaborate arguments to prove the existence of G.o.d, and it was to these cla.s.ses that many of the works under discussion were addressed. To them the argument, such as we frequently find, from the Old Testament types and prophecies, or from the superior beauty and morality of the Christian doctrine and life, taking for granted the existence of G.o.d, was what the case required. And when, as is very frequently the case, they address the popular idolaters, it is a negative argument to show the unworthiness of idol-wors.h.i.+p, and the superiority of their own doctrine, of which they naturally make use, and not a theistic argument which would have no significance to those who were already "too religious."

Many of the apologies of the early Church were called forth by the attacks which were made on the Christians by the adherents of the popular religions. The charges usually brought against them were those of atheism, because of their rejection of the G.o.ds of Greece and Rome; of immorality, because of the secrecy and mystery of their meetings, and cannibalism, because of their doctrine of the partaking of the Body and Blood of Christ in the Eucharist. In refuting these charges, especially the first, no place was afforded for the use of a theistic argument, but they naturally exhibit their belief in G.o.d as superior to that of their accusers, and appeal to their lives as justifying their belief.

But aside from these cases in which the theistic argument would have been superfluous, there are many places in which it is conspicuous for its absence. That they had other arguments besides those from scripture and authority, and that they believed in using them when necessary, we have, as we have seen, many proofs in their writings. Their position is well indicated by Lactantius, who blamed St. Cyprian for using a Scripture argument to an unbeliever,[85] and we shall be obliged to look deeper than mere ignorance or lack of occasion to account for the paucity of cases in which they use the argument for the existence of G.o.d.

The fact is that the history of Greek thought had shown conclusively the absolute futility of any efforts to arrive at a certain proof of the existence of G.o.d by purely rational methods. The attempts of each school to attain such certainty were repudiated by their successors, and even by their contemporaries; and the later trials--which the religious instincts and aspirations of men would not permit them to forego, even when they were sceptical of obtaining any valid and positive results--frequently became, instead of a sincere seeking after G.o.d, mere practice in the art of Rhetoric. And not only was it true that no one of the forms of the theistic argument brought conviction to any other mind than that of the man who regarded it with the partial enthusiasm of an originator or formulator, but even such an one was led to only the most vague and indefinite results. We have already seen how even the best theology of the Greeks led to nothing but a sort of organized or unified polytheism. A vague, fanciful first cause of physical phenomena, a general idea, abstracted out of all content, so as to leave no meaning for the human mind--whatever the imagination might make of it--a mechanical, magnetic force, to which all motion might conveniently be referred; a deified principle of order--and these held in conjunction with the popular polytheism, and impregnated with the national pantheistic conceptions--was all that Greek philosophy could offer to the higher religious aspirations of the educated man. The opinion of the Greek mind itself as to the character of the knowledge of G.o.d, to which the thought of their race had led them at the beginning of the Christian era was fitly expressed by those Athenians, who erected near the Areopagus the "altar on which was written, 'To the Unknown G.o.d.'"[86]

The opinion (for in most cases it did not amount to a conviction) that there was an Unknown (or even, as many thought, an Unknowable) Divinity of some sort, which might account for the phenomena of the world, and which might be the truth behind the vagaries of the anthropomorphic polytheism, was as far as Greek thought had led men at the period with which we have to do. Their ?e?? was really nothing more than Mr. Herbert Spencer's "Unknowable,"--a mysterious "force," to which everything was referred which could not be accounted for on the basis of scientific principles.

Now if this was the case with the adherents of the heathen philosophical schools, how must the realization of the poverty of this result, and the distrust of the means which led to it, have been emphasized by the conversion of individuals from them to Christianity. It is a graphic picture which some of the Fathers paint for us of their eager search, in the different schools in turn, for some religious truth which would bring with it conviction; of their disappointment and consequent despair and scepticism, and then of the satisfaction which they had found for their aspirations in the teaching of Jesus Christ, who, they were convinced, was the very Word of G.o.d. Viewed merely from the historical point of view, this process is full of interest as ill.u.s.trating that which was going on in many minds that stopped at the sceptical stage, and, for one reason or another, never found refuge in the Christian Church. But for those who did take this step, their former distrust of the theistic argument, as a basis for religious conviction, must have been greatly emphasized. The contrast between their former scepticism as to man's ability to attain to any knowledge of things beyond the phenomenal world, and their present faith and conviction which their belief in the Person of Christ gave them, must have made the part of any such means of arriving at truth as the already discredited theistic argument most insignificant. They, themselves, had no need for it. All it had been able to do for them, as for those to whom they wrote, was to raise an aspiration which "would not down"--to bring them to the hypothesis (subst.i.tuted for polytheism, now outgrown) of an "Unknown G.o.d," and they felt that their message to their contemporaries was, like that of St. Paul to the Athenians on Areopagus: "Whom, therefore, ye ignorantly wors.h.i.+p, Him declare I unto you."

It is with this att.i.tude in mind, I am convinced, that we must interpret the doctrine, so often enunciated by the early Christian writers, but especially by St. Justin Martyr and St. Clement of Alexandria, of the "partial," "fragmentary" character of the theological truth arrived at by Greek philosophy. They have sometimes been charged with inconsistency in thus characterizing the work of men from whom they borrowed so much, but they seem, in fact, to have been remarkably appreciative of their old masters when we consider the position in which they stood. In fact, they seem to grant to Greek philosophy all that its adherents would claim for it, namely, that, by means of the arguments adduced by its different schools, the Greeks had attained to the opinion that there was something behind the phenomena of nature, but this might as well be a transcendent force or a pantheistic world-soul as an immanent G.o.d. With the Apostle on Mars' Hill they would say that the best theology of the Greeks simply put them in a position "that they should seek the Lord, if haply they might feel after Him and find Him."