Moral Science; a Compendium of Ethics Part 22

To sum up

I.--As regards the Standard, Brown contends for an Innate Sentiment.

II.--The Faculty being thus determined, along with the Standard, we have only to resume his views as to Disinterested action. For a full account of these, we have to go beyond the strictly Ethical lectures, to his a.n.a.lysis of the Emotions. Speaking of love, he says that it includes a desire of doing good to the person loved; that it is necessarily pleasurable because there must be some quality in the object that gives pleasure; but it is not the mere pleasure of loving that makes us love. The qualities are delightful to love, and yet impossible not to love. He is more explicit when he comes to the consideration of Pity, recognizing the existence of sympathy, not only without liking for the object, but with positive dislike. In another place, he remarks that we desire the happiness of our fellows simply as human beings. He is opposed to the theory that would trace our disinterested affections to a selfish origin. He makes some attempt to refer to the laws of a.s.sociation, the taking in of other men's emotions, but thinks that there is a reflex process besides.

Although recognizing in a vague way the existence of genuine disinterested impulses, he dilates eloquently, and often, on the deliciousness of benevolence, and of all virtuous feelings and conduct.

WILLIAM PALEY. [1743-1805].

The First Book of Paley's 'Moral and Political Philosophy' is ent.i.tled 'PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS' it is in fact an unmethodical account of various fundamental points of the subject. He begins by defining Moral Philosophy as '_that science which teaches men their duty, and the reasons of it_. The ordinary rules are defective and may mislead, unless aided by a scientific investigation. These ordinary rules are the Law of Honour, the Law of the Land, and the Scriptures.

He commences with the Law of Honour, which he views in its narrow sense, as applied to people of rank and fas.h.i.+on. This is of course a very limited code.

The Law of the Land also must omit many duties, properly compulsory, as piety, benevolence, &c. It must also leave unpunished many vices, as luxury, prodigality, partiality. It must confine itself to offences strictly definable.

The Scriptures lay down general rules, which have to be applied by the exercise of reason and judgment. Moreover, they pre-suppose the principles of natural justice, and supply new sanctions and greater certainty. Accordingly, they do not dispense with a scientific view of morals.

[The correct arrangement of the common rules would have been (1) the Law of the Land, (2) the Laws of Society generally, and (3) the Scriptures. The Law of Honour is merely one application of the comprehensive agency of society in punis.h.i.+ng men, by excommunication, for what it prohibits.]

Then follows his famous chapter on the MORAL SENSE.

It is by way of giving an effective statement of the point in dispute that he quotes the anecdote of Caius Toranius, as an extreme instance of filial ingrat.i.tude, and supposes it to be put to the wild boy caught in the woods of Hanover, with the view of ascertaining whether he would feel the sentiment of disapprobation as we do. Those that affirm an innate moral sense, must answer in the affirmative; those that deny it, in the negative.

He then recites the arguments on both sides.

For the moral sense, it is contended, that we approve examples of generosity, grat.i.tude, fidelity, &c., on the instant, without deliberation and without being conscious of any a.s.signable reason; and that this approbation is uniform and universal, the same sorts of conduct being approved or disapproved in all ages and countries; which circ.u.mstances point to the operation of an instinct, or a moral sense.

The answers to these allegations are--

First, The _Uniformity_ spoken of is not admitted as a fact. According to the authentic accounts of historians and travellers, there is scarcely a single vice that, in some age or country of the world, has not been countenanced by public opinion. The murder of aged parents, theft, suicide, promiscuous intercourse of the s.e.xes, and unmentionable crimes have been tolerated and approved. Among ourselves, Duelling is viewed with the most opposite sentiments; forgiveness of injuries is accounted by some people magnanimity, and by others meanness. In these, and in many other instances, moral approbation follows the fas.h.i.+ons and inst.i.tutions of the country, which inst.i.tutions have themselves grown out of local circ.u.mstances, the arbitrary authority of some chieftain, or the caprice of the mult.i.tude.

Secondly, That, although, after allowing for these exceptions, it is admitted that some sorts of actions are more approved than others, the approbation being general, although not universal, yet this may be accounted for, without supposing a moral sense, thus:--

Having experienced a particular line of conduct as beneficial to ourselves, for example, telling the truth, a sentiment of approbation grows up in consequence, and this sentiment thereupon arises whenever the action is mentioned, and without our thinking of the consequences in each instance. The process is ill.u.s.trated by the love of money, which is strongest in the old, who least of all think of applying it to its uses. By such means, the approval of certain actions is commenced; and being once commenced, the continuance of the feeling is accounted for by authority, by imitation, and by all the usages of good society.

As soon as an entire society is possessed of an ethical view, the initiation of the new members is sure and irresistible. The efficacy of Imitation is shown in cases where there is no authority or express training employed, as in the likings and dislikings, or tastes and antipathies, in mere matters of indifference.

So much in reply to the alleged uniformity. Next come the positive objections to a Moral Instinct.

In the first place, moral rules are not absolutely and universally true; they bend to circ.u.mstances. Veracity, which is a natural duty, if there be any such, is dispensed with in case of an enemy, a thief, or a madman. The obligation of promises is released under certain circ.u.mstances.

In the next place, the Instinct must bear with it the _idea_ of the actions to be approved or disapproved; but we are not born with any such ideas.

On the whole, either there exist no moral instincts, or they are undistinguishable from prejudices and habits, and are not to be trusted in moral reasonings. Aristotle held it as self-evident that barbarians are meant to be slaves; so do our modern slave-traders. This instance is one of many to show that the convenience of the parties has much to do with the rise of a moral sentiment. And every system built upon instincts is more likely to find excuses for existing opinions and practices than to reform either.

Again: supposing these Instincts to exist, what is their authority or power to punish? Is it the infliction of remorse? That may be borne with for the pleasures and profits of wickedness. If they are to be held as indications of the will of G.o.d, and therefore as presages of his intentions, that result may be arrived at by a surer road.

The next preliminary topic is HUMAN HAPPINESS.

Happiness is defined as the excess of pleasure over pain. Pleasures are to be held as differing only in _continuance_, and in _intensity_. A computation made in respect of these two properties, confirmed by the degrees of cheerfulness, tranquillity, and contentment observable among men, is to decide all questions as to human happiness.

I.--What Human Happiness does not consist in.

Not in the pleasures of Sense, in whatever profusion or variety enjoyed; in which are included sensual pleasures, active sports, and Fine Art.

1st, Because they last for a short time. [Surely they are good for the time they do last.] 2ndly, By repet.i.tion, they lose their relish.

[Intermission and variety, however, are to be supposed.] 3rdly, The eagerness for high and intense delights takes away the relish from all others.

Paley professes to have observed in the votaries of pleasure a restless craving for variety, languor under enjoyment, and misery in the want of it. After all, however, these pleasures have their value, and may be too much despised as well as too much followed.

Next, happiness does not consist in the exemption from pain (?), from labour, care, business, and outward evils; such exemption leaving one a prey to morbid depression, anxiety, and hypochondria. Even a pain in moderation may be a refreshment, from giving a stimulus to pursuit.

Nor does it consist in greatness, rank, or station. The reason here is derived, as usual, from the doctrine of Relativity or Comparison, pushed beyond all just limits. The ill.u.s.tration of the dependence of the pleasure of superiority on comparison is in Paley's happiest style.

II.--What happiness does consist in. Allowing for the great difficulties of this vital determination, he proposes to be governed by a reference to the conditions of life where men appear most cheerful and contented.

It consists, 1st, In the exercise of the social affections. 2ndly, The exercise of our faculties, either of body or of mind, in the pursuit of some engaging end. [This includes the two items of occupation and plot-interest.] 3rdly, Upon the prudent const.i.tution of the habits; the prudent const.i.tution being chiefly in moderation and simplicity of life, or in demanding few stimulants; and 4thly, In Health, whose importance he values highly, but not too highly.

The consideration of these negative and positive conditions, he thinks, justifies the two conclusions: (1) That happiness is pretty equally distributed amongst the different orders of society; and (2) That in respect of this world's happiness, vice has no advantage over virtue.

The last subject of the First Book is VIRTUE. The definition of virtue is '_the doing good to mankind, in obedience to the will of G.o.d, and for the sake of everlasting happiness_.'

If this were strictly interpreted according to its form, it would mean that three things go to const.i.tute virtue, any one of which being absent, we should not have virtue. Doing good to mankind alone is not virtue, unless coupled with a divine requirement; and this addition would not suffice, without the farther circ.u.mstance of everlasting happiness as the reward. But such is not his meaning, nor is it easy to fix the meaning. He unites the two conditions--Human Happiness and the Will of the Deity--and holds them to coincide and to explain one another. Either of the two would be a sufficient definition of virtue; and he would add, as an explanatory proposition and a guide to practice, that the one may be taken as a clue to the other. In a double criterion like this, everything depends upon the manner of working it.

By running from one of the tests to another at discretion, we may evade whatever is disagreeable to us in both.

Book II., ent.i.tled MORAL OBLIGATION, is the full development of his views. Reciting various theories of moral right and wrong, he remarks, first, that they all ultimately coincide; in other words, all the theorists agree upon the same rules of duty--a remark to be received with allowances; and next, that they all leave the matter short; none provide an adequate _motive_ or inducement. [He omits to mention the theory of the Divine Will, which is partly his own theory].

In proceeding to supply this want, he asks first 'what is meant by being obliged to do a thing;' and answers, '_a violent motive resulting from the command of another_.' The motive must be violent, or have some degree of force to overcome reluctance or opposing tendencies. It must also result from the _command_ of another; not the mere offer of a gratuity by way of inducement. Such is the nature of Law; we should not obey the magistrate, unless rewards or punishments depended on our obedience; so neither should we, without the same reason, do what is right, or obey G.o.d.

He then resumes the general question, under a concrete case, 'Why am I obliged to keep my word?' The answer accords with the above explanation;--Because I am urged to do so by a violent motive (namely, the rewards and punishments of a future life), resulting from the command of G.o.d. Private happiness is the motive, the will of G.o.d the rule. [Although not brought out in the present connexion, it is implied that the will of G.o.d intends the happiness of mankind, and is to be interpreted accordingly.]

Previously, when reasoning on the means of human happiness, he declared it to be an established conclusion, that virtue leads to happiness, even in this life; now he bases his own theory on the uncertainty of that conclusion. His words are, 'They who would establish a system of morality, independent of a future state, must look out for some other idea of moral obligation, _unless they can show_ that virtue conducts the possessor to certain happiness in this life, or to a much greater share of it than he could attain by a different behaviour.' He does not make the obvious remark that _human_ authority, as far as it goes, is also a source of obligation; it works by the very same cla.s.s of means as the divine authority.

He next proceeds to enquire into the means of determining the WILL OF G.o.d. There are two sources--the express declarations of Scripture, when they are to be had; and the design impressed on the world, in other words, the light of nature. This last source requires him, on his system, to establish the Divine Benevolence; and he arrives at the conclusion that G.o.d wills and wishes the happiness of his creatures, and accordingly, that the method of coming at his will concerning any action is to enquire into the tendency of that action to promote or to diminish the general happiness.

He then discusses UTILITY, with a view of answering the objection that actions may be useful, and yet such as no man will allow to be right.

This leads him to distinguish between the _particular_ and the _general_ consequences of actions, and to enforce the necessity of GENERAL RULES. An a.s.sa.s.sin, by knocking a rich villain on the head, may do immediate and particular good; but the liberty granted to individuals to kill whoever they should deem injurious to society, would render human life unsafe, and induce universal terror. 'Whatever is expedient is right,' but then it must be expedient on the whole, in the long run, in all its effects collateral and remote, as well as immediate and direct. When the _honestum_ is opposed to the _utile_, the _honestum_ means the general and remote consequences, the _utile_ the particular and the near.

The concluding sections of Book II. are occupied with the consideration of RIGHT and RIGHTS. A Right is of course correlative with an Obligation. Rights are Natural or Advent.i.tious; Alienable or Inalienable; Perfect or Imperfect. The only one of these distinctions having any Ethical application is Perfect and Imperfect. The Perfect Rights are, the Imperfect are not, enforced by Law.

Under the 'general Rights of mankind,' he has a discussion as to our right to the flesh of animals, and contends that it would be difficult to defend this right by any arguments drawn from the light of nature, and that it reposes on the text of Genesis ix. 1, 2, 3.

As regards the chief bulk of Paley's-work, it is necessary only to indicate his scheme of the Duties, and his manner of treating them.

Book III. considers RELATIVE DUTIES. There are three cla.s.ses of these.

First, Relative Duties that are _Determinate_, meaning all those that are strictly defined and enforced; those growing out of Promises, Contracts, Oaths, and Subscriptions to Articles of Religion. Secondly, Relative Duties that are _Indeterminate_, as Charity, in its various aspects of treatment of dependents, a.s.sistance to the needy, &c.; the checks on Anger and Revenge; Grat.i.tude, &c. Thirdly, the Relative Duties growing _out of the s.e.xes_.

Book IV. is DUTIES TO OURSELVES, and treats of Self-defence, Drunkenness, and Suicide.

Book V. comprises DUTIES TOWARDS G.o.d.