Their Finest Hour Part 42

Prime Minister to Mr. Menzies.

2.X.40.

I am very sorry to receive your message of September 29, because I feel that the great exertions we have made deserve a broad and generous measure of indulgence, should any particular minor operation miscarry.... The situation at Dakar was revolutionised by arrival of French s.h.i.+ps from Toulon with Vichy personnel and the manning of the batteries by the hostile French Navy. Although every effort was made, the British Navy was not able to stop these s.h.i.+ps on their way. After strongly testing the defences, and sustaining the losses I have already reported to you, the naval and military commanders did not consider they had the strength to effect and support a landing, and I think they were quite right not to get us committed to a sh.o.r.e operation which could not, like the naval attack, be broken off at any moment, and might have become a serious entanglement.With regard to your criticisms, if it is to be laid down that no attempt is to be made which has not "overwhelming chances of success," you will find that a complete defensive would be imposed upon us. In dealing with unknown factors like the degree of French resistance, it is impossible to avoid uncertainty and hazard. For instance, Duala, and with it the Cameroons, were taken by twenty-five Frenchmen after their Senegalese troops had refused to march. Ought we to have moved in this case without having overwhelming force at hand? Secondly. I cannot accept the reproach of making "a half-hearted attack." I hoped that you had not sustained the impression from these last five months of struggle which has excited the admiration of the whole world that we were "a halfhearted Government" or that I am half-hearted in the endeavours it is my duty to make. I thought, indeed, that from the way my name was used in the election that quite a good opinion was entertained in Australia of these efforts.Every care will always be taken to keep you informed before news is published, but we could not prevent the German and Vichy wireless from proclaiming the course of events as they occurred at Dakar before we had received any information from our commanders.With regard to what you say about the Middle East, I do not think the difficulties have been underestimated, but of course our forces are much smaller than those which the Italians have in Libya and Abyssinia, and the Germans may always help them. The defection of France has thrown the whole Middle East into jeopardy and severed our communications through the Mediterranean. We have had to face the threat of invasion here and the full strength of Germany's air-bombing attack on our cities, factories, and harbours. Nevertheless, we have steadfastly reinforced the Middle East, and in spite of all our perils at home and scanty resources have sent over thirty thousand men, nearly half our best tanks, many anti-aircraft guns needed to protect our vital aircraft factories, two of the finest units in the Fleet, the Ill.u.s.trious Ill.u.s.trious and and Valiant Valiant, and a considerable number of Hurricane fighters and Wellington bombers. We have done this in the face of an acc.u.mulation across the Channel and the North Sea of barges and s.h.i.+pping sufficient to carry half a million men to these sh.o.r.es at a single voyage and in a single night. Therefore, if the Middle East difficulties and dangers have not been fully met, it is not because the Mother Country has s.h.i.+rked her share of perils and sacrifice. At present the situation in Egypt and the Soudan looks better than we feared some time ago. Still, my dear Prime Minister and friend, as you have allowed me to deem you, I cannot guarantee "clear-cut victory" in the Middle East, or that Cairo, Khartoum, the Suez Ca.n.a.l, and Palestine may not fall into Italian or German hands. We do not think they will, and we are trying our utmost to resist the attacks which are ma.s.sing against us. But I can make no promises at all of victory, nor can I make any promises that regrettable and lamentable incidents will not occur, or that there will not be disappointments and blunders. On the contrary, I think the only certainty is that we have very bad times indeed to go through before we emerge from the mortal perils by which we are surrounded.I felt it due to your great position and the extremely severe tone of your message to reply with equal frankness.

Mr. Menzies to Mr. Churchill.

4.X.40.

I have received your message of October 2 and am very disturbed by some of its contents.We were, and are, concerned about the failure at Dakar. My telegram concerning it was somewhat crudely expressed, as I can see on perusing it again. But I still do not understand how it can be construed as containing even the faintest suggestion that you or the British Government are half-hearted in policy, spirit, or achievement.As the recent election here has left my own position extremely precarious and I may therefore soon go out of office, I would like to take the opportunity of saying to you that I have been very proud on behalf of Australia to be a.s.sociated, even though at a distance, with the efforts of Winston Churchill and the British people. Such machinery as I possess in my own country has, at all times, been exercised so as to encourage the Australian people to realise that Great Britain is fighting our battles and that her heroism and superhuman cheerfulness and philosophy must be for us not only a s.h.i.+eld but an inspiration.As for yourself praise from me would be an impertinence but what I cabled you on September 3, the anniversary of the war, represented my whole heart and mind. I am, indeed, grieved to think that you should have felt my recent telegram to be either carping or discouraging.I say no more about Dakar because it, no doubt, has lessons which it is not necessary for me to underline. Real point I make is that we, at this distance, will learn the lessons of events the more rapidly if information about those events can come to us as promptly and as fully as possible.As to the Middle East, I have not sought or intended to seek guarantees. All that we ask and I am sure it is granted before the asking is that the Middle East should be as fully reinforced and equipped as is humanly possible. Your telegram has given me great satisfaction on this point.You point out that if the Middle East difficulties and dangers have not been fully met, it is not because the Mother Country has s.h.i.+rked her share of the perils or sacrifice: this is, of course, splendidly true. But I hope that you do not entertain any idea that Australia is s.h.i.+rking her share. We have many thousands of men in the Middle East, as many as s.h.i.+pping has been able to take. We have in camp in Australia further Expeditionary Force approximating 85,000 men, many of whom will shortly be moving to the Middle East.In spite of much public doubt caused by a real fear of what j.a.pan may do, my Government has raised naval, air, and military forces and pledged our resources to munitions production on a scale previously unknown and regarded only a year ago as impossible.We have done this notwithstanding the parochial interests and issues which in the recent elections succeeded in defeating us in the all-important State of New South Wales. We have set no limit to our contribution because we know that there is no limit to the total British risk.I mention these matters because I desire to make it clear that our anxiety about our main overseas theatre of actual partic.i.p.ation in the war is not only intelligible but acute.Please, my dear Prime Minister, do not interpret anxieties arising from these facts as either fearful, selfish, or unduly wrong-headed. And above all, please understand that whatever interrogative or even critical telegrams I may send to you in secret, Australia knows courage when it sees it and will follow you to a finish, as to the best of my abilities I certainly shall.

Prime Minister to Mr. Menzies.

6.X.40.

I am deeply grateful for your generous message. Forgive me if I responded too controversially to what I thought was somewhat severe criticism. I am having an account prepared of the Dakar incident, in all its stages, which I will send for the confidential information of yourself and your colleagues. I do not propose to defend myself at any length in Parliament, as such a spectacle would only gratify the enemy. I am deeply grateful for all that Australia has done under your leaders.h.i.+p for the common cause. It has been a great comfort having some of the Australians here during these anxious months. I greatly admired their bearing and spirit when I inspected them. They had just received twenty-four good field guns. They are soon going to join the rest of the Australian Army in the Middle East, where they will probably be in the forefront of the fighting next year. We shall do everything in our power to equip them as they deserve. For the moment it seems that the situation in the Middle East is steady. Should the armies engage near Mersa Matruh, the forces available during the next month or six weeks would not appear to be ill-matched in numbers. This should give a good chance to General Wilson, who is reputed a fine tactician, and the excellent troops he has. The Londoners are standing up magnificently to the bombing, but you can imagine the numerous problems which a ruthless attack like this upon a community of eight million people creates for the Administration. We are getting the better of our difficulties, and I feel confident that the act of ma.s.s terror which Hitler has attempted will fail, like his magnetic mines and other deadly schemes. All good wishes personally for yourself.

Appendix E

LISTOF OPERATIONAL CODE NAMES FOR 19401941

CATAPULT: Seizure, control or effective disablement or destruction of all the accessible French Fleet.

COMPa.s.s: Offensive operations in the Western Desert.

CROMWELL: Alarm word to be used if invasion of Britain imminent.

DYNAMO: Naval evacuation of the B.E.F., May 1940.

EXCESS: Aircraft reinforcements to the Middle East, January 1941.

HATS: Pa.s.sing of Fleet reinforcements through Mediterranean and running of supply convoy to Malta.

MANDIBLES: Operations against the Dodecanese.

MARIE: Occupation of Jibuti.

MENACE: Occupation of Dakar.

MULBERRY: Artificial harbours.

OVERLORD: Liberation of France.

SEA L LION: German plan for the invasion of Britain.

SHRAPNEL: Occupation of Cape Verde Islands.

TORCH: Anglo-American invasion of North Africa.

WINCH: Fighter reinforcement to Malta.

WORKSHOP: Capture of Pantellaria.

Appendix F

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.

A.A. guns Anti-aircraft guns or ack-ack guns A.D.G.B.

Air defence of Great Britain A.F.S.

Auxiliary Fire Service A.F.V.'s Armoured fighting vehicles A.G.R.M.

Adjutant General Royal Marines A.R.P.

Air raid precautions A.S.U.

Air Supply Units A.T. rifles Anti-tank rifles A.T.S.

(Women's) Auxiliary Territorial Service B.E.F.

British Expeditionary Force C.A.S.

Chief of the Air Staff C.I.G.S.

Chief of the Imperial General Staff C.-in-C.

Commander-in-Chief Controller.

Third Sea Lord and Chief of Material C.N.S.

Chief of the Naval Staff (First Sea Lord) or I.S.L.

C.O.S.

Chiefs of Staff D.N.C.

Director of Naval Construction E.F.

Expeditionary Force F.O.

Foreign Office G.H.Q.

General Headquarters G.O.C.

General Officer Commanding G.Q.G.

Grand Quartier General H.F.

Home Forces H.M.G.

His Majesty's Government L. of C.

Line of Communications L.D.V.

Local Defence Volunteers [renamed Home Guard]

M.A.P.

Ministry of Aircraft Production M.E.

Middle East M.E.W.

Ministry of Economic Warfare M. of I.

Ministry of Information M. of L.

Ministry of Labour M. of S.

Ministry of Supply O.K.H.

Oberkommando das Heeres. Supreme Command of the German Army O.T.U.

Operational Training Unit P.M.

Prime Minister U.P.

Unrelated projectiles, i.e., code name for rockets V.C.A.S.

Vice Chief of the Air Staff V.C.I.G.S.

Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff V.C.N.S.

Vice Chief of the Naval Staff W.A.A.F.

Women's Auxiliary Air Force W.R.N.S.

Women's Royal Naval Service. "Wrens"

Notes.

Book One

Chapter 1.

* Eisenhower "Crusade in Europe."

1The house in Downing Street, usually occupied by the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

2 The Defence Committee met 40 times in 1940, 76 in 1941, 20 in 1942, 14 in 1943, and 10 in 1944.

Chapter 2.