Their Finest Hour Part 26

The letter reached our great friend when he was cruising, on board an American wars.h.i.+p, the Tuscaloosa, Tuscaloosa, in the sunlight of the Caribbean Sea. He had only his own intimates around him. Harry Hopkins, then unknown to me, told me later that Mr. Roosevelt read and re-read this letter as he sat alone in his deck-chair, and that for two days he did not seem to have reached any clear conclusion. He was plunged in intense thought, and brooded silently. in the sunlight of the Caribbean Sea. He had only his own intimates around him. Harry Hopkins, then unknown to me, told me later that Mr. Roosevelt read and re-read this letter as he sat alone in his deck-chair, and that for two days he did not seem to have reached any clear conclusion. He was plunged in intense thought, and brooded silently.

From all this there sprang a wonderful decision. It was never a question of the President not knowing what he wanted to do. His problem was how to carry his country with him and to persuade Congress to follow his guidance. According to Stettinius, the President, as early as the late summer, had suggested at a meeting of the Defence Advisory Commission on s.h.i.+pping Resources that. "It should not he necessary for the British to take their own funds and have s.h.i.+ps built in the United States, or for us to lend them money for this purpose. There is no reason why we should not take a finished vessel and lease it to them for the duration of the emergency." It seems that this idea had originated in the Treasury Department, whose lawyers, especially Oscar S. c.o.x, of Maine, had been stirred by Secretary Morgenthau. It appeared that by a statute of 1892 the Secretary for War, "when in his discretion it will be for the public good," could lease Army property if not required for public use for a period of not longer than five years. Precedents for the use of this statute, by the lease lease of various Army items from time to time, were on record. of various Army items from time to time, were on record.

Thus the word "lease" "lease" and the idea of applying the lease principle to meeting British needs had been in President Roosevelt's mind for some time as an alternative to a policy of indefinite loans which would soon far outstrip all possibilities of repayment. Now suddenly all this sprang into decisive action, and the glorious conception of Lend-Lease was proclaimed. and the idea of applying the lease principle to meeting British needs had been in President Roosevelt's mind for some time as an alternative to a policy of indefinite loans which would soon far outstrip all possibilities of repayment. Now suddenly all this sprang into decisive action, and the glorious conception of Lend-Lease was proclaimed.

The President returned from the Caribbean on December 16 and broached his plan at his press conference next day. He used a simple ill.u.s.tration: Suppose my neighbour's house catches fire and I have a length of garden hose four or five hundred feet away. If he can take my garden hose and connect it up with his hydrant, I may help him to put out the fire. Now what do I do? I don't say to him before that operation, "Neighbour, my garden hose cost me fifteen dollars; you have to pay me fifteen dollars for it." No! What is the transaction that goes on? I don't want fifteen dollars I want my garden hose back after the fire is over.

And again: There is absolutely no doubt in the mind of a very overwhelming number of Americans that the best immediate defence of the United States is the success of Great Britain defending itself; and that, therefore, quite aside from our historic and current interest in the survival of Democracy in the world as a whole, it is equally important from a selfish point of view and of American defence that we should do everything possible to help the British Empire to defend itself.

Finally: What I am trying to do is to eliminate the dollar sign.

On this foundation the ever-famous Lend-Lease Bill was at once prepared for submission to Congress. I described this to Parliament later as "the most unsordid act in the history of any nation." Once it was accepted by Congress, it transformed immediately the whole position. It made us free to shape by agreement long-term plans of vast extent for all our needs. There was no provision for repayment. There was not even to be a formal account kept in dollars or sterling. What we had was lent or leased to us because our continued resistance to the Hitler tyranny was deemed to be of vital interest to the great Republic. According to President Roosevelt, the defence of the United States and not dollars was henceforth to determine where American weapons were to go.

It was at this moment, the most important in his public career, that Philip Lothian was taken from us. Shortly after his return to Was.h.i.+ngton, he fell suddenly and gravely ill. He worked unremittingly to the end. On December 12, in the full tide of success, he died. This was a loss to the nation and to the Cause. He was mourned by wide circles of friends on both sides of the ocean. To me, who had been in such intimate contact with him a fortnight before, it was a personal shock. I paid my tribute to him in a House of Commons united in deep respect for his work and memory.

I had now to turn immediately to the choice of his successor. It seemed that our relations with the United States at this time required as Amba.s.sador an outstanding national figure and a statesman versed in every aspect of world politics. Having ascertained from the President that my suggestion would be acceptable, I invited Mr. Lloyd George to take the post. He had not felt able to join the War Cabinet in July, and was not happily circ.u.mstanced in British politics. His outlook on the war and the events leading up to it was from a different angle from mine. There could be no doubt, however, that he was our foremost citizen, and that his incomparable gifts and experience would be devoted to the success of his mission. I had a long talk with him in the Cabinet Room, and also at luncheon on a second day. He showed genuine pleasure at having been invited. "I tell my friends," he said, "I have had honourable offers made to me by the Prime Minister." He was sure that at the age of eighty-two he ought not to undertake so exacting a task. As a result of my long conversations with him I was conscious that he had aged even in the months which had pa.s.sed since I had asked him to join the War Cabinet, and with regret but also with conviction I abandoned my plan.

I next turned to Lord Halifax, whose prestige in the Conservative Party stood high, and was enhanced by his being at the Foreign Office. For a Foreign Secretary to become an Amba.s.sador marks in a unique manner the importance of the mission. His high character was everywhere respected, yet at the same time his record in the years before the war and the way in which events had moved left him exposed to much disapprobation and even hostility from the Labour side of our National Coalition. I knew that he was conscious of this himself.

When I made him this proposal, which was certainly not a personal advancement, he contented himself with saying in a simple and dignified manner that he would serve wherever he was thought to be most useful. In order to emphasise still further the importance of his duties, I arranged that he should resume his function as a member of the War Cabinet whenever he came home on leave. This arrangement worked without the slightest inconvenience owing to the qualities and experience of the personalities involved, and for six years thereafter, both under the National Coalition and the Labour-Socialist Government, Halifax discharged the work of Amba.s.sador to the United States with conspicuous and ever-growing influence and success.

President Roosevelt, Mr. Hull and other high personalities in Was.h.i.+ngton were extremely pleased with the selection of Lord Halifax. Indeed it was at once apparent to me that the President greatly preferred it to my first proposal. The appointment of the new Amba.s.sador was received with marked approval both in America and at home, and was judged in every way adequate and appropriate to the scale of events.

I had no doubt who should fill the vacancy at the Foreign Office. On all the great issues of the past four years I had, as these pages have shown, dwelt in close agreement with Anthony Eden. I have described my anxieties and emotions when he parted company with Mr. Chamberlain in the spring of 1938. Together we had abstained from the vote on Munich. Together we had resisted the party pressures brought to bear upon us in our const.i.tuencies during the winter of that melancholy year. We had been united in thought and sentiment at the outbreak of the war and as colleagues during its progress. The greater part of Eden's public life had been devoted to the study of foreign affairs. He had held the splendid office of Foreign Secretary with distinction, and had resigned it when only forty years of age for reasons which are in retrospect, and at this time, viewed with the approval of all parties in the State. He had played a fine part as Secretary of State for War during this terrific year, and his conduct of Armv affairs had brought us very close together. We thought alike, even without consultation, on a very great number of practical issues as they arose from day to day. I looked forward to an agreeable and harmonious comrades.h.i.+p between the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, and this hope was certainly fulfilled during the four and a half years of war and policy which lay before us. Eden was sorry to leave the War Office, in all the stresses and excitements of which he was absorbed; but he returned to the Foreign Office like a man going home.

I filled Mr. Eden's place as Secretary of State for War by submitting to the King the name of Captain Margesson, at that time the Chief Whip to the National Government. This choice excited some adverse comment. David Margesson had been for nearly ten years at the head of the Government Whip's Office in the House of Commons, and it had fallen to him to marshal and to stimulate the patient and solid Conservative majorities which had so long sustained the Baldwin and Chamberlain Administrations. I had, as a leading figure among the Conservative dissentients from the India Bill, had many sharp pa.s.sages with him. In the course of those eleven years of my exclusion from office my contacts with him had been not infrequent and generally hostile. I had formed the opinion that he was a man of high ability, serving his chief, whoever he was, with unfaltering loyalty, and treating his opponents with strict good faith. This opinion was also held by the Whips of the Labour and Liberal Parties, and such a reputation is of course essential to the discharge of this particular office. When I became Prime Minister it was generally expected that I should find someone else for the task, but I was quite sure that I should receive from Margesson the same skilful and faithful service that he had given to my predecessors; and in this I had been in no way disappointed. He had served in the First World War, and through much of the worst of it as a regimental officer, gaining the Military Cross. He thus had a strong soldierly background as well as a complete knowledge of the House of Commons.

In Margesson's place I appointed Captain James Stuart, with whom also I had had many differences, but for whose character I had high respect.

The interval between November, 1940, and the pa.s.sage of Lend-Lease in March, 1941, was marked by an acute stringency in dollars. Every kind of expedient was devised by our friends. The American Government bought from us some of the war plants which they had built to our order in the United States. They a.s.signed them to the American defence programme, but bade us go on using them to the full. The War Department placed orders for munitions that it did not need immediately, so that when finished they could be released to us. On the other hand, certain things were done which seemed harsh and painful to us. The President sent a wars.h.i.+p to Capetown to carry away all the gold we had gathered there. The great British business of Courtaulds in America was sold by us at the request of the United States Government at a comparatively low figure, and then resold through the markets at a much higher price from which we did not benefit. I had a feeling that these steps were taken to emphasise the hards.h.i.+p of our position and raise feeling against the opponents of Lend-Lease. Anyhow, in one way or another we came through.

On December 30, the President gave a "fireside chat" on the radio, urging his policy upon his countrymen.

There is danger ahead danger against which we must prepare. But we well know that we cannot escape danger by crawling into bed and pulling the covers over our heads.... If Britain should go down, all of us in all the Americas would be living at the point of a gun, a gun loaded with explosive bullets, economic as well as military. We must produce arms and s.h.i.+ps with every energy and resource we can command.... We must be the great a.r.s.enal of Democracy. We must be the great a.r.s.enal of Democracy.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt.

31.XII.40.

We are deeply grateful to you for all you said yesterday. We welcome especially the outline of your plans for giving us the aid without which Hitlerism cannot be extirpated from Europe and Asia. We can readily guess why you have not been able to give a precise account of how your proposals will be worked out. Meanwhile, some things make me anxious.First, sending the wars.h.i.+p to Capetown to take up the gold lying there may produce embarra.s.sing effects. It is almost certain to become known. This will disturb public opinion here and throughout the Dominions and encourage the enemy, who will proclaim that you are sending for our last reserves. If you feel this is the only way, directions will be given for the available Captown gold to be loaded on the s.h.i.+p. But we should avoid it if we can. Could we, for instance, by a technical operation, exchange gold in South Africa for gold held for others at Ottawa and make the latter available for movement to New York? We must know soon, because the s.h.i.+p is on its way.My second anxiety is because we do not know how long Congress will debate your proposals and how we should be enabled to place orders for armaments and pay our way if this time became protracted. Remember, Mr. President, we do not know what you have in mind, exactly what the United States is going to do, and we are fighting for our lives. What would be the effect upon the world situation if we had to default in payments to your contractors, who have their workmen to pay? Would not this be exploited by the enemy as a complete breakdown in Anglo-American co-operation? Yet a few weeks' delay might well bring this upon us.Thirdly, apart from the interim period, there arises a group of problems about the scope of your plan after being approved by Congress. What is to be done about the immense heavy payments still due to be made under existing orders before delivery is completed? Substantial advance payments on these same orders have already denuded our resources. We have continued need for various American commodities not definitely weapons for instance, raw materials and oils. Canada and other Dominions, Greece and refugee allies, have clamant dollar needs to keep their war effort alive. I do not seek to know immediately how you will solve these latter questions. We shall be entirely ready, for our part, to lay bare to you all our resources and our liabilities around the world, and we shall seek no more help than the common cause demands. We naturally wish to feel sure that the powers with which you propose to arm yourself will be sufficiently wide to deal with these larger matters, subject to all proper examination.Sir Frederick Phillips is discussing these matters with Mr. Secretary Morgenthau, and he will explain the war commitments we have in many parts of the world for which we could not ask your direct help, but for which gold and dollars are necessary. This applies also to the Dutch and Belgian gold, which we may become under obligation to return in specie in due course.

They burned a large part of the City of London last night, and the scenes of widespread destruction here and in our provincial centres are shocking; but when I visited the still-burning ruins today, the spirit of the Londoners was as high as in the first days of the indiscriminate bombing in September, four months ago.I thank you for testifying before all the world that the future safety and greatness of the American Union are intimately concerned with the upholding and the effective arming of that indomitable spirit.All my heartiest good wishes to you in the New Year of storm that is opening upon us.

14.

Germany and Russia

Hitler Turns Eastward - Stalin's Attempts to Placate Germany - Communist Machinations in the British Factories - Projects of Dividing the British Empire - Soviet Miscalculations - Molotov's Visit to Berlin - His Meeting with Ribbentrop and with the Fuehrer - Soviet-n.a.z.i Negotiations - A British Air Raid Intervenes - Further Argument with the Fuehrer - Second British Air Raid - Talks in a Dugout - Stalin's Account Given to Me in August, 1942 - Hitler's Final Resolve to Invade Russia - Military Preparations - The Draft Agreement - The Soviets Ask for More - Amba.s.sador Schulenburg's Efforts to Reach an Agreement - Hitler Veiled - "Operation Barbarossa," December, 1940.

HITLER had failed to quell or conquer Britain. It was plain that the Island would persevere to the end. Without the command of the sea or the air, it had been deemed impossible to move German armies across the Channel. Winter with its storms had closed upon the scene. The German attempt to cow the British nation, or shatter their warmaking capacity and will-power by bombing, had been foiled, and the Blitz was costly. There must be many months' delay before "Sea Lion" could be revived, and with every week that pa.s.sed, the growth, ripening, and equipment of the British home armies required a larger "Sea Lion," with aggravated difficulties of transportation. Even three-quarters of a million men with all their furnis.h.i.+ngs would not be enough in April or May, 1941. What chance was there of finding by then the s.h.i.+pping, the barges, the special landing-craft necessary for so vast an oversea stroke? How could they be a.s.sembled under ever-increasing British air-power? Meanwhile this air-power, fed by busy factories in Britain and the United States, and by immense training schemes for pilots in the Dominions centred in Canada, would perhaps in a year or so make the British Air Force superior in numbers, as it was already in quality, to that of Germany. Can we wonder, then, that Hitler, once convinced that Goering's hopes and boasts had been broken, should turn his eyes to the East? Like Napoleon in 1804, he recoiled from the a.s.sault of the island until at least the Eastern danger was no more. He must, he now felt, at all costs settle with Russia before staking everything on the invasion of Britain. Obeying the same forces and following the same thoughts as Napoleon when he marched the Grand Army from Boulogne to Ulm, Austerlitz, and Fried-land, Hitler abandoned for the moment his desire and need to destroy Great Britain. That must now become the final act of the drama. had failed to quell or conquer Britain. It was plain that the Island would persevere to the end. Without the command of the sea or the air, it had been deemed impossible to move German armies across the Channel. Winter with its storms had closed upon the scene. The German attempt to cow the British nation, or shatter their warmaking capacity and will-power by bombing, had been foiled, and the Blitz was costly. There must be many months' delay before "Sea Lion" could be revived, and with every week that pa.s.sed, the growth, ripening, and equipment of the British home armies required a larger "Sea Lion," with aggravated difficulties of transportation. Even three-quarters of a million men with all their furnis.h.i.+ngs would not be enough in April or May, 1941. What chance was there of finding by then the s.h.i.+pping, the barges, the special landing-craft necessary for so vast an oversea stroke? How could they be a.s.sembled under ever-increasing British air-power? Meanwhile this air-power, fed by busy factories in Britain and the United States, and by immense training schemes for pilots in the Dominions centred in Canada, would perhaps in a year or so make the British Air Force superior in numbers, as it was already in quality, to that of Germany. Can we wonder, then, that Hitler, once convinced that Goering's hopes and boasts had been broken, should turn his eyes to the East? Like Napoleon in 1804, he recoiled from the a.s.sault of the island until at least the Eastern danger was no more. He must, he now felt, at all costs settle with Russia before staking everything on the invasion of Britain. Obeying the same forces and following the same thoughts as Napoleon when he marched the Grand Army from Boulogne to Ulm, Austerlitz, and Fried-land, Hitler abandoned for the moment his desire and need to destroy Great Britain. That must now become the final act of the drama.

There is no doubt that he had made up his own mind by the end of September, 1940. From that time forth the air attacks on Britain, though often on a larger scale through the general multiplication of aircraft, took the second place in the Fuehrer's thoughts and German plans. They might be maintained as effective cover for other designs, but Hitler no longer counted on them for decisive victory. Eastward ho! Personally, on purely military grounds, I should not have been averse from a German attempt at the invasion of Britain in the spring or summer of 1941. I believed that the enemy would suffer the most terrific defeat and slaughter that any country had ever sustained in a specific military enterprise. But for that very reason I was not so simple as to expect it to happen. In war what you don't dislike is not usually what the enemy does. Still, in the conduct of a long struggle, when time seemed for a year or two on our side and mighty allies might be gained, I thanked G.o.d that the supreme ordeal was to be spared our people. As will be seen from my papers written at the time, I never seriously contemplated a German descent upon England in 1941. By the end of 1941, the boot was on the other leg; we were no longer alone; three-quarters of the world were with us. But tremendous events, measureless before they happened, were to mark that memorable year.

While to uninformed continentals and the outer world our fate seemed forlorn, or at best in the balance, the relations between n.a.z.i Germany and Soviet Russia a.s.sumed the first position in world affairs. The fundamental antagonisms between the two despotic Powers resumed their sway once it was certain that Britain could not be stunned and overpowered like France and the Low Countries. To do him justice, Stalin tried his very best to work loyally and faithfully with Hitler, while at the same time gathering all the strength he could in the enormous ma.s.s of Soviet Russia. He and Molotov sent their dutiful congratulations on every German victory. They poured a heavy flow of food and essential raw materials into the Reich. Their Fifth Column Communists did what they could to disturb our factories. Their radio diffused its abuse and slanders against us. They were at any time ready to reach a permanent settlement with n.a.z.i Germany upon the numerous important questions open between them and to accept with complacency the final destruction of the British power. But all the while they recognised that this policy might fail. They were resolved to gain time by every means, and had no intention, as far as they could measure the problem, of basing Russian interests or ambitions solely upon a German victory. The two great totalitarian empires, equally devoid of moral restraints, confronted each other, polite but inexorable.

There had, of course, been disagreements about Finland and Rumania. The Soviet leaders had been shocked at the fall of France, and the end of the Second Front for which they were so soon to clamour. They had not expected so sudden a collapse, and had counted confidently on a phase of mutual exhaustion on the Western Front. Now there was no Western Front! Still, it would be foolish to make any serious change in their collaboration with Germany till it could be seen whether Britain would give in or be crushed in 1940. As it gradually became apparent to the Kremlin that Britain was capable of maintaining a prolonged and indefinite war, during which anything might happen about the United States and also in j.a.pan, Stalin became more conscious of his danger and more earnest to gain time. Nevertheless, it is remarkable, as we shall see, what advantages he sacrificed and what risks he ran to keep on friendly terms with n.a.z.i Germany. Even more surprising were the miscalculations and the ignorance which he displayed about what was coming to him. He was indeed from September, 1940, to the moment of Hitler's a.s.sault in June, 1941, at once a callous, a crafty and an ill-informed giant.

With these preliminaries we may come to the episode of Molotov's visit to Berlin on November 12, 1940. Every compliment was paid and all ceremony shown to the Bolshevik envoy when he readied the heart of n.a.z.i Germany. During the next two days long and tense discussions took place between Molotov and Ribbentrop, and also with Hitler. All the essential facts of these formidable interchanges and confrontations have been laid bare in the selection of captured doc.u.ments published early in 1948 by the State Department in Was.h.i.+ngton under the t.i.tle "n.a.z.i-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941." On this it is necessary to draw if the story is to be told or understood.

Molotov's first meeting was with Ribbentrop.1 November 12, 1940. 12, 1940.The Reich Foreign Minister said that in the letter to Stalin he had already expressed the firm conviction of Germany that no power on earth could alter the fact that the beginning of the end had now arrived for the British Empire. England was beaten, and it was only a question of time when she would finally admit her defeat. It was possible that this would happen soon, because in England the situation was deteriorating daily. Germany would, of course, welcome an early conclusion of the conflict, since she did not wish under any circ.u.mstances to sacrifice human lives unnecessarily. If, however, the British did not make up their minds in the immediate future to admit their defeat, they would definitely ask for peace during the coming year. Germany was continuing her bombing attacks on England day and night. Her submarines would gradually be employed to the full extent and would inflict terrible losses on England. Germany was of the opinion that England could perhaps be forced by these attacks to give up the struggle. A certain uneasiness was already apparent in Great Britain, which seemed to indicate such a solution. If, however, England were not forced to her knees by the present mode of attack, Germany would, as soon as weather conditions permitted, resolutely proceed to a large-scale attack and thereby definitely crush England. This large-scale attack had thus far been prevented only by abVsppara weather conditions......Any attempt at a landing or at military operations on the European Continent by England or by England backed by America was doomed to complete failure at the start. This was no military problem at all. This the English had not yet understood, because apparently there was some degree of confusion in Great Britain and because the country was led by a political and military dilettante by the name of Churchill, who throughout his previous career had completely failed at all decisive moments and who would fail again this time.Furthermore, the Axis completely dominated its part of Europe militarily and politically. Even France, which had lost the war and had to pay for it (of which the French, incidentally, were quite aware), had accepted the principle that France in the future would never again support England and de Gaulle, the quixotic conqueror of Africa. Because of the extraordinary strength of their position, the Axis Powers were not, therefore, considering how they might win the war, but rather how rapidly they could end the war which was already won.

After luncheon the Soviet Envoy was received by the Fuehrer, who dilated further upon the total defeat of Britain.

The war [he said] had led to complications which were not intended by Germany, but which had compelled her from time to time to react militarily to certain events.The Fuehrer then outlined to Molotov the course of military operations up to the present, which had led to the fact that England no longer had an ally on the Continent.... The English retaliatory measures were ridiculous, and the Russian gentlemen could convince themselves at first hand of the fiction of alleged destruction in Berlin. As soon as atmospheric conditions improved, Germany would be poised for the great and final blow against England. At the moment, then, it was her aim to try not only to make military preparations for this final struggle, but also to clarify the political issues which would be of importance during and after this showdown. He had, therefore, re-examined the relations with Russia, and not in a negative spirit, but with the intention of organising them positively if possible, for a long period of time. In so doing he had reached several conclusions:1. Germany was not seeking to obtain military aid from Russia.2. Because of the tremendous extension of the war, Germany had been forced, in order to oppose England, to penetrate into territories remote from her and in which she was not basically interested politically or economically.3. There were, nevertheless, certain requirements, the full importance of which had become apparent only during the war, but which were absolutely vital to Germany. Among them were certain sources of raw materials, which were considered by Germany as most vital and absolutely indispensable.

To all this Molotov gave a non-committal a.s.sent.

Molotov asked about the Tripart.i.te Pact.2 What was the meaning of the New Order in Europe and in Asia, and what role would the U.S.S.R. be given in it? These issues must be discussed during the Berlin conversations and during the contemplated visit of the Reich Foreign Minister to Moscow, on which the Russians were definitely counting. Moreover, there were issues to be clarified regarding Russia's Balkan and Black Sea interests, about Bulgaria, Rumania, and Turkey. It would be easier for the Russian Government to give specific replies to the questions raised by the Fuehrer if it could obtain the explanations just requested. The Soviet would be interested in the New Order in Europe, and particularly in the tempo and the form of this New Order. It would also like to have an idea of the boundaries of the so-called Greater East Asian Sphere. What was the meaning of the New Order in Europe and in Asia, and what role would the U.S.S.R. be given in it? These issues must be discussed during the Berlin conversations and during the contemplated visit of the Reich Foreign Minister to Moscow, on which the Russians were definitely counting. Moreover, there were issues to be clarified regarding Russia's Balkan and Black Sea interests, about Bulgaria, Rumania, and Turkey. It would be easier for the Russian Government to give specific replies to the questions raised by the Fuehrer if it could obtain the explanations just requested. The Soviet would be interested in the New Order in Europe, and particularly in the tempo and the form of this New Order. It would also like to have an idea of the boundaries of the so-called Greater East Asian Sphere.The Fuehrer replied that the Tripart.i.te Pact was intended to regulate conditions in Europe as to the natural interests of the European countries, and consequently Germany was now approaching the Soviet Union in order that she might express herself regarding the areas of interest to her. In no case was a settlement to be made without Soviet-Russian co-operation. This applied not only to Europe, but also to Asia, where Russia herself was to co-operate in the definition of the Greater East Asian Sphere and where she was to designate her claims there. Germany's task in this case was that of a mediator. Russia by no means was to be confronted with a fait accompli. fait accompli.When the Fuehrer undertook to try to establish the above-mentioned coalition of Powers, it was not the German-Russian relations.h.i.+p which appeared to him to be the most difficult point, but the question of whether a collaboration between Germany, France, and Italy was possible. Only now ... had he thought it possible to contact Soviet Russia for the purpose of settling the questions of the Black Sea, the Balkans, and Turkey.In conclusion, the Fuehrer summed up by stating that the discussion, to a certain extent, represented the first concrete step toward a comprehensive collaboration, with due consideration for the problems of Western Europe, which were to be settled between Germany, Italy, and France, as well as for the issues of the East, which were essentially the concern of Russia and j.a.pan, but in which Germany offered her good offices as mediator. It was a matter of opposing any attempt on the part of America to "make money on Europe." The United States had no business in Europe, in Africa, or in Asia.Molotov expressed his agreement with the statements of the Fuehrer upon the role of America and England. The partic.i.p.ation of Russia in the Tripart.i.te Pact appeared to him entirely acceptable in principle, provided that Russia was to co-operate as a partner and not be merely an object. In that case he saw no difficulties in the matter of partic.i.p.ation of the Soviet Union in the common effort. But the aim and the significance of the Pact must first be more closely defined, particularly with regard to the delimitation of the Greater East Asian Sphere.

When the conferences were resumed on November 15: Molotov mentioned the question of the strip of Lithuanian territory and emphasised that the Soviet Government had not received any clear answer yet from Germany on this question. However, it awaited a decision. Regarding the Bukovina, he admitted that this involved an additional territory, one not mentioned in the secret protocol. Russia had at first confined her demands to Northern Bukovina. Under the present circ.u.mstances, however, Germany must understand the Russian interest in Southern Bukovina. But Russia had not received an answer to her question regarding this subject either. Instead, Germany had guaranteed the entire territory of Rumania and completely disregarded Russia's wishes with regard to Southern Bukovina.The Fuehrer replied that it would mean a considerable concession on the part of Germany if even part of Bukovina were to be occupied by Russia....Molotov, however, persisted in the opinion previously stated: that the revisions desired by Russia were insignificant.The Fuehrer replied that if German-Russian collaboration was to show positive results in the future, the Soviet Government would have to understand that Germany was engaged in a life-and-death struggle which at all events she wanted to conclude successfully.... Both sides agreed in principle that Finland belonged to the Russian sphere of influence. Instead, therefore, of continuing a purely theoretical discussion, they should rather turn to more important problems.After the conquest of England, the British Empire would be apportioned as a gigantic world-wide estate in bankruptcy of forty million square kilometres. In this bankrupt estate there would be for Russia access to the ice-free and really open ocean. Thus far a minority of forty-five million Englishmen had ruled six hundred million inhabitants of the British Empire. He was about to crush this minority. Even the United States was actually doing nothing but picking out of this bankrupt estate a few items particularly suitable to the United States. Germany, of course, would like to avoid any conflict which would divert her from her struggle against the heart of the Empire, the British Isles. For that reason, he (the Fuehrer) did not like Italy's war against Greece, as it diverted forces to the periphery instead of concentrating them against England at one point. The same would occur during a Baltic war. The conflict with England would be fought to the last ditch, and he had no doubt that the defeat of the British Isles would lead to the dissolution of the Empire. It was a chimera to believe that the Empire could possibly be ruled and held together from Canada. Under those circ.u.mstances there arose world-wide perspectives. During the next few weeks they would have to be settled in joint diplomatic negotiations with Russia, and Russia's partic.i.p.ation in the solution of these problems would have to be arranged. All the countries which could possibly be interested in the bankrupt estate would have to stop all controversies among themselves and concern themselves exclusively with the part.i.tion of the British Empire. This applied to Germany, France, Italy, Russia, and j.a.pan.Molotov replied that he had followed the arguments of the Fuehrer with interest and that he was in agreement with everything that he had understood.

Hitler then retired for the night. After supper at the Soviet Emba.s.sy there was a British air raid on Berlin. We had heard of the conference beforehand, and though not invited to join in the discussion did not wish to be entirely left out of the proceedings. On the "Alert" all moved to the shelter, and the conversation was continued till midnight by the two Foreign Secretaries in safer surroundings. The German official account says: Because of the air raid the two Ministers went into the Reich Foreign Minister's air-raid shelter at 9.40 P.M. P.M. in order to conduct the final conversation. in order to conduct the final conversation......The time was not yet ripe, said Ribbentrop, for discussing the new order of things in Poland. The Balkan issue had already been discussed extensively. In the Balkans we had solely an economic interest, and we did not want England to disturb us there. The granting of the German guarantee to Rumania had apparently been misconstrued by Moscow.... In all its decisions, the German Government was guided solely by the endeavour to preserve peace in the Balkans and to prevent England from gaining a foothold there and from interfering with supplies to Germany. Thus our [German] action in the Balkans was motivated exclusively by the circ.u.mstances of our war against England. As soon as England conceded her defeat and asked for peace, German interests in the Balkans would be confined exclusively to the economic field, and German troops would be withdrawn from Rumania. Germany had, as the Fuehrer had repeatedly declared, no territorial interests in the Balkans. He could only repeat again and again that the decisive question was whether the Soviet Union was prepared and in a position to co-operate with us in the great liquidation of the British Empire. On all other questions we would easily reach an understanding if we could succeed in extending our relations and in defining the spheres of influence. Where the spheres of influence lay had been stated repeatedly. It was therefore as the Fuehrer had so clearly put it a matter of the interests of the Soviet Union and Germany requiring that the partners stand not breast to breast but back to back, in order to support each other in the achievement of their aspirations.In his reply Molotov stated that the Germans were a.s.suming that the war against England had already actually been won. If, therefore, as had been said in another connection, Germany was waging a life-and-death struggle against England, he could only construe this as meaning that Germany was fighting "for life" and England "for death." As to the question of collaboration, he quite approved of it, but he added that they had [to] come to a thorough understanding. This idea had also been expressed in Stalin's letter. A delimitation of the spheres of influence must also be sought. On this point, however, he (Molotov) could not take a definitive stand at this time, since he did not know the opinion of Stalin and of his other friends in Moscow in the matter. However, he had to state that all these great issues of tomorrow could not be separated from the issues of today and the fulfilment of existing agreements....Thereupon Herr Molotov cordially bade farewell to the Reich Foreign Minister, stressing that he did not regret the air-raid alarm, because he owed to it such an exhaustive conversation with the Reich Foreign Minister.

When in August, 1942, I first visited Moscow I received from Stalin's lips a shorter account of this conversation which in no essential differs from the German record, but may be thought more pithy.

"A little while ago," said Stalin, "the great complaint against Molotov was that he was too pro-German. Now everyone says he is too pro-British. But neither of us ever trusted the Germans. For us it was always life and death." I interjected that we had been through this ourselves, and so knew how they felt. "When Molotov," said the Marshal, "went to see Ribbentrop in Berlin in November of 1940, you got wind of it and sent an air raid." I nodded. "When the alarm sounded, Ribbentrop led the way down many flights of stairs to a deep shelter sumptuously furnished. When he got inside, the raid had begun. He shut the door and said to Molotov: 'Now here we are alone together. Why should we not divide?' Molotov said: 'What will England say?' 'England,' said Ribbentrop, 'is finished. She is no more use as a Power.' 'If that is so,' said Molotov, 'why are we in this shelter, and whose are these bombs which fall?' "

The Berlin conversations made no difference to Hitler's deep resolve. During October, Keitel, Jodl, and the German General Staff had under his orders been forming and shaping the plans for the eastward movement of the German armies and for the invasion of Russia in the early summer of 1941. It was not necessary at this stage to decide on the exact date, which might also be affected by the weather. Having regard to the distances to be traversed after the frontiers were crossed, and the need of taking Moscow before the winter began, it was obvious that the beginning of May offered the best prospects. Moreover, the a.s.sembly and deployment of the German Army along the two-thousand-mile front from the Baltic to the Black Sea, and the provision of all the magazines, camps, and railway sidings, was in itself one of the largest military tasks ever undertaken, and no delay either in planning or in action could be tolerated. Over all hung the vital need for concealment and deception.

For this purpose two separate forms of cover were used by Hitler, each of which had advantages of its own. The first was an elaborate negotiation about a common policy based on the part.i.tion and distribution of the British Empire in the East. The second was the domination of Rumania, Bulgaria, and Greece, with Hungary on the way, by a steady influx of troops. This offered important military gains, and at the same time masked or presented an explanation for the building-up of the German armies on the southern flank of the front to be developed against Russia.

The negotiations took the form of draft proposals by Germany for the accession of Soviet Russia to the Three-Power Pact at the expence of British interests in the Orient. If Stalin had accepted this scheme events might for a time have taken a different course. It was possible at any moment for Hitler to suspend his plans for invading Russia. We cannot attempt to describe what might have happened as the result of an armed alliance between the two great empires of the Continent, with their millions of soldiers, to share the spoil in the Balkans, Turkey, Persia, and the Middle East, with India always in the background and with j.a.pan as an eager partner in the "Greater East Asia Scheme." But Hitler's heart was set on destroying the Bolsheviks, for whom his hatred was mortal. He believed that he had the force to gain his main life-aim. Thereafter all the rest would be added unto him. He must have known from the conversations at Berlin and other contacts that the proposals which he made Ribbentrop send to Moscow fell far short of Russian ambitions.

A draft, bearing no date, of a Four-Power Pact was found in the captured correspondence of the German Foreign Office with the German Emba.s.sy in Moscow. This apparently formed the basis for Schulenburg's conversation with Molotov reported on November 26, 1940. By this Germany, Italy, and j.a.pan were to agree to respect each other's natural spheres of influence. In so far as these spheres of interest came into contact with each other, they would constantly consult each other in an amicable way with regard to the problems arising therefrom.

Germany, Italy, and j.a.pan declared on their part that they recognised the present extent of the possessions of the Soviet Union and would respect them.

The Four Powers undertook to join no combination of Powers and to support no combination of Powers which was directed against one of the Four Powers. They would a.s.sist each other in economic matters in every way and would supplement and extend the agreements existing among themselves. The agreement would continue for a period of ten years.

To this there was to be a secret protocol by which Germany declared that, apart from the territorial revisions in Europe to be carried out at the conclusion of peace, her territorial aspirations centred in the territories of Central Africa; Italy declared that, apart from territorial revisions in Europe, her territorial aspirations centred in the territories of Northern and Northeastern Africa; j.a.pan declared that her territorial aspirations centred in the area of Eastern Asia to the south of the Island Empire of j.a.pan; and the Soviet Union declared that its territorial aspirations centred south of the national territory of the Soviet Union in the direction of the Indian Ocean.

The Four Powers declared that, reserving the settlement of specific questions, they would mutually respect these territorial aspirations and would not oppose their achievement.3 * * * * *

As was expected, the Soviet Government did not accept the German project. They were alone with Germany in Europe, and at the other side of the world j.a.pan lay heavy upon them. Nevertheless they had confidence in their growing strength and in their vast expanse of territory, amounting to one-sixth of the land-surface of the globe. They therefore bargained toughly. On November 26, 1940, Schulenburg sent to Berlin the draft of the Russian counter-proposals. These stipulated that the German troops should be immediately withdrawn from Finland, which, under the Compact of 1939, belonged to the Soviet Union's sphere of influence; that within the next few months the security of the Soviet Union in the Straits should be a.s.sured by the conclusion of a mutual a.s.sistance pact between the Soviet Union and Bulgaria, which geographically is situated inside the security zone of the Black Sea boundaries of the Soviet Union, and by the establishment of a base for land and naval forces of the U.S.S.R. within range of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles by means of a long-term lease; that the area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf should be recognised as the centre of the aspirations of the Soviet Union; that j.a.pan should renounce her rights to concessions for coal and oil in Northern Sakhalin.

No effective answer was returned to this doc.u.ment. No attempt was made by Hitler to split the difference. Issues so grave as these might well justify a prolonged and careful study in a friendly spirit by both sides. The Soviets certainly expected and awaited an answer. Meanwhile on both sides of the frontier the forces, already heavy, began to grow, and Hitler's right hand reached out towards the Balkans.

The plans prepared on his instructions by Keitel and Jodl had by now reached sufficient maturity to enable the Fuehrer to issue from his headquarters on December 18, 1940, his historic Directive Number 21.

OPERATION B BARBAROSSAThe German Armed Forces must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia in a quick campaign to crush Soviet Russia in a quick campaign 4 4 even before the conclusion of the war against England. even before the conclusion of the war against England.For this purpose the Army Army will have to employ all available units, with the reservation that the occupied territories must be secured against surprise attacks. will have to employ all available units, with the reservation that the occupied territories must be secured against surprise attacks.For the Air Force it will be a matter of releasing such strong forces for the eastern campaign in support of the Army that a quick completion of the ground operations may be expected and that damage to Eastern German territory by enemy air attacks will be as slight as possible. This concentration of the main effort in the East is limited by the requirement that the entire combat and armament area dominated by us must remain adequately protected against enemy air attacks, and that the offensive operations against England, particularly her supply lines, must not be permitted to break down.The main effort of the Navy Navy will remain unequivocally directed against will remain unequivocally directed against England England even during an eastern campaign. even during an eastern campaign.I shall order the concentration concentration against Soviet Russia possibly eight weeks before the intended beginning of operations. against Soviet Russia possibly eight weeks before the intended beginning of operations.Preparations requiring more time to begin are to be started now if this has not yet been done and are to be completed by May 15, 1941. May 15, 1941.It is to be considered of decisive importance, however, that the intention to attack is not discovered.The preparations of the High Commands are to be made on the following basis: I. General Purpose: General Purpose:The ma.s.s of the Russian Army Army in Western Russia is to be destroyed in daring operations, by driving forward deep armoured wedges, and the retreat of units capable of combat into the vastness of Russian territory is to be prevented. in Western Russia is to be destroyed in daring operations, by driving forward deep armoured wedges, and the retreat of units capable of combat into the vastness of Russian territory is to be prevented.In quick pursuit a line is then to be reached from which the Russian Air Force will no longer be able to attack German Reich territory. The ultimate objective of the operation is to establish a defence line against Asiatic Russia from a line running approximately from the Volga River to Archangel. Then, in case of necessity, the last industrial area left to Russia in the Urals can be eliminated by the Luftwaffe.In the course of these operations the Russian Baltic Sea Fleet Baltic Sea Fleet will quickly lose its bases and thus will no longer be able to fight. will quickly lose its bases and thus will no longer be able to fight.Effective intervention by the Russian Air Force Air Force is to be prevented by powerful blows at the very beginning of the operation. is to be prevented by powerful blows at the very beginning of the operation.

II. Probable Allies and their Tasks: Probable Allies and their Tasks:1. On the flanks of our operation we can count on the active partic.i.p.ation of Rumania Rumania and and Finland Finland in the war against Soviet Russia. in the war against Soviet Russia.The High Command will in due time concert and determine in what form the armed forces of the two countries will be placed under German command at the time of their intervention.2. It will be the task of Rumania, Rumania, together with the force concentrating there, to pin down the enemy facing her, and in addition to render auxiliary services in the rear area. together with the force concentrating there, to pin down the enemy facing her, and in addition to render auxiliary services in the rear area.3. Finland Finland will cover the concentration of the redeployed German will cover the concentration of the redeployed German North Group North Group (parts of the XXI Group) coming from Norway and will operate jointly with it. Besides, Finland will be a.s.signed the task of eliminating Hango. (parts of the XXI Group) coming from Norway and will operate jointly with it. Besides, Finland will be a.s.signed the task of eliminating Hango.4. It may be expected that Swedish Swedish railroads and highways will be available for the concentration of the German North Group, from the start of operations at the latest. railroads and highways will be available for the concentration of the German North Group, from the start of operations at the latest.

III. Direction of Operations: Direction of Operations:A. Army Army (hereby approving the plans presented to me): (hereby approving the plans presented to me):In the zone of operations divided by the Pripet Marshes into a southern and northern sector, the main effort will be made north north of this area. Two Army Groups will be provided here. of this area. Two Army Groups will be provided here.The southern group of these two Army Groups the centre of the entire front will be given the task of annihilating the forces of the enemy in White Russia by advancing from the region around and north of Warsaw with especially strong armoured and motorised units....Only a surprisingly fast collapse of Russian resistance could justify aiming at both objectives simultaneously....The Army Group employed south of the Pripet Marshes is to make its main effort in the area from Lublin in the general direction of Kiev, in order to penetrate quickly with strong armoured units into the deep flank and rear of the Russian forces and then to roll them up along the Dnieper River. is to make its main effort in the area from Lublin in the general direction of Kiev, in order to penetrate quickly with strong armoured units into the deep flank and rear of the Russian forces and then to roll them up along the Dnieper River.The German-Rumanian groups on the right flank are a.s.signed the task of:(a) protecting Rumanian territory and thereby the southern flank of the entire operation; protecting Rumanian territory and thereby the southern flank of the entire operation;(b) pinning down the opposing enemy forces while Army Group South is attacking on its northern flank and, according to the progressive development of the situation and in conjunction with the Air Force, preventing their orderly retreat across the Dniester during the pursuit; pinning down the opposing enemy forces while Army Group South is attacking on its northern flank and, according to the progressive development of the situation and in conjunction with the Air Force, preventing their orderly retreat across the Dniester during the pursuit;[and] in the north, in the north, of reaching Moscow quickly. of reaching Moscow quickly.The capture of this city means a decisive success politically and economically, and, beyond that, the elimination of the most important railway centre.B. Air Force Air Force:Its task will be to paralyse and to eliminate as far as possible the intervention of the Russian Air Force, as well as to support the Army at its main points of effect, particularly those of Army Group Centre and, on the flank, those of Army Group South. The Russian railroads, in the order of their importance for the operations, will be cut or the most important near-by objectives (river crossings) seized by the bold employment of parachute and airborne troops.In order to concentrate all forces against the enemy Air Force and to give immediate support to the Army, the armament industry will not be attacked during the main operations. Only after the completion of the mobile operations may such attacks be considered primarily against the Ural region....IV. All orders to be issued by the Commanders-in-Chief on the basis of this directive must clearly indicate that they are precautionary measures precautionary measures for the possibility that Russia should change her present att.i.tude towards us. The number of officers to be a.s.signed to the preparatory work at an early date is to be kept as small as possible; additional personnel should be briefed as late as possible, and only to the extent required for the activity of each individual. Otherwise, through the discovery of our preparations the date of their execution has not even been fixed there is danger that most serious political and military disadvantages may arise. for the possibility that Russia should change her present att.i.tude towards us. The number of officers to be a.s.signed to the preparatory work at an early date is to be kept as small as possible; additional personnel should be briefed as late as possible, and only to the extent required for the activity of each individual. Otherwise, through the discovery of our preparations the date of their execution has not even been fixed there is danger that most serious political and military disadvantages may arise.V. I expect reports from the Commanders-in-chief concerning their further plans based on this directive.The contemplated preparations of all branches of the Armed Forces, including their progress, are to be reported to me through the High Command [O.K.W.]ADOLF H HITLER 5 5* * * * *

From this moment the moulds had been shaped for the supreme events of 1941. We, of course, had no knowledge of the bargainings between Germany and Russia for dividing the spoils of our Empire and for our destruction; nor could we measure the as yet unformed intentions of j.a.pan. The main troop movements of the German armies eastward had not yet become apparent to our active Intelligence Service. Only the infiltration and gradual ma.s.sing in Bulgaria and Rumania could be discerned. Had we known what is set forth in this chapter, we should have been greatly relieved. The combination against us of Germany, Russia, and j.a.pan was the worst of our fears. But who could tell? Meanwhile, "Fight on!"

15.

Ocean Peril

Disguised Surface Raiders - Excursion of the "Scheer" - The "Jervis Bay" Saves the Convoy - Further Depredations of the "Scheer" - A Surprise for the "Hipper" - Disproportionate Strains - The U-Boat Peril Dominates - Increasing Stranglehold upon the Northwestern Approaches - Grievous Losses - A Cruel Stroke of Fortune - The Diver's Anxieties - Need to s.h.i.+ft the Control from Plymouth to Liverpool - Sharp Contraction of Imports - Losses off the b.l.o.o.d.y Foreland - Withdrawal of the Irish Subsidies - My Telegram to the President of December 13 - A Sombre Admiralty Proposal - The Dynamite Carpet - Reinforcement and Stimulation of the Air Force Coastal Command - Eventual Success of Their Counter-Offensive.

THE destruction of the destruction of the Graf Spee Graf Spee in the action off the Plate in December 1939, had brought to an abrupt end the first German campaign against our s.h.i.+pping in the wide oceans. The fighting in Norway had, as we have seen, paralysed for the time being the German Navy in home waters. What was left of it was necessarily reserved for the invasion project. Admiral Raeder, whose ideas on the conduct of the German war at sea were technically sound, had some difficulty in carrying his views in the Fuehrer's councils. He had even at one time to resist a proposal made by the Army to disarm all his heavy s.h.i.+ps and use their guns for long-range batteries on sh.o.r.e. During the summer, however, he had fitted out a number of merchant s.h.i.+ps as disguised raiders. They were more powerfully armed, were generally faster than our armed merchant cruisers, and were provided with reconnaissance aircraft. Five s.h.i.+ps of this type evaded our patrols and entered the Atlantic between April and June, 1940, whilst a sixth undertook the hazardous northeast pa.s.sage to the Pacific along the north coasts of Russia and Siberia. a.s.sisted by a Russian ice-breaker, she succeeded in making the pa.s.sage in two months, and emerged into the Pacific through the Bering Sea in September. The object which Admiral Raeder laid down for the conduct of these s.h.i.+ps was threefold: first, to destroy or capture enemy s.h.i.+ps; secondly, to dislocate s.h.i.+pping movements; and, thirdly, to force the dispersion of British wars.h.i.+ps for escort and patrol to counter the menace. These well-conceived tactics caused us both injury and embarra.s.sment. By the first weeks of September, these five disguised raiders were loose upon our trade routes. Two of them were working in the Atlantic, two others in the Indian Ocean, and the fifth, after laying mines off Auckland, New Zealand, was in the Pacific. Only two contacts were made with them during the whole year. On July 29, in the action off the Plate in December 1939, had brought to an abrupt end the first German campaign against our s.h.i.+pping in the wide oceans. The fighting in Norway had, as we have seen, paralysed for the time being the German Navy in home waters. What was left of it was necessarily reserved for the invasion project. Admiral Raeder, whose ideas on the conduct of the German war at sea were technically sound, had some difficulty in carrying his views in the Fuehrer's councils. He had even at one time to resist a proposal made by the Army to disarm all his heavy s.h.i.+ps and use their guns for long-range batteries on sh.o.r.e. During the summer, however, he had fitted out a number of merchant s.h.i.+ps as disguised raiders. They were more powerfully armed, were generally faster than our armed merchant cruisers, and were provided with reconnaissance aircraft. Five s.h.i.+ps of this type evaded our patrols and entered the Atlantic between April and June, 1940, whilst a sixth undertook the hazardous northeast pa.s.sage to the Pacific along the north coasts of Russia and Siberia. a.s.sisted by a Russian ice-breaker, she succeeded in making the pa.s.sage in two months, and emerged into the Pacific through the Bering Sea in September. The object which Admiral Raeder laid down for the conduct of these s.h.i.+ps was threefold: first, to destroy or capture enemy s.h.i.+ps; secondly, to dislocate s.h.i.+pping movements; and, thirdly, to force the dispersion of British wars.h.i.+ps for escort and patrol to counter the menace. These well-conceived tactics caused us both injury and embarra.s.sment. By the first weeks of September, these five disguised raiders were loose upon our trade routes. Two of them were working in the Atlantic, two others in the Indian Ocean, and the fifth, after laying mines off Auckland, New Zealand, was in the Pacific. Only two contacts were made with them during the whole year. On July 29, Raider E Raider E was engaged in the South Atlantic by the armed merchant-cruiser was engaged in the South Atlantic by the armed merchant-cruiser Alcantara, Alcantara, but escaped after an inconclusive action. In December another armed merchant cruiser, the but escaped after an inconclusive action. In December another armed merchant cruiser, the Carnarvon Castle, Carnarvon Castle, attacked her again off the Plate River, but she escaped after some damage. Up till the end of September, 1940, these five raiders sank or captured thirty-six s.h.i.+ps, amounting to 235,000 tons. attacked her again off the Plate River, but she escaped after some damage. Up till the end of September, 1940, these five raiders sank or captured thirty-six s.h.i.+ps, amounting to 235,000 tons.

At the end of October, 1940, the pocket battles.h.i.+p Scheer Scheer was at last ready for service. When the invasion of England had been shelved, she left Germany on October 27, and broke out into the Atlantic through the Denmark Strait north of Iceland. She was followed a month later by the eight-inch gun cruiser, was at last ready for service. When the invasion of England had been shelved, she left Germany on October 27, and broke out into the Atlantic through the Denmark Strait north of Iceland. She was followed a month later by the eight-inch gun cruiser, Hipper. Hipper. The The Scheer Scheer had orders to attack the North Atlantic convoys, from which the battles.h.i.+p escorts had been withdrawn to reinforce the Mediterranean. Captain Krancke believed that a homeward-bound convoy had left Halifax on October 27, and he hoped to intercept it about November 3. On the 5th his aircraft reported eight s.h.i.+ps in the southeast, and he set off in pursuit. At 2.27 had orders to attack the North Atlantic convoys, from which the battles.h.i.+p escorts had been withdrawn to reinforce the M