Their Finest Hour Part 10

In the closing days at Bordeaux, Admiral Darlan became very important. My contacts with him had been few and formal. I respected him for the work he had done in re-creating the French Navy, which after ten years of his professional control was more efficient than at any time since the French Revolution. When in November, 1939, he had visited England, we gave him an official dinner at the Admiralty. In response to the toast, he began by reminding us that his great-grandfather had been killed at the Battle of Trafalgar. I therefore thought of him as one of those good Frenchmen who hate England. Our Anglo-French naval discussions in January had also shown how very jealous the Admiral was of his professional position in relation to whoever was the political Minister of Marine. This had become a positive obsession, and I believe played a definite part in his action.

For the rest, Darlan had been present at most of the conferences which I have described, and as the end of the French resistance approached, he had repeatedly a.s.sured me that whatever happened the French Fleet should never fall into German hands. Now at Bordeaux came the fateful moment in the career of this ambitious, self-seeking, and capable Admiral. His authority over the Fleet was for all practical purposes absolute. He had only to order the s.h.i.+ps to British, American, or French colonial harbours some had already started to be obeyed. In the morning of June 17, after the fall of M. Reynaud's Cabinet, he declared to General Georges that he was resolved to give the order. The next day Georges met him in the afternoon and asked him what had happened. Darlan replied that he had changed his mind. When asked why, he answered simply, "I am now Minister of Marine." This did not mean that he had changed his mind in order to become Minister of Marine, but that being Minister of Marine he had a different point of view.

How vain are human calculations of self-interest! Rarely has there been a more convincing example. Admiral Darlan had but to sail in any one of his s.h.i.+ps to any port outside France to become the master of all French interests beyond German control. He would not have come like General de Gaulle with only an unconquerable heart and a few kindred spirits. He would have carried with him outside the German reach the fourth Navy in the world, whose officers and men were personally devoted to him. Acting thus, Darlan would have become the chief of the French Resistance with a mighty weapon in his hand. British and American dockyards and a.r.s.enals would have been at his disposal for the maintenance of his fleet. The French gold reserve in the United States would have a.s.sured him, once recognised, of ample resources. The whole French Empire would have rallied to him. Nothing could have prevented him from being the Liberator of France. The fame and power which he so ardently desired were in his grasp. Instead, he went forward through two years of worrying and ignominious office to a violent death, a dishonoured grave, and a name long to be execrated by the French Navy and the nation he had hitherto served so well.

There is a final note which should be struck at this point. In a letter which Darlan wrote to me on December 4, 1942,1 just three weeks before his a.s.sa.s.sination, he vehemently claimed that he had kept his word. As this letter states his case and should be on record, I print it at the end of this chapter. It cannot be disputed that no French s.h.i.+p was ever manned by the Germans or used against us by them in the war. This was not entirely due to Admiral Darlan's measures; but he had certainly built up in the minds of the officers and men of the French Navy that at all costs their s.h.i.+ps should be destroyed before being seized by the Germans, whom he disliked as much as the English. just three weeks before his a.s.sa.s.sination, he vehemently claimed that he had kept his word. As this letter states his case and should be on record, I print it at the end of this chapter. It cannot be disputed that no French s.h.i.+p was ever manned by the Germans or used against us by them in the war. This was not entirely due to Admiral Darlan's measures; but he had certainly built up in the minds of the officers and men of the French Navy that at all costs their s.h.i.+ps should be destroyed before being seized by the Germans, whom he disliked as much as the English.

Those of us who were responsible at the summit in London understood the physical structure of our island strength and were sure of the spirit of the nation. The confidence with which we faced the immediate future was not founded, as was commonly supposed abroad, upon audacious bluff or rhetorical appeal, but upon a sober consciousness and calculation of practical facts. When I spoke in the House of Commons, I founded myself upon realities which I and others had carefully studied some for many years. I will presently a.n.a.lyse in detail the invasion problem as I and my expert advisers saw it in these memorable days. But first of all there was one step to take. It was obvious, and it was dire.

The addition of the French Navy to the German and Italian Fleets, with the menace of j.a.pan measureless upon the horizon, confronted Great Britain with mortal dangers and gravely affected the safety of the United States. Article 8 of the Armistice prescribed that the French Fleet, except that part left free for safeguarding French Colonial interests, "shall be collected in ports to be specified and there demobilised and disarmed under German or Italian control." It was therefore clear that the French war vessels would pa.s.s into that control while fully armed. It was true that in the same article the German Government solemnly declared that they had no intention of using them for their own purposes during the war. But who in his senses would trust the word of Hitler after his shameful record and the facts of the hour? Furthermore, the article excepted from this a.s.surance "those units necessary for coast surveillance and mine-sweeping." The interpretation of this lay with the Germans. Finally, the Armistice could at any time be voided on any pretext of non-observance. There was in fact no security for us at all. At all costs, at all risks, in one way or another, we must make sure that the Navy of France did not fall into wrong hands, and then perhaps bring us and others to ruin.

The War Cabinet never hesitated. Those Ministers who, the week before, had given their whole hearts to France and offered common nationhood, resolved that all necessary measures should be taken. This was a hateful decision, the most unnatural and painful in which I have ever been concerned. It recalled the episode of the destruction of the Danish Fleet in Copenhagen Harbour by Nelson in 1801; but now the French had been only yesterday our dear allies, and our sympathy for the misery of France was sincere. On the other hand, the life of the State and the salvation of our cause were at stake. It was Greek tragedy. But no act was ever more necessary for the life of Britain and for all that depended upon it. I thought of Danton in 1793: "The coalesced Kings threaten us, and we hurl at their feet as a gage of battle the head of a King." The whole event was in this order of ideas.

The French Navy was disposed in the following manner: Two battles.h.i.+ps, four light cruisers (or contre-torpilleurs), contre-torpilleurs), some submarines, including a very large one, the some submarines, including a very large one, the Surcouf, Surcouf, eight destroyers, and about two hundred smaller but valuable minesweeping and anti-submarine craft, lay for the most part at Portsmouth and Plymouth. These were in our power. At Alexandria there were a French battles.h.i.+p, four French cruisers, three of them modern eight-inch cruisers, and a number of smaller s.h.i.+ps. These were covered by a strong British battle squadron. At Oran, at the other end of the Mediterranean, and at its adjacent military port of Mers-el-Kebir, were two of the finest vessels of the French fleet, the eight destroyers, and about two hundred smaller but valuable minesweeping and anti-submarine craft, lay for the most part at Portsmouth and Plymouth. These were in our power. At Alexandria there were a French battles.h.i.+p, four French cruisers, three of them modern eight-inch cruisers, and a number of smaller s.h.i.+ps. These were covered by a strong British battle squadron. At Oran, at the other end of the Mediterranean, and at its adjacent military port of Mers-el-Kebir, were two of the finest vessels of the French fleet, the Dunkerque Dunkerque and the and the Strasbourg, Strasbourg, modern battle cruisers much superior to the modern battle cruisers much superior to the Scharnhorst Scharnhorst and and Gneisenau Gneisenau and built for the express purpose of being superior to them. These vessels in German hands on our trade routes would have been most disagreeable. With them were two French battles.h.i.+ps, several light cruisers, and a number of destroyers, submarines, and other vessels. At Algiers were seven cruisers, of which four were eight-inch armed, and at Martinique an aircraft-carrier and two light cruisers. At Casablanca lay the and built for the express purpose of being superior to them. These vessels in German hands on our trade routes would have been most disagreeable. With them were two French battles.h.i.+ps, several light cruisers, and a number of destroyers, submarines, and other vessels. At Algiers were seven cruisers, of which four were eight-inch armed, and at Martinique an aircraft-carrier and two light cruisers. At Casablanca lay the Jean Bart, Jean Bart, newly arrived from Saint Nazaire, but without her guns. This was one of the key s.h.i.+ps in the computation of world naval strength. It was unfinished, and could not be finished at Casablanca. It must not go elsewhere. The newly arrived from Saint Nazaire, but without her guns. This was one of the key s.h.i.+ps in the computation of world naval strength. It was unfinished, and could not be finished at Casablanca. It must not go elsewhere. The Richelieu, Richelieu, which was far nearer completion, had reached Dakar. She could steam, and her fifteen-inch guns could fire. There were many other French s.h.i.+ps of minor importance in various ports. Finally, at Toulon a number of wars.h.i.+ps were beyond our reach. "Operation Catapult" comprised the simultaneous seizure, control, or effective disablement or destruction of all the accessible French Fleet. which was far nearer completion, had reached Dakar. She could steam, and her fifteen-inch guns could fire. There were many other French s.h.i.+ps of minor importance in various ports. Finally, at Toulon a number of wars.h.i.+ps were beyond our reach. "Operation Catapult" comprised the simultaneous seizure, control, or effective disablement or destruction of all the accessible French Fleet.

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

1.VII.40.

1. The Admiralty are retaining Nelson Nelson and her four destroyers in home waters, and "Operation Catapult" should go forward, aiming at daybreak the 3d. and her four destroyers in home waters, and "Operation Catapult" should go forward, aiming at daybreak the 3d.2. During the night of 2d/3d all necessary measures should be taken at Portsmouth and Plymouth, at Alexandria, and if possible at Martinique, on the same lines as Catapult. The reactions to these measures at Dakar and Casablanca must be considered, and every precaution taken to prevent the escape of valuable units.

On account of the pressure of events, I added also: The Admiralty should endeavour to raise the flotillas in the narrow seas to a strength of forty destroyers, with additional cruiser support. An effort should be made to reach this strength during the next two or three days and hold it for the following fortnight, when the position can be reviewed. The losses in the Western approaches must be accepted meanwhile. I should like also a daily return of the numbers of craft on patrol or available between Portsmouth and the Tyne.

On the night of July 3, all the French vessels at Portsmouth and Plymouth were taken under British control. The action was sudden and necessarily a surprise. Overwhelming force was employed, and the whole transaction showed how easily the Germans could have taken possession of any French wars.h.i.+ps lying in ports which they controlled. In Britain the transfer, except in the Surcouf, Surcouf, was amicable, and the crews came willingly ash.o.r.e. In the was amicable, and the crews came willingly ash.o.r.e. In the Surcouf Surcouf two British officers were wounded, one leading seaman killed and an able seaman wounded. One Frenchman was killed in the scuffle, but the utmost endeavours were made with success to rea.s.sure and comfort the French sailors. Many hundreds volunteered to join us. The two British officers were wounded, one leading seaman killed and an able seaman wounded. One Frenchman was killed in the scuffle, but the utmost endeavours were made with success to rea.s.sure and comfort the French sailors. Many hundreds volunteered to join us. The Surcouf, Surcouf, after rendering distinguished service, perished on February 19, 1942, with all her gallant French crew. after rendering distinguished service, perished on February 19, 1942, with all her gallant French crew.

The deadly stroke was in the Western Mediterranean. Here, at Gibraltar, Vice-Admiral Somerville with "Force H," consisting of the battle cruiser Hood, Hood, the battles.h.i.+ps the battles.h.i.+ps Valiant Valiant and and Resolution, Resolution, the aircraft-carrier the aircraft-carrier Ark Royal, Ark Royal, two cruisers and eleven destroyers, received orders sent from the Admiralty at 2.25 two cruisers and eleven destroyers, received orders sent from the Admiralty at 2.25 A.M A.M. on July 1: Be prepared for "Catapult" July 3.

Among Somerville's officers was Captain Holland, a gallant and distinguished officer, lately Naval Attache in Paris and with keen French sympathies, who was influential. In the early afternoon of July 1 the Vice-Admiral telegraphed: After talk with Holland and others Vice-Admiral "Force H" is impressed with their view that the use of force should be avoided at all costs. Holland considers offensive action on our part would alienate all French wherever they are.

To this the Admiralty replied at 6.20 P.M P.M.: Firm intention of H.M.G. that if French will not accept any of your alternatives they are to be destroyed.

Shortly after midnight (1.08 A.M A.M., July 2) Admiral Somerville was sent the following carefully conceived text of the communication to be made to the French Admiral: It is impossible for us, your comrades up to now, to allow your fine s.h.i.+ps to fall into the power of the German or Italian enemy. We are determined to fight on to the end, and if we win, as we think we shall, we shall never forget that France was our Ally, that our interests are the same as hers, and that our common enemy is Germany. Should we conquer, we solemnly declare that we shall restore the greatness and territory of France. For this purpose, we must make sure that the best s.h.i.+ps of the French Navy are not used against us by the common foe. In these circ.u.mstances, His Majesty's Government have instructed me to demand that the French Fleet now at Mers-el-Kebir and Oran shall act in accordance with one of the following alternatives:(a) Sail with us and continue to fight for victory against the Germans and Italians. Sail with us and continue to fight for victory against the Germans and Italians.(b) Sail with reduced crews under our control to a British port. The reduced crews will be repatriated at the earliest moment. Sail with reduced crews under our control to a British port. The reduced crews will be repatriated at the earliest moment.If either of these courses is adopted by you, we will restore your s.h.i.+ps to France at the conclusion of the war or pay full compensation, if they are damaged meanwhile.(c) Alternatively, if you feel bound to stipulate that your s.h.i.+ps should not be used against the Germans or Italians unless these break the Armistice, then sail them with us with reduced crews to some French port in the West Indies Martinique, for instance where they can be demilitarised to our satisfaction, or perhaps be entrusted to the United States and remain safe until the end of the war, the crews being repatriated. Alternatively, if you feel bound to stipulate that your s.h.i.+ps should not be used against the Germans or Italians unless these break the Armistice, then sail them with us with reduced crews to some French port in the West Indies Martinique, for instance where they can be demilitarised to our satisfaction, or perhaps be entrusted to the United States and remain safe until the end of the war, the crews being repatriated.If you refuse these fair offers, I must, with profound regret, require you to sink your s.h.i.+ps within six hours.Finally, failing the above, I have the orders of His Majesty's Government to use whatever force may be necessary to prevent your s.h.i.+ps from falling into German or Italian hands.

In the evening of the 2d, I requested the Admiralty to send the Vice-Admiral the following message (despatched 10.55 P.M P.M.): You are charged with one of the most disagreeable and difficult tasks that a British Admiral has ever been faced with, but we have complete confidence in you and rely on you to carry it out relentlessly.

The Admiral sailed at daylight and was off Oran at about 9.30. He sent Captain Holland himself in a destroyer to wait upon the French Admiral Gensoul. After being refused an interview, Holland sent by messengers the doc.u.ment already quoted. Admiral Gensoul replied in writing that in no case would the French wars.h.i.+ps be allowed to fall intact into German and Italian hands, and that force would be met with force.

All day negotiations continued, Captain Holland waiting in his destroyer off the boom. The distress of the British Admiral and his princ.i.p.al officers was evident to us from the signals which had pa.s.sed. Nothing but the most direct orders compelled them to open fire on those who had been so lately their comrades. At the Admiralty also there was manifest emotion. But there was no weakening in the resolve of the War Cabinet. I sat all the afternoon in the Cabinet Room in frequent contact with my princ.i.p.al colleagues and the First Lord and First Sea Lord. A final signal was despatched at 6.26 P.M P.M.

French s.h.i.+ps must comply with our terms or sink themselves or be sunk by you before dark.

But the action had already begun. At 5.54 Admiral Somerville opened fire upon this powerful French fleet, which was also protected by its sh.o.r.e batteries. At 6.0 P.M P.M. he reported that he was heavily engaged. The bombardment lasted for some ten minutes, and was followed by heavy attacks by our naval aircraft, launched from the Ark Royal. Ark Royal. The battles.h.i.+p The battles.h.i.+p Bretagne Bretagne was blown up. The was blown up. The Dunkerque Dunkerque ran aground. The battles.h.i.+p ran aground. The battles.h.i.+p Provence Provence was beached. The was beached. The Strasbourg Strasbourg escaped, and, though attacked and damaged by torpedo aircraft, reached Toulon, as did also the cruisers from Algiers. escaped, and, though attacked and damaged by torpedo aircraft, reached Toulon, as did also the cruisers from Algiers.

At Alexandria, after protracted negotiations with Admiral Cunningham, the French Admiral G.o.dfrey agreed to discharge his oil fuel, to remove important parts of his gun-mechanisms, and to repatriate some of his crews. At Dakar on July 8 an attack was made on the battles.h.i.+p Richelieu Richelieu by the aircraft-carrier by the aircraft-carrier Hermes, Hermes, and most gallantly by a motor-boat. The and most gallantly by a motor-boat. The Richelieu Richelieu was. .h.i.t by an air torpedo and seriously damaged. The French aircraft-carrier and two light cruisers at Martinique were immobilised after long-drawn-out discussions under an agreement with the United States. was. .h.i.t by an air torpedo and seriously damaged. The French aircraft-carrier and two light cruisers at Martinique were immobilised after long-drawn-out discussions under an agreement with the United States.

On July 4 I reported at length to the House of Commons what we had done. Although the battle-cruiser Strasbourg Strasbourg had escaped from Oran and the effective disablement of the had escaped from Oran and the effective disablement of the Richelieu Richelieu had not then been reported, the measures we had taken had removed the French Navy from major German calculations. I spoke for an hour or more that afternoon, and gave a detailed account of all these sombre events as they were known to me. I have nothing to add to the account which I then gave to Parliament and to the world. I thought it better for the sake of proportion to end upon a note which placed this mournful episode in true relation with the plight in which we stood. I therefore read to the House the admonition which I had, with Cabinet approval, circulated through the inner circles of the governing machine the day before. had not then been reported, the measures we had taken had removed the French Navy from major German calculations. I spoke for an hour or more that afternoon, and gave a detailed account of all these sombre events as they were known to me. I have nothing to add to the account which I then gave to Parliament and to the world. I thought it better for the sake of proportion to end upon a note which placed this mournful episode in true relation with the plight in which we stood. I therefore read to the House the admonition which I had, with Cabinet approval, circulated through the inner circles of the governing machine the day before.

On what may be the eve of an attempted invasion or battle for our native land, the Prime Minister desires to impress upon all persons holding responsible positions in the Government, in the Fighting Services or in the Civil Departments, their duty to maintain a spirit of alert and confident energy. While every precaution must be taken that time and means afford, there are no grounds for supposing that more German troops can be landed in this country, either from the air or across the sea, than can be destroyed or captured by the strong forces at present under arms. The Royal Air Force is in excellent order and at the highest strength yet attained. The German Navy was never so weak, nor the British Army at home so strong as now. The Prime Minister expects all His Majesty's servants in high places to set an example of steadiness and resolution. They should check and rebuke the expression of loose and ill-digested opinions in their circles, or by their subordinates. They should not hesitate to report, or if necessary remove, any persons, officers, or officials who are found to be consciously exercising a disturbing or depressing influence, and whose talk is calculated to spread alarm and despondency. Thus alone will they be worthy of the fighting men who, in the air, on the sea, and on land, have already met the enemy without any sense of being outmatched in martial qualities.

The House was very silent during the recital, but at the end there occurred a scene unique in my own experience. Everybody seemed to stand up all around, cheering, for what seemed a long time. Up till this moment the Conservative Party had treated me with some reserve, and it was from the Labour benches that I received the warmest welcome when I entered the House or rose on serious occasions. But now all joined in solemn stentorian accord.

The elimination of the French Navy as an important factor almost at a single stroke by violent action produced a profound impression in every country. Here was this Britain which so many had counted down and out, which strangers had supposed to be quivering on the brink of surrender to the mighty power arrayed against her, striking ruthlessly at her dearest friends of yesterday and securing for a while to herself the undisputed command of the sea. It was made plain that the British War Cabinet feared nothing and would stop at nothing. This was true.

The Petain Government had moved to Vichy on July 1, and proceeded to set itself up as the Government of Unoccupied France. On receiving the news of Oran they ordered retaliation by air upon Gibraltar, and a few bombs were dropped upon the harbour from their African stations. On July 5 they formally broke off relations with Great Britain. On July 11 President Lebrun gave place to Marshal Petain, who was installed as Chief of the State by an enormous majority of 569 against 80, with 17 abstentions and many absentees.

The genius of France enabled her people to comprehend the whole significance of Oran, and in her agony to draw new hope and strength from this additional bitter pang. General de Gaulle, whom I did not consult beforehand, was magnificent in his demeanour, and France liberated and restored has ratified his conduct. I am indebted to M. Teitgen for a tale which should be told. In a village near Toulon dwelt two peasant families, each of whom had lost their sailor son by British fire at Oran. A funeral service was arranged to which all their neighbours sought to go. Both families requested that the Union Jack should lie upon the coffins side by side with the Tricolour, and their wishes were respectfully observed. In this we may see how the comprehending spirit of simple folk touches the sublime.

Immense relief spread through the high Government circles in the United States. The Atlantic Ocean seemed to regain its sheltering power, and a long vista of time opened out for the necessary preparations for the safety of the great Republic. Henceforth there was no more talk about Britain giving in. The only question was, would she be invaded and conquered? That was the issue which was now to be put to the proof.

APPENDIX.

Admiral Darlan to Mr. Churchill 2 2 Algiers, December 4, 1942.Dear Mr. Prime Minister,On June 12, 1940, at Briare, at the Headquarters of General Weygand, you took me aside and said to me: "Darlan, I hope that you will never surrender the Fleet." I answered you: "There is no question of doing so; it would be contrary to our naval traditions and honour." The First Lord of the Admiralty, Alexander, and the First Sea Lord, Pound received the same reply on June 17, 1940, at Bordeaux, as did Lord Lloyd. If I did not consent to authorise the French Fleet to proceed to British ports, it was because I knew that such a decision would bring about the total occupation of Metropolitan France as well as North Africa.I admit having been overcome by a great bitterness and a great resentment against England as the result of the painful events which touched me as a sailor; furthermore, it seemed to me that you did not believe my word. One day Lord Halifax sent me word by M. Dupuy that in England my word was not doubted, but that it was believed that I should not be able to keep it. The voluntary destruction of the Fleet at Toulon has just proved that I was right, because even though I no longer commanded, the Fleet executed the orders which I had given and maintained, contrary to the wishes of the Laval Government. On the orders of my Chief the Marshal, I was obliged from January, 1941, to April, 1942, to adopt a policy which would prevent France and its Empire from being occupied and crushed by the Axis Powers. This policy was by the force of events opposed to yours. What else could I do? At that time you were not able to help us, and any gesture towards you would have led to the most disastrous consequences for my country. If we had not a.s.sumed the obligation to defend the Empire by our own forces (I always refused German aid, even in Syria), the Axis would have come to Africa and our own Army would have been discarded; the First British Army undoubtedly would not be before Tunis today with French troops at its side to combat the Germans and Italians.When the Allied forces landed in Africa on November 8, I at first executed the orders I had received. Then, as soon as this became impossible, I ordered the cessation of the fighting in order to avoid unnecessary bloodshed and a fight which was contrary to the intimate sentiments of those engaged. Disavowed by Vichy and not wis.h.i.+ng to resume the fight, I placed myself at the disposition of the American military authorities, only in that way being able to remain faithful to my oath. On November 11, I learned of the violation of the Armistice Convention by the Germans, the occupation of France, and the solemn protest of the Marshal. I then considered that I could resume my liberty of action, and that, remaining faithful to the person of the Marshal, I could follow that road which was most favourable to the welfare of the French Empire, that of the fight against the Axis. Supported by the high authorities of French Africa and by public opinion, and acting as the eventual subst.i.tute of the Chief of State, I formed the High Commissariat in Africa and ordered the French forces to fight at the side of the Allies. Since then French West Africa has recognised my authority. I should never have been able to accomplish this result if I had not acted under the aegis of the Marshal and if I were simply represented as a dissident. I have the conviction that all Frenchmen who now fight against Germany each in his own manner will finally achieve a general reconciliation, but I believe that for the moment they must continue their separate action. There is a certain resentment, notably in French West Africa, which is too active for me to obtain more, as you know. I follow my role without attacking anyone, I ask for reciprocity. For the moment the only thing which counts is to defeat the Axis; the French people when liberated will later choose their political regime and their leaders.I thank you, Mr. Prime Minister, for having a.s.sociated yourself with President Roosevelt in declaring that, like the United States, Great Britain wishes the integral re-establishment of French sovereignty as it existed in 1939. When my country has recovered its integrity and its liberty, my only ambition will be to retire with the sentiment of having served it well.Please accept, Mr. Prime Minister, the a.s.surances of my highest consideration.FRANcOIS D DARLAN, Admiral of the Fleet. Admiral of the Fleet.

12.

The Apparatus of Counter-Attack 1940.

My Own Reactions After Dunkirk - Minute to General Ismay of June 4 - Work of June 6 - A Retrogression - My Old Plans of July, 1917 - An Early Idea of Tank-Landing Craft - The Germ of the "Mulberry" Harbours of 1944 - Directive to General Ismay on Counter-Attack - "Commandos" - Tank-Landing Craft and Parachutists - My Minute of July 7, 1940, Calling for Beach Landing Craft for Six or Seven Hundred Tanks - Minute of August 5, 1940, on Programme of Armoured Divisions - Overseas Transportation for Two Divisions at a Time - Creation of the Combined Operations Command - Appointment of Sir Roger Keyes - The Joint Planning Committee Is Placed Directly Under the Minister of Defence - Progress of the Landing-Craft Construction in 1940 and 1941 - My Telegram to President Roosevelt of July 25, 1941 - My Consistent Purpose to Land Large Armies in Europe.

MY FIRST REACTION to the "Miracle of Dunkirk" had been to turn it to proper use by mounting a counter-offensive. When so much was uncertain, the need to recover the initiative glared forth. June 4 was much occupied for me by the need to prepare and deliver the long and serious speech to the House of Commons of which some account has been given, but as soon as this was over I made haste to strike the note which I thought should rule our minds and inspire our actions at this moment. to the "Miracle of Dunkirk" had been to turn it to proper use by mounting a counter-offensive. When so much was uncertain, the need to recover the initiative glared forth. June 4 was much occupied for me by the need to prepare and deliver the long and serious speech to the House of Commons of which some account has been given, but as soon as this was over I made haste to strike the note which I thought should rule our minds and inspire our actions at this moment.

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

4.VI.40.

We are greatly concerned and it is certainly wise to be so with the dangers of the German landing in England in spite of our possessing the command of the seas and having very strong defence by fighters in the air. Every creek, every beach, every harbour has become to us a source of anxiety. Besides this the parachutists may sweep over and take Liverpool or Ireland, and so forth. All this mood is very good if it engenders energy. But if it is so easy for the Germans to invade us in spite of sea-power, some may feel inclined to ask the question, "Why should it be thought impossible for us to do anything of the same kind to them?" The completely defensive habit of mind which has ruined the French must not be allowed to ruin all our initiative. It is of the highest consequence to keep the largest numbers of German forces all along the coasts of the countries they have conquered, and we should immediately set to work to organise raiding forces on these coasts where the populations are friendly. Such forces might be composed of self-contained, thoroughly equipped units of say one thousand up to not more than ten thousand when combined. Surprise would be ensured by the fact that the destination would be concealed until the last moment. What we have seen at Dunkirk shows how quickly troops can be moved off (and I suppose on) to selected points if need be. How wonderful it would be if the Germans could be made to wonder where they were going to be struck next, instead of forcing us to try to wall in the island and roof it over! An effort must be made to shake off the mental and moral prostration to the will and initiative of the enemy from which we suffer.

Ismay conveyed this to the Chiefs of Staff, and in principle it received their cordial approval and was reflected in many of the decisions which we took. Out of it gradually sprang a policy. My thought was at this time firmly fixed on tank warfare, not merely defensive but offensive. This required the construction of large numbers of tank-landing vessels, which henceforward became one of my constant cares. As all this was destined to become of major importance in the future, I must now make a retrogression into a subject which had long ago lain in my mind and was now revived.

I had always been fascinated by amphibious warfare, and the idea of using tanks to run ash.o.r.e from specially constructed landing craft on beaches where they were not expected had long been in my mind. Ten days before I rejoined Mr. Lloyd George's Government as Minister of Munitions on July 17, 1917, I had prepared, without expert a.s.sistance, a scheme for the capture of the two Frisian islands Bork.u.m and Sylt. The object was to secure an overseas base for flotillas and cruisers and for such air forces as were available in those days, in order to force the naval fighting, in which we had a great numerical superiority, and by re-establis.h.i.+ng close blockade relieve the pressure of the U-boat war, then at its height, against our Atlantic supply-line and the movement of the American armies to France. Mr. Lloyd George was impressed with the plan, and had it specially printed for the Admiralty and the War Cabinet.

It contained the following paragraph, 22c, which has never yet seen the light of day: The landing of the troops upon the island [of Bork.u.m or Sylt] under cover of the guns of the Fleet [should be] aided by gas and smoke from torpedo-proof transports by means of bullet-proof lighters. bullet-proof lighters. Approximately one hundred should be provided for landing a division. In addition a number say fifty Approximately one hundred should be provided for landing a division. In addition a number say fifty tank-landing lighters should be provided, each carrying a tank or tanks tank-landing lighters should be provided, each carrying a tank or tanks [and] fitted for wire-cutting in its bow. By means of a drawbridge or shelving bow [the tanks] would land under [their] own power, and prevent the infantry from being held up by wire when attacking the gorges of the forts and batteries. This is a new feature, and removes one of the very great previous difficulties, namely, the rapid landing of [our] field artillery to cut wire. [and] fitted for wire-cutting in its bow. By means of a drawbridge or shelving bow [the tanks] would land under [their] own power, and prevent the infantry from being held up by wire when attacking the gorges of the forts and batteries. This is a new feature, and removes one of the very great previous difficulties, namely, the rapid landing of [our] field artillery to cut wire.

And further, paragraph 27: There is always the danger of the enemy getting wind of our intentions and reinforcing his garrisons with good troops beforehand, at any rate so far as Bork.u.m, about which he must always be very sensitive, is concerned. On the other hand, the landing could be effected under the s.h.i.+elds of lighters, proof against machine-gun bullets, the landing could be effected under the s.h.i.+elds of lighters, proof against machine-gun bullets, and too numerous to be seriously affected by heavy gunfire [i.e., the fire of heavy guns]; and too numerous to be seriously affected by heavy gunfire [i.e., the fire of heavy guns]; and tanks employed in even larger numbers than are here suggested, especially the quick-moving tank and lighter varieties, and tanks employed in even larger numbers than are here suggested, especially the quick-moving tank and lighter varieties, would operate in an area where no preparations could have been made to receive them. These may be thought new and important favourable considerations. would operate in an area where no preparations could have been made to receive them. These may be thought new and important favourable considerations.

In this paper also I had an alternative plan for making an artificial island in the shallow waters of Horn Reef (to the northward): Paragraph 30. One of the methods suggested for investigation is as follows: A number of flat-bottomed barges or caissons, made not of steel, but of concrete, A number of flat-bottomed barges or caissons, made not of steel, but of concrete, should be prepared in the Humber, at Harwich, and in the Wash, the Medway, and the Thames. These structures would be adapted to the depths in which they were to be sunk, according to a general plan. They would float when empty of water, and thus could be towed across to the site of the artificial island. On arrival at the buoys marking the island, sea-c.o.c.ks would be opened, and they would settle down on the bottom. They could subsequently be gradually filled with sand, as opportunity served, by suction dredgers. These structures would range in size from 50' X 40' X 20' to 120' X 80' X 40'. should be prepared in the Humber, at Harwich, and in the Wash, the Medway, and the Thames. These structures would be adapted to the depths in which they were to be sunk, according to a general plan. They would float when empty of water, and thus could be towed across to the site of the artificial island. On arrival at the buoys marking the island, sea-c.o.c.ks would be opened, and they would settle down on the bottom. They could subsequently be gradually filled with sand, as opportunity served, by suction dredgers. These structures would range in size from 50' X 40' X 20' to 120' X 80' X 40'. By this means a torpedo- and weather-proof harbour, like an atoll, would be created in the open sea, with regular pens for the destroyers and submarines, and alighting platforms for aeroplanes. By this means a torpedo- and weather-proof harbour, like an atoll, would be created in the open sea, with regular pens for the destroyers and submarines, and alighting platforms for aeroplanes.This project, if feasible, is capable of great elaboration, and it might be applied in various places. Concrete vessels can perhaps be made to carry a complete heavy-gun turret, and these, on the admission of water to their outer chambers, would sit on the sea floor, like the Solent forts, at the desired points. Other sinkable structures could be made to contain storerooms, oil tanks, or living chambers. It is not possible, without an expert inquiry, to do more here than indicate the possibilities, which embrace nothing less than the creation, transportation in pieces, a.s.semblement, and posing of an artificial island and destroyer base.31. Such a scheme, if found mechanically sound, avoids the need of employing troops and all the risks of storming a fortified island. It could be applied as a surprise, for although the construction of these concrete vessels would probably be known in Germany, the natural conclusion would be that they were intended for an attempt to block up the river mouths, which indeed is an idea not It could be applied as a surprise, for although the construction of these concrete vessels would probably be known in Germany, the natural conclusion would be that they were intended for an attempt to block up the river mouths, which indeed is an idea not to be excluded. to be excluded. Thus, until the island or system of breakwaters actually began to grow, the enemy would not penetrate the design. Thus, until the island or system of breakwaters actually began to grow, the enemy would not penetrate the design.A year's preparation would, however, be required.

For nearly a quarter of a century this paper had slumbered in the archives of the Committee of Imperial Defence. I did not print it in The World Crisis, The World Crisis, of which it was to have been a chapter, for reasons of s.p.a.ce, and because it was never put into effect. This was fortunate, because the ideas expressed were in this war more than ever vital; and the Germans certainly read my war books with attention. Indeed a staff study of the writings of anyone in my position would be a matter of normal routine. The underlying conceptions of this old paper were deeply imprinted in my mind, and in the new emergency formed the foundation of action which, after a long interval, found memorable expression in the vast fleet of tank-landing craft of 1943 and in the "Mulberry" harbours of 1944. of which it was to have been a chapter, for reasons of s.p.a.ce, and because it was never put into effect. This was fortunate, because the ideas expressed were in this war more than ever vital; and the Germans certainly read my war books with attention. Indeed a staff study of the writings of anyone in my position would be a matter of normal routine. The underlying conceptions of this old paper were deeply imprinted in my mind, and in the new emergency formed the foundation of action which, after a long interval, found memorable expression in the vast fleet of tank-landing craft of 1943 and in the "Mulberry" harbours of 1944.

On this same not unfertile 6th of June, 1940, flushed with the sense of deliverance and the power to plan ahead, I began a long series of Minutes in which the design and construction of tank-landing craft was ordered and steadily pressed.

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

6.VI.40.

Further to my Minute of yesterday [dated June 4] about offensive action: when the Australians arrive it is a question whether they should not be organised in detachments of 250, equipped with grenades, trench-mortars, tommy-guns, armoured vehicles and the like, capable of acting against an attack in this country, but also capable of landing on the friendly coasts now held by the enemy. We have got to get out of our minds the idea that the Channel ports and all the country between them are enemy territory. What arrangements are being made for good agents in Denmark, Holland, Belgium, and along the French coast? Enterprises must be prepared, with specially trained troops of the hunter cla.s.s, who can develop a reign of terror down these coasts, first of all on the "butcher and bolt" policy; but later on, or perhaps as soon as we are organised, we could surprise Calais or Boulogne, kill and capture the Hun garrison, and hold the place until all the preparations to reduce it by siege or heavy storm have been made, and then away. The pa.s.sive-resistance war, in which we have acquitted ourselves so well, must come to an end. I look to the Joint Chiefs of the Staff to propose me measures for a vigorous, enterprising, and ceaseless offensive against the whole German-occupied coastline. Tanks and A.F.V.s [Armoured Fighting Vehicles] must be made in flat-bottomed boats, out of which they can crawl ash.o.r.e, Tanks and A.F.V.s [Armoured Fighting Vehicles] must be made in flat-bottomed boats, out of which they can crawl ash.o.r.e, do a deep raid inland, cutting a vital communication, and then back, leaving a trail of German corpses behind them. It is probable that when the best troops go on to the attack of Paris, only the ordinary German troops of the line will be left. The lives of these must be made an intense torment. The following measures should be taken: do a deep raid inland, cutting a vital communication, and then back, leaving a trail of German corpses behind them. It is probable that when the best troops go on to the attack of Paris, only the ordinary German troops of the line will be left. The lives of these must be made an intense torment. The following measures should be taken:1. Proposals for organising the striking companies. Proposals for organising the striking companies.2. Proposals for transporting and landing tanks on the beach, Proposals for transporting and landing tanks on the beach, observing that we are supposed to have the command of the sea, while the enemy have not. observing that we are supposed to have the command of the sea, while the enemy have not.3. A proper system of espionage and intelligence along the whole coasts.4. Deployment of parachute troops on a scale equal to five thousand.5. Half a dozen of our fifteen-inch guns should be lined up [i.e., with inner tubes] immediately to fire fifty or sixty miles, and should be mounted either on railway mountings or on steel and concrete platforms, so as to break up the fire of the German guns that will certainly in less than four months be firing across the Channel.

Action in many directions followed accordingly. The "Striking Companies" emerged under the name of "Commandos," ten of which were now raised from the Regular Army and the Royal Marines. The nucleus of this organisation had begun to take shape in the Norwegian campaign. An account will be given in its proper place of the cross-Channel heavy guns. I regret, however, that I allowed the scale I had proposed for British parachute troops to be reduced from five thousand to five hundred.

I recurred at intervals to the building of landing craft, on which my mind constantly dwelt both as a peril to us and in the future a project against the enemy. Development of small a.s.sault craft had been started before the outbreak of war, and a few had been employed at Narvik. Most of these had been lost either there or at Dunkirk. Now we required not only the small craft which could be lifted in the troop-carrying s.h.i.+ps, but sea-going vessels capable themselves of transporting tanks and guns to the a.s.sault and landing them onto the beaches.

Prime Minister to Minister of Supply.

7.VII.40.

What is being done about designing and planning vessels to transport tanks across the sea for a British attack on enemy countries? This might well be remitted as a study to Mr. Hopkins, former Chief Constructor of the Navy, who must have leisure now that Cultivator No. 61 is out of fas.h.i.+on. These must be able to move six or seven hundred vehicles in one voyage and land them on the beach, or, alternatively, take them off the beaches, as well, of course, as landing them on quays if it be possible to combine the two. is out of fas.h.i.+on. These must be able to move six or seven hundred vehicles in one voyage and land them on the beach, or, alternatively, take them off the beaches, as well, of course, as landing them on quays if it be possible to combine the two.

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

5.VIII.40.

I asked the other day for a forecast of the development of the armoured divisions which will be required in 1941 namely, five by the end of March and one additional every month until a total of ten is reached at the end of August, 1941; and also for the composition of each division in armoured and ancillary vehicles of all kinds.Pray let me know how far the War Office plans have proceeded, and whether the number of tanks ordered corresponds with a programme of these dimensions.Let me further have a report on the progress of the means of transportation overseas, which should be adequate to the movement at one moment of two armoured divisions Who is doing this Admiralty or Ministry of Supply? I suggested that Mr. Hopkins might have some spare time available. Who is doing this Admiralty or Ministry of Supply? I suggested that Mr. Hopkins might have some spare time available.

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

9.VIII.40.

Get me a further report about the designs and types of vessels to transport armoured vehicles by sea and land on[to] beaches.

In July I created a separate Combined Operations Command under the Chiefs of Staff for the study and exercise of this form of warfare, and Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger Keyes became its chief. His close personal contact with me and with the Defence Office served to overcome any departmental difficulties arising from this unusual appointment.

Prime Minister to General Ismay and Sir Edward Bridges.

17.VII.40.

I have appointed Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger Keyes as Director of Combined Operations. He should take over the duties and resources now a.s.signed to General Bourne. General Bourne should be informed that, owing to the larger scope now to be given to these operations, it is essential to have an officer of higher rank in charge, and that the change in no way reflects upon him or those a.s.sociated with him. Evidently he will have to co-operate effectively. I formed a high opinion of this officer's work as Adjutant-General Royal Marines, and in any case the Royal Marines must play a leading part in this organisation.Pending any further arrangements, Sir Roger Keyes will form contact with the Service Departments through General Ismay as representing the Minister, of Defence.