Submarine Warfare of To-day - LightNovelsOnl.com
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When a mine-field was discovered which interfered with the free movement of a large number of s.h.i.+ps a big concentration of sweepers from all the adjacent bases was ordered by telegraph and wireless. The area was isolated by patrols and the mines swept up. In one field no less than 300-400 mines were known to have been laid. Finally a further exploratory sweep was made, and if nothing further was discovered the area was again opened to traffic, and the sweepers turned their attention either to routine duties or to the clearance of another field.
The entrance to every important harbour was swept once or twice a day, and all convoys had sweepers ahead of them when they left or entered such confined waters. The seas adjacent to harbours and naval bases were searched at low water for mines which might be showing above the surface. Around the anchorage of the Grand Fleet in Scapa Flow a wide belt of sea was kept clear of mines so that at any moment the fleet could reach blue water without risk from these weapons. The same precautions were taken off the Firth of Forth for the benefit of the battle cruisers, and outside Harwich for Admiral Tyrwhitt's light forces.
[Ill.u.s.tration: MODEL OF A COASTAL MOTOR BOAT (55 FT.) WITH TORPEDO AND FOUR DEPTH CHARGES
_Th.o.r.n.ycroft & Co., Ltd._]
A pa.s.sage known as the "war channel"--about which more will be said later--extending from the Downs to Newcastle, was swept daily by relays of sweepers operating from the anti-submarine bases along this 320 miles of coast-line. This buoyed and guarded channel formed a line of supply for the great fleets in the north.
Each big fighting formation was provided with a special flotilla of fast fleet sweepers, which were capable of clearing the seas ahead of the battles.h.i.+ps and cruisers moving at 20 knots. This was a separate organisation to what may be described as the routine sweeping of the trade routes. These vessels were always within call of the fleets they served.
It has been estimated that over 1000 square miles of sea were swept daily by the anti-mine fleets of the British navy during the four years of war. This may not sound a very stupendous figure compared with the area of the danger zone, but in practice it necessitated terribly hard work from dawn to dusk by several thousand s.h.i.+ps and many thousands of men in summer heat and winter snow.
There was in addition to all this the clearing of British mine-fields no longer required in the positions in which they had been originally laid.
This was not entirely an after-the-war problem, for although the great mine barriers were left until peace was a.s.sured, there were fields of minor importance which had to be cleared to meet new situations as the years of war pa.s.sed swiftly by. A notable instance of this was the destruction of a big field of some 400 mines off the Moray Firth.
The foregoing refers only to the minesweeping in the princ.i.p.al danger zones in British waters, no account being taken of the work carried out by Allied vessels in the Mediterranean, off the coasts of France, Italy, Greece, Gallipoli, and in such distant seas as those was.h.i.+ng the sh.o.r.es of New Zealand, Australia, Hong-Kong, j.a.pan, Singapore, Bombay, Aden, the Cape of Good Hope, the United States, Eastern Canada, West Africa and Arctic Russia, in all of which mines were laid by surface raiders like the _Wolfe_, and afterwards located and cleared by Allied wars.h.i.+ps.
From the foregoing some idea of the gigantic nature of the task will be obtained, and we can pa.s.s on to a more detailed account of the actual work. Minesweeping may be divided into eight well-defined sections, as follows:--
(1) _Fleet Sweeping._--Keeping clear the sea routes of the battle fleet.
(2) _Exploratory Sweeping._--Searching the sea for isolated groups or fields.
(3) _Routine Sweeping._--The daily or weekly sweeping of areas, channels and coastal trade routes, largely used by s.h.i.+pping.
(4) _Clearing Large Mine-fields._--Big concentrations of s.h.i.+ps to rapidly clear important routes temporarily blocked by large mine-fields.
(5) _Special Shallow-Water Sweeping._--Such as that carried out off the Belgian coast by specially constructed shallow-draught s.h.i.+ps, frequently with single-s.h.i.+p sweeps.
(6) _Convoy Sweeping._--Precautionary sweeping in front of incoming and outgoing convoys. This was regularly done even if the fair-way was covered by routine sweeping.
(7) _Harbour Sweeping._--Precautionary sweeping usually carried out by small craft at big naval bases such as Portsmouth (Spithead) and Rosyth (Firth of Forth) inside the submerged defences.
(8) _Searching at Low Tide._--This was done by shallow-draught vessels of the M.L. type in order to locate badly laid mines which might project above the surface at low water. Several hundred were discovered in this way.
In order to carry out these duties efficiently the heterogeneous fleet of minesweepers was divided into small fleets stationed at the numerous anti-submarine bases, and these were again subdivided into units of s.h.i.+ps especially adapted for the different cla.s.ses of work. Each _pair_ of vessels had to be more or less alike in size, draught, speed and manoeuvring ability to enable them to work efficiently in dual harness. Consequently there were complete units of vessels specially constructed for dealing rapidly with discovered mine-fields and for use with the battle fleets. Shallow-draught vessels of the motor launch type for work in the shallow water off the Belgian coast. Converted pleasure steamers of the usual Thames, Mersey and Clyde type for convoy sweeping.
Motor launches for clearing fair-ways and for searching at low water.
Flotillas of trawlers and drifters for the hard and monotonous routine sweeping on the important coastal trade routes. They comprised in all several thousand s.h.i.+ps engaged solely on this work.
At each important base there was a Port Minesweeping Officer (P.M.S.O.), with one or more a.s.sistants, whose duty it was to administer, under the command of the S.N.O., the fleets in the attached area, and to furnish preliminary telegraphic and detailed reports to the Minesweeping Staff at the Admiralty, who issued a confidential bi-monthly publication to all commanding officers which was a veritable encyclopaedia of valuable information regarding current operations, events and enemy tactics.
Attached to this department was a section of the Naval School of Submarine Mining, Portsmouth, where all knotty problems were unravelled and appliances devised to meet all kinds of emergencies.
Each unit of s.h.i.+ps was under the command of a senior officer, responsible for the operations of these vessels, and where big fleets were engaged a special minesweeping officer was placed in supreme command. Only by close co-ordination of effort from the staff at Whitehall and elsewhere to the units at sea could this gigantic work have been expeditiously accomplished. It frequently happened that any delay due to very severe weather in clearing a field or area meant complete stoppage or chaotic dislocation of the almost continuous stream of merchant s.h.i.+pping entering and leaving a big harbour, which, in turn, disorganised the adjacent harbours to which s.h.i.+ps had often to be diverted. It disturbed the railway facilities for the rapid transport of the food or raw materials from the coast to the manufacturing centres, from the sugar on the breakfast-table to the sh.e.l.ls for the batteries in France. One hour's delay in unloading a s.h.i.+p may mean three hours'
additional delay on the railways, the loss of a s.h.i.+ft at a munition works and a day's delay in a great offensive. It is a curious anomaly, made vividly apparent to those in administrative command during the past years of stress, that the more perfect the organisation the greater the delay in the event of a breakdown in the system.
There were various methods of minesweeping, but in all of them the object was to cut the mooring wire of any mine that came within the area of the sweep and so cause the mine itself to bob up to the surface, where it could be seen and destroyed by gun-fire. In order to encompa.s.s this many kinds of minesweeping gear were devised and given practical trial during the war. The one most generally used, however, was the original but vastly improved sweep. This consisted of a special wire extended between two s.h.i.+ps and held submerged by a device known as a kite. This apparatus is best described diagrammatically (Fig. 25).
There was, however, another type of sweep used for exploratory work and also for sweeping in shallow water. It was a one-s.h.i.+p sweep (_i.e._ required only one vessel to drag it), and this can also be best described by a diagram (Fig. 26).
[Ill.u.s.tration: FIG. 25.--Diagram showing the form of apparatus princ.i.p.ally used by British minesweepers. _AA._ Sweeping vessels. _BB._ Sweep-wire. _CC._ Wires holding kites. _DD._ Kites which hold sweep-wire at correct depth below the surface by their "kite-like" action when being towed through the water. _E._ Mine and mooring. _F._ Surface of the sea. _G._ Sea-bed.]
It will be observed that in all cases the object is to drag a submerged wire through the water at an angle from the s.h.i.+p's course until it encounters the mooring wire of a mine. When this takes place it is the purpose of the sweep-wire to cut the mooring wire and allow the buoyant mine to float up to the surface free of its sinker (see Fig. 27). In order to effect this various kinds of hard wire with a cutting capacity were used as sweep-wires, and also numerous mechanical devices, all of which are more or less of a secret character; but the object remained the same--to find and cut the mooring wire.
[Ill.u.s.tration: FIG. 26.--Diagrammatic sketch showing princ.i.p.al parts of a single-s.h.i.+p sweep. _A._ Towing vessel. _B._ Tail wire. _C._ Kite holding sweep-wires _D_ at correct depth below the surface. _D._ Light sweep-wires held at an angle by spars _E_ and surface hydroplane floats _F_. The dotted lines show how either arm of the sweep swing towards the centre line when exposed to the pull of a mine. This movement of the hydroplane floats indicates to those on board the sweeping vessel that a mine has been caught. The mine _H_ slides down the sweep-wire until the mooring is cut at _G_, and the mine floats freely to the surface.]
The introduction of what became known as "delayed action mines"--weapons held down on the sea-bed, after being launched, for varying periods of time, so that sweeping operations might take place above them without their being discovered; then, when the time for which the delay was set had expired, they rose to within ten feet of the surface and became a great danger to s.h.i.+pping in places recently swept and reported clear--caused a new form of sweep to be devised and used in waters where these mines were likely to be sown.
[Ill.u.s.tration: FIG. 27.--Diagram showing mine mooring being cut by sweep-wire. _A._ Mine-mooring wire. _B._ Hard and cutting face of sweep-wire. The dotted lines _C_ show how the mine floats to the surface by its own buoyancy when the mooring wire holding it down has been cut.]
This type of sweep was known as a "bottom sweep," and generally consisted of a chain fitted into the bight of a sweep-wire and dragged along the sea-bed, the idea being to overturn the delayed mine and so upset its mechanism that it would either rise immediately to the surface or else remain for ever harmless at the bottom of the sea. In many cases the heavy chain pa.s.sing over the horns of the mine would bend and make them useless, so destroying the efficiency of the mine even if it did eventually rise to the correct firing depth.
Into almost every operation carried out on or under the sea there enters the tide difficulty, and in all mining and minesweeping operations it is one of the most important factors to be considered. The effect of the tide on mine-laying has been dealt with in a previous chapter, and the same difficulties in reverse order are experienced when sweeping the sea for these invisible and dangerous weapons. It has already been shown that a vessel may sometimes pa.s.s safely over a mine at high water which would touch her sides or keel and explode if she pa.s.sed over it at low water when the mine was nearer to the surface. All minesweeping vessels, therefore, need to be of comparatively shallow draught in order to reduce the risk of touching mines, but against this is the fact that shallow-draught s.h.i.+ps, even if powerfully engined, have but little grip on the water and experience an undue loss of speed when towing a heavy sweep-wire. Such vessels can seldom operate in even moderately heavy weather owing to their rolling and pitching propensities. Therefore a vessel of medium--bordering on shallow--draught, with a fairly broad beam, is the best type. Here, again, is a difficulty. Minesweeping is a type of defensive warfare requiring a vast number of s.h.i.+ps successfully to carry on against an enemy well provided with surface and submarine mine-layers, and not even the greatest naval power in the world could seriously contemplate maintaining a peace fleet of, say, 2000 such vessels in constant readiness. Therefore recourse has to be made, when war comes, to mercantile craft, which seldom possess all the desired qualities.
This is what actually occurred in every maritime country at war during the years succeeding August, 1914, and in order to meet the danger attending the use of pa.s.senger s.h.i.+ps, trawlers and drifters, often with a considerable draught, minesweeping operations were, whenever possible, confined to the three hours before and the three hours after high water.
Shallow-draught M.L.'s carried out the scouting for mines at low tide.
It is difficult to see what would be the fate of a nation hemmed in by mines and devoid of a mercantile fleet sufficiently numerous to provide powerful sweeping units. The trawlers and pleasure steamers were a G.o.dsend to England in those years of intensive submarine warfare. This undeniable fact incidentally provides another example--if such is now needed--of naval power resting not entirely on fleets and dockyards, but on every branch and twig of maritime activity.
It is difficult to describe in small compa.s.s and non-technical language the various tactical formations employed in minesweeping operations.
They were many and various. The Germans used their vessels in long lines, the s.h.i.+ps being connected together by a light wire-sweep plentifully supplied with cutting devices, into which the mooring wire of the mine was expected to obligingly slip. This method suffered from the serious drawback that if any part of the sweep-wire caught on a submerged obstacle, such as a projection of rock, the whole line of s.h.i.+ps became disorganised. There were also many other objections to this system, some of which will doubtless be apparent to the thoughtful reader.
The formation usually adopted by British minesweepers was that shown in Fig. 28, in which it will be observed that each pair of s.h.i.+ps is actually independent of the others, but is acting in company with them, and that the pathway swept by one pair is slightly overlapped by the following pair. In the event of an accident to one s.h.i.+p the next astern can immediately let go its own end of sweep-wire and go to the rescue of any survivors. It may be apropos to say here that the smaller cla.s.s of minesweeper is usually blown to pieces if she touches a mine.
[Ill.u.s.tration: FIG. 28.--Plan showing the usual formation adopted by British minesweeping vessels. _A._ Three pairs of sweepers. _B._ Sweep-wires. _C._ A mine entering the sweep of the second pair. _D._ A vessel following the sweepers for the purpose of sinking by gun-fire the mines cut up.]
The set of the tide is another important factor which has to be taken into serious consideration when plotting a sweep. This complication enters into every operation, and its salient points will be made quite clear by referring to Fig. 29.
The actual speed at which minesweeping operations are carried out depends greatly upon the engine-power of the sweepers themselves. In the case of trawlers and drifters it is seldom possible to drag the 300-600 feet of heavy wire through the water at a greater rate than 4 to 6 knots. M.L.'s can accomplish 8 knots with a lighter wire, while big fleet sweepers with engines of several thousand horse-power can clear the seas at 18-23 knots.
[Ill.u.s.tration: FIG. 29.--Diagram ill.u.s.trating the effect of tide on minesweeping operations. _A._ The vessels sweeping along the coast-line _B._ A fast ebb-tide is coming down the estuary _C._ Unless an allowance was made for this tide and mark-buoys or s.h.i.+ps were placed along the dotted course _D_, the sweepers would unknowingly drift seawards along course _E_, leaving a s.p.a.ce _F_ unswept and possibly dangerous to s.h.i.+ps entering and leaving the estuary _C_.]
Sufficient has now been said to enable the reader to realise fully the arduous, exciting and often very hazardous nature of the work. Veteran sweepers listen for the loud hum of the wire which proclaims that a mine has been caught. Then comes an interval of a few seconds of suspense. Sometimes the mine bobs up within a few feet of the s.h.i.+p; at other times it is in the middle or bight of the wire, far astern, and half-way between the two sweeping vessels. When a mine is cut up a few shots from a 3-pounder, a shattering roar and the mine is destroyed. All that remains is a column of smoke reaching from sea to sky.
It frequently happened that the mine became entangled in the sweeping gear and was unknowingly hauled on board with the sweep. When this occurred the position was fraught with extreme peril. Any roll of the s.h.i.+p might cause an explosion which would shatter to fragments everything and everyone within range. Safety lay in lowering the sweep gently back into the sea--an extremely difficult operation on a rough day.
THE WAR CHANNEL
This carefully guarded fair-way consisted of a 320-mile stretch of sea, extending along the east coast of England from the Downs to Newcastle, which was marked on the seaward side by a continuous line of gigantic buoys, two miles apart. It was patrolled day and night by hundreds of small wars.h.i.+ps, and swept from end to end by relays of sweepers acting in conjunction with each other from the different anti-submarine bases along the coast.
The war channel formed a comparatively safe highway for all coastal s.h.i.+pping pa.s.sing north or south through the danger zone, and vessels from Holland, Denmark, Norway and Sweden were able to cross the North Sea at any point under escort and proceed independently and safely along the British coast to whichever port could most conveniently accommodate them at the time of their arrival. It also relieved the terrible congestion on the railway lines between the north and south of England by enabling a coast-wise traffic to be carried on between the ports of London, Grimsby, Hull and Newcastle, as well as enabling the numerous Iceland fis.h.i.+ng fleet to pa.s.s up and down the coast in comparative safety on their frequent voyages to and from the fis.h.i.+ng grounds of the far north. From the naval or strategic point of view it more or less secured a line of supply for the Grand Fleet a.s.sembled in the misty north. Colliers, oilers, ammunition and food s.h.i.+ps were able to proceed through the comparatively narrow section of the danger zone with a minimum of risk; and, had it been required, there was available a cleared pa.s.sage for any squadron from the big fighting formations to come south at high speed to checkmate a bombardment or attempted landing on anything like a grand scale.
It may perhaps be wondered why _this_ channel was not extended up the east coast of Scotland as far as Scapa Flow. In the first place, the North Sea widens considerably as the higher lat.i.tudes are approached, the coast of Scotland does not lend itself to a clearly defined channel and the heavy weather which prevails for so many months in the year made the maintenance of gigantic buoys and their moorings almost impossible. Secondly, there were various systems of mine defences in this area, and, although not defined by a chain of buoys, the pa.s.sage north from Newcastle to the Scottish islands was, in actual fact, maintained by a vast organisation of patrols and sweepers, but over this section of sea supply s.h.i.+ps for the Grand Fleet were nearly always under escort. The area from the Scotch to the German coast was looked upon more as a possible battle-ground for the fleets at war than as a route for merchant s.h.i.+pping, owing to the comparatively few big commercial harbours along the eastern sh.o.r.e.
Laying the moorings of over 150 gigantic buoys in fairly deep water, exceptionally p.r.o.ne to sudden and violent storms, was in itself a noteworthy feat of submarine engineering. The chains and anchors had to be of great strength, and the whole work, which occupied many weeks, was carried out in waters infested with submarines and mines.
The task of sweeping this vast stretch of sea almost continuously for four years was by no means either straightforward or without risk. The Germans, when they discovered the existence and purpose of this channel, sought to turn it to their own advantage by systematically laying mines around the moorings of the mark-buoys, where they could only be swept up with great difficulty, owing to the sweep-wires fouling the moorings of the buoys. This strategem had to be answered by the creation of "switch lines," or small sections of false channel marked by buoys, while the real channel was only outlined on secret charts. In this way the preservation of the war channel and its use for misleading and entrapping U and U-C boats became a semi-independent campaign, in the same way as that which surrounded the great mine barrages and other activities of the anti-submarine service.