A Theodicy, or, Vindication of the Divine Glory Part 6

Now, here the question arises, Is this doctrine consistent with the character of G.o.d? Is it not repugnant to his infinite holiness? We affirm that it is; Edwards declares that it is not. Let us see, then, if his position does not involve him in insuperable difficulties, and in irreconcilable contradictions.

Edwards supposes that some one may object: "All that these things amount to is, that _G.o.d may do evil that good may come_; which is justly esteemed immoral and sinful in men, and therefore may be justly esteemed inconsistent with the perfections of G.o.d." This is a fair and honest statement of the objection; now let us hear the reply. "I answer," says Edwards, "that for G.o.d to dispose and permit evil in the manner that has been spoken of, is not to do evil that good may come; for it is not to do evil at all." It is not to do evil at all, says he, for the Supreme Ruler of the world to arrange events around one of his creatures in such a manner that they will certainly and infallibly induce him to commit sin.

Why is not this to do evil? At first view, it certainly looks very much like doing evil; and it is not at once distinguishable from the temptations ascribed to Satanic agency. Why is it not to do evil, then, when it is done by the Almighty? It is not to do evil, says Edwards, because when G.o.d brings sin certainly and infallibly to pa.s.s, he does so "for wise and holy purposes." This is his answer: "In order to a thing's being morally evil, there must be one of these two things belonging to it: either it must be a thing _unfit_ and _unsuitable_ in its own nature, or it must have a _bad tendency_, or it must be done for an evil end. But neither of these things can be attributed to G.o.d's ordering and permitting such events as the immoral acts of creatures for good ends."(76) Let us examine this logic.

We are gravely told, that G.o.d designedly brings the sinful acts of men to pa.s.s by the use of most certain and infallible means; but this is not to do evil, _because he has a good end in view_. His intention is right; he brings sin to pa.s.s for "wise and holy purposes." Let us come a little closer to this doctrine, and see what it is. It will not be denied, that if any being should bring sin to pa.s.s without any end at all, except to secure its existence, this would be a sinful agency. If any being should, knowingly and designedly, bring sin to pa.s.s in another, without any "wise and holy purposes," all mankind will agree in p.r.o.nouncing the deed to be morally wrong. But precisely the same deed is not wrong in G.o.d, says Edwards, because in his case it proceeds from "a wise and holy purpose,"

and he has "a good end in view." That is to say, the means, in themselves considered, are morally wrong; but being employed for a wise and holy purpose, for the attainment of a good end, they are sanctified! This is precisely the doctrine, that the end sanctifies the means. Is it not wonderful, that any system should be so dark and despotic in its power as to induce the mind of an Edwards, ordinarily so amazing for its acuteness and so exalted in its piety, to vindicate the character of G.o.d upon such grounds?

The defence of Edwards is neither more nor less than a play on the term _evil_. When it is said, that "we may do evil that good may come;" the meaning of the maxim is, that the means in such a case and under such circ.u.mstances ceases to be evil. The maxim teaches that "we may do evil,"

that it is lawful to do evil, with a view to the grand and glorious end to be attained by it. Or, in other words, that it is right to do what would otherwise be morally evil, in order to accomplish a good end. If Edwards had considered the other form of the same odious maxim, namely, that "the end sanctifies the means," he would have found it impossible to evade the force of its application to his doctrine. He could not have escaped from the difficulty of his position by a play upon the word _evil_. He would have seen that he had undertaken to justify the conduct of the Father of Lights, by supposing it to be governed by the most corrupt maxim of the most corrupt system of casuistry the world has ever seen.

What G.o.d does, says Edwards, is not evil at all; because his purpose is holy, because his object is good, his intention is right. In like manner, the maxim says, that when the end is good and holy, "it sanctifies the means." The means may be impure in themselves considered, but they are rendered pure by the cause in which they are employed. This doctrine has been immortalized by Pascal, in his "Provincial Letters;" and we cannot better dismiss the subject than with an extract from the "Provincial Letters." "I showed you," says the jesuitical father, "how servants might, with a safe conscience, manage certain troublesome messages; did you not observe that it is simply taking off their intention from the _sin itself_, and fixing it on the advantage to be gained."(77) On this principle, stealing, and lying, and murder, may all be vindicated.

"Caramuel, our ill.u.s.trious defender," says the Jesuit, "in his Fundamental Theology," ... enters into the examination of many new questions resulting from this principle, (of directing the intention,) as, for example, whether the Jesuits may kill the Jansenists? "Alas, father!" exclaimed Pascal, "this is a most surprising point in theology! I hold the Jansenists already no better than dead men by the doctrine of Father Launy." "Aha, sir, you are caught; for Caramuel deduces the very opposite conclusion from the same principles." "How so?" said Pascal. "Observe his words, n. 1146 and 1147, p. 547 and 548. The Jansenists call the Jesuits Pelagians; may they be _killed_ for so doing? No-for this plain reason, that the Jansenists are no more able to obscure the glory of our society, than an owl can hide the sun; in fact, they promote it, though certainly against their intention-_occidi non possunt, quia nocere non potuerunt_."

"Alas, father," says Pascal, "and does the existence of the Jansenists depend solely upon their capacity of injuring your reputation? If that be the case, I am afraid they are not in a very good predicament; for if the slightest probability should arise of their doing you any hurt, they may be despatched at once. You can perform the deed logically and in form; for it is only to _direct your intention_ right, and you insure a quiet conscience. What a blessedness for those who can endure injuries to know this charming doctrine! But, on the other hand, how miserable is the condition of the offending party! Really, father, it would be better to have to do with people totally devoid of all religion, than with those who have received instructions so far only as to this point, relative to directing the intention. I am afraid the _intention_ of the murderer is no consolation to the wounded person. He can have no perception of this secret _direction_-poor man! he is conscious only of the _blow_ he receives; and I am not certain whether he would not be less indignant to be cruelly ma.s.sacred by people in a violent transport of rage, than to be devoutly killed for conscience' sake." Now, we submit it to the candid reader, whether the reasoning here ascribed to the Jesuit by Pascal, is not exactly parallel with that on which Edwards justifies the procedure of the Almighty? If G.o.d may choose sin and bring it to pa.s.s, without contracting the least impurity, because his _intention is directed aright_, to a wise and good end, may we not be permitted to imitate his example? And again, if G.o.d thus employs the creature as an instrument to accomplish his wise and holy purposes, why should he pour out the vials of his wrath upon him for having yielded to the dispensations of his almighty power? In order to save his doctrine from reproach, Edwards has invented a distinction, which next demands our attention. "There is no inconsistence," says he, "in supposing that G.o.d may hate a thing as it is in itself, and considered simply as evil, and yet that it may be his will it should come to pa.s.s, considering all consequences. I believe there is no person of good understanding who will venture to say, he is certain that it is impossible it should be best, taking in the whole compa.s.s and extent of existence, and all consequences in the endless series of events, that there should be such a thing as moral evil in the world. And if so, it will certainly follow, that an infinitely wise Being, who always chooses what is best, must choose that there should be such a thing. And if so, then such a choice is not evil, but a wise and holy choice. And if so, then that Providence which is agreeable to such a choice, is a wise and holy Providence. Men do _will_ sin as sin, and so are the authors and actors of it; they love it as sin, and for evil ends and purposes. G.o.d does not will sin as sin, or for the sake of anything evil; though it be his pleasure so to order things that, he permitting, sin will come to pa.s.s, for the sake of the great good that by his disposal shall be the consequence. His willing to order things so that evil should come to pa.s.s for the sake of the contrary good, is no argument that he does not hate evil as evil; and if so, then it is no reason why he may not reasonably forbid evil as evil, and punish it as such."(78) Here we are plainly told, that although G.o.d hates sin as sin, yet, all things considered, he prefers that it should come to pa.s.s, and even helps it into existence. But man loves and commits evil _as such_, and is therefore justly punishable for it.

There are several serious objections to this extraordinary distinction. It is not true that men love and commit sin _as sin_. Sin is committed, not for its own sake, but for the pleasure which attends it. If sin did not gratify the appet.i.tes, or the pa.s.sions, or the desires of men, it would not be committed at all; there would be no temptation to it, and it would be seen as it is in its own loathsome nature. Indeed, to speak with philosophical accuracy, sin is never a direct object of our affections or choice; we simply desire certain things, as Adam did the forbidden fruit, and we seek our gratification in them contrary to the will of G.o.d. This const.i.tutes our sin. The direct object of our choice is, not disobedience, not sin, but the forbidden thing, the prohibited gratification. We do not love and choose the disobedience, but the thing which leads us to disobey.

This is so very plain and simple a matter, that we cannot but wonder that honest men should have lost sight of it in a mist of words, and built up their theories in the dark.

Secondly, the above position, into which Edwards has been forced by the exigencies of his doctrine concerning evil, is directly at war with the great fundamental principle on which his whole system rests, namely, that the will is always determined by the greatest apparent good. For how is it possible that men should commit sin _as sin_, and for its own sake, if they never do anything except what is the most agreeable to them? How is it possible that they pursue moral evil merely _as moral evil_, and yet pursue it as the greatest apparent good? If it should be said that men love sin merely _as sin_, and therefore it pleases them to choose it for its own sake, this reply would be without foundation. For, as we have already seen, there is no such principle in human nature as the love of sin _as such_, or for its own sake; and consequently sin can never delight or please the human mind as it is in itself. And, besides, it is self-contradictory; for the question is, How can a man commit sin _for its own sake on account of the pleasure it affords him_? It would be an attempt to explain an hypothesis which denies the very fact to be explained by it.

In the third place, if the philosophy of Edwards be true, no good reason can be a.s.signed why men should restrain themselves from the commission of sin: for, all things considered, G.o.d prefers the sin which actually exists, and infallibly brings it to pa.s.s. He _prefers_ it on account of the great good he intends to educe from it. Why then should we not also prefer its existence? G.o.d is sovereign; he will permit no more sin than he can and will render subservient to the highest good of the universe; and so much as is for the highest good he will bring into existence. Why, then, should we give ourselves any concern about the matter? Why should we fear that there may be too much sin in the world, or why should we blame other men for their crimes and offences?

The inference which we have just mentioned as necessarily flowing from the doctrine of Edwards, has actually been drawn by some of the most ill.u.s.trious advocates of that doctrine. Thus says Hartley, as we have already seen, "since all men do against us is by the appointment of G.o.d, it is rebellion against him to be offended with them." This is so clearly the logical inference from the doctrine in question, that it is truly wonderful how any one can possibly fail to perceive it.

We are told by Leibnitz and Edwards, that we should not presume to act on the principle of permitting sin in others, or of bringing it to pa.s.s, on account of the good that we may educe from it; because such an affair is too high for us. But, surely, we need have no weak fears on this ground; for although it may be too high for us, they do not pretend that it is too high for G.o.d. He will allow no more sin to make its appearance in the world, say they, than he will cause to redound to the good of the universe. He prefers it for that reason, and why should we not respond, amen! to his preference? Why should we give ourselves any concern about sin? May we not follow our own inclinations, leaving sin to take its course, and rest quietly in Providence? To this question it will be replied, as Calvin and Edwards repeatedly reply, that the revealed, and not the secret, will of G.o.d is the rule of our duty. We do not object to this doctrine; we acknowledge its perfect propriety and correctness: but it is no reply to the consequence we have deduced from the philosophy of Edwards. It only shows that his philosophy leads to a conclusion which is in direct opposition to revelation. So far from objecting that any should turn from the philosophy of Edwards to revelation, in order to find reasons why evil should not be committed by us, we sincerely regret that such a departure from a false philosophy, and return to a true religion, is not more permanent and universal.

The doctrine of Edwards on this subject destroys the harmony of the divine attributes. It represents G.o.d as having two wills; or, to speak more correctly, it represents him as having published a holy law for the government of his creatures, which he does not, in all cases, wish them to obey. On the contrary, he prefers that some of them should violate his holy law; and not only so, but he adopts certain and infallible means to lead them to violate and trample it under foot. It is admitted by Edwards, that in this sense G.o.d really possesses two wills; but he still denies that this shows any inconsistency in the nature of G.o.d.

Edwards says, that the will of G.o.d does not oppose sin in the same sense in which it prefers sin, and that, therefore, there is no inconsistency in the case. But let us not deceive ourselves by words. Is it true, that sin is opposed by what is called the revealed will of G.o.d, by his command; and yet that it is, all things considered, chosen by his secret and working will? He commands one thing, and yet works to bring another to pa.s.s! He prohibits all sin, under the awful penalty of eternal death, and yet secretly arranges and plans things in such a manner as to secure the commission of it!

We have already seen one of these defences. G.o.d "hates sin as it is in itself;" and hence he prohibits it by his command. "Yet it may be his will it should come to pa.s.s, considering all its consequences;" and hence his secret will is bent on bringing it into existence. There is no inconsistency here, says Edwards, because the divine will relates to two different objects; namely, to "sin considered simply as sin," and to "sin considered in all its consequences." We do not care whether the two propositions contradict each other or not; it is abundantly evident, as we have seen, that it makes G.o.d choose that which he hates, even sin itself, as the means of good. It makes the end sanctify the means, even in the eye of the holy G.o.d. This doctrine we utterly reject and infinitely abhor. We had rather have "our sight, hearing, and motive power, and what not besides, disputed, and even torn away from us, than suffer ourselves to be disputed into a belief," that the holy G.o.d can choose moral evil as a means of good. We had rather believe all the fables in the Talmud and the Koran, than that the ever-blessed G.o.d should, by his providence and his power, plunge his feeble creatures into sin, and then punish them with everlasting torments for their transgression. We know of nothing in the Pantheism of Spinoza, or in the atheism of Hobbes, more revolting than this hideous dogma.

The great metaphysician of New-England has made a still further attempt to vindicate the dogma in question. "The Arminians," says he, "ridicule the distinction between the secret and revealed will of G.o.d, or, more properly expressed, the distinction between the decree and law of G.o.d; because we say he may decree one thing and command another. And so, they argue, we hold a contrariety in G.o.d, as if one will of his contradicted another.

However, if they will call this a contradiction of wills, we know that there is such a thing; so that it is the greatest absurdity to dispute about it. We and they know it was G.o.d's secret will, that Abraham should not sacrifice his son Isaac; but yet his command was, that he should do it."(79) Such is the instance produced by this acute divine, to show that the secret will of G.o.d may prefer the very thing which is condemned by his revealed will or law; and on the strength of it, he is bold to say, "We _know_ it, so that _it is the greatest absurdity to dispute about it_."

We have often seen this pa.s.sage of Scripture produced by infidels, to show that the Old Testament contains unworthy representations of G.o.d. If Edwards had undertaken to refute the infidel ground in relation to this pa.s.sage, he might have done so with very great ease: but then he would at the same time have refuted himself. The Scriptural account of G.o.d's commanding Abraham to offer up his son Isaac, was long ago employed by the famous infidel Hobbes to show that there are two wills in G.o.d. This argument of Hobbes has been refuted by Leibnitz. "Hobbes contends," says Leibnitz, "that G.o.d wills not always what he commands, as when he commands Abraham to sacrifice his son;" and he replies, that "G.o.d, in commanding Abraham to sacrifice his son, _willed the obedience, and not the action_, which he prevented after having the obedience; for that was not an action which merited in itself to be willed: but such is not the case with those actions which he positively wills, and which are indeed worthy of being the objects of his will; such as piety, charity, and every virtuous action which G.o.d commands, and such as the avoidance of sin, more repugnant to the divine perfections than any other thing. It is incomparably better, therefore, to explain the will of G.o.d, as we have done it in this work."(80) It is evident that Leibnitz did not relish the idea of two wills in G.o.d; and perhaps few pious minds would do so, if it were presented to them by an atheist. But there was too close an affinity between the philosophy of Leibnitz and that of Hobbes, to permit the former to furnish the most satisfactory refutation of the argument of the latter.

This command to Abraham does not show that there ever was any such contrariety between the revealed and the decretal wills of G.o.d, as is contended for by Hobbes and Edwards. G.o.d intended, as we are told, to prove the faith of Abraham, in order that it might s.h.i.+ne forth and become a bright example to all succeeding ages. For this purpose he commanded him to take his only son, whom he loved, and go into the land of Moriah, and there offer him up as a burnt-offering upon one of the mountains. Abraham obeyed without a murmur. After several days travelling and preparation, Abraham has reached the appointed place, and is ready for the sacrifice.

His son Isaac is bound, and laid upon the altar; the father stretches forth his hand to take the knife and slay him. But a voice is heard, saying, "Lay not thine hand on the lad; neither do thou anything unto him." Now, the conduct of Abraham on this memorable occasion, is one of the most remarkable exhibitions of confidence in the wisdom and goodness of G.o.d, which the history of the world has furnished. It deserves to be held up to the admiration of mankind, and to be celebrated in all ages of the world. We sincerely pity the man, who is so taken up with superficial appearances, or who is so dest.i.tute of sympathy with the moral greatness and beauty of soul manifested in this simple narrative, that he can approach it in a little, captious, sneering spirit, rather than in an att.i.tude of profound admiration. But our business, at present, is not so much with the laughing sceptic as with the grave divine.

What evidence, then, does this story furnish that the secret will of G.o.d had anything to do with the simple but sublime transaction which it records? G.o.d commanded Abraham to repair to the land of Moriah with his son Isaac; but are we informed that his secret will was opposed to the patriarch's going thither, or that it opposed any obstacle to his obedience? Are we told that G.o.d so arranged the events of his providence as to render the disobedience of Abraham, in any one particular, certain and infallible? We cannot find the shadow of any such information in the sacred story. And is there the least intimation, that when Abraham was commanded to stay the uplifted knife, the secret will of G.o.d was in favour of its being plunged into the bosom of his son? Clearly there is not.

Where, then, is the discrepancy between the revealed and the secret wills of G.o.d in this case, which we are required to see? Where is this discrepancy so plainly manifested, that we absolutely _know_ its existence, so that it is the height of absurdity to dispute against it?

If there is any contrariety at all in this case, it is between the _revealed will_ of G.o.d in commanding Abraham to offer up his son, and his subsequently _revealed will_ to desist from the sacrifice. It does not present even a seeming inconsistency between his secret will and his command, but between two portions of his revealed will. This seeming inconsistency between the command of G.o.d and his countermand, in relation to the same external action, has been fully removed by Leibnitz; and if it had not been, it is just as inc.u.mbent on the abettors of Edwards's scheme to explain it, as it is upon his opponents. If G.o.d had commanded Abraham to do a thing, and yet exerted his secret will to make him violate the injunction, this would have been a case in point: but there is no such case to be found in the word of G.o.d.

It may not be improper, in this connexion, to quote the following judicious admonition of Howe: "Take heed," says he, "that we do not oppose the secret and revealed will of G.o.d to one another, or allow ourselves so much as to imagine an opposition or contrariety between them. And that ground being once firmly laid and stuck to, as it is impossible that there can be a will against a will in G.o.d, or that he can be divided from himself, or against himself, or that he should reveal anything to us as his will that is not his will, (it being a thing inconsistent with his nature, and impossible to him to lie,) that being, I say, firmly laid, (as nothing can be firmer or surer than that,) then measure all your conceptions of the secret will of G.o.d by his revealed will, about which you may be sure. But never measure your conceptions of his revealed by his secret will; that is, by what you may imagine concerning that. For you can but imagine while it is secret, and so far as it is unrevealed."(81)

"It properly belongs," says Edwards, "to the supreme absolute Governor of the universe, to order all important events within his dominions by wisdom; but the events in the moral world are of the most important kind, such as the moral actions of intelligent creatures, and the consequences.

These events will be ordered by something. They will either be disposed by wisdom, or they will be disposed by chance; that is, they will be disposed by blind and undesigning causes, if that were possible, and could be called a disposal. Is it not better that the good and evil which happen in G.o.d's world should be ordered, regulated, bounded, and determined by the good pleasure of an infinitely wise being, than to leave these things to fall out by chance, and to be determined by those causes which have no understanding and aim?... It is in its own nature fit, that wisdom, and not chance, should order these things."(82)

In our opinion, if there be no other alternative, it is better that sin should be left to chance, than ascribed to the high and holy One. But why must sin be ordered and determined by the supreme Ruler of the world, or else be left to chance? Has the great metaphysician forgotten, that there may be such things as men and angels in the universe; or does he mean, with Spinoza, to blot out all created agents, and all subordinate agency, from existence? If not, then certainly G.o.d may refuse to be the author of sin, without leaving it to blind chance, which is incapable of such a thing. He may leave it, as we conceive he has done, to the determination of finite created intelligences. If sin is to come into the world, as come it evidently does, it is infinitely better, we say, that it should be left to proceed from the creature, and not be made to emanate from G.o.d himself, the fountain of light, and the great object of all adoration. It is infinitely better that the high and holy One should do nothing either by his wisdom or by his decree, by his providence or his power, to help this hideous thing to raise its head amid the inconceivable splendours of his dominion.

Such speculations as those of Edwards and Leibnitz, in our opinion, only reflect dishonour and disgrace upon the cause they are intended to subserve. It is better, ten thousand times better, simply to plant ourselves upon the moral nature of man, and the irreversible dictates of common sense, and annihilate the speculations of the atheist, than to endeavour to parry them off by such invented quibbles and sophisms. They give point, and pungency, and power to the shafts of the sceptic. If we meet him on the common ground of necessity, he will snap all such quibbles like threads of tow, and overwhelm us with the floods of irony and scorn.

For, in the memorable words of Sir William Hamilton, "It can easily be proved by those who are able and not afraid to reason, that the doctrine of necessity is subversive of religion, natural and revealed." To perceive this, it requires neither a Bayle, nor a Hobbes, nor a Hume; it only requires a man who is neither unable nor afraid to reason.

Section IV.

The attempts of Dr. Emmons and Dr. Chalmers to reconcile the scheme of necessity with the purity of G.o.d.

As we have dwelt so long on the speculations of President Edwards concerning the objections in question, we need add but a few remarks in relation to the views of the above-mentioned authors on the same subject.

The sentiments of Dr. Emmons on the relation between the divine agency and the sinful actions of men, are even more clearly defined and boldly expressed than those of President Edwards. The disciple is more open and decided than the master. "Since mind cannot act," says he, "any more than matter can move, without a divine agency, it is absurd to suppose that men can be left to the freedom of their own will, to act, or not to act, independently of a divine influence. There must be, therefore, the exercise of a divine agency in every human action, without which it is impossible to conceive that G.o.d should govern moral agents, and make mankind act in perfect conformity to his designs."(83) "He is now exercising his powerful and irresistible agency upon the heart of every one of the human race, and producing either holy or unholy exercises in it."(84) "It is often thought and said, that nothing more was necessary on G.o.d's part, in order to fit Pharaoh for destruction, than barely to leave him to himself. But G.o.d knew that no external means and motives would be sufficient of themselves to form his moral character. He determined therefore to operate on his heart itself, and cause him to put forth certain evil exercises in view of certain external motives. When Moses called upon him to let the people go, G.o.d stood by him, and moved him to refuse. When the people departed from his kingdom, G.o.d stood by him and moved him to pursue after them with increased malice and revenge. And what G.o.d did on such particular occasions, he did at all times."(85) It is useless to multiply extracts to the same effect. Could language be more explicit, or more revolting to the moral sentiments of mankind?

If G.o.d is alike the author of all our volitions, sinful as well as holy, one wonders by what sort of legerdemain the authors of the doctrine have contrived to ascribe all the glory and all the praise of our holy actions to G.o.d, and at the same time all the shame and condemnation of our evil actions to ourselves. In relation to the holy actions of men, all the praise is due to G.o.d, say they, because they were produced by his power.

Why is not the moral turpitude of their evil actions, then, also ascribed to G.o.d, inasmuch as he is said to produce them by his irresistible and almighty agency? We are accountable for our evil acts, say Dr. Emmons and Calvin, because they are _voluntary_. Are not our moral acts, our virtuous acts, also voluntary? Certainly they are; this is not denied; and yet we are not allowed to impute the moral quality of the acts to the agent in such cases. This whole school of metaphysicians, indeed, from Calvin down to Emmons, can make G.o.d the author of our evil acts, by an exertion of his omnipotence, and yet a.s.sert that because they are voluntary we are justly blameworthy and punishable for them; but though our virtuous acts are also voluntary, they still insist the praiseworthiness of them is to be ascribed exclusively to Him by whom they were produced. The plain truth is, that as the scheme originated in a particular set purpose and design, so it is one-sided in its views, arbitrary in its distinctions, and full of self-contradictions.

The simple fact seems to be, that if any effect be produced in our minds by the power of G.o.d, it is a pa.s.sive impression, and is very absurdly called a voluntary state of the will. And even if such an impression could be a voluntary state, or a volition, properly so called, we should not be responsible for it, because it is produced by the omnipotence of G.o.d.

This, we doubt not, is in perfect accordance with the universal consciousness and voice of mankind, and cannot be resisted by the sophistical evasions of particular men, how great soever may be their genius, or exalted their piety.

We shall, in conclusion, add one more great name to the list of those who, from their zeal for the glory of the divine omnipotence, have really and clearly made G.o.d the author of sin. The denial of his scheme of "a rigid and absolute predestination," as he calls it, Dr. Chalmers deems equivalent to the a.s.sertion, that "things grow up from the dark womb of non-ent.i.ty, which omnipotence did not summon into being, and which omniscience could not foretell." And again, "At this rate, events would come forth uncaused from the womb of non-ent.i.ty, to which omnipotence did not give birth, and which omniscience could not foresee."(86) Now all this is spoken, be it remembered, in relation to the volitions or acts of men.

But if there are no such events, except such as omnipotence gives birth to, or summons into being, how clear and how irresistible is the conclusion that G.o.d is the author of the sinful acts of the creature? It were better, we say, ten thousand times better, that sin, _that_ monstrous birth of night and darkness, should grow up out of the womb of nonent.i.ty, if such were the only alternative, than that it should proceed from the bosom of G.o.d.

Chapter III.

Scheme Of Necessity Denies The Reality Of Moral Distinctions.

Our voluntary service He requires, Not our necessitated; such with him Finds no acceptance, nor can find; for how Can hearts, not free, be tried whether they serve Willing or no, who will but what they must By destiny, and can no other choose?-MILTON.

In the preceding chapters we have taken it for granted that there is such a thing as moral good and evil, and endeavoured to show, that if the scheme of necessity be true, man is absolved from guilt, and G.o.d is the author of sin. But, in point of fact, if the scheme of necessity be true, there is no such thing as moral good or evil in this lower world; all distinction between virtue and vice, moral good and evil, is a mere dream, and we really live in a non-moral world. This has been shown by many of the advocates of necessity.

Section I.

The views of Spinoza in relation to the reality of moral distinctions.

It is shown by Spinoza, that all moral distinctions vanish before the iron scheme of necessity. They are swept away as the dreams of vulgar prejudice by the force of Spinoza's logic; yet little praise is due, we think, on that account, to the superiority of his ac.u.men. The wonder is, not that Spinoza should have drawn such an inference, but that any one should fail to draw it. For if our volitions are necessitated by causes over which we have no control, it seems to follow, as clear as noonday, that they cannot be the objects of praise or blame-cannot be our virtue or vice. So far is it indeed from requiring any logical acuteness to perceive such an inference, that it demands, as we shall see, the very greatest ingenuity to keep from perceiving it. Hence, in our humble opinion, the praise which has been lavished on the logic of Spinoza is not deserved.