Khartoum Campaign, 1898 Part 9

"Certain questions will naturally arise as to whom exactly we should educate, and as to the nature of the education to be given.

Our system would need to be gradually built up. We should begin by teaching the sons of the leading men, the heads of villages, and the heads of districts. They belong to a race very capable of learning and ready to learn. The teaching, in its early stages, would be devoted to purely elementary subjects, such as reading, writing, geography, and the English language. Later, and after these preliminary stages had been pa.s.sed, a more advanced course would be inst.i.tuted, including a training in technical subjects specially adapted to the requirements of those who inhabit the Valley of the Upper Nile. The princ.i.p.al teachers in the college would be British and the supervision of the arrangements would be vested in the Governor-General of the Soudan. I need not add that there would be no interference with the religion of the people.

"The fund required for the establishment of such a college is 100,000. Of this, 10,000 would be appropriated to the initial outlay, while the remaining 90,000 would be invested, and the revenue thence derived would go to the maintenance of the college and the support of the staff of teachers. It would be clearly impossible at first to require payment from the pupils, but as the college developed and the standard of its teaching rose, it would be fair to demand fees in respect of this higher education, which would thus support itself, and render the college independent of any further call upon the public. It is for the provision of this sum of 100,000 that I now desire to appeal, on behalf of a race dependent upon our mercy, in the name of Gordon, and in the cause of that civilisation which is the life of the Empire of Britain.

"I am authorised to state that Her Majesty the Queen has been graciously pleased to become the patron of the movement. His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales has graciously consented to become vice-patron.

"I may state that a general council of the leading men of the country is in course of formation. Lord Hillingdon has kindly consented to accept the post of hon. treasurer. The Hon. George Peel has accepted to act as hon. secretary, and all communications should be addressed to him at 67, Lombard Street, London, E.C.

Subscriptions should be paid to the Sirdar's Fund for the 'Gordon Memorial College' at Khartoum, Messrs Glyn, Mills, Currie, & Co., 67, Lombard Street, London, E.C.

"Enclosed herewith is a letter from the Marquis of Salisbury, in which he states that this scheme represents the only policy by which the civilising mission of this country can effectively be accomplished. His lords.h.i.+p adds that it is only to the rich men of this country that it is possible for me to look, yet I should be glad for this appeal to find its way to all cla.s.ses of our people.

"I further enclose a letter from the Baroness Burdett-Coutts, whose devotion to the cause of Africa has been not the least of her magnificent services. I forward, besides, an important telegram from the Lord Mayor of Liverpool, and letters of great weight from the Lord Provost of Edinburgh, and the Lord Provost of Glasgow. I would venture to address myself to the other great munic.i.p.alities of the Kingdom.

"Above all, it is in the hands of the Press of this country that I place this cause. I look with confidence to your support in the discharge of this high obligation.--I have the honour to remain, yours faithfully,

"(Signed) KITCHENER OF KHARTOUM."

Lords Salisbury and Rosebery, and many more distinguished personages, followed the example of the Sovereign and the Prince of Wales and became supporters of the proposed inst.i.tution. In the Metropolis as well as in all the chief towns of the Kingdom the matter was taken up enthusiastically. An influential committee was formed. The subscriptions were showered in from home and abroad, wherever the English tongue was spoken and Gordon had been known. In less than a month the 100,000, and considerably more, were subscribed, and the establishment of the Memorial College a.s.sured.

Lieut.-Colonel C. S. B. Parsons, R.A., Governor of Ka.s.sala and the Red Sea littoral, to whom I have previously referred when we were advancing against Omdurman, was menacing the dervish outpost of Gedarif. Later on, when Ahmed Fadl was marching to reinforce his master the Khalifa, Colonel Parsons was leading his Egyptians, Abyssinian irregulars, and friendlies from Ka.s.sala up the head waters or khor of the Atbara, far to the southward, and thence to a tributary of the Blue Nile where the enemy had long had a garrison. The fifteen years' campaign against Mahdism was nigh over, but not quite concluded, with the victory of Omdurman. On receiving the check from the gunboats, Fadl and his dervishes retreated up the Blue Nile to where they had come from, their own country upon the borders of Abyssinia. News seems to have reached them of Colonel Parsons'

advance, and it became a race for Gedarif. The Egyptians had a good start, and managed to reach and capture the place and occupy the two forts, one on either side of the river, or, what it is more frequently, the khor, before the dervishes got back. Fadl was a man of mettle and resolutely a.s.saulted the town and forts of which he had so long been governor. A desperate action ensued, but Fadl was beaten off with a loss of 700, it is said, in killed and wounded. The casualties in Colonel Parsons' force were about 100. But the dervishes, though severely beaten, soon returned to attack the forts.

With increased numbers they sat down before the place and began to hara.s.s sorely the Egyptian troops, cutting their communications with Ka.s.sala, whence by wire to Ma.s.sowah over the Italian lines and up the Red Sea to Egypt the Sirdar was able to keep in touch with Colonel Parsons. They endeavoured again, on several occasions, to storm one or other of the forts, which were about half a mile apart, but happily they were invariably repulsed. Still they persisted in their tactics of worrying, evidently determined to recapture the place. At last matters grew so serious that Major-General Rundle was sent with a brigade of infantry and several batteries to deal with Ahmed Fadl's dervishes. Advancing up the Blue Nile in gunboats, the Egyptian force cleared the banks of all the many wandering armed bands of the enemy.

Through the aid of the wily Abyssinian scouts, information was sent to and received from Colonel Parsons and a plan arranged for catching Fadl and his men between two attacking columns. Seventeen hundred men of the Omdurman force attacked the dervishes on one side, whilst Colonel Parsons' garrison a.s.sailed them from the other. The enemy were completely routed and scattered in all directions. Hundreds of dervishes were slain, and ultimately many who escaped were so closely pressed by friendlies and Abyssinians that they surrendered. A thousand fugitive Baggara or so vainly tried to make their way up the Blue Nile, in order to retire to their former country in Kordofan.

They were caught crossing far up stream, near Rosaires, by Colonel Lewis, vigorously attacked, defeated, and finally scattered. Thus the last dervish army in the field was destroyed, and the country reclaimed to the side of peace, order, and civilised government.

The following are the official despatches of Lieutenant-General Sir Francis Grenfell, who commanded the British troops in Egypt, and of the Sirdar, relating to the battle of Omdurman:--

THE OFFICIAL DESPATCHES.

Headquarters, Cairo, _September 16, 1898_.

SIR,--1. I have the honour to forward a despatch from Major-General Sir H. Kitchener, K.C.B., Sirdar, describing the later phases of the Soudan Campaign, and the final action on 2nd September.

2. The Sirdar, in this despatch, recounts in brief, simple terms the events of the closing phase of one of the most successful campaigns ever conducted by a British General against a savage foe, resulting in the capture of Omdurman, the destruction of the dervish power in the Soudan, and the reopening of the waterway to the Equatorial Provinces.

3. The concentration of the army on the Atbara was carried out to the hour, and the arrangements for the transport of the force to the vicinity of the battle-field were made by the Sirdar and his staff with consummate ability. All difficulties were foreseen and provided for, and, from the start of the campaign to its close at Omdurman, operations have been conducted with a precision and completeness which have been beyond all praise; while the skill shown in the advance was equalled by the ability with which the army was commanded in the field.

The Sirdar's admirable disposition of the force, the accurate fire of the artillery and Maxims, and the steady fire discipline of the infantry, a.s.sisted by the gunboats, enabled him to destroy his enemy at long range before the bulk of the British and Egyptian force came under any severe rifle fire, and to this cause may be attributed the comparatively small list of casualties. Never were greater results achieved at such a trifling cost.

4. The heavy loss in killed and wounded in the 21st Lancers is to be deeply regretted. But the charge itself, against an overwhelming force of sword and spear men over difficult ground, and under unfavourable conditions, was worthy of the best traditions of British cavalry.

5. As regards the force employed, I can say with truth that never, in the course of my service, have I seen a finer body of troops than the British contingent of cavalry, artillery, engineers, and infantry placed at the disposal of the Sirdar, as regards physique, smartness, and soldierlike bearing. The appearance of the men speaks well for the present recruiting department, and was a source of pride to every Englishman who saw them.

6. While thoroughly endorsing the Sirdar's recommendations, I desire to call attention to the good work done by Major-General Henderson, C.B., and staff at Alexandria, who conducted the disembarkation of the force, and by my own staff at Cairo.

On Colonel H. Cooper, a.s.sistant Adjutant-General, and Lieut.-Colonel L. A. Hope, Deputy-a.s.sistant Adjutant-General, fell the brunt of the work in the despatch of the British Division to the front.

I also desire to acknowledge the services of Brevet-Colonel A. O.

Green, Commanding Royal Engineer; Surgeon-General H. S. Muir, M.D., Princ.i.p.al Medical Officer; Lieut.-Colonel F. O. Leggett, Army Ordnance Department; Colonel F. Treffry, Army Pay Department; Veterinary-Captain Blenkinsop, and the junior officers of the various departments.

Major Williams, my C.R.A., was indefatigable in organising the mule transport for the 32nd and 37th Field Batteries.

7. I have received the greatest a.s.sistance from the Egyptian Railway Administration in the movements of the troops both going south and returning.

Thanks to the admirable system organised by Iskander Bey Fahmy, the traffic manager, all the services were rapidly and punctually carried out.

8. I am sending this despatch home by my _Aide-de-camp_, Lieutenant H. Grenfell, 1st Life Guards, who acted as Orderly Officer to Brigadier-General Honourable N. G. Lyttelton, C.B., commanding Second British Brigade in the Soudan.--I have, &c.,

FRANCIS GRENFELL, Lieutenant-General, Commanding in Egypt.

The despatch from Major-General Sir Herbert Kitchener, Sirdar, to Lieutenant-General Sir Francis Grenfell, commanding in Egypt, was as follows:--

Omdurman, _September 5, 1898_.

SIR,--It having been decided that an expeditionary force of British and Egyptian troops should be sent against the Khalifa's army in Omdurman, I have the honour to inform you that the following troops were concentrated at the North End of the Sixth Cataract, in close proximity to which an advanced supply depot had been previously formed at Nasri Island.

BRITISH TROOPS.--21st Lancers; 32nd Field Battery, Royal Artillery; 37th Howitzer Battery, Royal Artillery; 2 40-prs., Royal Artillery. Infantry Division:--1st Brigade: 1st Battalion Warwicks.h.i.+re Regiment, 1st Battalion Lincolns.h.i.+re Regiment, 1st Battalion Seaforth Highlanders, 1st Battalion Cameron Highlanders, 6 Maxims, Detachment Royal Engineers. 2nd Brigade: 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards, 1st Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers, 2nd Battalion Lancas.h.i.+re Fusiliers, 2nd Battalion Rifle Brigade, 4 Maxims, Detachment Royal Engineers.

EGYPTIAN TROOPS.--9 Squadrons, Cavalry; 1 Battery, Horse Artillery; 4 Field Batteries; 10 Maxims; 8 Companies, Camel Corps.

1st Brigade: 2nd Egyptian Battalion; 9th, 10th, and 11th Soudanese Battalions. 2nd Brigade: 8th Egyptian Battalion; 12th, 13th, and 14th Soudanese Battalions. 3rd Brigade: 3rd, 4th, 7th, and 15th Egyptian Battalions. 4th Brigade: 1st, 5th, 17th, and 18th Egyptian Battalions. Camel Transport.

On 24th August the troops began moving by successive divisions to Jebel Royan, where a depot of supplies and a British communication hospital of two hundred beds were established.

On 28th August, the army marched to Wadi el Abid, and on the following day proceeded to Sayal, from whence I despatched a letter to the Khalifa, warning him to remove his women and children, as I intended to bombard Omdurman unless he surrendered.

Next day the army marched to Sururab, and on September 1 reached the village of Egeiga, two miles south of the Kerreri hills, and within six miles of Omdurman. Patrols of the enemy's hors.e.m.e.n were frequently seen during the march falling back before our cavalry, and their outposts being driven in beyond Egeiga, our advanced scouts came in full view of Omdurman, from which large bodies of the enemy were seen streaming out and marching north.

At noon, from the slopes of Jebel Surgham, I saw the entire dervish army some three miles off advancing towards us, the Khalifa's black flag surrounded by his Mulazimin (body-guard) being plainly discernible. I estimated their numbers at 35,000 men, though, from subsequent investigation, this figure was probably under-estimated, their actual strength being between forty and fifty thousand. From information received, I gather that it was the Khalifa's intention to have met us with this force at Kerreri, but our rapid advance surprised him.

The troops were at once disposed around the village of Egeiga, which formed an excellent position with a clear field of fire in every direction, and shelter-trenches and zerebas were prepared.

At 2 p.m. our vedettes reported that the enemy had halted, and later on it was observed that they were preparing bivouacs and lighting fires. Information was received that the Khalifa contemplated a night attack on our position, and preparations to repel this were made, at the same time the Egeiga villagers were sent out to obtain information in the direction of the enemy's camp with the idea that we intended a night attack, and, this coming to the Khalifa's knowledge, he decided to remain in his position; consequently, we pa.s.sed an undisturbed night in the zereba.

Meanwhile the gunboats, under Commander Keppel, which had sh.e.l.led the dervish advanced camp near Kerreri on 31st August, proceeded at daylight on 1st September, towing the Howitzer Battery to the right bank, whence, in conjunction with the Irregulars under Major Stuart Wortley, their advance south was continued. After two forts had been destroyed and the villages gallantly cleared by the Irregulars, the Howitzers were landed in a good position on the right bank, from whence an effective fire was opened on Omdurman, and, after a few rounds, the conspicuous dome over the Mahdi's tomb was partially demolished, whilst the gunboats, steaming past the town, also effectually bombarded the forts, which replied with a heavy, but ill-directed fire.

At dawn on the following morning (2nd September), our mounted patrols reported the enemy advancing to attack, and by 6.30 a.m.

the Egyptian Cavalry, which had been driven in, took up a position with the Horse Artillery, Camel Corps, and four Maxims on the Kerreri ridge on our right flank.

At 6.40 a.m. the shouts of the advancing dervish army became audible, and a few minutes later their flags appeared over the rising ground, forming a semi-circle round our left and front faces. The guns of the 32nd Field Battery opened fire at 6.45 a.m.

at a range of two thousand eight hundred yards, and the dervishes, continuing to advance rapidly, delivered their attack with all their accustomed dash and intrepidity. In a short time the troops and Maxims on the left and front were hotly engaged, whilst the enemy's riflemen, taking up positions on the slopes of Jebel Surgham, brought a long-range fire to bear on the zereba, causing some casualties, and their spearmen, continually reinforced from the rear, made attempt after attempt to reach our lines.

Shortly after 8.0 a.m. the enemy's main attack was repulsed. At this period a large and compact body of dervishes was observed attempting to march round our right, and advancing with great rapidity they soon became engaged with our mounted troops on the Kerreri ridge. One of the gunboats which had been disposed to protect the river flanks at once proceeded down stream to afford a.s.sistance to the somewhat hardly-pressed mounted troops, and coming within close range of the dervishes inflicted heavy loss on them, upwards of 450 men being killed in a comparatively circ.u.mscribed area. The Artillery and Maxims on the left face of the zereba also co-operated, and the enemy was forced to retire again under cover of the hills.

All attacks on our position having failed, and the enemy having retired out of range, I sent out the 21st Lancers to clear the ground on our left front and head off any retreating dervishes from the direction of Omdurman. After crossing the slopes of Jebel Surgham they came upon a body of dervishes concealed in a depression of the ground; these they gallantly charged, but finding, too late to withdraw, that a much larger body of the enemy lay hidden, the charge was pressed home through them, and, after rallying on the other side, they rode back, driving off the dervishes, and remaining in possession of the ground. Considerable loss was inflicted on the enemy; but I regret to say that here fell Lieutenant R. Grenfell (12th Lancers) and twenty men.

Meanwhile I had ordered the army to follow in echelon of brigades from the left. At 9.30 a.m. the front brigades having reached the sand ridge running from the west end of Jebel Surgham towards the river, a halt was ordered to enable the rear brigades to get into position, and I then received information that the Khalifa was still present in force on the left slopes of Surgham; a change of front half-right of the three leading brigades was, therefore, ordered, and it was during this movement that Macdonald's brigade became hotly engaged, whilst taking up position on the right of the echelon.

Learning from General Hunter, who was with Macdonald's brigade, that he might require support, I despatched Wauchope's brigade to reinforce him, and ordered the remaining brigades to make a further change half-right.